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Showing 21 to 40 of 244 Records
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1985 (1) TMI 326 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... to relief. 42. We, therefore, modify the two orders before us to the extent that the proforma credit shall be disallowed only to the extent of the inputs calculated as having been used in the manufacture of goods which were exempted from the whole of the excise duty or were chargeable to nil rate of duty. The appellants shall be permitted, within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order, to furnish to the proper officer the allocation of raw materials and duty thereon necessary for the purposes of the above calculation. The proper officer shall, in his best judgment, and after taking into account the calculations, if any, furnished by the appellants, determine the quantum of credit to be disallowed in terms of this order, and shall allow the balance of the proforma credit which is allocable to dutiable goods. The appellants shall, be entitled to consequential relief. With this modification, we confirm the two orders of the Collector (Appeals).
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1985 (1) TMI 325 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... s appeal on these points. As regards his appeal relating to the demand for duty on the shortage of 74,716 kgs. of unmanufactured tobacco, we agree with the appellant that as per the finding of the Collector and the Board, the case is one of contravention of rule 151(c) and (d), i.e. illicit removal from warehouse. According to view taken by the highest authorities in the Department on the advice of the Ministry of Law, rule 9A(5) is applicable to the cases of this type. Neither side is able to say as to why rule 9A(5) should not apply to cases of such illicit removals. The view taken by the Board in their letter dated 24-11-84 that rule 9A(5) applied to such cases before amendment of the rule on 11-4-81 is correct. 5. Accordingly, we allow the appeal to the extent that we set aside the demand for duty in respect of 74,716 kgs. of unmanufactured tobacco found short in the appellant’s warehouse. In other respects, we confirm the impugned order and reject the appeal.
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1985 (1) TMI 324 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... e Rules made thereunder, as in force from time to time, to matters arising under the Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act. The argument was that because of the clause “as in force from time to time” the amendments and insertions made in the Central Excises and Salt Act become automatically applicable. While there can be no doubt about the automatic application of amendments and insertions in the Central Excises and Salt Act to proceedings under the Beedi Workers Welfare Cess Act and similar Acts, 1 do not think that the absence of the above qualifying words in the Produce Cess Act would make for any difference in the light of the Supreme Court decisions cited and discussed in the earlier part of this order. 29. In the present case, the impugned order is, on the face of it, not one passed against an order of assessment under Section 9 of the Produce Cess Act. Therefore, the present appeal before the Tribunal, which has come as transferred proceedings, is competent.
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1985 (1) TMI 323 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... uld think that there is little difference whether the selfsame coparceners carry on the business as H.U.F. or as a partnership, for purposes of licensing under the Act; (e) be that as it may, even if it be that the Appellant was not in possession of a valid licence, thanks to errors of the licensing authorities, and are thus technically in violation of the provisions of S. 27, the offence, if any, should not call for the confiscation of the entire stock in trade of the Appellant. The Appellant could not have been visited with such a consequence for the errors of the Respondent. 5. In the premises, we allow the Appeal and set aside the order of confiscation of the entire stock in trade and hereby direct that the same should be returned to the Appellant. If, however, it had already been redeemed by payment of ₹ 10,000, the said amount should be refunded. The penalty had already been set aside by the learned Gold Control Administrator. 6. Order accordingly.
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1985 (1) TMI 322 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... appellants and the show cause notice was issued long after on 15-12-81 with a vague allegation that ‘appellants were claiming benefits under the garb of the notification’. The clearances of all excisable goods effected during the relevant period were made known to the department. We note that the registers were periodically checked by the authorities. It is manifest that there was no deliberate concealment of any fact by the appellants. Considering all the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that there are no grounds for the imposition of the penalty and it is set aside. 18. In the result, we partly accept this appeal in the following terms (i) We set aside the penalty amount of ₹ 50,000/- levied on the appellants; (ii) The insurance amount of ₹ 1,085 be excluded from the value of clearances; and (iii) We confirm the remaining part of the impugned order of the Collector. The appeal is thus disposed of in the above terms.
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1985 (1) TMI 321 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... al in his own rights. Therefore, a customs clearing agent has no locus standi to file an appeal for the imports made by his principals. It was further held that the Customs (Appeals) Rules, 1982 operative from 11-10-1982 cannot be invoked in respect of earlier proceedings and, therefore, the Tribunal cannot question the validity of appeals which were signed by the agents. Since the appeal presented in the Registry on the 21st April, 1983, is not in conformity with the Customs (Appeal) Rules, 1982 and the appellant has not been able to show any sufficient cause as to the defect in the appeal, I feel that it is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretion under Rule 11 of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1982. Accordingly I hold that the appeal was not signed and verified properly. Admission of supplementary appeal at this stage will infringe the right of the respondent as the same is hit by limitation. The appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (1) TMI 320 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... such goods shall thereupon vest in the Central Government. The question is whether a situation where goods have been confiscated would be similar to one where goods are seized for satisfying a valid demand of Government. We note that Sec. 142 of the Act provides for recovery of sums due to Government and one of the options available to Government is to realise the amount as if it were an arrear of land revenue, a procedure in which goods or property could be seized and sold in satisfaction of sums due to Government. We would consider that the case dealt with by the Supreme Court would be relevant to a proceeding under Sec. 142 of the Act rather than one under Sec. 126 wherein the vesting of confiscated goods in Government, it appears to us, is absolute. On a valid order of confiscation being passed, the property vests absolutely in Government. In this view of the matter we find that the claim of the appellant is not maintainable in law. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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1985 (1) TMI 319 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ses a liability on a person who contravenes any provision of the Act or abets any such contravention or fails to comply with any provisions of the Act. Section 115 (1) (a) makes a conveyance liable to confiscation when it has been constructed, adapted or altered or fitted for the purpose of concealing goods. It is not the department’s case that either the owners of the vessel or the Master either made any alteration on their own or abetted in the making of such alterations. As rightly pointed out by the counsel for the appellants, no particular rules have been framed under Section 115 (2) regarding precautions to be taken by the owner of a vessel, which precautions, one or many have not been taken by either the owners or the Master of the vessel. We, therefore, consider that there is no scope for imposition of penalty on either the owners of the vessel or the Master. Accordingly, we set aside the penalties imposed under Section 117 of the Act with consequential relief.
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1985 (1) TMI 318 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... appellants explained that ‘Leco’ is carbon which is accepted as a reducing agent in the recovery of metal from ore and it promotes function of the material in the production of high carbon ferro manganese and high carbon ferro-silicon. 3. The SDR supported the order of the department on the basis that Lignite is used along with other items of carbon and cannot be treated as the principal source of carbon in the final product. 4. We have carefully considered the submissions of the parties herein. We note that production of ferro-alloys from ores is essentially a process of production. This needs large quantities of carbon in one form or the other and Leco is carbon, commonly known as brown coal. The object of reducing ore cannot be achieved except by the use of brown coal etc , and we consider that it is essentially a raw material in the manufacture of the final product. In this view of the matter, we allow the appeal, with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1985 (1) TMI 317 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... t reference to that judgment is not well-placed because the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court was dealing with an entirely different situation; when question of statutory time limit of six months, as laid down by Section 27 (1) of the Customs Act, was involved and not such like procedural matters, as to whom the application is to be presented. These matters, in our opinion, could certainly be regulated by a practice, as has been shown in the present case. We therefore, with regrets, have to differ, from the view expressed by our learned Brother in the case pertaining to Hindustan Motors Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Customs, Calcutta (supra). 11. We, therefore, on the facts before us and the material shown, hold that the refund claim was wrongly rejected as being barred by time. We, therefore, allow the appeal and direct that, in case the refund of duties was actually due, the same be given to the appellants, as a consequential relief, of this appeal being allowed.
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1985 (1) TMI 316 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... m the case of Miles India Limited v. Assistant Collector of Customs (Civil Appeal No. 1633 of 1984 decided on 6-4-1984) wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court ruled that the Customs authorities acting under the Act were justified in disallowing the claim for refund as they were bound by the period of limitation provided under Section 27 (1) of the Customs Act, 1962. Their Lordiships observed, “if really the payment of duly was under a mistake of law, the appellant may seek recourse to such alternative remedy as it may be advised.” 13. By extending the provisions of general law of limitation to the facts of the present case, the Appellate Collector has exceeded his jurisdiction and passed this order which is erroneous and illegal. 14. Under these circumstances, we set aside the order No. 139/81, dated 23-3-1981 passed by the Appellate Collector, Bombay, and confirm the order passed by the Assistant Collector in this matter. 15. Appeal is allowed accordingly.
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1985 (1) TMI 315 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... rities have not gone into this specific question of fact, we think it to be a fit case where the matter has to be remitted to the lower authorities for de novo examination, on the guidelines set out by us. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order after holding that the Appellants have been able to establish that they are an existing industrial unit and that the manufacture of mini-computers/micro-processor based systems, was an expansion of the existing unit, that in case they are able to establish before the Collector of Customs (Appeals), Bombay on the basis of the manufacturer’s catalogue or some other reliable evidence that the imported systems (Model DS 990-20) is related inter alia to testing of hardware produced or to be produced by them, then their application for registration under Tariff Item 84.66(1) of C.T.A. and concessions thereunder in the rate of Customs Duty would be admissible and also consequential refund of duty already paid.
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1985 (1) TMI 314 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... o; letter dated 28-3-1976 should be considered as a valid claim in respect of excess duty paid by them on excess production for a period of up to one year prior to the date of receipt of that letter, namely, 3-4-1976. As regards the interpretation of Notification No. 146/74, we follow our earlier decisions which have already been referred to. We further hold that the consideration of the refund claim would not involve a revision of the Assistant Collector’s earlier order, but could be considered as supplementary to that order, and therefore, as within his competence. We accordingly allow the appeal and direct that consequential relief be granted. Subject to the verification of the appellants’ claim that excess payments started from October 1975 onwards, viz., less than a year prior to 3-4-1976, the refund due to them shall be worked out by the Assistant Collector, following the interpretation adopted by us in the cases referred to in para 3 above, and sanctioned.
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1985 (1) TMI 313 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... , Justice Shri Misra has observed that, “I am fully conscious of the view that the construction of a particular expression in one statute need not follow the construction of the same expression in other statutes and we have to take into consideration the language used, the object of the Act, the preceding provision of law, the mischief which was sought to be remedied and the intention of the legislature in enacting the provision”. Then he goes on to examine the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878. Hence the observation that the Judgment of the Delhi High Court is based on one of the Supreme Court in similar circumstances does not seem to be quite apt. 7. Accordingly, we see no reason to change the stand taken by us earlier in regard to the scope of Section 23 (1) as set out in the case of Bharat Electronics Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Madras in Appeal No. CD(T) (Mad.) 167/81, dated 16-2-1983, 1983 E.L.T 653. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
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1985 (1) TMI 312 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... be ignored. 53. We have covered all the salient arguments put forward by both sides. We do not consider it necessary to refer specifically to some of the other arguments put forward by Shri Raghavan Iyer, which would only go to reinforce our conclusions; or to discuss some minor points advanced by Shri Haksar such as that based on the article contained in a journal (vide para 25 above), or on the unlikely possibility of a manufacturer’s accounts being held to stand retrospectively falsified (vide para 20 above), as these would not affect the conclusions reached. 54. In the result, we hold that the Order-in-Appeal No. 331-CE/IND/83, dated 22-6-1984 of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals), New Delhi, was not correct and in accordance with law. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the Order of the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) and restore the Order C. No. CEX-20/Misc/16-B/82/197, dated 12-3-1982 of the Superintendent of Central Excise, Range IV, Bhopal.
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1985 (1) TMI 311 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... 13. The show cause notice not having invoked the proviso to Section 11A with material on the basis of which the extended time limit was to be applied, the normal period of limitation under this Section, viz., six months should apply in this case and not the extended period. Neither did the circumstances warrant such enlargement of limitation nor was such enlargement correct in the absence of allegations in the show cause notice. 14. The appellants gave an apparently plausible explanation about Invoice No. 50 and Invoice No. 48. However, this explanation is not being considered in depth inasmuch as we have decided in favour of the party on the basis of limitation. 15. As a result we hold that the demand against appellants should be limited to a period of six months only. This would have the effect of allowing the appeal inasmuch as the show cause notice was issued well beyond six months from the relevant period for which duty is demanded. The appeal is allowed in these terms.
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1985 (1) TMI 310 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ely, for the appellants, the duty had already beep levied at the rate of ₹ 500/- per K.L. which was in force on the date of presentation of the ex-bond Bill of Entry for home consumption. For whatever reasons, the appellants submitted the refund application for the excess duty paid only on 29-12-1979 i.e. more than 6 months beyond the date of payment of duty i.e. 13-6-1969. In terms of Section 27(1), the application was clearly hit by limitation. In terms of Section 27(4), no claim for refund of any duty shall be entertained except in accordance with the provisions of Section 27. The net result, therefore, is that though duty was payable only at ₹ 408.19 per K.L., the rate in force on the date of actual removal of the goods in terms of Section 15(l)(b), the appellants have lost their right of claiming and receiving the excess duty paid because of the delay in submitting the refund application. 15. With these observations, I concur with my brother Shri Syiem.
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1985 (1) TMI 309 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ry. It is called naphthalene by the buyer and by the seller. There is no reason why, knowing what its nature and structure and composition are, we should not say that Chapter 29 is the appropriate head, while for the same good reason, we should not say that Chapter 27 cannot cover it, a separate chemically defined organic compound. 26. We are not convinced by the arguments of the Appellate Collector that heading 27.07 is appropriate. In our view this heading is excluded by the note. We are of the view that Chapter 29 should be preferred over Chapter 27, and that it is the most appropriate assessment for the naphthalene in question. 27. We accordingly set aside the two orders of the Appellate Collector viz.(1) Order No. S/49-2117/80R dated 29-12-1980 and (2) Order No. S/49-1406/78R dated 30-11-1978 and order that the naphthalene be assessed under Chapter 29. There is no dispute before us about countervailing duty, and therefore, we pass no orders about this subject.
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1985 (1) TMI 308 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ly or as a part of the adjoining premises is not maintainable in law. This action cannot be supported by bringing in arguments either of “dependance” of the two was on each other or that the raw material, for the manufacture of sheets and circles would be not the billets from which sheets and circles are manufactured but the material from which the billets or gullies are manufactured in the adjoining premises, or that the two units are not separately registered under the Factories Act. The view expressed by the Collector in his adjudication order that the party’s stand in the matter could be on account of its “intention to evade correlation between their inputs and their final products” is also in the nature of an un-warranted and un-substantiated allegation which, even if it were true, cannot nullify the exemption accorded under the law to the billet manufacturing unit. 13. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.
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1985 (1) TMI 307 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... the Trade Notice No. 191/84 of December 1984 issued by the Collector of Central Excise, Madras, according to which late filing of D-3 intimation could be condoned. The nature of the articles, in the present case, shows that they are more or less specialised units sent by customers of rubber lining; the process of sand-blasting etc. seems to be the initial phase of preparing the article received for the purpose of rubber lining and in this sense it could be deemed to have been taken into use for the purpose of further processing. The nature of the articles vis-a-vis the persons who supplied them and the operations involved would suggest that their identity could be established and the procedure under Rule 56A could be broadly observed. In this view of the matter, and taking note of the relaxation available under Trade Notice No. 191/84, we condone the delay in the filing of the D-3 intimation in which the present case has arisen and allow the appeal with consequential relief.
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