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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 318 Records
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1984 (3) TMI 363 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... der section 4 continues ice-cream cannot be taxed by notifications under section 3-A of the Act. In Deep Chand Goyal v. Sales Tax Officer 1983 52 STC 110 1982 UPTC 1058 a question arose about cotton seeds being taxable. In that case exemption was granted by an earlier notification but was not withdrawn while issuing the subsequent notification, It was held that since the exemption which has been granted has not been withdrawn, cotton seed cannot be taxed by a separate notification. Thus the consistent view of this Court throughout had been that by issuing a separate notification under section 3-A the earlier exemption granted under section 4 of the Act cannot be negatived. If the State wanted to tax beltings of all kinds it has to amend the general notification issued under section 4 by deleting cotton fabric belts from the notification issued under section 4 of the Act. In view of the above there is no merit in the revision. The revision is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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1984 (3) TMI 362 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appily worded. 8.. In these circumstances we are of opinion that it is not necessary to consider the case law cited on behalf of the applicant though he also submitted that this Court can suitably amend the question referred to, but in our opinion in the present case, considering the facts and circumstances thereof, it is not necessary to do so and this reference deserves to be disposed of on this short point alone. 9.. Our answer, therefore, to the question referred is in favour of the assessee and against the department. Our answer, therefore, is that in the facts and circumstances the of case, the Tribunal was justified in treating the turnover of charcoal worth Rs. 67,000 for the period 1st April, 1959 to 14th August, 1962 as not liable to tax in spite of the fact that deduction was not allowable on these sales either under section 2(r)(ii) or under section 2(r)(iv) as they stood during the relevant period. The reference is answered accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1984 (3) TMI 361 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... est judgment assessment based on such arbitrary figure cannot legally be upheld. However, in this case, there has been actual test check in the assessees own factory and it is not based on any arbitrary figure. If one kg. of CO2 Gas has been found to produce 238.9 bottles of Limca or 322 bottles of Goldspot on 17th June, 1981, it is for the assessees to show the reason as to why it was not possible to manufacture the same quantity in the year 1980-81. If the assessees had produced any acceptable material to show that one kg. of CO2 Gas was not able to produce the said outturn for any special reason or reason, it would have been a different matter. But in this case, except saying that the same outturn cannot be expected for the previous year no special reason has been shown as to why it was not possible to produce the same outturn. In this view of the matter, we do not see any justification for interfering with the order of the Tribunal. The tax case is accordingly dismissed.
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1984 (3) TMI 360 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . Annexure 1/G is the letter dated 17th March, 1981, from the Director, Industriescum-Special Secretary, Bihar, to petitioner No. 1. By this annexure petitioner No. 1 was informed that it was entitled to the incentives in terms of annexure 1, annexure A and annexure 1/H. This was issued during the pendency of this writ petition. No counter-affidavit was filed by the respondents controverting the grounds of annexure 1/G and nothing was stated as to why the petitioner should not be granted relief on the basis of annexure 1/G. It was not contended that annexure 1/G was ultra vires the power of the Director of industries-cumSpecial Secretary. Equity in this case must be held to be in favour of the petitioner. 16.. In the result, this application is allowed and annexure 11 is quashed. It is held that petitioner No. 1 shall be entitled to the incentives under the sales tax legislation in terms of annexure 1/G dated 17th March, 1981. No order as to costs. ABHIRAM SINGH, J.-I agree.
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1984 (3) TMI 359 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y and since it is not disputed that it is used for agricultural purpose it would also constitute agricultural machinery. 7.. A reference may also be made to a decision of a Division Bench of this Court, to which my learned brother was a party, in Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Shetkari Sahakari Sangh Ltd. 1975 35 STC 554, where the court was required to consider entry No. 12 as it stood before the amendment of 1973. In that case also oil engines commonly used by agriculturists for working pumpsets for drawing out water and sold to agriculturists for such purposes were held to be agricultural machinery within the meaning of entry No. 12 of Schedule C, as it stood before the amendment. Although the entry is differently worded it is significant that oil engine was treated as an agricultural machine and not as a part of agricultural machinery. 8.. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the applicant-dealer. The applicant to pay costs.
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1984 (3) TMI 358 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... had to be sent in sealed envelopes and the packing of the examination papers in envelopes was incidental to the contract for the supply of printed examination papers. Thus the contract could not be split up in two parts one for the supply of paper, packing envelopes, etc., and the other of labour or service, viz., printing, despatch, etc. The entire contract being a composite contract was a works contract and the transaction did not involve any element of sale and there was no question of bringing any turnover to tax. Following this decision the learned Additional judge (Revisions) accepted the assessee s contention and declared it as non-taxable. Being aggrieved, the department has filed the present revision. It would be seen that the case stands squarely covered by the aforesaid decision given in the assessee s own case and there is no substance in this revision. The revision hence fails and is dismissed with costs to the respondent assessee which are assessed at Rs. 200.
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1984 (3) TMI 357 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ime when the assessee purchased newsprint it was with the intention to sell waste newsprint or how it can be said that the assessee was a dealer in that commodity. 11.. As far as old newspapers are concerned, the case of the revenue is even weaker, and in fact, Mr. Jetley fairly did not press his arguments in connection with the sales of old newspapers with his usual zest and vigour. If old newspapers are to be regarded as newspapers, they are expressly excluded from the definition of the word goods under the said Act and if they are regarded as newspapers which have remained as unsold and hence not really newspapers, then they are like discarded goods and not by-products or subsidiary products. In either view of the matter, it cannot be said that the sales of old newspapers were liable to the charge of sales tax. 12.. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 13.. The applicant to pay the costs of the reference.
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1984 (3) TMI 356 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... resort should be had not to the scientific and technical meaning of the terms or expressions used but to their popular meaning, that is to say, the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them, held that the basic question, which fell for consideration, was as to whether plain HDPE fabrics were known as artificial silk or not according to the popular meaning given to that expression by those dealing in the said fabrics. On the basis of various affidavits and certificates produced on behalf of the opposite party, the Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that the meaning attached to the plain HDPE fabrics by those who were dealing in the said fabrics was that it was artificial silk. On this finding, plain HDPE fabrics clearly fell within the notification dated 25th November, 1958, mentioned above and were rightly held by the Tribunal to be exempt from tax. In the result, I find no merit in this revision. It is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1984 (3) TMI 355 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... uced before the Tribunal by Mr. Damle, who appeared for the department. It is true that from the judgment of the Tribunal it does appear that after the signatures were compared by the Tribunal and found to tally, Mr. Damle did object that the signatures on the purchase vouchers could not be compared with the signatures on the returns, unless the party was produced. Such an objection was, however, without any substance and has been rightly rejected by the Tribunal. The returns were produced by Mr. Damle himself and could have been produced only for the purpose of comparison of signatures. It was not thereafter open to Mr. Damle to object to such comparison. As far as the actual conclusion reached by the Tribunal on the comparison of the signatures is concerned, that is obviously in the realm of appreciation of evidence, and no question of law can arise with respect to the same. In the result, the application is dismissed, and the rule is discharged with costs fixed at Rs. 45.
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1984 (3) TMI 354 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o be a single return on the aggregated taxable turnover, obliterating the distinction as marked on sales effected and purchases made, the intendment of the legislature in making their reference in plural terms would be rendered otiose. Thus I have no hesitation to hold that filing of a sales tax return in form S.T. VIII does not ipso facto mean that the proceedings are deemed to have been instituted in respect of an aggregated taxable turnover inclusive of purchase deals, returns of which have not been filed. To conclude, I answer both the formulated questions at the outset in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No other point is argued. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is allowed, the impugned orders, annexures P3 and P4, so far as they relate to purchase tax stated to be due from the petitioner, are hereby quashed. But in the circumstances of the case, the matter being not free from difficulty, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1984 (3) TMI 353 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the absence of quantification of purchase tax. The learned counsel for the petitioner also challenged levy of penalty on the ground that it was being demanded of him as late as on 1st February, 1983, i.e., after the lapse of nearly 14 years from the assessment year. There is some authority for the proposition that proceedings for penalty should be initiated within a reasonable time. Rather, I would say, so far as this Court is concerned, the view is consistent. See in this connection Ram Kishan Kapoor and Co. v. State of Haryana 1983 53 STC 148. Initiation of penalty proceedings that late too appears to me unreasonable in the circumstances of the case. Thus from either angle, the order of imposition of penalty too cannot be sustained. For the view taken, this petition is allowed, the impugned orders so far as they relate to imposition of purchase tax are quashed as also the order levying penalty. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1984 (3) TMI 352 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... evenue is fallacious. The State had power to carve out exception and to notify a special rate for such excepted goods. In the present case, the State has prescribed a different rate for footwear. Therefore, though, the footwear is included in the leather goods and since footwear is leather goods, the notification specifically says that all kinds of leather goods except footwear. If the State wanted to exempt the sport goods also, it could have very well said in the notification- except sport goods . Therefore, when it is not disputed that the leather covers of football and volleyball are leather goods, there is no reason why a separate rate should be charged merely because they are used for the purpose of sports. Therefore, in our view, leather covers of volleyball and football should be taxed at 7 per cent during the period from 1st July, 1962 to 30th June, 1963 (1963-64) and not at the general rate in force during the relevant period. The reference is answered accordingly.
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1984 (3) TMI 351 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... o be dismissed. We accordingly discharge the rule and dismiss these writ petitions. But in the circumstances of the cases, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. After we pronounced our order in these cases, oral applications were made by the learned counsel for the assessees for grant of a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under articles 133 and 134A of the Constitution of India. It was argued on behalf of the assessees that the decision in these cases arises a substantial question of law of general importance and the same needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. In disposing of these cases and interpreting the meaning of the word cereal we have followed the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. We are of the view that our decision in these cases does not involve a substantial question of law of general importance that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We accordingly reject the prayer made for the assessees for grant of certificate.
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1984 (3) TMI 350 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t the hearing on 10th May, 1966. In our view, it is clear that the offer made by Mr. Surte on behalf of the dealer-assessees was a conditional offer and if the same was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner, he was bound to deal with the claim of the dealer-assessees for deductions under the first proviso to section 9 on merits. Mr. Jetley urged that in view of the findings given by the Tribunal, it is clear that there was no merit in this claim at all, and the claim could not possibly be sustained. That, however, is a question with which we are not concerned in this reference. If that is so, the claim will be disallowed by the authorities. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the negative and in favour of the dealers. Looking to all the facts and circumstances of the case, there will, however, be no order as to the costs. Deposits made by the dealers before the Tribunal at the time of the reference applications in question to be refunded to the assessees.
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1984 (3) TMI 349 - CEGAT, BOMBAY
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... ... ..... as live Bill of Entry cases. In the present case, I am surprised to know from the applicants that they had not even approached the Tribunal for a priority hearing of their appeals. Had they done so earnestly, probably the appeals themselves would have been decided finally by now. 26. emsp In sum, while agreeing with the learned Member (Judicial) that this Tribunal has incidental and ancillary powers to grant interim reliefs, I do not agree with him that in the present cases balance of convenience and equity lies in favour of accepting the request of the applicants to take bank guarantee with 12 interest in lieu of payment of redemption fine in cash. Accordingly, I reject both the applications. COURT rsquo S ORDER 27. emsp In accordance with the order of the majority of the members who have heard these two applications the applications are rejected. However, as these are cases of live Bills of Entry, the two connected appeals shall be listed for hearing on merits on 14-2-1984.
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1984 (3) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the notice Ex. A-8 given by the plaintiffs' father Seth Lachman Dass Gupta before his death under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 would enure for the benefit of the plaintiffs.
Whether the notice gives sufficient information as to the nature of the claim such as would enable the recipient to avert the litigation?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The present suit would be directly covered by sub-s.(3) of s.80 so introduced if the suit had been brought after February 1, 1977. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, s.97 of the Amendment Act provides that the amendment shall not apply to pending suit and the suits pending on February 1, 1977 have to be dealt as if such amendment had not been made. Nevertheless the Courts must have due regard to the change in law brought about by sub- s.(3) of s.80 of the Code introduced by the Amendment Act w.e.f. February 1, 1977.
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1984 (3) TMI 347 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Firm, Registration ... ... ... ... ..... ew s. 147 will not be apposite for interpreting s. 186(1) of the Act. We would not like to say anything about the material upon which the Department has placed reliance for proceeding under s. 186(1) of the Act and, further, we would not like to say anything as to whether there was or there was no genuine firm in existence in the relevant period. Obviously this is not our province in the extraordinary writ petition under art. 226 to pass an order creating complications for the assessee and for the Department. However, we feel that this is not a fit case where it can be said that the Department lacks jurisdiction to take proceedings under s. 186(1). In this view of the matter, this petition is dismissed in limine. Learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for a certificate of fitness under art. 133 of the Constitution of India. In our opinion, this case does not raise any such substantial questions of law of general importance which may need adjudication by the Supreme Court.
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1984 (3) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
Held that assessment could be made under section 23(3) on the basis of voluntary returns filed or action should have been taken under section 34 with the help of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of section 34
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1984 (3) TMI 345 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Right to present winding-up petition where company is being wound-up voluntarily or subject to courts supervision
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1984 (3) TMI 344 - HIGH COURT OF KERALA
Winding up - Avoidance of certain attachments, executions, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... t respondent, counsel for the applicant as also counsel for the fourth respondent in this behalf. It is true that the dictum in Roopnarain Ramchandra P. Ltd. v. Brahmapootra Tea Co. (India) Ltd., AIR 1962 Cal 192, supports counsel and there is considerable force on the merits, as pleaded by counsel. But in view of the fact that there is no winding up order in force as on today, leave applied for is unnecessary. Even assuming that a provisional liquidator has been appointed for certain purposes, I do not think, it is open to the applicant herein to raise objections regarding want of leave under section 446 of the Act. In this view of the matter, I do not pass any order on merits in MCA No. 47 of 1983 as no further orders are necessary in the matter. The net result is that MCA No. 44 of 1983 is groundless and filed without any bona fides. The same is dismissed with costs of the fourth respondent. MCA No. 47 of 1983 is dismissed, since no further orders are necessary at present.
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