|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 101 to 120 of 155 Records
-
1986 (6) TMI 55 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
... ...
... ... ..... m to find out whether the contention of the assessee was correct or not. 8. We have looked into the facts and the rival arguments. In our opinion, the AAC accepted the plea of the assessee without giving any opportunity to the ITO to examine the same vis-a-vis the registers maintained in Form nos. 11 and 12. The order of the AAC on this issue, therefore, cannot be upheld. The orders of the authorities below on this issue are set aside and the issue is restored to the file of the ITO for being decided afresh after examining the registers maintained by the assessee in Form nos. 11 and 12 of the Gold Control Act. If these registers are still with the Central Excise Department, the ITO may make necessary arrangements to examine the said registers by getting the registers from the Central Excise Department officially. The assessee should also be given an opportunity of hearing in this connection. 9. In the result, the appeal of the Department would be deemed to have been allowed.
-
1986 (6) TMI 54 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
... ...
... ... ..... particularly when there is a clear finding that the sons of the assessee carried on independent business in dealings of cloth. We have mentioned earlier that the ITO besides mentioning that the assessee gifted a sum of Rs. 5,000 on 14th Jan., 1974 which was utilised by the two sons in their cloth businesses, did not bring any other material to show that the management and control of the two businesses vested with the assessee and that the from the two businesses was enjoyed by the family consisting of the assessee and his two sons. Accordingly we hold that the correct status of the assessee for the year under appeal is that of individual and that the AAC was justified in directing the ITO t exclude the income of Arvind Vastralaya and Janata Handlom Stores aggregating to Rs. 37,000. 5. Ground. No. 2 and 3 raised in the assessee s cross-objection have not been pressed. 6. I the result, the departmental appeal is dismissed and the assessee s cross objection is allowed in part.
-
1986 (6) TMI 53 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
Appellate Tribunal, Procedure of ... ... ... ... ..... itional grounds of appeal taken. We agree with the contention raised by the learned representative of the assessee that this issue is wholly covered by the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. The decision of the Allahabad High Court is binding here. In our opinion, the facts, in the case at present for consideration before us and the facts in the said case before the Tribunal were exactly identical. Respectfully following the decision of the Allahaba High Court on the said issue, we admit the said additional ground of appeal taken before us for consideration. However, as this ground has not been considered by the Commissioner (Appeals), the issue is referred to the Commissioner (Appeals) for being considered and decided at his end, keeping in view the decision of the Tribunal in the assessment year 1977-78. 9 to 16. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues. 17. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part.
-
1986 (6) TMI 52 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
Association Of Persons, Assessable As, Body Of Individuals ... ... ... ... ..... not the case of the ITO nor of the department as would be evident from the grounds of appeal. Even otherwise the contention raised on behalf of the departmental representative does not stand in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of CIT v. K. Adinarayana Murty 1967 65 ITR 607 which has been followed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Ravinder Narain v. ITO 1974 96 ITR 612. We may also refer in this connection the Allahabad High Court decision in Madanlal Agarwal v. CIT 1982 UPTC 1069. It has to be remembered that the assessments were made by issue of notices under section 148 after obtaining the prior approval of the Commissioner. In such circumstances, the ITO had no jurisdiction to frame the assessments in the status of body of individuals on Shri Prem Das when admittedly the notices were issued on Shri Prem Das in the status of an AOP. 7. In the result, both the departmental appeals are dismissed and the cross-objections being infructuous are also dismissed.
-
1986 (6) TMI 51 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-C
... ...
... ... ..... to the submissions advanced before us. To our mind the words exclusively used by him for residential purposes through out the period of 12 months immediately preceding the valuation date should be interpreted pragmatically fairly and reasonable and not in a pedantic sense. The term user does not mean that the assessee should be in physical occupation of the house or any part of it. It means that the house is used by him as a residence and not with a view to make any income or profit out of it. The words residential purposes signify not merely the living of the assessee in the house but it necessarily implies that the house is not used otherwise than as residence. In the instant case the assessee did not let out the house in question and it was being kept ready for use by him as residence. In such circumstances we are, in agreement with the findings of the AAC that conditions of s. 7(4) of the WT Act are satisfied. 5. The appeals therefore fails and are accordingly dismissed.
-
1986 (6) TMI 50 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
Deductions, Donation To Charitable Institution ... ... ... ... ..... s end in view, I have carefully considered the facts of this case vis-a-vis the facts in the other cases cited before me. I am of the view that the fixed deposit receipt which was likely to mature in the next year cannot be said to be a sum of money . As regards the emphasis laid on the instructions issued by the Central Board of Revenue, where the word etc. had been used, I do not agree with the counsel for the assessee that the expression etc. will include within it fixed deposit receipt. On the face of it, it may include pay order and travellers cheque. In any event, the word etc. will take colour from the earlier expression used. Having regard to the above discussion, I am inclined to agree with the learned judicial member and hold that the donation of fixed deposit receipt by the assessee in this case to Shreyas Foundation does not qualify for deduction under section 80G. This order will now go to the Division Bench for deciding the appeal according to the majority view.
-
1986 (6) TMI 49 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-A
Unexplained Investments ... ... ... ... ..... ave carefully gone through the order of assessment, the order of the AAC and the differing orders of the learned Members and the order of the learned Members in the case of Karsan Premijibhai. I find that the cost of construction shown by the assessee at Rs. 3,31,533 is on the basis of the books of account regularly maintained. Without finding anything wrong with the accounts maintained, I do not think one would be justified to make an addition on the mere fact that insurance has been taken on the launch for Rs. 3,51,000. It is common knowledge that on account of inflation and for many considerations, a person would like to insure his plant and machinery at a price slightly higher than the cost so that in the event of destruction, loss or damage, it is fully compensated. In the circumstances, I agree with the learned Accountant Member and hold that the addition is not justified..My order will now go to the Division Bench for deciding the appeal according to the majority view.
-
1986 (6) TMI 48 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Writ jurisdiction ... ... ... ... ..... nts the court made the following order - 2. The point involved in this writ petition has already been answered in favour of the petitioner by a Bench of this Court in Union of India, Resp. by the Collector of Central Excise v. Aruna Sugars Ltd. W.A. Nos. 303, 309 and 311 of 1980 - judgment, dated 12-8-1985 - reported in 1986 (24) E.L.T. 492 (Mad.) 1985 WLR 669 . In view of this, this writ petition has got to be allowed. However, Mr. T. Somasundaram, learned Additional Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the Respondents, would contend that the factory of the petitioner is within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, and hence this Court shall not show the indulgence of interference. The petitioner is a company having its head office in Madras. It is not claimed that the factory itself as an independent entity to suffer a separate assessment. This contention with regard to jurisdiction is not tenable. Hence this writ petition is allowed. No costs.
-
1986 (6) TMI 47 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
Customs House Agents - Licence ... ... ... ... ..... (1). To put it tersely the reconstituted firm can apply for licence under the general provision contained in clause (1) notwithstanding its case not falling squarely within clauses (2) and (3). If it is interpreted otherwise, not only the generality of clause (1) is stultified but as stated above the provision becomes otiose. In the circumstances, therefore, we are of the opinion that the impugned order is bad in law and should be quashed and set aside and the matter be remanded back to the Collector of Customs, Ahmedabad for deciding about the grant of licence afresh on the application made by the petitioner firm in Form A according to the correct legal principles and what we have stated in this order. It is further directed that the Collector of Customs shall grant temporary licence to the petitioner firm till he decides the question of grant of licence on the substantive application as aforesaid. 9.In the result, Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs.
-
1986 (6) TMI 46 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Penalty - Short-landing of goods ... ... ... ... ..... may be passed here in the light of the earlier decision of this Court. 7. In view of my earlier decision as referred to above, the impugned order of the Deputy Collector of Customs, imposing penalty upon the petitioner under Section 116 of the Customs Act, 1962 cannot be said to be either perverse or otherwise bad in law and consequently, cannot be interfered with by this Court, exercising Writ Jurisdiction. 8. The Rule is, accordingly, discharged and the interim order, if any, do stand vacated. 9. The respondents may now realise the amount of penalty imposed upon the petitioner by the impugned order by enforcement of the bank guarantee and/or bond and/or in any other lawful manner. 10. No order is made for costs. 11. Leave is given to the petitioner to file the renewed bank guarantee in the Department in course of this week. 12. Verbal prayer of Mr. Ghosh, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, for stay of operation of this order for four weeks, is considered and rejected.
-
1986 (6) TMI 45 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Burden of proof - Proceedings under the Customs Act penal in nature ... ... ... ... ..... her husband. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate by his judgment and order dated 28th September, 1978 acquitted both of them. It is true that in the said proceedings the Department relied practically only on Section 123 of the Customs Act. As I have already held above, the provisions of Section 123 have been found to be inapplicable to the goods which were seized from the petitioner s house. The appeal against the order of acquittal preferred by the State has been summarily dismissed by this Court. 9. Considering all these facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the orders passed by the authorities below deserve to be set aside. 10. In the result, this petition is allowed. The orders of all the three authorities below are set aside and the proceedings held against the petitioner are quashed. The amounts which have been paid by the petitioner under the orders which are now set aside shall be refunded to her. No order as to costs in this petition.
-
1986 (6) TMI 44 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Manufacture - Intermediate product ... ... ... ... ..... I am not able to sustain the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. Secondly, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that as per the notification referred to above, bagasse should be held to be an intermediate goods or the component part of any goods. This submission also I am not able to sustain. The ultimate product that has been manufactured by the petitioner is sugar. Intermediate good or component part of any goods could only mean a product or a component which results in the course of manufacture of the final product and goes to make the component for the final product and certainly not an independent by-product as in the case of bagasse. Bagasse is certainly not a component part of sugar as such. Equally so, it is not a product which results in the intermediate stage in the course of manufacturing the final product so as to merge with the final product as such. 6. For the above reasons, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
-
1986 (6) TMI 43 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Imports - Advance licence ... ... ... ... ..... oms duty. Thus, the two circumstances relied on by the respondents to refuse the petitioner to enjoy the benefit under the Advance licence scheme are wholly untenable. One other argument advanced by Mr. R. Shanmugham is that when the show cause notice was issued to the petitioner, there was no reply and therefore there is no impropriety in the respondents passing the impugned order. In my view, such a conduct on the part of the petitioner will in no way disentitle it from challenging the validity of the impugned order. As a matter of fact, I did not award costs because the petitioner did not reply to the show cause notice and did not participate in the enquiry held by the respondents. 5. The result is that the impugned order dated 21-6-1984 passed by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports in reference No. 18(524)82-83/ECA/MAD, deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly quashed. Consequently, both the writ petitions are allowed as prayed for. No order as to costs.
-
1986 (6) TMI 42 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Refund admissible - Electric wires and cables - Cross examination - Classification of goods - Natural justice
-
1986 (6) TMI 41 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Wires and cables for telecommunications - Adjudication order ... ... ... ... ..... subsequently amended from time to time. The goods manufactured by the petitioners clearly fall within Serial No. 2(ii) and (iii) of Notification No. 50 of 1968 and the authorities below were clearly in error in not accepting the claim of the petitioners and not approving the classification list accordingly. The petitioners are entitled to the refund for the excess duty paid on mis-construction of application of Notification by the Department. 6. Accordingly, petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). It is declared that the goods manufactured by the petitioners are overground and underground telecommunication wires and cables and in accordance with Notification No. 50 of 1968, the excise duty payable was only 5 ad valorem. The respondents are directed to calculate the amount of refund due to the petitioners and award this refund claim within a period of three months from today. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
-
1986 (6) TMI 40 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Sugar - Bagasse is excisable goods liable to duty ... ... ... ... ..... n and labour and skill spent are irrelevant. In this view, I am not able to sustain the first contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 4. Secondly, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that as per the notification referred to above, bagasse should be held to be an intermediate goods or the component part of any goods. This submission also been manufactured by the petitioner is sugar. Intermediate good or component part of any good could only mean a product or a compound which results in the course of manufacture of the final product and goes to make the component for the final product and certainly not an independent by-product as in the case of bagasse. Bagasse is certainly not a component part of sugar as such. Equally so, it is not a product which results in the intermediate stage in the course of manufacturing the final product so as to merge with the final product as such. 5. For the above reasons, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No costs.
-
1986 (6) TMI 39 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Appeal to Supreme Court - Detention - Seizure - Burden of proof ... ... ... ... ..... icle 133 and 134A of the Constitution for a certificate of fitness to appeal from our order on the ground that the questions raised and decided are substantial questions of law of general importance and they need to be decided by the Supreme Court. 52. We are of the view that one of the questions raised and decided by us viz., whether the non-supply of documents referred to in the grounds when demanded atleast vitiates the detentions, is likely to arise before the High Courts now and then. On that question, there is no direct ruling of the Supreme Court and there is conflict of opinion among the High Courts in the country. We are of the view that that question is a substantial question of law of general importance and the same needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. We, therefore, allow the oral application made by the petitioner and grant a certificate of fitness to appeal from our common order to the Supreme Court of India under Articles 133 and 134A of the Constitution.
-
1986 (6) TMI 38 - HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... ectfully disagree with the order made by the learned Single Judge and make the following order (i) The writ appeal is partly allowed. (ii) The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge that the local anaesthetic manufactured by the respondent on and after 25-11-1974 and in particular during the period commencing from 1-4-1975 to 15-3-1976 was not liable to excise duty under the Act, is set aside. (iii) The order of the learned Single Judge in so far it set aside the demand made by the third appellant calling upon the respondent to pay excise duty of Rs. 1,97,128.40, is confirmed leaving the issue open to be decided by the third appellant after giving an opportunity of hearing to the respondent. (iv) The respondent shall be at liberty to urge all the contentions which it had taken in the writ petition and in this appeal as also other contentions which are open to it in law in contesting any fresh proposal to levy the excise duty during the period in question. (v) No costs.
-
1986 (6) TMI 37 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Inclusions In Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... of the Gift-tax Act which has been inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1980, with effect from April 1, 1980. The said clause (e) to section 4(1) reads (e) Where a person who has an interest in property as a tenant for a term or for life or a remainderman surrenders or relinquishes his interest in the property or otherwise allows his interest to be terminated without consideration or for a consideration which is not adequate, the value of the interest so surrendered, relinquished or allowed to be terminated or, as the case may be, the amount by which such value exceeds the consideration received, shall be deemed to be a gift made by such person. The answer to the question before us would have been different if section 4(1)(e) is applicable to the case on hand. But it is not. Section 4(1)(e) cannot be applied to the present case since the assessment year involved is 1980-81 (sic). For the reasons stated above, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue.
-
1986 (6) TMI 36 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Registered Firm ... ... ... ... ..... firm as capital gains would accrue or could be allocated to the partners as tax-free income added to his other income. If income-tax is payable, the same may be at a higher rate than that prescribed under section 114 which has been imposed in the instant case. For the reasons above, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. The learned advocate for the assessee contended that a substantial question of law has arisen in the instant case and this was a case fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. The learned advocate contended that inasmuch as another High Court has taken a different view, the matter is required to be decided finally by the Supreme Court. The prayer of the assessee is allowed. Let a certificate be issued to the effect that this is case fit for appeal to the Supreme Court. Let the order for issue of certificate be drawn up separately. MONJULA BOSE J.-I agree.
....
|
