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Case Laws
Showing 201 to 220 of 278 Records
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1987 (4) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Valuation - Trade discount ... ... ... ... ..... s not been considered at all, the impugned order being order No. 2033 of 1976 of the Government of India passed by the joint Secretary to the Department of Revenue and Banking on 24-11-1976 is quashed. The order of the Appellate Collector of Central Excise being order in appeal No. 54/C.O. of 1975, dated 21-2-1975 is also quashed. The Appellate Collector the respondent No. 3, is directed to pass a fresh order in accordance with law after giving a notice of hearing to the petitioner. The Appellate Collector must examine the scope and effect of the order passed by the Central Board of Revenue on 2nd May, 1956, and must dispose of the case within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order. All the questions of fact and law are left open to be agitated before the Appellate Collector. The Appellate Collector will also be entitled to find out the facts and decide all questions of law as he thinks fit. 21. The writ petition is disposed of finally as above.
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1987 (4) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Export - Imports for re-export - Dutiability ... ... ... ... ..... n appeal before the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, and the said Tribunal by its order, dated April 26, 1983 rejected the appeal so far as the case of the petitioner for 240 bales was concerned. 3. In view of the concurrent finding made by both the authorities that the petitioner could not produce the relevant documents to establish that the goods-in-question had been exported and the petitioner was entitled to the benefit under the Rules, in my view, the Writ Court cannot decide the question of fact whether the goods had really been exported or not. It is a matter to be decided by the authorities concerned on being satisfied on the basis of the evidence required to be produced and when it appears that the authorities concerned were satisfied that the goods were not exported, this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is unable to give any relief to the petitioner. 4. Accordingly, the writ petition is rejected and dismissed.
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1987 (4) TMI 76 - HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Refund claim time barred when filed after prescribed period of limitation ... ... ... ... ..... st dictates and equity projects. In that connection, the Supreme Court further held Where public bodies, under colour of public laws, recovery people s moneys, later discovered to be erroneous levies the dharma of the situation admits of no equivocation. There is no law of limitation, especially for public bodies, on the virtue of returning what was wrongly recovered to whom it belongs. Nor is it palatable to our jurisprudence to turn down the prayer for high prerogative writs, on the negative plea of alternative remedy, since the root principle of law married to justice, is un jus ibi remedium. 18. For what we have said above, we partly allow the writ petition and quash the orders of the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, dated 1-9-1984 and the Collector, Customs and Central Excise (Appeals), New Delhi, dated 17-7-1986, for the years 1982-83 and 1983-84, and further direct the Central Excise to refund the excise duty to the petitioner to which it may be found entitled to.
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1987 (4) TMI 75 - SUPREME COURT
Fabrics - Man-made fabrics ... ... ... ... ..... ion III. - Explanation II under Item 19 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to this Item as it applies in relation to that Item. 3. It is accepted that yarn is woven into fabric. Item 19 deals with cotton fabrics while Item 22 deals with man-made fabrics. On the footing recorded by the Tribunal, it is claimed that there was no pre-existing base fabric and the manufacturing process simultaneously brought into existence the commodity by weaving yarn into fabric and application of P.V.C. Compound. 4. In view of the higher percentage of P.V.C. Compound in commodity, it becomes difficult to treat the ultimate goods as man-made fabrics for holding that it is covered by Item 22. Upon this analysis it follows that the Tribunal came to the correct conclusion when it held that the goods were not covered by Item 22 and, therefore, for the residuary item 68 applied. All these appeals are without any merit and are dismissed. Each of the respondents should be entitled to its costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 74 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ourt, but for the opinion that the order passed in First Appeal No. 157 of 1972 was binding, the questions of law proposed by the appellant would have arisen. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we have come to the conclusion that the aforesaid questions call for consideration and that a statement of the case should be referred to the High Court by the Appellate Tribunal. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and direct the Appellate Tribunal to state the case to the High Court on the questions of law suggested by the appellant. It will be open to the Appellate Tribunal to reframe the questions in order that the real points of law may be brought out in those questions. There will be no order as to costs. Special Leave Petitions Nos. 7738-39 of 1981 -Upon the particular facts and circumstances of the cases, it has not been shown to us why we should grant special leave in these cases. The special leave petitions are rejected. There will be no order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the benefits of partnership given to minors, Kiritkumar Chhotalal and Deepak Kumar Chhotalal, was a gift under the Gift-tax Act, 1958 ?
Held that:- Once goodwill is taken to be property and with the admission of the two minors to the benefits of partnership in respect of a fixed share, the right to the money value of the goodwill stands transferred, the transaction does constitute a gift under the Act. Since there has been no dispute about valuation of the goodwill as made by the Gift-tax Officer, with the conclusion that there has been a gift in respect of a part of the goodwill, the answer to the question referred has to be in the affirmative, that is, it constitutes a gift under the Act. The appeal is allowed and the conclusion of the High Court is reversed.
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1987 (4) TMI 72 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ncealed the particulars of the income within the meaning of section 271(1)(c). The facts discussed above would show that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had rightly found that there was concealment of particulars of income within the meaning of section 271(1)(c) and hence the assessees were liable for the penalty. The facts dealt with by us would show that the Tribunal has not, properly framed the question. The question, accordingly, is recast as follows Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in cancelling the penalty levied under section 271(1)(c) ? For the reasons stated above, we answer the question aforesaid in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessees. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these tax referred cases. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (4) TMI 71 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Appeals, Penalty, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... a. 7 thereof would at once show that the specific issue was not under consideration and is no warrant for a proposition contrary to Ramanand Singh and Co. s case 1987 164 ITR 78 (Pat). Even otherwise, as has already been pointed out, Ramanand Singh and Co. s case had referred to and relied on Arvind N. Mafatlal v. ITO 1957 32 ITR 350 (Bom), which, as noticed, has been affirmed by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court. I find no adequate reason whatsoever to differ from or take a view contrary to the case of Ramanand Singh and Co. v. CIT 1987 164 ITR 78 (Pat) which has been arrived at after an exhaustive discussion of principle and precedent. The somewhat tenuous challenge to its correctness on behalf of the assessee, therefore, must be rejected. In the light of the above, the answer to question No. (2) is rendered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. UDAY SINHA J.-I -agree. B. N. AGRAWAL J.-I agree.
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1987 (4) TMI 70 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... R 412 and Narrondas Manordass v. CIT 1957 31 ITR 909. Accordingly, it has got to be held that the orders of assessment for the assessment years 1965-66 and 1967-68, including the deemed orders of waiver of interest under section 139 for assessment for the assessment year 1965-66 and under section 217 for the assessment year 1967-68, had merged in the orders of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Since at the time the Additional Commissioner was seeking to exercise powers of revision under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the requisite orders had stood merged in those of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, we agree with the Tribunal that the Additional Commissioner could not have exercised jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act. In the result, the second question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. In the above view of the matter, the other questions of law do not need an answer and are returned unanswered. No order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 69 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... as taxable or not. Had that been the question, the question of the year of assessment would have to be considered along with the liability to tax. But, upon the findings, the question of the year of taxability need not be answered. I, therefore, refuse to answer question No. (5). Thus, questions Nos. (1) and (2) are answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee and question No. (4) is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. So far as questions Nos. (3) and (5) are concerned, this court refuses to answer the same. These references are thus disposed of with costs. In Taxation Case No. 62 of 1977, hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250 payable by the assessee. In each of the Taxation Cases Nos. 63 and 64 of 1977, hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 250 payable by the Revenue. Let a copy of this judgment be forwarded to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench B , Patna, in terms of section 260 of the Act. UDAY SINHA J.-I agree.
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1987 (4) TMI 68 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and (2) That the section conferred arbitrary exercise of power on the Income-tax Officer and did not provide for any guidelines or classification, thereby offending article 14 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, after carefully considering the arguments, repelled both the submissions and held that the section did not suffer from any vice of the nature urged before it. The question whether the Income-tax Officer can, under section 241 of the Act, withhold a refund without forming an opinion regarding its adverse impact on the Revenue, and, merely for the reason that some proceedings under the Act are pending, was neither canvassed nor gone into. This case, therefore, does not help the submissions made on behalf of the Revenue. In the result, the petition succeeds and the same is allowed. The order made by the income-tax authorities withholding the refund to the petitioner, as communicated to it vide letter dated December 9, 1985, annexure P-2 to the petition, is quashed.
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1987 (4) TMI 67 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ued income-tax liability was a debt owed by the assessee on the valuation date. The Punjab and Haryana and Karnataka High Courts in Ashok Kumar Oswal (Minor) 1984 148 ITR 620 and CWT v. N. Krishnan 1986 162 ITR 309 have taken a contrary view. The Karnataka High Court has followed the Punjab and Haryana High Court s decision. Both the courts equated the expression tax payable with reference to book profits with the tax payable thereon less advance tax paid. With respect, there does not seem to us to be any warrant for such a view. In the circumstances, we are in agreement with the Tribunal that for the purpose of determining excess of provision for taxation over the tax payable with reference to book profits in terms of Explanation II(ii)(e) to rule ID, the tax payable with reference to book profits cannot be reduced by the amount of advance tax paid. Accordingly, we answer the question of law referred to us in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 66 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... eopening the assessment disclose that the petitioner sought for rectification of the assessments and succeeded in having an order allowing the expenditure incurred on ropeways as revenue expenditure. The consequence of this finding is that the assessee cannot have the benefit of both the allowances on the same count both as revenue expenditure and depreciation treating it as capital expenditure. The finding of the Tribunal while allowing the assessee s claim as revenue expenditure, was a finding which could rightly be construed as a finding to give effect to which the Income-tax Officer took action to withdraw the depreciation to which the assessee was not entitled and which was wrongly allowed. The notice, therefore, does not suffer from any illegality and the action of the Income-tax Officer is saved under the provisions of section 150(1) of the Act. For the reasons stated above, I dismiss the writ petition. Petitioner is permitted to file return within 8 weeks from today.
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1987 (4) TMI 65 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Transfer Of Case ... ... ... ... ..... tizens thereby converting what was a non-resident company to a resident company. The structure, character and status of the company changed by this expenditure. The expenditure was incurred for creating or curing or perfecting title to the share capital of the company in accordance with the requirements of the statute and not for the protection of the business of the company. The expenditure, in our view, was undoubtedly capital expenditure and, therefore, not deductible as a business expenditure. In the circumstances, we answer question No. 3 in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The other questions, in the light of this answer, do not require to be answered, and they are not accordingly answered. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this tax referred case. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (4) TMI 64 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... he book assets, and that, therefore, such reserves cannot be taken as forming part of the paid up capital for the purpose of computing the capital under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964? (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, diminution of the capital in proportion to the deduction allowed under sections 80M and 80G of the Income-tax Act is permissible under rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964 ? Question No.1 has been referred at the instance of the assessee and question No. 2 at the instance of the Revenue. The assessment years are 1972-73 and 1973-74. The assessee is limited company. Both the questions arise under the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, (the Act ). Question No. 2 has to be answered in the light of the decision of this court in CIT v. Premier Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. 1981 128 ITR 694 (Ker), in the affirmative (sic), that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We do so.
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1987 (4) TMI 63 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Transfer Of Case ... ... ... ... ..... on or even this court under article 136 of the Constitution in an appropriate case for challenging the order, inter alia, either on the ground that it is mala fide or arbitrary or that it is based on irrelevant and extraneous considerations. Whether such a writ or special leave application ultimately fails is not relevant for a decision of the question. We are clearly of opinion that the requirement of recording reasons under section 127(1) is a mandatory direction under the law and non-communication thereof is not saved by showing that the reasons exist in the file although not communicated to the assessee. No other authority of the Supreme Court to the contrary was cited by learned counsel for the respondents and the aforesaid authority clinches the matter in favour of the petitioner. In view of the above discussion, the impugned notification transferring the case of the petitioner from Bombay to Madras is held invalid and, consequently, the same is quashed to that extent.
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1987 (4) TMI 62 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Company, Offences And Prosecution, Person ... ... ... ... ..... tion 276B of the Income-tax Act. This does not mean that this section will be rendered nugatory because as stated above and as pointed out by the learned judges of the Allahabad and the Madras High Courts, the principal officer may be prosecuted for an offence punishable under section 276B of the Act. It may also be noted in this connection that in Laxmi Ratan Cotton Mills case 1975 Cri LJ 1881 (All), to which reference has been made by the learned Magistrate, his Lordship had observed that since in the case before him, the company was not impleaded through its principal officer, the complainant could not proceed against the company. In the instant case also, the company was not impleaded through its principal officer and, therefore, the Allahabad decision does not come to the aid of the prosecution. For the reasons stated above, it is held that the instant prosecutions against the petitioner are incompetent and are accordingly quashed. Both the rules are thus made absolute.
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1987 (4) TMI 61 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Collaboration Agreement, Depreciation, New Industrial Undertaking, Relief ... ... ... ... ..... he assessee submits that the foreign experts were rendering an indispensable service without which the plant could not have been erected. These facts are not disputed. We are of the view that all such expenses as are incurred for payment of rent for the building in which the experts were housed must be capitalised and added to the cost of the fixed assets created partly as a result of such expenditure. See Challapalli Sugars Ltd. v. CIT 1975 98 ITR 167 (SC), CIT v. L. G. Balakrishnan and Bros. (P.) Ltd. 1974 95 ITR 284 (Mad), Ambica Mills Ltd. v. CIT 1964 54 ITR 167 (Guj) and Habib Hussein v. CIT 1963 48 ITR 859 (Bom). Question No. 2 is accordingly answered in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in these tax referred cases. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (4) TMI 60 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... evidence. The burden was on the assessee to adduce at the appropriate time evidence in support of her case. She cannot ask for a second opportunity to improve on the evidence. This is what we stated in Travancore Tea Estates Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1985 154 ITR 745 (Ker). In the present case we are not satisfied that, even by a second opportunity, the assessee would succeed in adducing better evidence of agricultural activity in the property, the bulk of which she lost when it was acquired by the Government as early as 1969. It would, therefore , be not only wrong in law, but an exercise in futility to accede to the request for another opportunity. In the circumstances, we answer the questions in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this tax referred case. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (4) TMI 59 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Capital Asset, Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... le, it is chargeable, not because it is revenue, but because the statute specifically charges the capital gain by including it as income. With respect, we do not agree with the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in Manubhai A. Sheth v. N. D. Nirgudkar, IInd ITO 1981 128 ITR 87 to the contrary. We are fortified in this conclusion by the decisions in Ambalal Maganlal v. Union of India 1975 98 ITR 237 (Guj), Jayachandra v. ITO 1986 161 ITR 190 (Kar) and CIT v. Rajendrappa 1986 162 ITR 666 (Kar). In the circumstances, we have no doubt that the sale proceeds constituted capital receipt and not revenue receipt. The question referred is, in the circumstances, answered in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this tax referred case. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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