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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 252 Records
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1988 (4) TMI 419 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g the said words was to override the decision of the Madras High Court, yet it would be reasonable to presume that Parliament was aware of the lacuna in the provision pointed out by the Madras High Court and wanted to remedy it. Otherwise, there is no discernible reason for the Parliament to add the said words in clause (a) of the proviso. Evidently, the Parliament wanted to tax the second and subsequent sales, if they do not fall within section 6(2), even where the first sale of such goods is exempt by virtue of section 8(2-A). It must be remembered that section 9 was substituted by Amendment Act 28 of 1969 with retrospective effect, from the date of commencement of the Act. The insertion of the said words in clause (a) of the proviso could not have been without any purpose. For the above reasons, the tax revision case fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. But, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Petition dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 418 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... od being exempt in this manner, the assessee ultimately gets the benefit and, therefore, it is unnecessary to consider and decide the larger question which apparently was not raised, considered or decided at any stage earlier. It may however be clarified that it would be open to the assessee to raise that question, in case on the facts of a particular case, the same arises and the benefit under sub-section (2) of section 6 is not available and unless sub-section (1) thereof relieves the assessee of the tax liability, the assessee would otherwise be liable. I may add that even though the Tribunal s conclusion appears to be the same as understood by me yet several parts thereof may be either debatable or ambiguous. The Tribunal s order has, therefore, to be understood as indicated herein and the tax liability of the assessee in each case has to be determined accordingly. These revisions are, therefore, dismissed subject to the above observations. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 417 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... of the A.P. General Sales Tax Act which is relied upon by the sales tax authorities, even if applicable, cannot override the above law made by the Parliament. But Sri Venkatarama Reddi argued that section 17 of the Act has no application because the petitioner-company cannot be called a transferee within the meaning of section 17. Two judgments-one, of the Calcutta High Court in National Jute Manufacturers Corporation Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer (1982) 1 CLJ 31 and the other reported in Burn Standard Company Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu 1983 52 STC 62 (Mad.) support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. In any case, we hold in view of the language of the Central Act No. 42 of 1980 that this demand cannot be raised against the petitioner-company. We accordingly allow this writ petition and direct the State sales tax authorities to approach the Commissioner for payments as envisaged by the provisions of Act No. 42 of 1980. No costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 416 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on and has to be quashed. Section 3(1-A) of the Act, i.e., the Tamil Nadu Entertainments Tax Act (10 of 1939), was introduced only by Tamil Nadu Act 1 of 1974. Therefore, this section 3(PA) of the Act cannot be said to have any retrospective effect because there was no such indication made in the enactment itself. Therefore when the assessment in the instant case is for the period 1st November, 1962 to 17th May, 1964, certainly this provision under section 3(PA) of the Act cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case. Under these circumstances, the order impugned is certainly against law and the ratio decidendi in Kamalammal s case (1964) 1 MLJ 394 and hence it is liable to be set aside. The writ petition is allowed. The order is quashed. As there is limitation under the Act, now this Court cannot also remit the matter back for fresh disposal in accordance with the Act then available. Under the circumstances there is no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 415 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... l after the judgment of this Court in Nandanam Construction Co. v. Assistant Commissioner 1983 53 STC 42. Even taking that as correct we cannot as a matter of principle permit the petitioner to file the writ petition directly and challenge the assessments which have been allowed to become final. It has been stated as a general rule of law that courts should not allow writ petitions being filed for reopening of the assessments which have been allowed to become final. The petitioner in this case was assessed on 17th March, 1982 for the year 1977-78. The amount must have been spent by the State. Several decisions have been rendered by the courts including our High Court following the above principle refusing relief to the assessees. The petitioner ought to have had recourse to the appellate provisions provided under the Act for redressal of his grievance. Following the abovementioned rule we dismiss this writ petition with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Writ petition dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 414 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... cal authority there referred to must mean the local authority within whose municipal jurisdiction the entertainment tax producing theatre is situated. There would be no meaning in saying that the entertainment tax should be collected from the theatres located within Kovvur municipal limits and be paid over to the Rajahmundry municipality, which has no concern with those theatres. Law cannot be held sanctioning of Peter being robbed for the purpose of feeding Paul. This is a decisive consideration. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that these two theatres which are located within Kovvur municipality should not be made liable to pay entertainment tax under entry (b) of the table of section 5 to Rajahmundry municipality and that they should be liable to pay tax only under entry (f) to Kovvur municipality. In terms indicated above, a writ will issue in each of the cases. Both the writ petitions are allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250 in each. Writ petitions allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 413 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... enquiry has been made and as the applicant-assessee has filed an affidavit and the medical certificate and the department did not choose to file any counter, the Tribunal, after considering the material, came to a finding that the appellant-assessee was negligent, there were no bona fides, there was no sufficient cause and rejected the application to condone delay. The Tribunal has considered the affidavit and the medical certificate and after considering the probabilities has rightly held that there was no sufficient cause to condone delay. In the circumstances of the case, the discretion exercised by the Tribunal does not call for any interference, as it does not constitute a question of law. 9.. Hence, the question referred to this Court for its opinion is answered against the assessee and in favour of the department. 10.. The reference is answered accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1988 (4) TMI 412 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the entire case through the provision of section 4 together with section 5-B, it is clear that when there has been no show exhibited by the theatre owner, there cannot be any demand for payment of tax from the theatre owner even if there is an agreement to pay tax. This Court, therefore, holds that the petitioner is not liable to pay any amount towards entertainments tax for the two weeks above referred to and as such, the demand made for payment of tax by the first respondent for the said two weeks in question, is illegal. The impugned order is therefore liable to be quashed and is hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. Since it is not submitted (sic) that the tax demanded under the impugned order had been paid for those two weeks when there was no show, necessarily, the said amount has to be refunded to the petitioner. This Court directs refund of the amount so paid by the petitioner for the said two weeks. There will be no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 411 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e amount of tax levied on such paddy by the State law by virtue of the provisions of section 15(c) of the CST Act. In this view of the matter, according to provisions of section 8(2-A) read with section 15(c), tax was rightly calculated at twice the rate applicable for sale of rice to unregistered dealers in course of inter-State trade and commerce. Therefore, levy of tax at the rate of 8 per cent is correct. The question, however, seems to have been framed incorrectly and in a misleading manner. It is reframed as follows Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Member, Additional Sales Tax Tribunal, is correct in holding that the dealer was liable to pay sales tax at the rate of 8 per cent on the turnover of sale of rice in the course of inter-State sale? The first question as reframed is answered in the affirmative. 6.. The reference is answered accordingly. Hearing fee is settled at Rs. 250. H.L. AGRAWAL, C.J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1988 (4) TMI 410 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... 0 STC 398 only laid down and explained when an activity can be construed as business and in both the cases the said conclusion was based on the particular facts. Those decisions, therefore, do not help in deciding the question that arises for decision in these cases nor do they support the petitioner s contentions. (iv) so far as the second point as to the definition of dealer is concerned, the contention of the petitioner has to be rejected in view of what was stated by the Supreme Court in Abdul Bakshi s case 1964 15 STC 644 AIR 1965 SC 531, wherein it was held, a commodity may be used as an ingredient or in aid of manufacturing process leading to the production of another salable commodity and one need not sell the very article to become a dealer. For the reasons stated above, I hold the industrial machinery which is one of the scheduled goods is exigible to levy under the Karnataka Entry Tax Act, and the writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 409 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... aged, it will undoubtedly be a fraud on the statute. Therefore, the action of the S.T.O. for committing delay in dealing with the refund applications and then refusing interest cannot, in the facts and circumstances, be condoned. I am, therefore, of the view that the Special Additional Commissioner took a legal and reasonable view of the matter in allowing interest to the appellant. On the other hand, the impugned order of the Commissioner, in which he took a lop-sided view of the case in support of the Revenue ignoring the long delay committed by the S.T.O., is factually unsupportable. 13.. The aforesaid analysis will show that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order (annexure 9) and on facts also it is unsupportable. In either view, the appeal is bound to succeed. 14.. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the Commissioner (annexure 9) is set aside. Parties to bear their own costs. H.L. AGRAWAL, C.J.-I agree. Appeal allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 408 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s and the S.T.R.Ps. have to be allowed and it is ordered accordingly. 12.. Though it was contended by the learned Government Pleader that the petitioners in the W.Ps. have come up against the order of clarification made by the Commissioner for Commercial Taxes, it should be noticed that the clarification rendered by the Commissioner would be binding on all the subordinate authorities under section 3A of the K.S.T. Act. Therefore, it is unnecessary to drive the petitioners to another round of litigation before the authorities under the Central Sales Tax Act or K.S.T. Act. Therefore, the impugned clarification annexure A in all the writ petitions is quashed and it is declared that tarpaulin is cotton fabrics which enjoys the exemption under entry 8A of the Fifth Schedule to the K.S.T. Act. For the very same reasons the impugned orders in the S.T.R.Ps. are quashed and the levy in so far it related to the assessment period on P.V.C. rexine cloth stand quashed. Petitions allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 407 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tting aside the notices, this Court remands the matter back to the first respondent to be disposed of in the light of the observations made above following the ratio in Sakthi Sugars Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1985 59 STC 52 (Mad.) and with specific reference to the provisions of section 24(3) and rule 18(3) and come to a decision after giving an opportunity to the petitioner. The impugned notices in both the writ petitions are, therefore, quashed and the authorities are at liberty to proceed after following the provisions of section 24(3) and rule 18(3) as well as the ratio decidendi in Sakthi Sugars Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes 1985 59 STC 52 (Mad.). With the above observations, both the writ petitions are allowed and the matters are remitted back to the first respondent for disposal in accordance with law. The first respondent is directed to dispose of the matters within two months from today. No costs. Writ Petitions allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 406 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is Court is not inclined to give any definite finding with respect to the several points raised by the petitioner, but only permits the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the appellate authority. The appellate authority, on receipt of the appeal, will take into consideration all the points raised by the petitioner and dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. Two months time is granted to the petitioner to move the appellate authority by way of appeal. Though six years have elapsed since the institution of the writ petition, yet this Court is of opinion that a further opportunity should be granted to the petitioner to agitate the points raised herein by way of appeal to the appellate authority. The appellate authority shall go through the entire contentions that may be raised before it by the petitioner and deal with the same and dispose of the appeal. With these observations, the writ petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Writ Petition dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 405 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... overnment Advocate (Taxes) for the respondent, refers to the decision in Khazan Chand v. State of Jammu and Kashmir 1984 66 STC 214 (SC) for the following proposition that the penalty interest levied under section 9(2) can be recovered under section 24(3) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 as one well within the principles of law. Therefore, the prayer of the petitioner cannot be granted. Interest ought to have been paid by the petitioner herein and this levy of penal interest is leviable on the basis of section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act which can be recovered under section 24(3) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. It is only this procedure which has been resorted to by the respondent in sending the notice. There is no infirmity in the proceedings demanding penal interest. Hence, there is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. But, under the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Writ petition dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 404 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... achinery which was imported by the petitioner and installed on its industrial unit, was an old or second-hand machinery? It is seen from the import licence that the total value of machinery imported was Rs. 9,09,000 in terms of Indian currency and pound 52,176 in terms of pounds sterling and customs duty of Rs. 3,04,813.95 was paid as per bill of entry. All the documents produced before me indicate that the machinery was a reconditioned machinery . The order rejecting the claim is therefore set aside and I direct the claim to be reconsidered in the light of this order and taking into consideration the additional material that the petitioner may produce before the authority to establish its claim for a concessional rate. The writ petition is accordingly allowed for the reasons stated above. The petitioner is directed to appear before the second respondent, the Commercial Tax Officer, X Circle, Bangalore on 6th June, 1988 to receive further instructions. Writ petition allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 403 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... officer and no one would like to pass such an order at his own peril. The point remains the same with regard to the legality and validity of annexure-2, be it based upon the advice of the Law Department and the Advocate-General or on the instructions of the State Government. All these applications must, therefore, also be allowed and annexure-2 thereto must be quashed. Order accordingly. 16.. Let a writ of mandamus issue restraining the respondents from acting on the basis of annexure-2. We, however, may not be misunderstood in saying that the competent taxing authority under the Act will not now proceed for assessment in accordance with law. But, for the present that is neither here nor there. Suffice it to say that in all these applications, none of the respondents shall give effect to the notice as contained in annexure-2. On the facts and in the circumstances of both the first and the second batch of cases, there shall be no order as to costs. Writ applications allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 402 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... t the meaning to be assigned to item 1 of the Schedule to the Act cannot be the same as the meaning to be assigned to the relevant entry in the KST Act as the word textiles is not defined either under the Act or under the KST Act. The meaning to be given to this word in the Act is not statutorily linked to the amended definition of cotton fabrics in tariff item 19 of the Central Excise Act and therefore the proper test to interpret item 1 in the Act is the one as stated by the Supreme Court in Delhi Cloth Mills case 1980 46 STC 256 AIR 1980 SC 1552. We have applied this ruling of the Supreme Court to the facts of this case and in our view this decision supports our finding that P.V.C. leather cloth is not textiles within the meaning of item 1 of the Schedule to the Entry Tax Act. For these reasons, these petitions are allowed and accordingly the impugned proposition notices are quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties to bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 401 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w or of facts, which relate to the assessment of the assessee may be raised before the Tribunal. If for reasons recorded by the departmental authorities in respect of a contention raised by the assessee, grant of relief to him on another ground is justified, it would be open to the departmental authorities and the Tribunal, and indeed they would be under a duty to grant that relief. The right of the assessee to relief is not restricted to the plea raised by him. Adopting the ratio of the above verdict of the Final Court I hold that the Tribunal, respondent No. 2, acted illegally in the exercise of its jurisdiction when it refused to entertain the contention of the petitioner mentioned above. Consequently, I allow this petition with costs and quash the orders annexures P/6, P/7 and P/9. It is, however, made clear that respondent No. 4 shall be at liberty to take proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The costs are assessed at Rs. 500. Writ petition allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 400 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... should not have been demanded from him is more formal than substantial. Both the parties have understood the notice issued by the department on 16th March, 1983 as a show cause notice. It is on that basis the petitioner-firm had submitted its explanation without asking for further opportunity and it was on consideration of that explanation the department had imposed this liability on the firm. We see no procedural objection in that course adopted by the department. We, therefore, reject that argument. We are only sorry that this fraudulent petitioner under the cover of the interim orders of this Court had been able to carry on business for the last 4 or 5 years without furnishing the security. Nothing shakes the public confidence in the writ jurisdiction more than the misuse to which it is being put by these English speaking white-collared folk. We see no merit in this writ petition and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 250. Writ petition dismissed.
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