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Case Laws
Showing 161 to 180 of 265 Records
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1986 (9) TMI 106 - ITAT BOMBAY-D
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... ... ..... TR 603 (SC), the Supreme Court has held that the liability to tax in respect of any readjustment had to be determined according to the strict legal form of the transaction. The Court observed It is now well settled that the taxing authorities are not entitled in determining whether a receipt is liable to be taxed to ignore the legal character of the transaction which is the source of the receipt and to proceed on what they regard as the substance of the matter .......The taxing authority is entitled and indeed is bound to determine the true legal relation resulting from a transaction. If the parties have chosen to conceal by a device the legal relation it is open to the taxing authority to unravel the device and determine the true character of the relationship. But the legal effect of a transaction cannot be displaced by probing into the substance of the transaction. This passage answers the alternative argument of the assessee. 9. In the result, the appeal stands dismissed.
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1986 (9) TMI 105 - ITAT BOMBAY-D
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... ... ..... e the taxing authority in the High Court has held that the amount was taxable, the Supreme Court reversed that finding and held that the lease by which the Cinema house was demised did not contain any condition or stipulation from which it could be inferred that the aforesaid amount had been paid by way of advance rent. Therefore, the same was not taxable. 11. When the assessee has treated the amount as liability in his hands because the amount has to be adjusted against the rent payable in future, it cannot be treated as payment of advance rent so as to taxable as revenue receipt in the hands of the assessee. In any event, the matter is in our opinion directly covered by the decision of the Tribunal in the case of Mr. and Mrs. H.N. Kelawala and respectfully following the same we hold that the sum of Rs. 10 lakhs received in this year by the assessee was not taxable in the hands of the assessee as revenue income. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the addition is deleted.
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1986 (9) TMI 104 - ITAT BOMBAY-D
Closing Stock, Purchase Price, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... is income under section 41(1) is not justified as it is not proved that the assessee had got in his present capacity the benefit of deduction on account of purchase of the buffaloes that were sold during the year. We find there is no change in the income or tax as a result of the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) on this issue and in that sense the department is not aggrieved by the Commissioner (Appeals) s order. Even on merits the department has no case for the taxation of amount as profit under section 41(1). The assessee has himself offered the amount as a trading receipt and its taxability has not been challenged before us by the assessee either in a cross-objection or in a cross-appeal. We would, therefore, hold that this ground of appeal by the revenue is misconceived. The same is, therefore, dismissed. 12. In the result, the appeal by the department will be treated as allowed in part. The addition of Rs. 1,98,597 as capital expenditure made by the ITO is restored.
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1986 (9) TMI 103 - ITAT BOMBAY-C
Quoted Equity Shares, Unquoted Shares, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ether a different method. For all these reasons, we are of the view that the contention on behalf of the assessee raised for the first time should be rejected. 8. It was submitted that the Special Bench of the Tribunal has in the case of WTO v. C.J. Sheth 1983 4 ITD 706 (Bom.) followed the Gujarat High Court decision in the case of Ashok K. Parikh and we should not depart from the view taken by the Special Bench. The decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the Karnataka High Court are subsequent to the decision of the Special Bench of the Tribunal in the case of C.J. Sheth. Since two High Courts have taken a view, we are of the opinion that we should fall in line with the majority view. 9. In the result, while reversing the order of the AAC, we hold that the method of valuation made by the WTO while applying rule 1D was proper and the same is restored. The shares shall be accordingly valued for the purposes of the assessment. The department s appeals stand allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 102 - ITAT BOMBAY-C
Agricultural Land, Assessment Proceedings, Assessment Year, Jurisdiction For Reassessment, Reassessment Proceedings
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1986 (9) TMI 101 - ITAT BOMBAY-B
Undisclosed Income ... ... ... ... ..... ase cited by the learned counsel which is relied upon by the Commissioner (Appeals) also are distinguishable from the facts of the present case. 14. Since there is no iota of evidence on record to show that the expenditure incurred was wholly and exclusively for the benefit of the business of the bank or any way connected with the business of the bank, we cannot agree with the finding of the Commissioner (Appeals) that the entrance fees and subscription of clubs are not perquisite within the meaning of section 17(2)(iii) or (iv). We, therefore hold that the Commissioner (Appeals) has erred in giving relief and holding that the entrance fees and subscription of Rs. 6,200 and Rs. 1,730 respectively paid by the employer-bank to the assessee cannot be treated as perquisite, and accordingly deleting the same from the taxable income of the assessee. The order of the Commissioner (Appeals) is hereby set aside and that of the ITO is restored. 15. In the result, the appeal is allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 100 - ITAT AMRITSAR
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... ... ..... penalty is not imposable. In this case there is bona fide on part of the assessee, in view of the fact that the CTD are purchased by the assessee in the name of her daughter, when she was minor and it is the daughter Miss Gauri Tulsi, who encashed these on attaining the age of majority. Therefore, it is proved that the amount in dispute is belonging to Miss Gauri Tulsi and it cannot be held otherwise, if it is given to the assessee after 21 months of the encashment of the CTD. Moreover, if it is not shown as liability in the wealth-tax assessment, it cannot be held that there is no bona fide on the part of the assessee that because it is merely an omission. 14. In view of our above discussion and reasons thereto, we hold that there is no basis for imposing and sustaining the penalty in the case of the assessee. Therefore for these reasons we hold that the AAC is justified in deleting the penalty imposed by the ITO on the assessee. 15. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1986 (9) TMI 99 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
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... ... ..... for. 5. We have carefully considered the submissions of the parties. In the immediately preceding year, the assessee had shown investment at Rs. 27,100 which was enhanced by the ITO to Rs. 35,000 but in appeal it was restricted to Rs. 30,000 and no further appeal was preferred by the assessee. It is clear from the record that the assessee did not furnish details in regard to the investment. The assessee was required to furnish details, but he failed to do so and the ITO was left with no option, but to estimate the investment. The assessee only contended that it was excessive and even before us no further material has been placed to show that a particular amount was invested in the cement business. The assessee had withheld the material evidence which would have clinched the issue and, therefore, it is clear that the estimate in regard to the investment in cement business is fair and reasonable and no interference is called for. 6. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 98 - ITAT ALLAHABAD-A
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... ... ..... n the income shown and finally determined is very small. We, respectfully following the decision of Hon ble Allahabad High Court in the case of K.L. Mangal Sain hold that concealment of income to the tune of Rs. 8,000 was not due to any fraud or gross or wilful neglect and, therefore, the burden which lay on the assessee had already been discharged by the aforesaid evidence. The Deptt. thereafter not collected other reliable evidence. Taking the totality of the facts and circumstances and the material on record, we are convinced that the assessee had discharged the initial onus which lay on it. On the contrary, the Department failed to collect sufficient material to establish the concealment of income. We, therefore, hold that penalty in this case was not liveable as the factum of concealment had not been proved by cogent evidence. The penalty confirmed by the AAC is knocked off. 8. In the result, the appeal is allowed and in case penalty is paid, the same shall be refunded.
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1986 (9) TMI 97 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
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... ... ..... d going through the records find that the ITO has disallowed expenses of Rs. 5,000 over and above the lumpsum addition of Rs. 5,000 which is at variance with the procedure followed by him in asst. yr. 1980-81. As we observe from the order of the ITO in para 3 even the lumpsum addition of Rs. 5,000 has been made as according to the ITO there is no check over the expenses . We accordingly do not understand the logic of making a further disallowance of Rs. 3,000. 17.1. For the detailed reasons given in our order pertaining to asst. yr. 1980-81, we allow the appeal of the assessee and delete the addition of Rs. 5,000 as well as Rs. 3,000 made by the ITO and as sustained by the AAC. 18. As a result the appeal for asst. yr. 1981-82 is allowed. 19. Before we part with these appals, we would like to record that the ld. counsel of the assessee has argued these appeals commendably and has brought on record all facts in detail and as should be normally done. We record our appreciation.
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1986 (9) TMI 96 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
Business Loss, Year In Which Deductible ... ... ... ... ..... t in mind the various other case laws cited by both sides in coming to the conclusion that we have. 7. Ground Nos. 2 and 3 in the assessee s appeal challenges the levy of interest under section 139(8) and 217(1A). 8. We find from the order of the CIT(A) that he has held that interest under both provisions is chargeable. He has, however, left the option to the company to move an application for waiver of interest under the rules. Before us, it has been contended that the levy interest is consequential to the disallowance of loss amounting to Rs. 2,87,516 in respect of stolen jeeps. The learned D. R., On the other hand, relies totally on the order of the CIT (A) as regards charging of penal interest. We after hearing the rival contentions do accordingly hold that consequential relief be allowed to the assessee as a result of the decision that we have taken in respect of ground No. 1 pertaining to the loss in respect of stolen jeeps. 9. As a result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 95 - ITAT AHMEDABAD-B
Deductions, Long-term Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... en made. This letter has not been referred to either by the ITO or by the Commissioner (Appeals). In fitness of things, the assessee may be given a fresh opportunity in this regard and his claim be adjudicated de novo in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the discussion which we have set out above. 9.1 Before we part, we may say that the decision in the case of Gautam Sarabhai does not advance the case of the assessee any further. On the contrary, it states the proposition on the same lines which we have set out here inasmuch as the adjustment of capital loss against capital gain has to be made first before determining the total income and the relief under section 80T has to be given effect to thereafter. This decision as pointed out earlier fortifies the view which we have taken. 9.2 In the view which we have taken, it is not considered necessary to consider other points raised in the grounds of appeal. 10. As a result, the appeal of the revenue is partly allowed.
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1986 (9) TMI 94 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI-LB
Insulators
... ... ... ... ..... lassified as parts of electrical apparatus for making or breaking circuits (iv) we are, therefore, unable to uphold the decision in the said case. On the contrary, the decisions in 1983 E.L.T. 1794 and 1983 E.L.T. 2047 accord with our views (v) the decision in 1984 (16) E.L.T. 512 was on a concession, and the decision of the Tribunal in 1983 E.L.T. 177 centers entirely around eligibility to the benefit of the exemption in Customs Notification No. 172 of 8-8-1977, once the goods were admittedly classifiable under Heading No. 85.18/27(1). It has, therefore, no relevance (d) the contention, in the alternative, for classification under sub-item (7) also does not commend itself to us, seeing that the insulators in question have, admittedly, to be used, not by themselves, but necessarily as parts of circuit breakers. 14.In the result, we hold that the insulators in question are to be classified under Sub-Heading (1) of Heading 85.18/27 and not under Sub-Headings (3) or (7) thereof.
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1986 (9) TMI 93 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Reference to High Court ... ... ... ... ..... on should be 5 years and not 6 months from the date of payment of duty? It is in view of the fact that under Rule 173H no time limit is fixed within which duty paid goods could be returned to the factory and within which such duty paid goods could be removed from the factory after reprocessing. 3. Whether if the Tribunal s view is held to be correct then no duty could be demanded in this case of any contravention under Rule 173H if duty paid goods are returned after 6 months from the date of payment of duty? Such a situation will obviously be not tenable. 2. Consequently, we direct the Tribunal to set out the material facts necessary to decide the aforesaid three questions.
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1986 (9) TMI 92 - SC ORDER
Imports under buffer scheme by Steel Authority of India ... ... ... ... ..... omer we shall be thankful for your refunding the amount of duty either to us or directly to the customer M/s Steel Strips Ltd., Chandigarh. Emphasis added The import must be held to have been made by the Steel Authority of India and not by the appellant. The result would be that having regard to the buffer scheme the Steel Authority of India, real importers, would be entitled to exemption from payment of duty. The Tribunal was in error in dismissing the appeal of the appellant. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the order of the competent authority as confirmed by the Tribunal, and direct that if the amount of duty has been recovered, it shall be refunded to the party from whom it was recovered. There will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 91 - SC ORDER
Recovery of duty ... ... ... ... ..... ed for time to make payment on the ground that the textile industry is in a very difficult position and unless some time is given, the textile units may face closure resulting in loss of production and unemployment. We would, therefore, grant time to the petitioners to pay off the balance of arrears of excise duty. Fifty percent of such balance shall be paid on or before 15th March, 1987 and the remaining part of the balance shall be paid by the petitioners on or before 15th September, 1987. In view of this order granting time, the respondents will raise the attachments levied on the goods of some of the textile units in question. If the petitioners commit default in payment of one half of the balance on or before 15th March, 1987, the entire amount of the balance shall become due and payable forthwith. The petitioners also undertake to this Court through their counsel that they will not alienate or dispose of or deal with their assets except in the usual course of business.
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1986 (9) TMI 90 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Valuation when full duty charged from customer in spite of exemption - Estoppel ... ... ... ... ..... he value as per the price list submitted by the company excluding the effective duty which means the duty which is prescribed under the Act minus the exemption granted in regard to the same. In view of the above decisions of this Court, the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners deserves to be rejected 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioners wanted to raise before us another contention regarding promissory estoppel. No such contention is raised by the petitioner in the petition. The question about promissory estoppel is a question of fact which must be pleaded in the petition. Even otherwise, there is no merit in the contention because the exemption is claimed under the Notification issued under Rule 8 and at the time of claiming the exemption, an undertaking is given that they would be liable to pay full excise duty if so determined by the Department. There is thus no merit in the above contention about the promissory estoppel, which also deserves to be rejected.
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1986 (9) TMI 89 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Customs - Rate of duty, and withdrawal of exemption - Customs Classification ... ... ... ... ..... ses Act, 1897 and held that the old exemption notification continued to apply to the new tariff item 18E. With respect to the learned single Judge we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned single judge. 14. Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that where any Central Act or Regulation is replaced and re-enacted (with or without notification) then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any notification inter alia, under the replaced Act will continue to remain in force insofar as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of the re-enacted Act unless and until it is superseded. This section can have no application to a case where a new tariff entry is introduced by amendment. In such a situation there is no repealed and re-enacted Central Act. We are therefore, unable to apply the ratio of that judgment to the present case. In the premises the appeal fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1986 (9) TMI 88 - HIGH COURT OF PATNA (RANCHI BENCH)
Steel Ingots - Promissory estoppel - Demand - Words and Phrases ... ... ... ... ..... the scraps which answered the descriptions in Notification No. 66/73-C.E. and on other articles manufactured from the ingots by them in terms of Notification No. 152/77. The petitioner - Tisco is exempted from any excise duty on the scraps in terms of Notification No. 150/77-C.E. They have accordingly no liability to pay the demands. 33. In the result the two writ applications are allowed, the demands contained in Annexures 4, 5 and 6 in C.W.J.C. No. 337 of 1981(R) and Annexures 5, 6, 7 and 8 in C.W.J.C. No. 338 of 1981(R) are hereby quashed and the respondents are restrained from demanding any excise duty from the petitioners and treat the scraps, ingots and other articles produced from the ingots exempted so long the above three notifications are in force. Let a writ in the nature of certiorari and consequential mandamus accordingly be issued. The respondents shall pay to the petitioners the costs of litigation, hearing fee Rs. 250/- only. Madan Mohan Prasad, J. - I agree.
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1986 (9) TMI 87 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Writ jurisdiction vis-a-vis ... ... ... ... ..... d under which the Tribunal could send a reference to the High Court if it was satisfied that the case involved question of law. Before the Tribunal, the petitioner raised a number of grounds which are enumerated in paragraph 10 of the writ petition. The application was rejected on 4th April, 1986. Thereafter, instead of filing an application under sub-section (3) of Section 35G of the Central Excise and Salt Act, the petitioner filed the present writ petition and obtained a stay order. The petitioner s counsel was informed on the as occasion that the writ petition was not maintainable. The time was sought for converting the writ petition into application for reference, but this has not been done. Since a specific remedy for filing an application for reference is provided in the Central Excise Act, this writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected on that ground. The writ petition is rejected and the interim stay order given on 23rd April, 1986 is withdrawn.
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