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Showing 41 to 60 of 306 Records
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1984 (7) TMI 371
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... ... ..... ent also is not acceptable. 14. In the appeal memorandum reference has been made to the Indian Trade Classification-Revision 2, in which under group No. 664-Glass, sub-items 664.8, 664.8001 and 664.8009, dealt with mirrors. But, as pointed out by Sri Kampani himself, the Trade Classification carried a note that the same would not be binding on Customs authorities for classification for tariff purposes. The said trade classification had been more for purpose of facilitating collection of data. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to place reliance thereon in the present case. 15. In view of the above discussion we hold, on a careful and anxious consideration of the submissions of both sides, that glass mirrors would fall under item No. 23A(4) of the Central Excise Tariff for purpose of levy of duty. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the order of Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) dated 24-1-1984 is set aside to that extent. The Cross Objection is dismissed.
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1984 (7) TMI 370
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... ... ..... “step in the proceedings”, and legislative intent seems to be clear to exclude entertaining of appeals by the Tribunal, against such type of interim or interlocutory orders. 9. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the appeal is not maintainable. In the view we have taken, we do not think that the order issue, namely, as to whether the order which has been made the basis of the present appeal is appealable or not does not survive, though we would like to place on record our reservations in this regard and also unhappiness over the manner in which Collector (Appeals) has proceeded with the matter, in not seeming to have given any hearing to the party on their application nor supplying them a proper order, passed by himself. We hope that these observations will be kept in view by the Collector (Appeals) in dealing with matters such as this. In face of the view, we have taken on the main issue, as to non-maintainably of the appeal, the same is dismissed.
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1984 (7) TMI 369
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... ... ..... the tentative conclusion that the earlier decision required a reconsideration. The appellants submitted their replies to the show cause notice. They were also personally heard by the Assistant Collector. The Assistant Collector undertook verification of the matter personally in the appellants’ factory before passing his impugned order. We hold in the light of these facts that reconsideration of the earlier decision on classification in the case of the appellants was taken up by the Asstt. Collector for cogent reasons and as required by Rule 173-B (2). The Asstt. Collector’s decision was neither abrupt nor arbitrary. 11. In the light of our above discussion, we uphold classification of Carbide Throw Away Inserts under Item 62 of the Central Excise Tariff and reject all the three appeals so far as the substantive issue of classification is concerned. This will not, however, affect the relief already granted by the Collector (Appeals) on the ground of time bar.
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1984 (7) TMI 368
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... ... ..... the Tribunal has held that there is no bar to avail of more than one benefit unless it is barred categorically. 6. The Explanatory Memorandum indicates the intention of the Government when they introduced the Tariff Item. It could not be said that the subsequent Notification 105/78 would apply only to generating stations in the public and private sectors where current is produced for supply to different classes and consumers. 7. Shri Durga Prasad also rightly argued that the concession was accorded to the appellants on former occasions (March, 1981) and the show cause notice was issued only subsequently. According to him the mines are situated within 100 kms in different directions and the transmission losses could be reasonably expected. The power produced is exclusively used in the mines. We agree with the contention of Shri Durga Prasad and hold that the appellants are entitled to the benefit of Notification 52/78 and also 105/78. Appeals are therefore allowed.
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1984 (7) TMI 367
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... ... ..... e stage of being formed under external influence (usually heat and pressure, if necessary with a solvent or plasticizers) into shapes which are retained on the removal of the external influences. The shaping processes used include molding, casting, extruding, rolling, etc. No evidence has been produced before us to show that Santicizer 429 has resinous or plastic properties. 10. In our opinion, therefore, the product “Santicizer 429" did not fall under Heading No. 39.01/06 as it stood before its amendment in 1978. Since the product is not a separately defined chemical compound, it would not have fallen within Chapter 28 or 29. The appropriate chapter would be 38. Since the product was not specified elsewhere, the appropriate classification was 38.01/19 (6) as ”Plasticizers, not elsewwere specified". 11. We allow the appeal. Consequential relief shall be granted to the appellants within three months from the date of communication of this order.
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1984 (7) TMI 366
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... ... ..... after, has been made; (f) An assessment, as is well known, is a quasi-judicial process, which involves due application of mind to the facts as well as requirements of law (1978 E.L.T. 416 - Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. National Tobacco Co. of India Limited). (g) Such assessments are not the subject matter of the instant Appeal; (h) It is not competent for the Tribunal to stay the operation of the orders under Appeal, so that such assessments that may be made-not the subject matter of the instant Appeal-can be restrained. The Tribunal’s incidental or ancillary power of making an interlocutory orders cannot extend to interference in assessment in adjudication beyond the scope of the Appeal before the Tribunal; (i) to a similar effect was our decision in 1983(2) ETR 795 1984 (16) E.L.T. 445 (Tribunal) (Collector of Central Excise v. Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited) and we have no reason to differ from it. 6. In the premises, the application is dismissed.
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1984 (7) TMI 365
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... ... ..... the Notification 14/78-C.E. the concession was intended to be given from the very beginning that is, from 24-1-1978. This cannot be done except by giving the notification retrospective effect, an action that would, in different circumstances, bring out vehement protests from the assessee. We need not say anything more than that no notification can have retrospective effect whether such effect is for the assessee or against the assessee, unless such retroactivity is decreed by Parliament. 22. We have already discussed the matter in detail in the above paragraphs. We have also decided in two or three cases in the past that the concession sought by the appellants now cannot be given on the strict terms and constructions of the notifications. We rule similarly here and reject this appeal. 23. For the same reasons we reject the appeal filed by M/s. India Packaging Products Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore against the same order of the Appellate Collector of Central Excise, Madras.
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1984 (7) TMI 364
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... ... ..... 77; 100 from his credit account and paying the balance ₹ 300 by debit in his personal ledger account. This is the only manner in which the procedure presented in Notification No. 201/79 can be worked out in practice and is sanctioned by the procedure which permits the utilisation of the credit towards payment of duty on the finished product. One does not have to and it is no use to look at the credit account till after the duty liability on excisable goods, one seeks to clear, is determined. Once this determination is done, the credit account can be drawn upon to the extent permissible. This is the scheme of the procedure. We have no doubt that the method adopted by the lower auhtorities is incorrect, apart from being not sanctioned by the said procedure. 8. In the result, we allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants which shall be granted to them by the concerned excise authorities within two months from the date of communication of this order.
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1984 (7) TMI 363
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... ... ..... h the Appellate authority to permit presentation of the appeal within a further period of three months if the appellate authority was satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within three months from the date of communication of order. The appellate authority was not empowered to condone a delay of a period exceeding three months even if that authority was satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. Admittedly the appeal before the Appellate Authority was filed after a lapse of six months from the date of communication of the order on the appellant. If, in such circumstances the, Appellate Collector had rejected the appeal as barred by time the appellants cannot in law make any grievance against such an order. The order passed by the Appellate Collector is wholly legal and therefore not to be interfered with. Accordingly, I reject this appeal as having no merit.
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1984 (7) TMI 361
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... ... ..... right to recover the amount by recourse to any other legal course open to him but not by recourse to Central Excise Rule 10 since limitation had, as on the date of invoking the right to demand the amount by recourse to that rule, extinguished that remedial right. To quote the Kerala High Court in AIR 1966 Kerala 121- “But, in so far as the particular remedial right to which it applies is concerned, limitation undoubtedly extinguishes the right. It is, however, important to remember that limitation extinguishes only the particular remedial right which is its victim and that, since it leaves the substantive right unaffected, that right can still be enforced in other ways, if other ways are available, not merely indirectly by the enforcement of lien or by obtaining a fresh promise, or by reason of payment notwithstanding the bar being safe from recall, but also in a positive and direct manner.” 23. However, in view of the majority opinion, the appeal must fail.
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1984 (7) TMI 360
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... ... ..... hli very fairly conceded that the vires of the Entry cannot be challenged before the Tribunal. The Board’s rulling in 1982 E.L.T. p. 196 has also no bearing in view of the amendment to the Tariff Entry. A close reading of the Tariff Entry 18(IV), taken together with the Explanation leads us to conclude, that waste arising in or in relation to the manufacture of man-made filament yarn, even though they may be in intermediary stages, are liable to duty under that Entry. The Departmental pleas in respect of the waste arising prior to the stage of manufacture of polymer chips has rightly been disallowed by the Collector (Appeals). Hence we hold that the order passed by the Collector (Appeals) rejecting the prayer for refund by the appellants is justified and does not call for any interference. In the result Appeal Nos. 364/84 and 363/84 filed by the appellants (Ms. Shree Synthetics Ltd.) are dismissed. The appeal filed by the department in ED (SB) 446/84 is also dismissed.
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1984 (7) TMI 359
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... ... ..... effect of the decision of the Tribunal in M/s Tigrania Metal and Steel Industries’ case in the present appeal. The appellants’ product undisputedly is not hot or cold rolled product and nor is it rectangular in cross-section nor does it have trimmed or sheared edges. Thus the essential attributes to classify the product as strip under T.I. 26AA at the material time are lacking in the case. It has not been suggested by any of the parties that if classification of the product as strip fails, it would classify elsewhere other than wire under T.I. 26AA(ia). The appellants claim therefore for classification of their product under T.I. 26AA(ia) would have to be accepted. 8. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appellants’ product is held classifiable under T.I. 26AA(ia) and not as strip under sub-item (iii) as held by the lower authorities. The appeal is thus allowed in the light of foregoing observations with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1984 (7) TMI 358
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... ... ..... regard to interpretation of Notification No. 71/78 referred to by the appellants in the memorandum of appeal are prior to the year 1982 i.e. before the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 was amended by clause 47 of the Finance Bill, 1982. 9. After this amendment (effective from 1-10-1975) this position stands changed and now only the money paid as duty will be regarded as the duty payable under the Act. 10. That being the position, the money recovered in excess of the effective duty must form part of the assessable value unless it is shown to be deductible for any other reason, such as being a sales tax. We have seen that it is not such a deductible sum, and the appellants do not claim it as any such permissible deduction. They maintain it as duty. We hold that it is not duty and must form part of the assessable value. Therefore, the action of including the money in the assessable value is correct and we cannot pronounce it wrong. We, therefore, reject the appeal.
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1984 (7) TMI 357
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... ... ..... referring to the relevant provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961, Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 and the Finance Act, 1965 held that special excise duty was quite distinct and different from basic excise duty. There can be no quarrel with this proposition. However, the Court was concerned in that case with Section 280 ZD of the Income-tax Act which, for the purposes of that section, defined “duty of excise” as “the duty of excise leviable under the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944". It was urged before the Court that for the purpose of tax credit, special excise duty should also be taken into account, in addition to basic excise duty. The Court projected this contention having regard to the aforesaid definition of ”duty of excise". We fail to see the relevance of this decision to the matter before us. We think it has no application. 9. In the result, and following our decision in the Sirpur Paper Mills case, we reject this appeal.
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1984 (7) TMI 356
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... ... ..... y, such exercise of power would be arbitrary and it amounts to abuse of power. Consequently, the order would be vitiated. It is this that has happened in the instant case. Having regard to the import policy referred to above, I do not see any justification to refuse to grant import licence to import the printing machine in question. Thus, the petition is entitled to be allowed. 6. Accordingly, this petition is allowed, the impugned order dated 19-7-1983 Annexure F passed by the 2nd respondent, is qua shed. As a result thereof, the application filed by the petitioner for grant of import licence for importing the printing machine in question stands remitted to the 2nd respondent with a direction to consider and dispose of the same within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. 7. However there will be no order as to costs. 8. Communicate the order within 2 weeks.
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1984 (7) TMI 355
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... ... ..... unmindful of the consequences which would emanate if a purely idealistic view as opposed to a pragmatic one were to be propounded. It is equally important that the Court should also, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of a statutory provision, rule or bye-law which would bring about the result of rendering the system unworkable in practice. It is unfortunate that this principle has not been adequately kept in mind by the High Court while deciding the instant case. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we hold that the High Court was in error in striking down clauses (1) and (3) of Regulation 104 as illegal, unreasonable and void. We uphold the validity of these provisions. In the result, both the Judgments of the High Court are set aside and the two groups of Writ Petitions which were allowed under those judgments will now stand dismissed. These appeals are accordingly allowed. The appellant will get its costs from the respondents. Appeals allowed.
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1984 (7) TMI 354
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... ... ..... e assessment year but did not receive any dividend on the shares purchased with those monies Held, accordingly, that the interest on monies borrowed for investment in shares which had not yielded any dividend was admissible as a deduction under section 51(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in computing its income from dividend under the head 39 Income from other sources 39 . (p. 519) 9. In view of the above decisions with which we agree, the opinion on Question No. 8 is also in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. 10. So far as point No. 9 is concerned, we only say that on the facts of this case, the ratio of the decision of the Bombay High Court in Ormerods ( India) ( P.) Ltd. 39 s case (supra) is applicable on all fours to the facts of this case. So the question is answered in the affirmative. 11. As all the 9 points are answered as above, now the matter will go back to the Tribunal so that the Tribunal may be able to dispose of the matter in accordance with law.
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1984 (7) TMI 353
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... ... ..... s Court in their respective stay orders till today. It is made clear that in no circumstances, the above period of four weeks shall be extended. ORDER (W.P. Nos. 6948 of 1984 and batch) (Order of the Bench delivered by JEEVAN REDDY, J.) October 12, 1984 It is complained by several learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that the copies of judgment in W.P. Nos. 6948 of 1984 and batch, have not so far been supplied to them, in spite of our directions to supply, within two weeks. The office explains that copies could not be furnished because of the curfew which was imposed in this area and the consequent disturbance in the working of the office, soon after passing of the said judgment. Be that as it may, we direct the office to furnish copies to the petitioners, within ten days from today. The judgment in W.P. No. 6948 of 1984 and batch dated July 19, 1984 will be suspended, subject to the same terms and conditions, as are indicated therein, till the end of October, 1984.
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1984 (7) TMI 352
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... ... ..... declared by the assessee. It is not in evidence that the assessee realised any sum over and above the two sums of Rs. 25,000 and Rs. 32,895 referred to above. It is urged that the Commercial Tax Officer was in error in observing that the assessee underbilled. We are inclined to accept this contention. The turnover for purposes of assessment will consist of the sum of Rs. 25,000 and the excise duty of Rs. 32,895 paid. There is no material to indicate that the assessee charged any profit in respect of the excise duty. In our opinion, the Commercial Tax Officer could subject the tax only to the sum of Rs. 57,895 representing the sum total of Rs. 25,000 for which the liquor was sold and Rs. 32,895 which was the excise duty paid. We accordingly direct that the assessment be restricted to the turnover of Rs. 57,895 against Rs. 75,295. 7.. In the result, the tax revision case is partly allowed. The parties shall bear their own costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Petition partly allowed.
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1984 (7) TMI 351
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... ... ..... e lower rate of taxation is applied. There is no question of clarifying by subsequent amendment in such a case. The notification dated 2nd March, 1963, was itself exhaustive to deal with all items of iron and steel and if it did not include corrugated and galvanised iron sheets, it would be held that the intention of the legislature was not to include the same earlier as it was done subsequently by an amendment made in 1972. In the case of such notification no retrospective intention can be given. On the contrary it goes to show that the legislature wanted to include such goods only in 1972 as the same were mentioned by making an amendment in 1972. In the result, we hold that entry No. 23 of the abovementioned notification dated 2nd March, 1963, does not cover G.P. and G.C. sheets within the term iron and steel . The reference is thus answered in the negative. There would be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of this case. Reference answered in the negative.
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