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1987 (4) TMI 58 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Firm, Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... milarly, it is nowhere alleged that the petitioners prepared any false record or accounts and used these in any manner. In an earlier case under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973,i.e., Criminal Misc. No. 528-M of 1987, J.R. Grover, Director of K.D. Woollen Mills (Private) Ltd. v. Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, decided on April 6, 1987- 1987 62 Comp Cas 807 (P and H), I had almost in similar circumstances taken the view which is propounded on behalf of the petitioners. The relevant section, i.e., section 68 of the abovesaid Act and section 278B of the present Act, are almost in pari materia. Thus, for all the reasons recorded in that judgment, i.e., K.D. Woollen Mills (P.) Ltd. case 1987 62 Comp Cas 807 (P and H), I allow this petition and quash the proceedings so far as these concern the petitioners. For the sake of clarity, it may be mentioned here that the prosecution of Sohan Lal and the firm as such would not be affected in any manner by this order.
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1987 (4) TMI 57 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Gratuity Fund ... ... ... ... ..... tion to what the employer contributes. In the case of gratuity, no amount is contributed by an employee, and it becomes payable only on retirement or death, etc. Gratuity can be forfeited in certain eventualities. No employee, however, has any right or interest in any account or fund whatsoever even if created. The question of protection of interest of any one under these circumstances does not arise and the provisions of section 418 are not attracted. There being no entrustment nor any evidence of the conversion of the fund by the company for its own use, or towards other purposes, the provisions of section 406 are also not attracted. Both these essential ingredients are missing and as such the learned lower court in my opinion was justified in dismissing the complaint. The impugned order is factually and legally correct. The judgment cannot be said to be perverse calling for any interference. In the result, I see no force in the revision petition and the same is dismissed.
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1987 (4) TMI 56 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... of the Department in the instant case. After following the yield or rental method and having arrived at a figure, the Valuation Officer has added to it the value of an imaginary reversion in future. We invited Mr. Pal to cite any authority which has approved or even indicated this method but he was unable to do so. It is stated in Parks Valuation (at page 38) that when a property is valued on rental basis, the result is the value of the land and building taken together which cannot afterwards be apportioned. In the method adopted by the Valuation Officer, the value of the land is taken twice, once being included in the amount arrived at by the yield or rental method and again under the reversionary method. This is an entirely novel approach but in our view erroneous. We respectfully agree with the aforesaid view expressed by the Calcutta High Court. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department.
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1987 (4) TMI 55 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Remand, Tribunal ... ... ... ... ..... and be able to dig out fresh facts which may cast a doubt on the genuineness of the firm and or the transaction. It is merely a possibility and that too not supported by an iota of material. The Revenue desires to enter upon a mere fishing inquiry hoping that in the course of the inquiry some material may fall into its hands which may throw a doubt on the genuineness of the firm and/or the transaction. We are afraid that such a fishing inquiry which would cause considerable harassment, hardship and expenditure to the assessee cannot be permitted on the mere possibility or hope that some facts may emerge which may cast a doubt on the genuineness of the firm and/or the transaction. We are, therefore, of the view that such a fishing inquiry ought not to be allowed. In view of the above, we answer the question raised for our decision in the affirmative, that is, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 54 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... ere is also batch of cases on the same point, we have discussed the matter at some length. But we should like to make it clear that only a very short question is involved, namely, what was the market value of the shares in May, 1976, or February, 1977, as the case may be. Having regard to the public subscription on that day, the Tribunal has accepted the position that the market value of the shares as on that date was only the value for which the assessees purchased the shares. This is a simple conclusion of fact based on the ample material before the Tribunal. The Department is just attempting to make the matter look somewhat complicated by referring to certain earlier history which is not material and which is also not helpful to it. The basic question is a pure question of fact. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no reference is called for in any of these cases. We therefore, dismiss these petitions and having regard to the circumstances, we make no order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
HUF, Income Tax Proceedings, Partition ... ... ... ... ..... ide them in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. Before concluding, we consider it appropriate to reformulate the question referred to us and split it into two questions in the following manner 1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was legally right in taking the view that the assessment was liable to be made in the status of a Hindu undivided family ? 2. Whether there was any material before the Tribunal to justify confirming the clubbing of the income of Panna Lal and Prem Chand from sonari business as income of the Hindu undivided family ? For the reasons stated above, we answer the first question in the affirmative and in favour of the Department. The second question is returned unanswered with the direction that the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal will rehear the appeals for the years in dispute as indicated above in this order and dispose of them afresh in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ust, necessarily, reduce the requirements of clause (in) to almost a cypher. In the circumstances, we cannot hold that there is an obligation of the nature claimed by the assessee cast upon it under the provisions of section 108(m). Holding, as we do, that the assessee was under no obligation to restore the lands to their original condition, so far as may be, upon the determination of the lease , we do not find that the assessee had in the years in question the right to claim a deduction on account, on a hypothetical basis, of mining land restoration charges . Without more ado, the first question may be answered thus There existed during the relevant previous years no liability on the assessee to restore the lands leased to it to their original condition. We now deem it unnecessary to consider the further aspect of the first question, viz., as to whether the estimated liability was an eligible revenue expenditure, and the second question. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 51 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... these receipts was otherwise chargeable as income in a year in which the business to which they related was not in existence. This section, therefore, would not support the reasoning of the Tribunal that the business for all purposes continues to exist in the year in question. The assessee, therefore, cannot take advantage of section 41(2) to sustain its plea that the expenditure claimed is referable to the business it was carrying on before the nationalisation. We are, therefore, of the view that the assessing authority had rightly refused the claim of the assessee for deduction of 20 of the overhead charges as revenue expenditure. The question accordingly is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs in this tax referred case. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the High Court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1987 (4) TMI 50 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Application For Revision, Limitation, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... sioner when he declined to condone the delay with the result that substantial injury was caused to the petitioner company in so far as the consideration of the question regarding, the revenue expenditure of Rs. 6,00,000 for the year of 1968-69 was concerned. Consequently, we are constrained to observe that his approach could not be said to be exercise of sound judicial discretion and his decision, therefore, becomes vulnerable. In our opinion, under the facts and circumstances of the present case, the delay must be condoned on the ground of sufficiency of cause. We, therefore, allow this special civil application, quash and set aside the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat Central, Ahmedabad, dated September 4, 1986, at annexure C to the petition, and direct him to dispose of the revision application on merits expeditiously on the footing that there was sufficiency of cause and that the delay is condoned. Rule is made absolute accordingly with no order for costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 49 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction Of High Court, Supreme Court ... ... ... ... ..... court was flooded with innumerable writ petitions. We need hardly observe that all this is totally irregular and should have been avoided. We cannot help putting on notice all the authorities concerned that this court would not hesitate to take stern action for contempt if decisions of this court are disregarded unless the operation of the judgments of this court is suspended by the Supreme Court. As far as the present case is concerned, there could be little doubt that the first respondent, Commercial Tax Officer, is clearly guilty of committing contempt in observing in the assessment order dated March 2, 1987, that he cannot implement the order of this court. We have referred to the counter filed by him wherein the first respondent owned his mistake and expressed an unqualified apology. We take a lenient view of the matter, accept the apology tendered by the first respondent and drop further proceedings in the matter. The contempt case is-accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 48 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Capital Employed, Deduction U/S 80J, New Industrial Undertaking, Widely Held Company ... ... ... ... ..... their own right. It is true that both the banks are nominees of Hindustan Charity Trust. However, the Tribunal has given a clear-cut finding that they have never acted in concert and unison and they are the registered shareholders. In the above view of the matter, following the Supreme Court decisions, we hold that the two banks are to be treated as two persons and not as one single person as contended by the Revenue. Accordingly, the first question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. As regards the second question, both the parties agree that the issue is squarely covered by this court s decision in the assessee s own case CIT v. Alcock Ashdown and Co. Ltd. 1979 119 ITR 164 and the question is to be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The second question is, therefore, answered accordingly. In the result, both the questions of law are answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee with no order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 47 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... applied. Sub-section (1A) of section 5 stated, in relation to any gift made on or after April 1, 1964, with reference to the clause (v) aforementioned, that charitable purpose should be construed as not including a purpose the whole or substantially the whole of which is of a religious nature . Having regard to the object of the charitable trust to which we have just adverted, it cannot be said that the assessee s gift was for a purpose the whole or substantially the whole of which was of a religious nature. Accordingly, the assessee is entitled to succeed. It has been brought to our attention that upon the answer to the question posed depends the amount of Rs. 250. We express the hope that the Revenue shall take the amount involved into account before seeking a reference, especially when no really substantial question of law is involved. The question is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. The Revenue shall pay to the assessee the costs of the reference.
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1987 (4) TMI 46 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... usion as a perquisite or amenity, the permissible ceiling under the Act is exceeded, it cannot be allowed as a deduction in view of the language of section 40(c)(iii). This question is, therefore, answered in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee-company. Our answers to the questions referred are as follows Question No. 1 We answer this question in the negative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee-company. Question No. 2 We decline to answer this question. Question No. 3 We answer this question in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 4 We answer this question in the negative, against the Department and in favour of the assessee. Question 5 We answer this question in the affirmative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee-company. Question 6 We answer this question in the negative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. The reference is accordingly answered. No costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 45 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... he Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. For the reasons given by us in our judgment in Writ Petition No. 4378 of 1986 (Leader Valves Private Ltd. v. CIT 1987 167 ITR 542) rendered today, we are of the opinion that the assessing authority is not justified in withholding the refund which had become due to the petitioner as a result of the annulment of the assessments merely for the reason that the proceedings questioning the validity of the two orders annulling the assessments for the years 1979-80 and 1981-82 are pending before the appropriate authorities. The petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed and the respondents are directed not to withhold the refund of income-tax which has become due to the petitioner as a result of the annulment of its assessments for the years 1979-80 and 1981-82 on the ground that the proceedings questioning the validity of the two orders annulling the assessments are pending before the High Court and the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal respectively.
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1987 (4) TMI 44 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... gs questioning the validity of the order directing refund are pending before the High Court. As held by us in our judgment in Civil Writ Petition No. 4378 of 1986 (Leader Valves Private Ltd. v. CIT 1987 167 ITR 542), the assessing authority is not justified in withholding the refund which has become due to the assessee merely for the reason that the proceedings initiated by the Revenue questioning the validity of the order under which the refund has become due are pending before the appropriate authority. Accordingly, for the reasons given by us in our judgment in Writ Petition No. 4378 of 1986 (Leader Valves Private Ltd. v. CIT 1987 167 ITR 542), the petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed not to withhold the refund which has become due to the petitioner as a result of the annulment of its assessment for the year 1979-80 on the ground that the proceedings questioning the validity of the order annulling the assessment are pending before the High Court.
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1987 (4) TMI 43 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Assessment, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... In the present case, Roshanlal Sharma, who was a member of the old partnership firm, died and his wife was added as a new partner effective from February 10, 1974, and two returns for the, two separate periods had to be filed, one from October 25, 1973, to February 9, 1974, and was the other from February 10, 1974, to November 12, 1974. This actually done and the same was accepted by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as by the Tribunal. In the various decisions of this court, the position has been crystallised and it has been held that two separate assessments on the firm will have to be made. Thus, in this view of the matter, the Tribunal has held that two separate assessments f or the two periods, namely, one from October 1973, to February 9, 1974, and another from February 10, 1974, to November 12, 1974, shall be made. Thus, we answer the question in the affirmative. On the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear, their own costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 42 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
... ... ... ... ..... ere a rectification of the order of regular assessment was required to be made. Such relief necessarily encompassed not only the quantum of the amount refundable as a result of the order of rectification but also the date up to which interest on such amount was required to be paid. On a fair construction of the instruction of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, it appears to us that the assessee is entitled not only to interest on the amount required to be refunded by reason of the order of rectification, but he is also entitled to such interest up to the date of the order of rectification. It is within the powers of the Central Board of Direct Taxes to issue instructions of this nature giving relief to the assessee regardless of the fact that the legal position has been held to be different. In the circumstances, the question is answered thus Interest is payable under section 214 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, up to the date of the order of rectification. No order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 41 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appeal To AAC, Charitable Purpose, Income ... ... ... ... ..... are covered by the Supreme Court decision in the case of Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd. v. CIT 1986 160 ITR 961, where it has been held that the levy of interest under section 139(8) or section 215 is a part of the process of assessment. It is open to an assessee to dispute the levy in appeal provided he limits himself to the ground that he is not liable to the levy at all. In the present case, what was urged before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well as the Tribunal was that the levy of interest under section 215 and/or section 217 of the Income-tax Act should have been waived or reduced in terms of rule 40 of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and the contention was not that the assessee was not liable to the levy at all. Accordingly, the above two questions are also answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. In the result, all the six questions posed in this reference are answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 40 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Exemptions, New Industrial Undertaking, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... t of the Supreme Court is, therefore, not an authority for the proposition that the words after the commencement of the Wealth-tax Act in the said clause (xxi) of sub-section (1) of section 5 mean after the commencement of the operation of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, in respect of the company as on the valuation date, namely, July 31, 1956, and not on the date April 1, 1957, when the said Act came into force. There was no dispute before the Supreme Court that the words after the commencement of this Act in the said clause (xxi) mean anything other than what they ordinarily mean, namely, that this date was April 1, 1957. We have, in this view of the matter, to answer the second question in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. We express the hope that the Tribunal, shall apply to the facts that it finds the position in law stated above and shall then decide whether the assessee is entitled to relief under section 5(1)(xxi) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. No order as to costs.
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1987 (4) TMI 39 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... ecause there was no cost of acquisition for the tenant. Following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, the Bench held that there, was no capital gain, as there was no cost of acquisition. However, in a separate but concurring judgment, one of us (Jeevan Reddy J.), who was a party to the said judgment, has pointed out the need for redressal of the deficiencies, viz., excluding from capital gain of transfers of capital assets because they do not involve any cost of acquisition and several anomalies resulting therefrom. I too agree with the said observation of my learned brother, but, in view of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision, which is binding on us under article 141 of the Constitution of India, it has to be held that because there was no cost of acquisition for the calves in this case, there cannot be a capital gain by their sale as capital asset. The question is, therefore, answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Department. No costs.
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