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Case Laws
Showing 1 to 20 of 243 Records
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1986 (2) TMI 349 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... that the High Court or the Court of Session has power to grant anticipatory bail under S. 438(1) to a person after the criminal court has taken cognizance of the case and has issued process viz., the warrant of arrest of that accused person. Therefore, the decision of the Division Bench in Kamalakara Rao's case (1983) 1 APLJ 97 (1983 Cri LJ 872) (supra), upholding the view taken by Madhusudhan Rao J., in N. Dasaratha Reddy's case (1975) 2 APLJ (HC) 214 (supra), and by Ramachandra Raju J, in Crl. M. P. 884 of 1981 does not lay down the correct legal position and consequently all these rulings are overruled. 14. The reference is ordered accordingly. The matter may be posted before a single Judge for disposal. Ramanujulu Naidu, J. (3-3-1986) 15. This is not a fit case for grant of anticipatory bail to the petitioner. The petition is dismissed. 16. It is however open to the petitioner to surrender herself before Police and move this court for bail. 17. Order accordingly.
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1986 (2) TMI 348 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... fore, bad in law. 19. The result is that this petition is allowed and a writ of certiorari be issued to quash and set aside the impugned decision of the respondents refusing to pre-qualify the petitioners for the construction of concrete dam across the Narmada river in Sardar Sarovar Project in Gujarat and we direct the respondents to treat the joint venture of the first and the 2nd petitioners as provisionally pre-qualified to bid for the works and accordingly to issue tender documents so as to enable them to submit their tender for the aforesaid works, subject to the condition that the petitioners will make the needed organisational re-arrangement or legal commitments as required by the State Government in order to strengthen their qualifications and also without prejudice to the right of the State Government to withhold the approval when they submit their bids. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. No order on Civil Application. 20. Petition allowed.
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1986 (2) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... r as to costs. Signed order is placed on the file.
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1986 (2) TMI 346 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... m the Bench Shri Doshi admitted that depreciation at the rate of 10 per cent was allowed on the generating sets. However, this fact by itself does not deprive the assessee of its claim for extra shift allowance. The short question that requires consideration is whether the diesel generating sets are electrical machineries of the type envisaged in the above Schedule. We need hardly mention that the words used herein are indicative of the type of machinery envisaged in this column. Considering the column from this point of view we find that all these machineries and installations are post generation of electricity. The generating set is a basic machinery and, therefore, it is not possible to hold that the generating set falls under this column. Accordingly, following the two orders of the Tribunal relied upon by the assessee’s counsel, we hold that the assessee is entitled to extra shift allowance on the generating sets. In the result, both the appeals are partly allowed.
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1986 (2) TMI 345 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... pointment of the petitioner by the Board of Secondary Education, which alone was competent to make the appointment to the post of Headmaster in any non-Government Secondary School. It thus seems plain that the respondent State has legitimately arrived at a policy decision against any automatic and ipso facto transfer of the services of existing Headmasters of unrecognised schools after their take over. The policy to make such appointments only after reference to the School Service Board and on the basis of their recommendation the appointments made by the Government at the State level are wholly in accordance with justice and, indeed, mandate of Article 16. No quarrel can possibly be made with such a decision. 44. In the light of the aforesaid exhaustive discussion, there is no merit in any of the three civil writ jurisdiction cases, which are hereby dismissed. However, in view of some conflict of precedents within the Court, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1986 (2) TMI 344 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petitioner under the law was liable to pay the stamp duty? or he is arbitrarily called upon to pay the same, secondly whether the instrument itself is chargeable to stamp duty? If the instrument is chargeable to stamp duty and undoubtedly it is, and the petitioner's liability to pay the same under Section 29(f) of the Stamp Act, cannot be disputed, such an argument is of no help to the petitioner, whose initial stand before the respondent No. 2 was that it was held out by the auctioning Authority that the purchaser would be not required to pay any duty for registration etc. (See Annexure-'C') in short raising issue of 'Promissory Estoppel', which has rightly been not raised nor is it available to the petitioner. In such circumstances, the argument fails. 16. The petition for the foregoing reasons, fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee ₹ 250/- if certified to be adjusted against the security deposit made by the petitioner.
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1986 (2) TMI 343 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , the Judges have a constructive role and therefore there is always the need to use such extensive powers with due circumspection. There has to be in the larger public interest an element of selfordained restraint. We hope and trust that the High Court would hereafter use its powers to grant such ad-interim exparte orders with greater circumspection. The appeal must therefore succeed and is allowed. The order passed by the Division Bench dated December 11, 1985 is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge dated November 6, 1985 dismissing the application for release of the seized goods is restored. We direct that the High Court shall take immediate steps to recover back the seized property from the respondents including the two vehicles bearing registration nos. USY 6342 and WBQ 6688 if they have been delivered in pursuance of the orders passed by the learned Judges to respondents. The respondents shall pay the costs of the appellants. Costs quantified at ₹ 5,000.
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1986 (2) TMI 342 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... thdrawn the net income would remain nil. There would thus be no tax effect. Since the net income is nil it is immaterial whether the company is treated as an industrial company or not. Consequently, while we hold that the Order of the ITO on these two points was erroneous, the said erroneous order was not prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. Consequently, for the asst. yr. 1979-80, the ld. CIT should not have exercised the powers under s. 263 of the Act. 5. As for the asst. yr. 1978-79, there are two technical ground, as a result of which powers under s. 263 could not have been exercised. The first ground is that assessment order has merged in the order dt. 19th Feb., 1983 of the CIT(A) prior to the exercise of powers under s. 263 by the CIT. The Special Bench of the Tribunal has held that in Dwarkadas & Co. (P) Ltd. vs. ITO (1982) 6. In the result, we allow the appeals for the asst. yrs. 1978-79 and 1979-80, and partly allow the appeal for the asst. yr. 1980-81.
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1986 (2) TMI 341 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ven an interpretation wider than that warranted by the actual words used in that section. Without any provision to that effect, the word "loan", as used in section 370, cannot be given a wider interpretation to include deposits. 21. It was contended by Mr. Nilkanth that the petitioner company had itself treated the deposits in question as loans, because these amounts are shown in the balance-sheets under the heading "Loans and advances". Since the form of a balance sheet is prescribed under Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956, the amounts in question are required to be shown under the heading "Loans and Advances" on the assets side. The sub-heading, however, clearly describes the amounts as "deposits with joint stock companies". The balance-sheets, therefore, do not assist the respondents. 22. In thee premises, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (2) TMI 340 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... or exhausted his remedies against the principal debtor. The Act does not say that when a notification is issued under section 7(1)(b) of the Act the remedies against the guarantors also stand suspended. In any event the order of the High Court against respondents Nos. 2 to 5 is untenable. (See Bank of Bihar Ltd. V. Damodar Prasad & Anr., 1969 1 S.C.R. 620). Since in the instant case all secured liabilities due to a bank or a financial institution are excluded from the operation of the notification, the suit against respondent No.1 as well as respondents Nos. 2 to 5 remained unaffected by the notification issued by the Central Government. The order of the High Court in the Civil Revision is, therefore, liable to be set aside. We accordingly set aside the orders passed by the High Court against which these appeals are filed and direct the trial court to proceed with the suit. The appeals are accordingly allowed. Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 shall pay the costs of the appellant.
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1986 (2) TMI 339 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... on that court cannot usurp or abdicate, and the parameters of judicial review must be clearly defined and never exceeded. See the observations of Krishna Iyer J. in Fertilizer Corporation Kumgar Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and others 1981 2 S.C.R. p.67 at p.71. It is, however, neither possible nor desirable to define for all purposes that parameter. Judicial review of administrative action depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Its dimension 18 never closed and must remain flexible. But in this case the order of the High Court in the light we have read it, does not exceed that parameter. The petition for special leave is disposed of in the aforesaid manner without grant of any leave to appeal. Except the directions indicated above, there will be no further order on this application. In the facts and circumstances as the State Government has not shown any lack of imitative, the parties will pay and bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1986 (2) TMI 338 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ption is intrinsically defective and self-contradictory. There is, therefore, no reasonable classification and clauses 'First', 'Secondly', and ' Thirdly' of s.l5(1)(a), 'First', 'Secondly' and 'Thirdly', of s.15(1)(b), Clauses 'First', 'Secondly' and 'thirdly' of s.15(1)(c) and the whole of section 15(2) are, therefore, declared ultravires the Constitution. We are told that in some cases suits are pending in various courts and, where decrees have been passed, appeals are pending in appellate courts. Such suits and appeals will now be disposed of in accordance with the declaration granted by us. We are told that there are a few cases where suits have been decreed and the decrees have become final, no appeals having been filed against those decrees. The decrees will be binding inter-partes and the declaration granted by us will be of no avail to the parties thereto. There will be no order regarding costs.
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1986 (2) TMI 337 - ITAT JABALPUR
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... ... ..... any promise for and on behalf of the Government of India to make good the loss to the assessee as claimed. Therefore, the fact that the assessee took credit for the sum in its accounts is neither here nor there. It is now well settled proposition of law that income does not result by making mere book entries. The income must result in law. We would not like to refer to all the decided cases on this issue. Therefore, the crediting of the sum in its books and the approval of this credit by the Comptroller & Auditor General of India does not alter the legal position and convert the claim made by the assessee of the Government into an accrued right. The Department can only tax that amount which was received by the assessee by way of reimbursement was done in this case. The exclusion of the sum in question by the Commissioner(A) is, therefore, right and we approve of his action. 10. In the result, the assessee's appeal is allowed and the departmental appeal is dismissed.
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1986 (2) TMI 336 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ation at the rate of 9 in view of the subsequent amendment of the year 1984. In view of the dictum of law laid down in AIR 1985 SC 1576 Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, we think that the respondent is entitled to larger amount of solatium as well as higher rate of interest than awarded by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment because the solatium has been awarded at the rate of 15 and the interest at the rate of 6 but in view of the amendment the respondent is entitled to the solatium at the rate of 30 and interest at the rate of 9 . 15. In the result, the appeal fails but we modify the impugned judgment to this extent that the respondent should be paid solatium calculated at the rate of 30 and also interest at the rate of 9 on the amount of compensation enhanced from the date on which possession of her land was taken up to the date of the payment of the enhanced compensation. We order accordingly and direct that the parties shall bear their costs of this appeal.
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1986 (2) TMI 335 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... have occurred to the officers concerned subsequently. There may arise further correspondence between the department concerned suggesting starting of schools, providing transport facility etc.. It would be idle to depend upon such internal communication, which is normally not available to the party whose property is acquired and to contend that the notification is bad. Our considered view in this matter is that establishment of a hospital for crippled children falls within the idea of settlement and rehabilitation is displaced persons and the notification cannot be faulted on the ground that the purpose disclosed in the letters is one different from the public purpose disclosed in the notification. The Division Bench of the High Court was in error in quashing the notification. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore that of the Single Judge but, in the circumstances of the case, with no order as to costs.
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1986 (2) TMI 334 - SUPREME COURT
Whether it was necessary to detain the appellant under the COFEPOSA?
Held that:- No one can dispute the right of the detaining authority to make an order of detention if on a consideration of the relevant material, the detaining authority came to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the appellant. But the question was whether the detaining authority applied its mind to relevant considerations. If it did not, the appellant would be entitled to be released. The counters to which we have referred seem to us to make it clear that relevant material was not placed before the detaining authority and therefore, there was no occasion for the detaining authority to apply its mind to the relevant material. In the circumstances, the appellant is entitled to be released. The appeal is allowed and the appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.
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1986 (2) TMI 333 - SUPREME COURT
Whether after the coming into force of the Part States (Laws) Act 1951, the Travancore Christian Succession Act 1092 continues to govern intestate succession to the property of a member of the Indian Christian Community in the territories originally forming part of the erstwhile state of Travancore or is such intestate succession governed by the Indian Succession Act 1925?
Held that:- On the coming into force of Part-B States (Laws) Act, 1951 the Travancore Cochin Succession Act, 1092 stood repealed and Chapter II of Part V of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 became applicable and intestate succession to the property of members of the Indian Christian community in the territories of the erstwhile State of Travancore was thereafter governed by Chapter II of Part V of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. On this view, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether sections 24, 28 and 29 of the Travancore Christian Succession Act, 1092 are unconstitutional and void. We, therefore, allow the writ petitions and declare that intestate succession to the property of Indian Christians in the territories of the former State of Travancore is governed by the provisions contained in Chapter II of Part V of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Petitions allowed.
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1986 (2) TMI 332 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ified the purchase turnover of ivory exigible to tax under section 5A, on the basis of transfer and exports after deducting the margin earned . The assessing authority was accordingly directed to adopt the figure arrived at by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on a best of judgment estimation of the purchase turnover of ivory exigible to tax under section 5A. Even though the taxability under section 5A was challenged before the Appellate Tribunal, the assessee had no challenge against the quantum estimated by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The result of the foregoing discussion is the orders of the statutory authorities below are set aside to the extent they relate to levy of purchase tax under section 5A on the packing materials and remit the case to the assessing authority for reconsideration in the light of the directions and observations contained in this judgment. In all other respects the order of the Tribunal is confirmed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (2) TMI 331 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of section 7(1)(a) and section 7(15) of the Karnataka (Amending Act 13 of 1982) are unenforceable by reason of noncompliance with the requirement of the proviso to article 304(b) or article 255 of the Constitution, untill such compliance is shown (b) Issue a writ of mandamus in each of these cases to the respondents directing them to forbear from enforcing the provisions of section 7(1)(a) and section 7(15) of the amending Act 13 of 1982, as long as non-compliance with the proviso to article 304(b) or with article 255(c) of the Constitution continues (c) Quash that part of the Notification bearing No. FD 14 CET 82, dated 2nd April, 1982, which purports to bring to tax items 4 to 16 in the Schedule to the Principal Act. 82.. In the circumstances of these cases, we leave the parties to bear and pay their own costs in these petitions. Sri M.R. Achar, learned Government Advocate, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within two weeks from today. It is ordered accordingly.
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1986 (2) TMI 330 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... decisions of the Supreme Court wherein it had been categorically laid down that the primary responsibility to pay excise duty was on the manufacturer and though it was paid directly to the Government by a purchaser, still it formed part of the turnover of the manufacturer. For the reasons stated above all the writ petitions fail and they are accordingly dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 each. The counsel for the assessees made a submission that the assessees may be given a reasonable time to make payment inasmuch as they are hard-pressed for money particularly in view of the fact that this is the fag-end of the financial year. We have heard the Government Pleader who opposed grant of time. Taking all facts and circumstances into account, we would direct the assessees to pay 1/4th of the amount now in demand on or before the 31st day of March, 1986, and the entire balance amount on or before 15th of May, 1986. Writ petition dismissed.
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