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Showing 41 to 60 of 244 Records
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1985 (1) TMI 306 - SUPREME COURT
Interpretation of the term 'wilful default' appearing in the proviso to section 10 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Buil dings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960
Held that:- A consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.
In civil appeal No. 1178 of 1984, it would appear that though the tenant had committed a default but he had paid the entire rent well before the filing of the suit by the landlord. In fact, the suit for eviction was filed by the landlord not on the ground of pending arrears but to penalise the tenant for having defaulted in the past. Such a suit cannot be entertained because once the entire dues are paid to the landlord the cause of action for filing of a suit completely vanishes. Hence, the suit arising out of civil appeal No. 1978 of 1984 must be dismissed as being not maintainable and the order of ejectment passed by the High Court is hereby set aside.
In civil appeal No. 6211 of 1983, having regard to the tests and the criteria laid down by us there can be no doubt that wilful default in the payment of arrears to the tune of ₹ 900 has been proved and as there is nothing to show that the arrears were not paid or withheld due to circumstances beyond the control of the tenant, the order of eviction passed by the High Court is confirmed, and the appeal is allowed.
In civil appeal No. 1992 of 1982 the arrears having been paid through the Bank Draft, the question of eviction of the tenant did not arise nor did the question of default come into the picture merely because the landlord wanted to harass him by filing an eviction petition. The High Court was, therefore, clearly in error in passing the decree of ejectment against the tenant. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court evicting the tenant.
In civil appeal No. 1659 of 1982, as it was clearly a case of wilful default on the part of the tenant we affirm the order of the High Court evicting the tenant and dismiss the appeal.
In civil appeal No. 3668 of 1982, some dispute arose between the parties as to whether the rent was to be deposited in Bank, resulting in the filing of the present suit for eviction on 1.4.80 in the court of the Rent Controller by the landlord after verifying from the Bank that the tenant had not deposited the rent for the months of January and February 1980. This default, in our opinion, was undoubtedly deliberate, conscious and without any reasonable or rational basis and the High Court was perfectly right in holding that the tenant A was guilty of wilful default and passing a decree for ejectments. As no notice was given by the landlord, Explanation to proviso to s. 10 (2) of the Act does not apply at all. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
In civil appeal No. 2246 of 1982 the High Court in revision upheld the order of eviction on the ground that there was no satisfactory explanation for non- payment of rent for the period January to June 1976 was clearly in error because the tenant had already deposited the entire dues including the rent from January to June, on 17.7.76. Thus, the question of wilful default could not arise nor could it be said that the default was either conscious or deliberate or international. Moreover, in view of the Explanation since the tenant had paid the amount within the time of the notice, there could be no question of wilful default. This fact seems to have been completely overlooked by the High Court. We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court directing eviction of the tenant.
In civil appeal No. 4012 of 1982, the tenant occupied the premises at a monthly rent of ₹ 325. It appears that the tenant defaulted in payment of tent from June 1976 onwards and after repeated demands, only a sum Or ₹ 1000 was paid by him on 1.4 77. leaving a substantial balance of arrears unpaid. This was, therefore, a clear case of wilful default where the tenant did not pay the rent deliberately, consciously and intentionally.
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1985 (1) TMI 305 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... sessee has failed to explain as mentioned by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) that this amount was charged for any kind of services rendered to the principal other than by way of commission or adhat. The Board of Revenue in its judgment, either given by the learned Single Member or by the Division Bench, have not controverted these facts found proved by the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and allowed the revision merely by holding that it was an amount of commission charged by the assessee, which had nothing to do with the sale of goods. In view of these circumstances, we hold that under the facts and circumstances of the case, other charges collected by the assessee for rendering unspecified services can only be treated as commission and nothing else and such commission will form part of sale price as defined in section 2 (p) of the Act. The reference is thus answered in the manner indicated above. The parties are left to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1985 (1) TMI 304 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oes not contemplate exemption being granted in respect of the subsequent sales relating to the handmade matches. We are not in a position to construe the exemption notification issued by the Government in this case as a general notification exempting handmade matches in general. If the sale of handmade matches by the manufacturer is exempted, then the sale by the petitioner in this case, who has purchased the goods from the manufacturer, becomes the first taxable sale inside the State. As we have already held that, the exemption in relation to a particular sale will not be available to other subsequent sales, the taxing statute has to operate in respect of other sales, and the petitioner s sale becomes taxable being the first taxable sale inside the State. We, therefore, hold that the Tribunal in this case has come to the right conclusion in holding that the petitioner is not entitled to the exemption to Rs. 54,404.00. The tax case is therefore dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1985 (1) TMI 303 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ut any amendment in the section with a view to limiting resale in the same manner by the addition of some such words as in the Union Territory of Delhi or inside Delhi . This clearly evinces parliamentary intent not to insist upon resale being restricted to the Territory of Delhi. The reasoning of the Sales Tax Officer in the impugned order in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court cannot be upheld. The petitioner thus succeeds on the second question which has been raised in this petition. The finding regarding the adding back of Rs. 94,236.11 in the taxable quantum is thus quashed. However, it is for the Revenue to find out whether the said goods manufactured at the petitioner s factory at Ghaziabad were sold at all. For this purpose I remand the case to the Sales Tax Officer. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before him on 1st February, 1985. The petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No order as to costs. Petition Partly allowed.
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1985 (1) TMI 302 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... set aside and remand, as the circumstances justify. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Maganlal Chhagganlal s case AIR 1974 SC 2009 a provision for an appeal itself, is a sufficient safeguard to sustain the provision and cannot on any principle be held to be arbitrary. 41.. On the above discussion, it follows that our answer to question No. (2) has to be in the negative. 42.. In the light of our above discussion, we answer the questions referred to us as hereunder Questions Answers (1) Whether section 22-A of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, confers power on the Commissioner to interfere Affirmative. with an order made by an appellate authority under section 20 of the Act? (2) If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, whether section 22-A of the Act is void as offendNegative. ing article 14 of the Constitution? 43.. We direct the Registrar to place the papers before the Honourable Chief Justice for posting the case before a Division Bench for final disposal.
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1985 (1) TMI 301 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ent his case. Sri Gandhi who is representing the petitioner before the Commissioner has no objection to appear before him on 16th February, 1985, and argue his client s case on merits. We consider it proper to issue appropriate directions in this behalf. 6.. In the light of our above discussion, we make the following orders and directions (i) We dismiss this writ petition and discharge the rule issued in the case. But, this should not be understood by the Commissioner as this Court expressing its opinion on merits except on matters that are concluded by this order. (ii) We direct the petitioner to appear before the Commissioner in person or through his counsel on 16th February, 1985, and take further orders from him for the further progress of the case. 7.. The writ petition is disposed of in the above terms. But, in the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. 8.. Let this order be communicated to the respondent within 10 days from this day.
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1985 (1) TMI 300 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y drawn an inference against the assessee that since it did not produce the vouchers of sales before the authority at the time of survey, it cannot be accepted that it made all local purchases. It is true that the assessee has to prove its case under section 12-A of the Act but in case it had failed to prove then a categorical finding has to be recorded before imposing a tax that the purchases were not made locally but were made from outside U.P. Since the aforesaid finding has not been recorded by the Tribunal the order passed by it cannot be sustained. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed to the extent stated above. The order of the Tribunal to that extent is set aside and it is directed to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above on the basis of the evidence available on the record. However the parties shall bear their own costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as required under section 11(8) of the Act.
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1985 (1) TMI 299 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... . There must be a default in furnishing return and other documents, etc., and there must be some adverse material suggesting concealment of sale or furnishing of inaccurate particulars. In the present case, it appears that the forms have been refused on the ground that some enquiry is pending. We had directed by an interim order that the enquiry should be completed and ST-1 forms should be issued in the meantime. It appears that neither the enquiry has been concluded nor has the assessment of the assessee taken place. At this stage, it cannot be said that there has been any loss in revenue or any other action taken by the petitioner which would justify the withholding of the ST-1 forms. We would accordingly allow the petition and direct the respondent to issue the ST-1 forms as per the procedure prescribed by sub-rule (4) of rule 8. This by no means will stop or prevent the Sales Tax Officer or other assessing authority from passing any order in accordance with sub-rule (4).
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1985 (1) TMI 298 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on that the polishing of stones does not involve that process so as to fall within the term manufacture as defined in section 2(k) of the Act. In our considered opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench of the Board in its order dated 19th April, 1974, is the correct one when it held that the identity of the so-called polished stones sold by the dealer-assessee had not been changed from what it had been when they were originally purchased. The Division Bench of the Board was right in holding that the polishing of stones does not come within the term of manufacture and, therefore, the dealerassessee is not liable to pay sales tax at the concessional rate under section 5C of the Act. The question referred for our decision is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the dealer-assessee and against the department. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs of this reference. Let the answer be returned to the Board under section 15(5) of the Act.
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1985 (1) TMI 297 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ibunal set aside the aforesaid finding illegally. After hearing the counsel for the parties I am of the opinion that until and unless a finding is recorded to the effect that 1,75,000 bricks were sold by the assessee to the firm, Modern Kumar Rice Mill, the same could not be treated as a sale. Since the Tribunal has not recorded any finding that 1,75,000 bricks were sold by the assessee to the firm, Modern Kumar Rice Mill, it was not justified in reversing the findings recorded by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), who had allowed reduction in the total turnover of the assessee. In the result the revision succeeds in part and is allowed to the extent stated above. The order of the Tribunal to that extent is set aside and it is directed to decide the appeal afresh in the light of the observations made above. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as required under section 11(8) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act.
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1985 (1) TMI 296 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... red with in this petition. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not persuaded to agree with this submission as the original assessment has not at all been set aside by the revisional authority but he has remanded the same for a specific purpose and consequently it is clear from the impugned order (annexure 20) that the assessing authority, namely, respondent No. 1, has proceeded to start afresh assessment proceedings for the same period on the alleged ground of escaped assessment especially when the original order of assessment had become final and the remand order being quite clear gives no scope of any other interpretation. 21.. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed with no order as to costs. The impugned order, annexure 20 dated 31st December, 1981, passed by respondent No. 1 is quashed and set aside, being without jurisdiction. The amount of security deposit, if any, after verification be returned to the petitioner-in-person.
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1985 (1) TMI 295 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... who continues to be the owner of the goods and will, therefore, be liable to account for the sale proceeds. In that case, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the true relationship of the parties in each case has to be gathered from the nature of the contract, its terms and conditions and the terminology used by the parties is not decisive of the legal relationship. As already pointed out, the agreement entered into between the parties clearly shows that the Civil Supplies Corporations in Andhra Pradesh and Kerala are constituted only as agents and they cannot be taken to be buyers of the goods for a price. The terms of the agreement make it clear that the goods are delivered by the State Trading Corporation to the Civil Supplies Corporations only in their capacity as distribution agents and there is no sale as between them. In this view of the matter, we do not think that any interference is called for in the orders of the Tribunal. The revision is, therefore, dismissed.
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1985 (1) TMI 294 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ef Commissioner to refer to the High Court any question of law arising out of such order. Admittedly, the petitioner did not file any such application before the Financial Commissioner. I have gone through the impugned order of the Financial Commissioner. It appears that on facts it was held that the item which was manufactured and sold by the petitioner was not meant for exclusive use in the Persian wheel it could be used for other purposes also. As noticed by the learned Financial Commissioner this position had been tacitly admitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner . The item manufactured consisted of two joists comprising the base of the Persian wheel. In view of this finding of fact it cannot be held that the item manufactured and sold by the petitioner was an agricultural implement. At any rate, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. Mittal has to be upheld. The result is that the writ petition, which is devoid of any merit, is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1985 (1) TMI 293 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ow cause notice in cases where best judgment assessment has to be passed by the assessing authority is mandatory. Since in the instant case no notice was issued to the assessee before determining the turnover the assessment order cannot be maintained. In view of the aforesaid fact it appears expedient that the order of the Tribunal as well as the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) should be set aside and the matter should be sent back to the Sales Tax Officer for making fresh assessment after complying with the requirement of rule 41(7), proviso (2). In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed and the order passed by the authorities below are quashed and the matter is sent back to the Sales Tax Officer with a direction to pass fresh assessment order in the light of the observations made above. Let a copy of this order may be sent to the Sales Tax Officer concerned as contemplated under section 11(8) of the Act. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1985 (1) TMI 292 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... appeals filed by the assessee. Feeling aggrieved against the aforesaid order of the Tribunal the assessee has come to this Court in these revisions. Learned counsel appearing for the assessee has contended that the freight charges, which were not included in the taxable turnover, should not have been included in its turnover inasmuch as it had purchased gur from registered dealer and it was not liable to pay tax on the freight charged. It is well-settled that the freight charges are also a part of annual turnover and no exemption can be claimed on the aforesaid ground. The dharmada, which has been held not to be a part of taxable turnover, has been excluded by the Tribunal. In view of the purchase price defined in section 2(gg) of the Act the order passed by the Tribunal is wholly justified and does not call for any interference by this Court. In the result the revisions fail and are accordingly dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1985 (1) TMI 291 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e appeal in default and thereafter should not have refused to restore the same. 10.. In the result this petition succeeds. The impugned orders (annexures G, I and L) are set aside and the case is remitted to the Tribunal with a direction to restore the appeal to file and decide the appeal on merits within a period of four months from today after giving proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner subject to payment of costs of Rs. 1,000 to be deposited by the petitioner in this Court within a period of fifteen days from today. Even though we have allowed the petition, considering the facts and circumstances of the case we are of opinion that the respondents are entitled to costs plus counsel s fee, which is assessed at Rs. 500 which shall also be deposited by the petitioner in this Court within a fortnight from today. In case the petitioner fails to deposit the aforesaid amount within the stipulated time, the Tribunal s order in question will stand. Writ petition allowed.
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1985 (1) TMI 290 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... post. Moreover in the present case the memo of appeal was signed by the assessing authority himself after consulting Mr. Dalu Ram Sharma who had filed the appeal which was sent to him by the assessing authority duly signed. Thus keeping all these in view, it cannot be said that the special appeal presented by Dalu Ram Sharma, D.P., was improperly presented. It will be worthwhile to note here that the Revenue Board also in the later decision in Khandelwal Enterprise v. A.C.T.O., Ward I 1978 RRD 151 has taken the view that the defect of filing of memorandum of appeal presented by the person who was not authorised in writing as required by rule 2(b) of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Rules is curable by allowing the person presenting the appeal to submit an authority at a subsequent date as soon as the defect is brought to his notice. In the result, the question of law is answered in the negative in favour of the department and against the assessee. Reference answered in the negative.
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1985 (1) TMI 289 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... In the result, the writ petitions fail and they are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Orders on oral application for grant of certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under articles 133 and 134-A of the Constitution and for stay. Immediately after the order was pronounced, Sri M.R. Nayak, appearing for the petitioners, made an oral request for grant of certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under articles 133 and 134-A of the Constitution of India and for stay of the order and it is urged that the question decided by us in these cases raises a substantial question of law of general importance and the same needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. In our opinion, these cases does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance that needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Hence, we reject the oral request. We do not see any justification to grant stay of the order. We, therefore, reject the application for stay also.
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1985 (1) TMI 288 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... basic features of the Constitution (ii) is not ultra vires of article 368 of the Constitution and is not violative of articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution and (iii) it does not authorise imposition and collection of tax on the supply of foodstuffs from 2nd February, 1983 on which date the Amendment Act came into force, but confers legislative competence on the State Legislature so to do and merely validates the collection and recovery of tax by removing the invalidity in the existing law subject to the exemption granted under sub-section (2) of section 6. The writ petitions are partly allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 75 in each. Both the learned counsel for the parties make oral applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We do not think that any substantial question of law of general importance which requires to be considered by the Supreme Court arises in these cases. The oral applications are, therefore, rejected.
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1985 (1) TMI 287 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... plus, was held to be not exigible to sales tax, because the textile mill could not be held to be a dealer for carrying on a business in the sale of cotton. This was under the unamended provisions of the Bombay Sales Tax Act. Similarly, in State of Gujarat v. Raipur Manufacturing Company Limited 1967 19 STC 1 (SC), the sale of surplus coal by a textile factory and 21 items of discarded and unserviceable goods were held to be not done in course of the business, and therefore, not liable to sales tax. As I have said earlier, it is unnecessary to multiply authorities, because there is a best of High Court judgments taking a similar view. 28.. To finally conclude, the answer to question No. II is rendered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, whilst holding that the petitioner was not a dealer under section 2(f) of the Act in respect of the canteen sales, and consequently not liable to sales tax. UDAY SINHA, J.-I agree. NAZIR AHMAD, J.-I agree.
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