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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 155 Records
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1986 (6) TMI 160
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... ... ..... Explanation which was inserted through the Finance Act, 1982 and made retrospective from 1-10-1975. Shri Jain urged that this was because the new Section 4 came into effect only from 1-10-1975 and before that the old Section 4 was in force. It appears to us that if the Legislature had so desired, a corresponding retrospective amendment could have been made in the old Section 4. Since that has not been done, and the amendment made has been specifically made retrospective only from 1-10-1975, it cannot be read into the old Section 4 which was in force prior to 1-10-1975. Therefore, for considering the position prior to 1-10-1975 we have to take into account the wording of old-section 4, that is Section 4 prior to its supersession, without reading into it the Explanation inserted by the Finance Act of 1982. rdquo 12. emsp In view of the above discussion, we uphold the findings of the learned Appellate Collector of Central Excise, in the result all the six appeals are dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 159
Gasket non-automotive ... ... ... ... ..... he goods. The Bench followed the Gujarat High Court decision but classified the product before them under item No. 68 since they did not pass the predominance test. This decision does not appear to us to be relevant to the facts of the present case. As already noted, glass fabrics are direct manufactures from glass fibre or yarn. There can be no dispute about their classification under item No. 22F. The goods before us are manufactures from manufactures of asbestos fibre or yarn. 9. emsp Shri Venkataraman contended before us that though ldquo manufacture rdquo was involved in the conversion of gasketing sheets into gasket, the resultant gasket would continue to remain within item No. 22F(iv). 10. We have already discussed this aspect and come to the conclusion that the subject non-automotive gaskets would not fall under 22F(iv) but would fall under item 68 CET. 11. In the result, the impugned order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed and the show cause notice is discharged.
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1986 (6) TMI 158
Gasket non-automotive ... ... ... ... ..... he goods. The Bench followed the Gujarat High Court decision but classified the product before them under item No. 68 since they did not pass the predominance test. This decision does not appear to us to be relevant to the facts of the present case. As already noted, glass fabrics are direct manufactures from glass fibre or yarn. There can be no dispute about their classification under item No. 22F. The goods before us are manufactures from manufactures of asbestos fibre or yarn. 9. emsp Shri Venkataraman contended before us that though ldquo manufacture rdquo was involved in the conversion of gasketing sheets into gasket, the resultant gasket would continue to remain within item No. 22F(iv). 10. We have already discussed this aspect and come to the conclusion that the subject non-automotive gaskets would not fall under 22F(iv) but would fall under item 68 CET. 11. In the result, the impugned order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed and the show cause notice is discharged.
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1986 (6) TMI 157
Gasket non-automotive ... ... ... ... ..... he goods. The Bench followed the Gujarat High Court decision but classified the product before them under item No. 68 since they did not pass the predominance test. This decision does not appear to us to be relevant to the facts of the present case. As already noted, glass fabrics are direct manufactures from glass fibre or yarn. There can be no dispute about their classification under item No. 22F. The goods before us are manufactures from manufactures of asbestos fibre or yarn. 9. emsp Shri Venkataraman contended before us that though ldquo manufacture rdquo was involved in the conversion of gasketing sheets into gasket, the resultant gasket would continue to remain within item No. 22F(iv). 10. We have already discussed this aspect and come to the conclusion that the subject non-automotive gaskets would not fall under 22F(iv) but would fall under item 68 CET. 11. In the result, the impugned order is upheld and the appeal is dismissed and the show cause notice is discharged.
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1986 (6) TMI 133
Import licence ... ... ... ... ..... the indent is also not a point which would remain material for a decision of these arguments. We, therefore, do not go into the same. 19. emsp In so far as the valuation is concerned, we agree with the finding of the Board that the amount paid to Voltas should form part of the value of the imported goods. We agree with the observations of the Collector and that of the Board that indenting commission by whatever name it is called - here it was called service charges - is nothing but indenting commission. 20. emsp In the light of this finding, we allow the appeal in so far as the validity of the licence is concerned. As the value sought to be excluded from assessment amounted to only 10 of the total value, we take a lenient view and reduce the fine imposed from Rs.3,80,000/- to Rs.10,000/-only. The penalty on M/s. Raymonds Woollen Mills is reduced from Rs.2,00,000/- to Rs.5,000/- only. The penalty on M./s. Voltas is set aside. 21. The appeals are disposed of as indicated above.
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1986 (6) TMI 132
Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... serving that the ldquo actual uses of the product may be ascertained before finalising assessment rdquo . He should have only confined to the chemical composition of the sample. The learned Advocate has cited a number of judgments as to the binding effect of the tariff advice but in the present matter the argument of the learned Advocate for the respondents is not tenable in view of the specific entry in tariff Item 15A. We have already given our observations that whenever there is a specific entry under a particular tariff item, the item will fall in the specific entry than in the general entry, keeping in view the Hon rsquo ble Supreme Court rsquo s judgment in the case of Dunltm India Ltd. and Madras Rubber Factory Ltd. v. Union of India and Others reported in 1983 - ELT - 1566. Accordingly, we hold that the product ldquo Diakanol AMH rdquo is correctly classifiable under tariff Item 15A(i) of the Central Excise Tariff. In the result, the Revenue rsquo s appeal is allowed.
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1986 (6) TMI 131
Appeal - Condonation of delay ... ... ... ... ..... basis of the materials placed before the Tribunal. Despite the opportunity granted the department did not choose to furnish even the basic facts such as when the file was marked to A.O., how long thereafter the Collector came to know of the inaction, whether deliberate or otherwise, on the part of the A.O. and who processed the file subsequently and why there was delay of more than one year. From the perusal of the application one gets an impression that the department was under the misconception that the delay condonation is a matter of course. As stated earlier in order to condone the delay even if the delay is only a day the Tribunal has to be satisfied that the party was prevented by sufficient cause and not any cause from filing the appeal within the prescribed period. The contention of Shri Pal that public interest is involved is insufficient to condone the unexplained unduly long delay of more than a year. 5. For the reasons stated above, this application is rejected.
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1986 (6) TMI 130
Customs duly - Import - Relevant date for duty liability ... ... ... ... ..... y to the relaxations which are usually granted by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports from prohibitions which are clamped down from a given date in so far as goods imported after the imposition of the prohibition but for which irrecoverable letters of credit had been opened prior to the imposition of the bank, is of no avail. Such relaxations appear to be in the nature of executive or administrative relaxations of prohibitions clamped down (without for obvious reasons, advance notice) in the interest of observance of trade contracts and commitments entered into between Indian importers and overseas suppliers. There can be no such argument or scope for relaxation in so far as duty is concerned. In any event, liability to duty or otherwise is governed by the provisions of the Customs Act. 12. emsp In the light of the forgoing discussion, we do not see any reason to differ from the view which we have taken on similar earlier occasions. We, therefore, dismiss the appeals.
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1986 (6) TMI 129
Customs - Clearance of goods for home consumption ... ... ... ... ..... y to the relaxations which are usually granted by the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports from prohibitions which are clamped down from a given date in so far as goods imported after the imposition of the prohibition but for which irrecoverable letters of credit had been opened prior to the imposition of the bank, is of no avail. Such relaxations appear to be in the nature of executive or administrative relaxations of prohibitions clamped down (without for obvious reasons, advance notice) in the interest of observance of trade contracts and commitments entered into between Indian importers and overseas suppliers. There can be no such argument or scope for relaxation in so far as duty is concerned. In any event, liability to duty or otherwise is governed by the provisions of the Customs Act. 12. emsp In the light of the forgoing discussion, we do not see any reason to differ from the view which we have taken on similar earlier occasions. We, therefore, dismiss the appeals.
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1986 (6) TMI 128
Customs - Clearance of goods for home consumption ... ... ... ... ..... istant Collector giving ldquo a let export order rdquo cannot revise under law his own statutory order and the same can only be revised or reviewed in accordance with the provisions under the Act by a superior authority. 9. emsp Unfortunately, in the present case, instead of exercising the revisional or review powers in terms of Sec. 129(d) (1) and (2) of the Act, Collector of Customs has purported to issue a Show Cause Notice and decided the issue as if he were an original adjudicating authority. If the Collector of Customs had exercised jurisdiction as a reversionary or reviewing authority in terms of Section 129(d) of the Act and directed his subordinate authority to file an appeal before the Collector (Appeals), it would have been a proper course but as the same has not been done in the instant case, the impugned order is without jurisdiction and is legally not sustainable. In this view of the matter, we set aside the impugned order appealed against and allow the appeals.
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1986 (6) TMI 127
Appeal - Pre-deposit of duty and penalty ... ... ... ... ..... , has not been provided for. The projected balance sheet for the year ending with 31-3-1986 does not disclose any marked improvement (l) the assessment orders of the quandom partners for income tax or wealth tax do not also disclose any substantial income or assets. 5. emsp Deposit of a penalty of Rs. 5,00,000- itself without touching upon the demand for payment of an amount of Rs. 23,27,519.36 in the context of the meagre resources revealed during the examination of the balance sheet of the applicant, would, per se, constitute ldquo undue hardship rdquo . 6. emsp In the premises, we, hereby, dispense with the deposit of the duty demanded in a sum of Rs. 23,27,519.36 as well as the penalty in a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- on condition that the applicant deposits an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs towards the demand for duty and furnishes an undertaking not to dispose of any of its immovable assets pending judgment in the appeal within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order.
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1986 (6) TMI 126
Alloy - Nickel alloy and stainless steel alloy ... ... ... ... ..... 10 respectively or 0.20 both together. Phosphorous and sulphur cannot be present in terms of the later definition even as residuary or remainder after the contents of all others are accounted for. An alloy containing Phosphorous and sulphur and chromium below 10.5 can be an ldquo Alloy steel rdquo under Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, while it can be neither ldquo stainless steel rdquo because the chromium content is less than 10.5 nor ldquo Other alloy steel rdquo because of the phosphorous and sulphur content) in terms of the definitions in the Amendment Bill, 1985 (vi) one cannot, therefore, read the definition of ldquo stainless steel rdquo in the Amendment Bill into the schedule as it existed prior to the amendment. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the goods in question are not of ldquo stainless steel rdquo falling within Item No.73.15(2) of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The appeal does not sustain and is accordingly dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 125
Printing Industries Products ... ... ... ... ..... ical engineer who reads a label about a new design of transformer will understand nothing except when the label is on the transformer. In a realm of subject understanding, the aluminium label in such cases is preceded by the presence, the structure and the appearance of the apparatus like the transformer, before the reading on the label registers itself as a valuable intelligence. From this it will follow that the printing on the aluminium label as the printing on the paper package or the paper carton, is merely incidental to its use as a label or a wrapper and is not inherently a piece of reading matter and, therefore, the label will not rate as a product of the printing industry. In view of the above, we do not think it would be correct to assess the printing materials as products of the printing industry. 27. emsp We reject the appeal and direct assessment at standard rate under tariff item 68 without benefit of the exemption under notification No. 55/75-CE dated 1-3-1975.
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1986 (6) TMI 124
Proforma Credit ... ... ... ... ..... on this ground, were to consider warning the respondents or imposing any penalties for violation of procedures. To disallow credit of duty already paid even on satisfaction that such duty paid goods have been duly received and further consumed in the production of goods, which on clearance would be charged to duty, amounts to taking the stand that, on account of some default in following the procedural requirement, the Department would collect duty at both ends. This stand is not supportable. It is this principle which guides the earlier decision of this Tribunal in the case of lsquo Chemi Equip Limited v. Collector of Central Excise, Thane rsquo (supra) which undoubtedly covers the point at issue that procedural lapses should not be cited for denying the assessee the benefit of set off, where the receipt of goods, their essential duty paid character and their utilisation for further production is not disputed. 5. emsp In view of our foregoing finding the appeal is dismissed.
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1986 (6) TMI 123
CLASSIFICATION ... ... ... ... ..... t Act for a definition of cotton fabrics. 42. emsp Thus, as against the decision of the Madras High Court which held that the goods now in issue before us (tarpaulin) would not be a textile, the Bombay and Gujarat High Courts have held that the same would be cotton fabric only, specifically referring to the definition thereof as in Item 19 of the First Schedule to the Central Excises and Salt Act. Further, the basis of the Madras High Court judgment was the user test but the Supreme Court has, as earlier noted, disapproved of the said test for purposes of classification. In the circumstances, I am of opinion that as between the differing judgments of the High Courts on this question, it is the judgments of the Bombay and Gujarat High Courts that are to be followed in the present instance. 43. emsp Following the said judgments, I agree with the conclusions of brother Shri Prakash Anand in the order prepared by him and therefore concur with him that the appeal is to be allowed.
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1986 (6) TMI 122
Demand - Set off of duty ... ... ... ... ..... is not in respect of the duty short levied or short paid on the finished products, but in respect of a certain sum alleged to have been erroneously taken credit of and availed of. Whether the credit was taken on the appellant rsquo s own (but under intimation to the Superintendent) or it was ldquo allowed rdquo is immaterial since the fact is that credit had been availed of which the department felt was erroneously availed of. It is this which they were seeking to recover. Such a recovery, in the view of the Bombay High Court, which we respectfully follow, amounts to short levy which is what is sought to be recovered. In the result, the notice is hit by limitation and is set aside. In this view of the matter, we do not consider it necessary to go into the other submissions made before us including those on the question whether, but for the limitation, the credit would have been admissible to the appellants. 10. We allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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1986 (6) TMI 103
Valuation Of Assets, Unquoted Equity Shares ... ... ... ... ..... bed under rule 1D, a proper discount has to be given. The discount given of 15 per cent, i.e., adoption of 85 per cent is the normal discount given invariably in every case where the break-up method is adopted. Where there are special restrictions, as in the present case, a larger discount would be warranted..We would, therefore, direct that in the present case the value of each share in Abhirami Cotton Mills (P.) Ltd. on each of the valuation dates will be computed in terms of rule 1D, i.e., after allowing the normal discount of 15 per cent applicable in all cases. Thereafter, with reference to the value before allowing discount of 15 per cent, a further discount of 25 per cent will be given in each case. Such value would be the market value of the share on the respective valuation dates. The WTO would recompute the value of the share on each of the valuation dates in accordance with our aforesaid directions. 10. In the result, all the appeals are treated as allowed in part.
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1986 (6) TMI 101
Plant, Poultry Farming ... ... ... ... ..... we remit back the matter to the ITO to decide the issue of allowability or otherwise of investment allowance, after considering the cages installed by the assessee for rearing the birds as plant . 4. The next ground in the appeals is that the Commissioner (Appeals) erred in holding that the higher depreciation applicable to Class III factory buildings should to be allowed no the poultry farm buildings, belonging to the appellant. While deciding this issue the Commissioner (Appeals) followed his order for the earlier year 1982-83. For that year, it was held by the Tribunal that the building in which the poultry business was carried on by the assessee cannot be classified as factory building. Accordingly, the claim was rejected. Following respectfully the decisions of the Tribunal for the assessment year 1982-83 in IT Appeals No. 2056 (Mad.) of 1984, we uphold the action of the lower authorities in rejecting the assessee s claim. 5. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1986 (6) TMI 99
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... ... ..... this stage. The appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. A. Kalyanasundharam, A.M. - I concur with the conclusion arrived at my learned Brother only to the extent that under rectification proceedings, the issue could become arguable and therefore may not be said to be mistake apparent from the record. At the same time, I may also add that the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner v. Thayaballi Mulla Jeevaji Kapasy (1967) 66 ITR 147(SC) had held that if a notice is invalid, then all proceedings on pursuance of such an invalid notice would be illegal and void, thereby even if the assessee has co-operated consequent to such an invalid notice, even then the proceedings would remain invalid. This has been added by me only to the extent that the Act does not envisage any revised return for belated returns under section 139(4) and once the time of one year has been granted under that section a further time of one more year under section 139(6) is not at all permissible under law.
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1986 (6) TMI 98
Liquor Business ... ... ... ... ..... the earlier year was no ground for taxing in that year. In the present case the position is rather different. Here the assessee claimed some compensation from the Government but the amount of that claim has never been decided. It was stated on behalf of the assessee that whatever claim was accepted by the Government the assessee was prepared to be taxed thereon, whenever it was so done. This we think would be more fair to both the parties because it is premature to say what would be the ultimate fate of the assessee rsquo s claim. The mere fact that some stay orders in relation to the closing of liquor shops were issued is not conclusive of the genuineness of the assessee rsquo s claim, and it would not be safe to tax the entire claim in this year. The department would be at liberty to bring it to tax as and when the assessee gets any further amount from the Government. With these remarks, we are of the opinion that there is no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed.
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