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Case Laws
Showing 81 to 100 of 252 Records
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1988 (4) TMI 261 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... n cells, like all dry cells, cause electricity to flow between their electrodes when the circuit is closed. In this, the principle is identical whether it is a button cell or a paper jacketed dry torch battery cell. Were it not for this, the electronic watch will not operate because electricity will not flow. Larger time keepers can operate on paper jacketed torch batteries though they are electronic devices. It is not the process of manufacture, or shape, or raw material of the cell that is important but its ability to generate and induce a current of electrical energy to travel and activate the work or the machine or the device. The difference in technology has no relevance to assessment to Central Excise duty. 5. There is no merit in the argument that the button cells are not batteries because they are electronic parts. They are batteries to drive watches and the most suitable heading under the Central Excise Tariff is 31. 6. I order their assessment under Item 31 (i) CET.
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1988 (4) TMI 236 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... ial duty were confirmed under the Tariff Items indicated above. The classification has, therefore, been correctly done by the Assistant Collector while confirming the demands. 9. Shri Patel for the appellants has contended that demands in two cases are time-barred. The learned JDR has stated during her arguments that the assessments in all cases were provisional and not final and that the appellants executed B-13 bond under Rule 9-B of the Central Excise Rules. She has also stated that the show cause notices say that the assessment was subject to Chemical Test and not final. The learned Advocate has not controverted the arguments of the learned JDR by producing any materials before us. In the circumstances, the plea of time-bar of the demands in two cases is also rejected. 10. In the light of the above discussions, we do not find any infirmity in the orders of the lower authorities. Accordingly, the orders of the lower authorities are upheld and all the appeals are dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 235 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Refund - Supplementary refund claim for excess production rebate ... ... ... ... ..... d not have the effect of making the assessments provisional. In fact, the Department does not seem to have been a party to the Writ Petition. The respondents have not placed any evidence before us to show that any request was made by them for provisional assessment of duty nor that any bond was executed in terms of Rule 9B. In the circumstances, the respondent rsquo s contention that the assessments were provisional remains unsubstantiated. The benefit of the provisions with regard to the period of limitation in respect of provisional assessments is not, therefore, available to the respondents., 24. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the two supplementary daims dated 17.6.1983 and 2.4.1984 were, in my view, barred by limitation. 25. In the result, the appeal is allowed. 26. V.T. Raghavachari, Member (J) . - 1 agree with the order proposed by the Sr Vice-President that the appeal rsquo is to be allowed. FINAL ORDER In view of the majority opinion, the appeal is allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 234 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... ental Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (iii) Order No. 257-58/87-C - M/s. Export India Corporation v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (iv) Order No. 463/87-D - M/s. K. Mohan and Co. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (v) 1988 (34) ELT 371 (Tribunal) - Hargovinda and Co. Exports Pvt. Ltd. and Others v. Collector of Customs, Bombay holding Metallised Polyester Films as being eligible to the benefit of exemption under the Notification. While Shri K.P. Singh, SDR and Shri Sunder Rajan, JDR reiterated on the grounds urged in the Memo of appeal, we see no reason to depart from the above decisions and following the same we dismiss the appeals.
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1988 (4) TMI 233 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Claasification ... ... ... ... ..... is not necessary for the item to be classified under Tariff Item 10 that it should be in the liquid form at the room temperature. What is required is that it should satisfy the parameters of Item 10 which as we have discussed above stand satisfied. ( T. We observe that the respondents had given all information relevant to their product to the departmental authorities and the departmental authorities also tested the product. No case has been made out that the appellants had suppressed any fact or made any mis-statement with intent to evade payment of duty. In fact it is seen from the narration of the show cause notice issued no such allegation has been levelled against them that they had suppressed any fact or made any mis-statement with the intent to evade duty. Longer time of 5 years in terms of Section 11 A cannot be invoked. 12. We, therefore, find that no infirmity in the order of Collector (Appeals) and uphold the same. The appeals of the revenue are therefore dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 224 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Preventive detention ... ... ... ... ..... ssion was conveyed that all the nine accused had been apprehended as members of a conspiracy. In our judgment, there is no merit in this contention. Though the remand application is a joint application, the same specifically mentions the role played by each accused and the number of visits undertaken by each of them. It cannot be said that by virtue of the said joint remand application, an impression was conveyed that all the nine accused had been working in concert with each other as sought to be suggested by Shri Karmali. We are satisfied with the explanation given by the detaining authority that he had not mentioned in the grounds of detention that the detenu was one of the members of a gang of nine persons arrested. In this view of the matter, this contention of Shri Karmali will also have to be negatived. No other contentions were raised in support of the petition. 12. In the result, we find no merit in the petition and the same deserves to be dismissed. Rule discharged.
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1988 (4) TMI 223 - CEGAT, CALCUTTA
Confiscation and Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... the fact of violation of law may be self evident and may ipso facto justify imposition of penalty as rightly pointed out by the learned SDR. Therefore, it is incorrect to generalize that in all cases without exception mens rea must be established before imposing a penalty. 39. In the instant case the attendant circumstances pointed out by the learned counsel do show that there was some scope for leniency but do not show that no penalty at all was called for. 40. This fact has been recognized rightly by the learned Collector and, therefore, while holding that violation has taken place and observing that a lenient view was called for, he has imposed some penalty. 41. Looking to the totality of facts and circumstances I consider that a slightly more lenient view could be taken. I, therefore, reduce the penalty from Rs. 19,922.48 to Rs. 15,000/- only. The order of the learned Collector is modified to this extent only. It is otherwise confirmed. The appeal is thus partly allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 222 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Set-off of duty ... ... ... ... ..... so not necessary to discuss and give findings on the other points raised by him as such discussion will be academic in nature. We, however, observe that proforma credit under Rule 56-A is admissible when the inputs (i.e. the duty paid raw materials, component parts and finished goods) and the final product in which such duty-paid inputs are used, fall under the same Tariff Item. Notification No. 198/83-C.E., dated 1.8.1983 was issued by the Government under sub-rule (1) of Rule 56-A to extend the benefit of proforma credit under that Rule to the goods falling under Item 16 of the Central Excise Tariff. This Notification had no relation to the Notification No. 95/79-C.E., as amended by Notification No. 58/82-C.E. issued under Rule 8(1) of the Central Excise Rules, an assessee could avail of the exemption under Notification No. 95/79-C.E. as amended if the terms and conditions thereof were fulfilled, and not otherwise. 11. As held in paragraph 9 (supra) the appeal is dismissed.
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1988 (4) TMI 221 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Evidence - Privileged documents ... ... ... ... ..... iterated the principle in a still later decision in State of Rajasthan v. Sham Sher Singh (A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1082). 20. It, therefore, follows that as far as the order granting rewards to the informant is concerned, the same is privileged under Section 125 of the Evidence Act. The trial court cannot require the petitioner to produce the copy of the order, since the same would only amount to disclosing the name of the informant. That part of the notice of the trial court, therefore, has to be set aside. 21. In the result, the notice issued by the trial Court in so far as it relates to requiring the petitioner to produce the order granting rewards to the informant in the case, is quashed. In other respects, the notice is sustained. It will be open to the petitioner to claim privilege, if he so chooses, regarding the recorded information relating to the commission of the offence and the trial court will dispose of the matter according to law. This petition is ordered accordingly.
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1988 (4) TMI 220 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
ification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... AIR 1988 S.C. 563 cannot be of any use to us. That is entirely a different question from the one with which we are concerned. Here the question is, as stated above, whether the rice bran is an oil yielding material of plant origin. The answer in our opinion can only be in the affirmative. For these reasons, we do not find any merit in this writ petition. The writ petition fails. 8. Subject to the condition that the petitioners renew their bank guarantees before the expire, the Government is restrained from encashing the bank guarantees for a period of three months. 9. The writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocates fee Rs. 250/-. 10. Mr. Subrahmanya Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, has made an oral application for grant of a certificate to enable the petitioners to prefer an appeal to the Supreme Court. We are unable to certify that this case involves a substantial question of law which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The oral application is rejected.
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1988 (4) TMI 219 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Prima facie false refund claims made fraudulently in writ petitions ... ... ... ... ..... he petitioners states that so far as the main writ petitions are concerned, nothing survives therein. She, therefore, requests that these petitions may be allowed to be withdrawn. I see no good reason not to grant this request. The petitioners cannot be compelled or forced to go on with these petitions against their will and decision to the contrary. Besides, criminal as also contempt proceedings have been already taken against Kumar Prabhulal Shah and the same are proceeding according to law. Withdrawal of these present petitions cannot in the least affect the pending criminal or contempt proceedings. These petitions are, therefore, allowed to be withdrawn. 13. The protuonotary and Senior Master is, however, directed to keep all these petitions in her safe custody along with Writ Petition No. 174 of 1987 and copy of Writ Petition No. 744 of 1987 to abide by such orders as may be made inter alia in the pending criminal and/or contempt proceedings against Kumar Prabhulal Shah.
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1988 (4) TMI 218 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Cellulosic spun yarn and cotton yarn ... ... ... ... ..... , duty became chargeable at the time of removal of cotton fabrics. 7. We have heard Shri P.K. Ram, advocate for the appellants and Shri Balbir Singh, SDR for the department. 8. At the very out-set, the learned advocate submits that the issue is fully covered in favour of the appellants by the decision of this Tribunal in the case of Morarjee Goculdas Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay -1985 (20) E.L.T. 379. This is not denied by the learned SDR who, however, adds that the department have gone in appeal to the Supreme Court against the orders of the Tribunal. 9. We have carefully considered the facts of the case and the submissions made before us. We have also perused the decision of this Tribunal in Morarjee Gokuldas Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. case. This decision no doubt covers the issue involved in the present matter in favour of the appellants. We have carefully considered the view taken by the Tribunal and fully concur in it. Appeals allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 217 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
... ...
... ... ..... nguishing lsquo levy rsquo , lsquo collection rsquo and lsquo assessment rsquo with reference to Rules 10 and 10A which related to recovery of duty short-levied and which were the earlier provisions corresponding to the present Section 11 A. Interpretation of the word ldquo the date of payment of duty rdquo either in the context of the earlier Rule 11 or the present Section 11 B relating to claims for refund was not considered by the courts in the judgments cited by the appellants. These judgments do not, therefore, help their case. We find that a similar view was taken by an earlier Bench of this Tribunal also in 1983 ECR 839 D 1983 E.L.T. 1050 (Cegat Bombay) M/s. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. C.C.E. 8. Since the appellants rsquo refund claim filed on 31-10-1985 for the period from 1-4-1985 to 27-4-1985 was outside the time limit of six months from the date of payment of duty, it was correctly rejected by the lower authorities. We uphold their orders and reject this appeal.
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1988 (4) TMI 216 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification of goods ... ... ... ... ..... s, copies marked as Annexure-C to the appeal Memorandum, that the appellants were informed that Sodium Bicarbonate manufactured by them was liable to Central Excise duty under Tariff Item 14AA(1) of the Central Excise Tariff and they were asked to obtain Central Excise licence, file classification list and observe other Central Excise requirements. The appellants neither took Central Excise licence nor observed other Central Excise requirements including payment of duty. They have, therefore, deliberately contravened the provisions of law to evade payment of duty as indicated in the show cause notices and the impugned order. Demanding duty under Rule 9(2) of the Central Excise Rules and imposition of penalty under Rules 9(2), 173Q and 226 of the Central Excise Rules, are, therefore, according to the provisions of law and are justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. 10. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, we uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal.
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1988 (4) TMI 197 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Value of clearances ... ... ... ... ..... ring the preceding financial year had exceeded Rs. 15 lakhs. In the financial year 1979-80, life saving drugs were not wholly exempt from duty of Excise and became exempt only under Notification No. 106/80 dated 19-6-1980 reproduced by Brother Gulati at page 3 of his order. If benefit of Notification No. 106/80 dated 19-6-1980 be taken into consideration in determining the aggregate value of clearances of specified goods for the year 1979-80 (when the goods were in fact not exempt), this would be giving retrospective effect to Notification No. 106/80 dated 19-6-1980 which is not permissible and law forbids. As for the inequity pointed out by Brother Gulati in such an interpretation in the case of an old manufacturer and a new manufacturer, to me it appears that this anomaly would be taken care of by legislature or by those entrusted with issue of subordinate legislation. I do not see how we could apply the notification retrospectively. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeals.
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1988 (4) TMI 196 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Waste/Scrap ... ... ... ... ..... argument that nobody intends to manufacture scrap may not be strictly applicable to this situation. But then the Delhi High Court had held that similar scrap (arising out of destruction of the manufactured but rejected tyres was not excisable. The reliance on the judgments of Bombay High Court, as judgments to the contrary is not correct. Therefore, in the absence of any other judgment of any High Court contrary to the judgment of the Delhi High Court (the ratio of which squarely applies to the product before us) we respectfully follow the said decision and hold that cut cured flaps are not excisable products. 26. Even now I am of the same view. However, in view of the judgment of the Delhi High Court in the case of Modi Rubber Ltd. 1987 (29) E.L.T. 502 , which we were bound to follow in the absence of any contrary decision of any other High Court or the Supreme Court I agree with the disposal of these appeals as mentioned in paragraph 22 of the order prepared by Shri Anand.
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1988 (4) TMI 195 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
De-registration of exporter ... ... ... ... ..... s were given an adequate opportunity to submit their case before the Registering Authority. This is sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice looking to the present circumstances. 7. Immediately after the order of deregistration the petitioners were also informed by letter dated 10-3-1979 by the Engineering Export Promotion Council that the petitioners were at liberty to apply for re-registration under Rule 272 if they so desire. The petitioners did not apply for such re-registration. Even their original certificate would have come to an end on 10th October, 1980. 8. In these circumstances, no intervention is called for under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The petitioners have claimed cash incentives to the tune of Rs. 26,182.20 in respect of exports effected by them in March, 1977. In view however of de-registration of the petitioners, they are not entitled to avail of the cash incentives. 9. Petition, therefore, fails and the rule is discharged with costs.
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1988 (4) TMI 194 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... is is kept in mind, the test certificates issued by the National Test House explain themselves fully. This test house is under the Government of India and is one of the highly respected Institutes specialising in testing. After examining the samples the test clearly recorded that the sample confirmed to IS Specification No. 269 -1967 for ordinary portland cement. In the light of what we observed above we hold lsquo that there is no reason at all to depart from the findings of the National Test House, Bombay. We have also the evidence of the gate passes, invoices etc. which confirm that what was manufactured was only ordinary portland cement. Considered together with the other facts i.e. that the Cement Control Order was in force at the appropriate time and that the appellants repeatedly stated that they neither manufactured nor now manufacture rapid hardening cement, we have no hesitation in accepting the appellant rsquo s pleas and allowing this appeal. We order accordingly.
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1988 (4) TMI 193 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... gislature wanted to restrict the number of samples in the manner the Department now desires, the Notification would have simply said ldquo one day rdquo instead of ldquo at any one time rdquo . The Notification in question contains plain language and does not need any interpretation. The legislative intent has to be deduced from the language used. Going by the language of the Notification we hold that the appellants correctly availed of benefit of the Notification in so far as only one tyre was removed under a particular shipping order. We are not inclined to hold that there was any legislative intent to a different effect. Besides, as submitted by the ld. Advocate for the appellants and not contradicted, there are no allegations either that tyres were not tested and scrapped or that the tyres were removed illicitly. Therefore, there is nothing to show that the appellants misused the concession granted by the Notification. The appeal has to succeed. 10. The appeal is allowed.
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1988 (4) TMI 192 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Classification ... ... ... ... ..... eason adopted by the lower authorities. It appears, that the lower authorities have fallen into error in considering that Clause (c) of Chapter Note 4 could be relied upon for classifying the subject alloy even though Clause (a) applies to it. This is obviously, incorrect because Clause (c), as may be seen, applies only to ldquo other alloys containing two per cent, or more, by weight, of silver rdquo . The words ldquo other alloys rdquo evidently refer to alloys other than those covered by Clause (a) and (b). That is to say, if an alloy is, by virtue of the statutory Note, covered by Clause (a) or Clause (b), it cannot be brought into the scope of ldquo other alloys rdquo in Clause (c). 8. In the light of the foregoing discussion, we are of the view that the subject alloy was correctly classifiable under sub-heading (2) of Heading 71.05/11 and not, as classified, under sub-heading (1) thereof. 9. In the result, we allow the appeal with consequential relief to the appellants.
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