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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 224 Records
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1984 (4) TMI 65 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
Interest Paid By Firm, Minor Child, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... a firm in which he has been admitted to the benefits of partnership would be includible in the hands of his parent(s) irrespective of the fact that such parent(s) is also a partner of the said firm or not. According to us, after the amendment made with effect from 1-4-1976 the provisions of clause (iii) would be applicable irrespective of whether the assessee s minor children are allowed a share in the firm without any contribution on their part to the capital or assets of the firm or whether they bring their own capital or become members of the firm in their own right. Again, in our view, the provisions of clause (iii) are absolute and unqualified in terms and not subject to any exception or restrictions. In this view of the matter we have no hesitation in upholding the action of the income-tax authorities in including the interest earned by the minors in the total income of the assessee by invoking provisions of section 64(1)(iii). 7. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1984 (4) TMI 64 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF GUJARAT
Refund - Civil suit - Limitation - Suit for recovery on ground of mistake - Interest ... ... ... ... ..... re set aside and the suits of the Mills are dismissed with costs. Cross objections shall also stand dismissed with costs. 29. At this stage, it is prayed on behalf of the Mills that as they desire to approach the Supreme Court by way of appeal, a certificate as required by Article 133(1) of the Constitution be issued. As in our opinion, the cases do not involve substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, we reject the prayer made on behalf of the Mills. 30. Operation of the judgment is stayed until expiry of six weeks from the date certified copy of the judgment is ready for delivery. 31. The Mills are directed to pay back to the Revenue decretal amount together with interest and costs, which was deposited by the Revenue and withdrawn by them under the orders of this Court with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of withdrawal of the amount to the date of repayment thereof. 32. Decrees accordingly.
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1984 (4) TMI 63 - SC ORDER
Refund claim - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... raw the appeal. We accord their leave to withdraw the appeal but make it clear that the order of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal suffers from no infirmity. If really the payment of the duty was under a mistake of law, the appellant may seek recourse to such alternative remedy as it may be advised. The appeal is accordingly dismissed as withdrawn.
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1984 (4) TMI 62 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)
Valuation - Related person ... ... ... ... ..... nly for the Department but also for the assessee. This factor will not deter us from doing our plain duty of administering even handed justice between parties whosoever they be. We leave the point here. 21. Once the main part of Section 4(1) (a) is held to be the proper basis for determination of the assessable value it automatically follows that whatever margin the main dealers (who are buyers from the petitioners) may be permitted to charge to their customers, will form part of their selling profits. This component cannot by any stretch of imagination be blended into the assessable value. The respondent was manifestly wrong in holding that this item could be legitimately added to the figure declared by the petitioners in their price list as the price of the goods sold by them at the factory gate. 22. The result is that all the four petitions will have to be allowed. The four impugned orders are hereby quashed. Rule made absolute in all the four cases. No order as to costs.
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1984 (4) TMI 61 - HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA
Demand - R.T. 12 assessed ... ... ... ... ..... a definite stand not to take recourse to either Rule 10 or 10A but to Rule 9 and Rule 56A of the Central Excise Rules and having sought to sustain the notice on the basis of violation of such rules, the impugned notice cannot be allowed to stand. Rule 9 (2) cannot apply, as already stated, there has been no clandestine removal of the goods and there has been no deliberate evasion of excise duty payable. Rule 56A, as it stood on the date of issuance of the show cause notice, does not authorise the respondents to take steps for financial recovery. I direct accordingly that a writ of certiorari should issue quashing the impugned show cause notice and the orders passed in the proceeding pursuant thereto. I direct that a writ of mandamus should also be issued commending the respondents to forbear from making any demand pursuant to the said notice and the said orders. I accordingly make the rule absolute to the extent indicated above. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1984 (4) TMI 60 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... ibunal should reconsider the application made by the petitioner for modifying its earlier order dated 23rd December, 1983, keeping in view the fact that the State Bank of India insists upon the making of the cash deposits by the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that till the matter is disposed of by the Appellate tribunal in pursuance of the order passed by this court the threat given by the Superintendent of Central Excise, Unnao by his communication dated 16th April, 1984 should be kept in abeyance. This appears to be a reasonable request. The Superintendent, Central Excise, Unnao shall not take any steps to initiate recovery proceedings against the petitioner under Rule 230 of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 till the matter has been disposed of by the Appellate Tribunal. 4. With these observations the writ petition is disposed of. A copy of this order may be given to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on payment of usual charges within 24 hours.
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1984 (4) TMI 59 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Refund - Change law not given retrospective effect - Refund of duty paid under mistake of law - Writ jurisdiction - Statute
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1984 (4) TMI 58 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Refund - Blended yarn - Duty paid under mistake of law - Limitation for refund - Interest on duty illegally recovered and retained - Remission - Connotation of
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1984 (4) TMI 57 - HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Prosecution - Words or phrases - 'And' as 'or' and vice-versa -Interpretation of ... ... ... ... ..... as was with Shri B.B. Julka, even though while granting sanction for prosecution both these officers purported to act as Collector of Customs and. Central Excise, New Delhi. 8. Both Shri B.B. Julka and Shri K.P. Anand were holding the office as Collector, Central Excise when they granted sanctions for prosecution and in view of the interpretation of clause (a) (3) of the aforesaid notification, both of them were Collectors of Customs and thus had the authority to grant the requisite sanctions. 9. So, as a result of the above finding the petitions of Chander Parkash Tyagi, Shanker Lal Aggarwal, Azhar Ali Zai, Sriniwas Jain and Baldeep Singh are dismissed. But the petition of Union of India v. Vinod Bhardwaj etc. is accepted and the impugned order dated 30-11-1983 of Shri B.B. Gupta, Addl. Sessions Judge, New Delhi reversing the order dated 6-1-1983 of Shri J.M. Malik then Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate holding the sanction of prosecution valid, is quashed and set aside.
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1984 (4) TMI 56 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Writ jurisdiction - Revisionary Jurisdiction - Conviction ... ... ... ... ..... . P.C. I may observe that intervention under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is not favoured if the trial is at its fag end and it is also the view of the Supreme Court. The present case stands on a worst footing The applicant did not avail of the remedy of appeal available to him against the order of conviction. When that is the position, and the revisional court has sent back the case to the trial court to award suitable sentence, the applicant can have no genuine grievance at this stage nor would the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C be entertained on the merits of the conviction as such. The applicant will have his remedy after the trial court has complied with the orders of the remand and passed any sentence. I have not discussed the case on merits because I am of the view that no interference under Section 482 Cr. P C can be made when conviction was not challenged in spite of remedy of appeal being available. The application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. is, therefore, rejected.
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1984 (4) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Writ Jurisdiction being discretionary should be availed of in exceptional cases only ... ... ... ... ..... and there is no justification for compelling the petitioner to pass through the entire gamut as laid down in the Central Excise Act. Further, a number of appeals have to be filed from time to time and lastly, the question of payment of tax will also be there. 6. We have taken into consideration these aspects of the matter but in our view, they are not tenable. The appellate authority undoubtedly can grant stay orders in fit cases and the mere fact that the appeals take some time to decide will not be a sufficient ground for interference in the writ petition. Such a general ground can be advanced in respect of proceedings which have been treated as equally efficacious remedy, e.g. suits which take long to decide. Treating the matter as one of discretion, we do not think that there is any exceptional ground on the basis of which we should depart or deviate from the normal practice which we follow in these matters. 7. With these observations, we dismiss this petition in limine.
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1984 (4) TMI 54 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Precedents ... ... ... ... ..... of which has stood the test of time, is perfectly valid. This rule, which is derived from s. 295(2)(b) of the Central Act, read with art. 366(1) of the Constitution, is a binding fetter on the legislative competence of the State. The Advocate-General rightly points out that the State Legislature is perfectly competent to omit any provision which it has enacted and it is not open to the petitioners to question the validity of the Amendment Act, deleting the Explanation. But the question is not whether the State Legislature is competent to omit the Explanation or any other provision of the State Act, which it undoubtedly is, but whether the State Legislature is competent to assess such portion of the total income, derived from the sale of tea grown and manufactured by the seller, as is, or as is liable to be, treated as income from business. The answer is clearly no. It is so declared. The original petitions are accordingly allowed in the above terms. make no order as to costs.
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1984 (4) TMI 53 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Registered Firm, Unabsorbed Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... d set off of speculation loss admittedly stand on a footing different from the case of carry forward of depreciation allowance. Kalani Udyog v. ITO 1979 117 ITR 431 (MP), is a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court which relates to a case of carry forward and set off of unabsorbed loss in the case of a registered firm. We have already pointed out above the distinction between the case of a carry forward and set off of unabsorbed depreciation allowance and that of a business loss. The question as to whether these two stand on the same footing or different footing was not in question before the Madhya Pradesh High Court which only interpreted s. 75 of the Act with regard to, the case of carry forward and set off of business loss in the case of a registered firm. As per our above discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The parties are, however, left to bear their own costs of the Reference.
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1984 (4) TMI 52 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose ... ... ... ... ..... ts so as to enable the trustees to claim the benefit of exemption under the I.T. Act. No doubt, the court, under s. 92, C.P.C., can give a direction which is necessary for the administration of any trust. But it can only exercise the powers expressly set out thereunder and by exercising the power under s. 92, C.P.C., it cannot alter the objects of the trust deed. In this view, it appears that the decision in Jagdamba Charity Trust v. CIT 1981 128 ITR 377 (Delhi) and Kamla Town Trust v. CIT 1982 133 ITR 632 (All), will not be applicable to the facts of this case. However, we are not expressing any final opinion in this case as to whether the civil court s judgment rectifying the trust deed is without jurisdiction, and as such the ITO is not bound to give effect to the same, as that aspect of the case has not been referred to us. Questions Nos. 1 and 2 are answered in the negative and against the assessee. The assessee will pay the costs of the Revenue. Counsel s fees Rs. 500.
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1984 (4) TMI 51 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Assessment, Association Of Persons ... ... ... ... ..... n of the registration under s. 186(3) presupposes that at a particular time, there was a firm and the assessment had been made in the status of a firm and, therefore, when the registration is cancelled, the law provides that the assessment may be amended on the footing that the firm is an unregistered firm, but where from the very beginning, the finding is that there is no firm at all, then the question of assessing it even as an unregistered firm would not arise. The learned counsel then referred to CWT v. Ridhkaran 1972 84 ITR 705 (Raj) and CWT v. I. K. Srivastava and Sons 1983 142 ITR 183 (All). We need not discuss these authorities in detail as they do not relate to assessment under the I.T. Act of 1961 and are, therefore, not at all applicable. For the reasons stated above, we are clearly of the opinion that the question referred to us deserves to be answered in the affirmative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. We answer the question accordingly.
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1984 (4) TMI 50 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Transfer ... ... ... ... ..... questions which have been dealt with by the Tribunal in its order. Yet we would like to touch on one aspect. The Tribunal has referred to the decisions in CIT v. Madurai Mills P. Ltd. 1973 89 ITR 45 (SC) and CIT v. R. M. Amin 1971 82 ITR 194 (Guj), in support of its view. But these are cases which arose at the stage of the winding up of the company and the distribution of assets among the shareholders at that stage. The principle applicable to cases of distribution of assets at the stage of winding up may not apply to a case like the present one where as a result of the reduction of the share capital, the company becomes liable to pay the shareholders certain sums and to discharge that liability some property belonging to the company, which is a going concern, is transferred to the shareholders. We have to, therefore, answer the questions referred in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. The Revenue will get the costs from the assessee. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1984 (4) TMI 49 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Assessment, Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... cases referred to above, when applied to the present case, leave no room for debate that the intention of the donor-trust as well as the donee-trust was to treat the money as capital to be spent for the Ladnu Water Supply Scheme. It is of no significance whether the amount had since been paid to the State Government or kept in the account of the above-referred scheme by the assessee-trust. From whatever angle it may be seen, the deposited amount cannot be said to be income in the bands of the recipient trust. The conclusion, therefore, is that on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the sum of rupees one lakh received by the assessee-trust from the Calcutta trust was liable to be included as part of the income of the assessee-trust under the provisions of s. 12(2) of the Act of 1961. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The costs are made easy.
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1984 (4) TMI 48 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Benami Transaction, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... the Supreme Court in Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. CIT (1957 31 ITR 28 (SC). In that case the Supreme Court, after examining the case law on the subject, has held that when the finding is one of fact, the fact that it itself is an inference from other basic facts, will not alter its character as one of fact. In the said case the Supreme Court has also observed that a finding of benami was one of fact. In view of the aforesaid decision of Supreme Court there can be no doubt that the finding recorded by the Tribunal that Harish Chandra could not be regarded as benamidar of the assessee in relation to the transaction of purchase and sale of 291 bags of sarson is a finding of fact. Since the said finding recorded by the Tribunal cannot be regarded as perverse, or contrary to the record, no question of law arises out of the order dated June 13, 1980, passed by the Tribunal. There is thus no merit in this application and the same is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1984 (4) TMI 47 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... the Madras High Court in Radhika Mills Ltd. v. CIT 1969 74 ITR 661. The extent of confiscation will, however, be the amount of development rebate that could have been allowed vis-a-vis the total income as reduced by the development rebate actually allowed as deduction as per the amount of development rebate reserve created. If the profit of Rs. 11,195 for the assessment year 1966-67 is set off by the unabsorbed losses for the earlier years, then the failure to create a reserve would not entail any confiscation as the unabsorbed losses of the earlier years get precedence over the development rebate. I answer the reference in the affirmative to the extent indicated, i.e., against the Department and in favour of the assessee with no order as to costs. GOEL J.-As per my discussion in my order in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi-I, New Delhi v. M/s. Metal Forgings Private Limited (ITR No. 195 of 1975)- 1984 149 ITR 259, I agree with the conclusion of S. S. Chadha J.
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1984 (4) TMI 46 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Income, Time Of Accrual Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... s under s. 154 of the Act in these circumstances or not was a debatable question and if the ITO took the view that he could exercise powers under s. 154, it was not open to the ITO (Adm.) to say later that the ITO, K-Ward, was wrong in taking that view because he was not exercising any appellate or revisional powers against the order of his predecessor-in-office. Such a power could have been exercised only by the Commissioner under ss. 147, 148 or s. 263 of the Act. In these circumstances, the learned AAC as well as the learned Appellate Tribunal were perfectly justified in setting aside the order of the ITO (Adm.), Jodhpur, dated May 3, 1972. Our answer to the question referred to us, therefore, is that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the learned AAC cancelling the learned ITO s order dated May 3, 1972, under s. 154 of the I.T. Act, 1961. Let this answer be returned to the Tribunal.
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