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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 222 Records
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1985 (2) TMI 297 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ed order of suspension was passed-26.2.1969, the District Forest Officer under whom the respondent was working in the Ghumsur North Division was fully competent to pass the impugned order of suspension. Hence the High Court was perfectly right in rejecting the further contention advanced before it by the respondent herein that the impugned action had been taken in violation of the provisions of Rule 12. We accordingly allow this appeal C- A. No. 201 of 1971, set aside the judgment of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petition in O. J. C. No. 10 of 1970. The parties will bear their respective costs for this Court, In the light of the legal position enunciated above, it follows that C. A. No. 200 of 1971 has also to be allowed. The judgment of the High Court is accordingly set aside and the Writ Petition filed by the respondent therein- O. J. C. No. 101 of 1970 will also stand dismissed. The parties will bear their respective costs in this appeal also. M.L.A. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (2) TMI 296 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... decision which supports the case of the Respondent. What was decided in that case was that it was not necessary for the crown to have obtained a decree before it could apply to the court for payment out of amounts brought to Court by the sale of property in execution of a simple money decree obtained by some other attaching decree holder. We fail to see how that case can possibly help the respondent. As pointed out by Vivin Bose, J. in Zumberlal Chhotelal Agarwal and Anr. v. Sitaram and Ors. AIR 1937, Nagpur 80 the prior attachment fastens itself to the proceeds of a sale pursuant to the later attachment. The prior attachment effected by the State similarly fastens itself to the sale proceeds taken away by the decree holder. The State is, therefore, entitled to recover the amount from the decree holder who has taken away the amount. The result, therefore, is the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is set-aside and that of the Trial Court is restored. No costs.
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1985 (2) TMI 295 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... to question why Khandsari produced by the petitioners is Included when sugar produced by the Mills Is not so included. It is not a question to which we can legitimately address ourselves, for, essentially it is a question of legislative wisdom and legislative policy dictated by countless and complex considerations. The Court cannot, and will not, substitute its own wisdom in place of the legislative wisdom in such matters. The Court will not impose on itself this responsibility, if not for any A other reason, than for the reason that it is beyond its province, The arguments advanced on this wavelength need not, therefore, detain us any a longer. The petitions, accordingly, fail. Rule issued in each of the petitions will stand discharged There will be no order regarding costs. Interim orders will stand vacated. In view of the majority decision, all the writ petitions are dismissed. There will be no order regarding costs. Interim orders will stand vacated. Petitions dismissed
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1985 (2) TMI 294 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ial benefit or advantage for payment of the fee. Applying the ratio of these decisions it is incontrovertible that the appellant-corporation is rendering numerous services to the persons within its areas of operation and that therefore the levy of the licence fee as fee is fully justified Soaking coconut husks emit foul odour and contaminates environment. The Corporation by rendering scavenging services, carrying on operations for cleanliness of city, to make habitation tolerable is rendering general service of which amongst others appellants are beneficiaries. Levy as a fee is thus justified. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to consider the A alternative submission that the levy as a tax is legal. Accordingly, both the appeals are allowed and the decision of the learned Single Judge as well as the decision of the Division Bench in writ appeals are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are dismissed with no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.
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1985 (2) TMI 293 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... this case on July 1, 1968. The decision of the High Court on the above point is, however, allowed to re remain only for the period between March 23, 1968 and July 1, 1968 without expressing any opinion on its correctness because the period is a small one and the Electricity Board does not insist upon a decision on this question in this case. The question is left open by us. Similarly, the relief granted by the High Court with regard to A the levy of additional charge of 2 % with effect from December 1, 1967 till July 1, 1968 is not disturbed by us for the same reason without expressing any opinion on its correctness. This judgment shall not be construed as affirming the decision of the High Court in so far as the above points are concerned. The matter may be reconsidered by the Electricity Board as directed by the Division Bench of the High Court but with regard to the periods specified above. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1985 (2) TMI 292 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... sider that the ratio of our order Nos. 542-553/1984 is more aptly applicable to the facts of this case than the case decided in 1983 E.L.T. 361 (CEGAT). We have also taken note of the fact that the appellants are a department of the Government of India and are not expected to wilfully keep back any fact from us because any relief from our decision will not go to private party. In the end we set aside the order dated 2-7-1980 passed by the Appellate Collector of Customs, Madras and direct that the inspection charges applicable to the present case be adopted by 0.30% against 0.60% Consequential relief flowing from this order be allowed to the appellants. 8. While recalculating the amount of the less charge actually payable, the quantity of fertilizers proved to be short landed should be excluded and the demand should relate only to the quantity landed. 9. In the result, we allow both the appeals in the above terms with consequential reliefs flowing therefrom.
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1985 (2) TMI 291 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... . But significantly this sentence runs in the report “A review of the reports and documents collected during the investigation does not reveal any information which positively identifies the Indian exporter or which indicate shipper’s knowledge of the contents”. This is acknowledgement by the U.S. Agencies that even though the shippers of brass bells were known, there was no evidence to connect them with the hashish found concealed in the packages. We note that the Customs did not arrest Brij Mohan Mehra or prosecute him as they should have done, had they thought him to be the real culprit. The delay in processing this case lead us to doubt whether the Customs themselves really believed in their own case. We do not find the evidence enough to justify the conclusion that Brij Mohan was the shipper of the hashish. 10. We accordingly set aside the Collector’s order and allow the appeals of both M/s. Bee Emm (India) Exports and Shri Brij Mohan Mehra.
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1985 (2) TMI 290 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... implication. If the rights created under Section 35E(2) of the Act are substantive and not merely procedural Section 35E(2) and Section 11 A will have to be construed without any repugnancy. But this question is purely academic in the context of the facts of this case and therefore I make it clear that I am not called upon to decide this issue and pronounce upon the question as to whether the powers of revision conferred on the Collector under the present Section 35E(2) will be subject to the period of limitation under Section 11 A of the Act or vice versa. Suffice it to say, in the instant case, having regard to the admitted fact that even the power of review that was available to the Collector under law, as it then stood under Section 35A referred to supra, was barred by the period of limitation, the very basis of the review order will not be legally sustainable. In this view of the matter I find that there is no merit in the appeal and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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1985 (2) TMI 289 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... housands of chemicals and substances, some organic, some inorganic in origin, which can answer the description of drug/medicine, and pharmaceuticals. This decision will not help M/s. Citric India. Nor is M/s. Citric India within the plain terms of the exemption because the citric acid is not only a drug or pharmaceutical but is a chemical that has many more uses and employment than as a drug or a medicine. 26. We, accordingly order that the exemption should be extended to all citric acid cleared by M/s. Citric India Ltd. and used in the manufacture of drug medicines/pharmaceuticals. The central excise may make enquiries and satisfy itself about the uses and M/s. Citric India Ltd. should, to this end, furnish all help and aid to the central excise department so that the concession can be extended to all the deserving clearances, in accordance with the law. But the citric acid not so used must be denied the exemption, and we reject the appeal in regard to such clearances.
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1985 (2) TMI 288 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... nder consideration had merely directed retransfer of the papers to the Government on the basis that under Section 131B(2) of the Customs Act the proceedings which were pending before the Government on the appointed date were not such as were required to be transferred to this Tribunal under the said Section. Therefore when a retransfer was ordered the proceedings (preferred by way a Revision Petition to the Government and transferred to this Tribunal for disposal as an appeal) were not disposed of either by way of confirmation, modification or annulment of the order appealed against or by a remand to the original adjudicating authority after setting aside the order under appeal. Therefore the said order dated 6-8-1984 would not be one contemplated under Sec. 129B of the Customs Act. 6. In the circumstances we hold that no reference application under Section 130 of the Customs Act lies with reference to the said order dated 6-8-1984. This application is accordingly dismissed.
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1985 (2) TMI 287 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... carry the cargo to its intended destination. M.T. Netaji Subhas Bose diverted at Visakhapatnam, an Indian ports in order to carry cargo to Haldia another Indian port. It makes no difference that the cargo was a foreign cargo. The fact was that cargo was carried between one Indian port and another by a ship that was not meant to undertake that voyage. Nor was it meant to lift Indian cargo at Calcutta for any foreign port as is proved by the fact that she left that port in ballast, touching Vizag again which she left on 24-1-1978 also in ballast. The run from Vizag to Calcutta between 19 and 22-1-1978 was clearly a coastal run to carry cargo between two Indian ports, and no other. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the Shipping Corporation of India that the demand for duty made by the Vizag customs was incorrect. 7. We set aside the order of the Appellate Collector dated 18-2-1978 and direct that duty shall be paid on the stores as demanded by Visakhapatnam Custom House.
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1985 (2) TMI 286 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... tial as to affect the essential nature of the product. The appellants have produced an affidavit as regards the percentage of actual quantity of re-rollable scrap present in the total quantity of melting scrap. Appellants have filed the Affidavit by the Chief Superintendent of the Steel Authority of India Ltd., Bhilai Steel Plant, affirming that the scrap generated is fit only for re-melting purpose and not for re-rolling purpose. It is stated therein that the scrap so generated is used by the Steel Plant only in the Steel Melting Shop and the small quantity of such scrap is sent to sister plants only for re-melting. It has been affirmed that there is “rare chance” for re-rollable scrap also getting collected in this way and that the percentage of such scrap is very insignificant. We see no reason not to accept these averments. 8. In view of the foregoing findings, we set aside the impugned order including the demand for duty and the penalty and allow the appeal.
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1985 (2) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT
Validity of Section 28 of the Gold Control Act, 1968 questioned - Held that:- Parliament has carried out the necessary amendment in the Act. No such vague or indefinite expressions or concepts are to be found in section 28 by reference to which the Administrator is required to exercise his power. In the absence of parity of situation or circumstances the doctrine of parity of reasoning cannot be invoked.
In the result we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and declare section 28 of the Act valid.
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1985 (2) TMI 284 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... to the learned Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta to make a de novo adjudication after giving proper Opportunity to the appellant, We further direct the reweighment of the jewellery in the presence of the appellant or his representative. The appellant is at liberty to produce any other evidence if he so chooses. This court has already held in a number of decisions that where there was denial of principles of natural justice, the appeal was remanded to the adjudicating authority. A reference may be made to the decision of Shri Aswani v. Collector of Customs reported in 1984 ECR 1177 and in appeal no. CD(T) Cal-84/80 in the case of Kishanlal Fogla v. Collector of Central Excise and Customs. Since we are remanding the case to the adjudicating authority, we are not going into the merits and other legal issues involved in the case. We further direct the learned Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta to readjudicate the matter within one year from the date of this order.
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1985 (2) TMI 283 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... he appellant in conformity with the principles of natural justice, if the appellant had asked for such a cross-examination. It would have been desirable if the adjudicating authority had not negatived the request and more so with an observation that no useful purpose would be served by such cross-examination. I agree with the submissions of the learned DR that the adjudicating authority was never actuated by any pre-conceived bias in approaching the issue involved for consideration. Anyhow, since an opportunity for cross-examination of the officer who recorded the statement of the appellant and the witnesses, as desired by the appellant, had not been afforded, the order suffers from an infirmity in being violative of the principles of natural justice. In this view of the matter, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Additional Collector of Customs and Central Excise, Guntur, for fresh adjudication in the light of the observations made herein.
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1985 (2) TMI 282 - CEGAT NEW DELHI
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... ... ..... ested that since the Respondents had themselves classified the paper as pulp hoard prior to the 1976 Budget, they could not resile from that stand when it suited them. This argument does not appeal to us since there is no estoppel in classification matters. If the assessee had rightly or wrongly asked for classification of goods under a particular entry, that would not come in the way of their later pressing for classification under another entry which they consider more appropriate. 23. Considering all the facts and circumstances we are of the opinion that while the respondents have adduced sufficient evidence in support of their contention that the subject Maplitho paper was printing and writing paper, the appellant has not discharged the onus on him nor has produced satisfactory evidence in rebuttal. This is not thus a case where two views are equally possible, as the Deptl. Representative contended. Consequently we vacate the show cause notice and reject the appeal.
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1985 (2) TMI 281 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... at it issued the order that the goods had been cleared already. In exempting the ammonium chloride in question from payment of customs duty and auxiliary duty in excess of 5% ad valorem subject to certain conditions, there is no doubt that the exemption giving power knew that it would only act retrospectively.” I respectfully agree with the above views of my brethren. In the circumstances of the present case the fact of existence of an order has to be taken into account and not whether the Government exceeded its authority in passing the order, a factor which is not for this Tribunal to question, particularly when the order is in favour of the appellant. The circumstances of the case are such that the order of the Government dated 17-1-1979 should be considered as having given an absolute right to the appellant for claiming money paid prior to the passing of the order itself. In this view of the matter, I allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellant.
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1985 (2) TMI 280 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... appellate authority. Even in respect of the procedural formalities enjoined on the appellants under Rule 56A, since there is more than substantial compliance, I am of the view that the appellants would be entitled to avail proforma credit on and from 30-7-1979. Apart from this, I also take into consideration in this context the fact that the RT 12 returns of the appellants have been assessed as correct by the authorities who presumably must have also looked into RG 23 Part II which should have given a clear indication that the appellants were availing proforma credit in respect of RANIPAL, the item concerned in the present appeal. Therefore taking the aforesaid twin circumstances into consideration I hold that the appellants would be entitled to avail proforma credit in respect of optical bleaching agent - RANIPAL - used as a raw material in the manufacture of detergent cakes on and from 30-7-79. Accordingly the impugned order is set aside and the appeal accordingly allowed.
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1985 (2) TMI 279 - CEGAT MADRAS
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... ... ..... ,900 under Rule 9(2) to ₹ 1,000 (Rupees one thousand only); (ii) penalty of ₹ 800 under Rule 52A to ₹ 300 (Rupees three hundred only) ; and (iii) penalty of ₹ 1,850 under Rule 226 to ₹ 1,000 (Rupees one thousand only). So far as the appropriation of ₹ 2,000 in enforcing the terms of the bond executed by the appellant for the provisional release of the confiscated biris is concerned, I hold that part of the order is not appealable because goods confiscated were provisionally released subject to the bond executed by the appellant, the terms of which are admittedly to the effect that the goods would be produced when the authority called upon him to do so. Since non-compliance of the bond and enforcement thereof are administrative in nature and not quasi-judicial in character, no appeal under law would lie to the Tribunal in that respect. Except for the above modifications in the amounts of penalty, the appeal is otherwise dismissed.
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1985 (2) TMI 278 - CEGAT CALCUTTA
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... ... ..... in filing appeal beyond the prescribed period it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations namely (1) the expiration of limitation for making appeal gives rise to a legal right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right should not be light-heatedly disturbed and (2) if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown the applicant is not entitled as a matter of right to condonation of delay but discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit appeal.” The judgment cited by the learned J.D.R. does not help the respondent in any way as the same relates to the sending of appeals by post. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, I hold that the appellant was not prevented by sufficient cause in the late filing of the appeal. The appeal is dismissed being hit by limitation. Since the appeal is dismissed on the ground of limitation, I am not going into the merits of the appeal.
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