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Showing 1 to 20 of 231 Records
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1989 (12) TMI 363 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... his submission Mr. Dutt asked us to consider the documents now filed by her. We are unable to accept this submission of Mr. Dutt for at this stage we are concerned only with the question whether the Magistrate was justified in taking cognizance upon the complainant and whether the issuance of the process against the petitioners was an abuse of the process of the Court or not. If really, the documents now disclosed by Mr. Dutt were in the possession of the complainant and were relevant to prove her case, nothing prevented her to disclose the same at the time of filing the complaint so as to entitle the Magistrate to legally take cognizance of the same. 18. In view of the above discussion, we must hold that the learned Magistrate was not justified in taking cognisance upon the complaint filed by the complainant. We therefore allow this application and quash the proceeding. Needless to say, the benefit of this order goes to the other accused also. S.P. RAJKHOWA, J. 19. I agree.
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1989 (12) TMI 362 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... by the Tribunal in the department's appeal. 6. The point that the assessee now seeks to raise was not argued before the Tribunal nor was the same considered by the Tribunal. In fact the Tribunal could not consider without any cross-objection being filed by the assessee. The question is a mixed question of facts and law. The question that has now been sought to be raised regarding depreciation was not considered and decided by the Tribunal and does not arise out of the order of the Tribunal. It has not been shown how the Tribunal has erred in not considering this question. In fact in the department's appeal the Tribunal could not have considered this until and unless the assessee took this point before the Tribunal. 7. We are unable to accept the assessee's prayer for remanding the matter back to the Tribunal to consider the case. The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the revenue. There will be no order as to costs. B.P. Banerjee, J. I agree.
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1989 (12) TMI 361 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... probe into the details of the discussions and the deliberation before legislative will is seen expressed by passing the resolution. The connotation of the word 'consideration' occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 98 ' comprehends 'taking note of or 'paying heed to' depending upon the nature of the subject. It may be open to the councillors to express views even within the limited time available. No standard can be prescribed in such matters. When it is shown that the council had the opportunity to consider the objections received, it has to be deemed, that they had taken note of the same before reaching a decision. 12. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has committed an error in assuming on account of the shortage of time alone and that there had been non-compliance with the requirements under the statute. We set aside the judgment of the High Court and allow the appeals. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (12) TMI 360 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... swer the three questions by saying (1) The entire amount received by the assessee from the company must be treated as dividend income without any deduction of the face value of the shares or the purchase price of the shares. (2) The purchase price of the shares must be treated as business expenditure as the assessee had done in his share-trading account and such expenditure should be allowed as deduction in the share-trading account under the business head. (3) The assessee will be entitled to relief under Section 80M of the Income-tax Act, 1961, in respect of the amount of dividend received from the company as the shareholder on the reduction of the company's capital. The relief will be calculated on the net amount of dividend which has been included in the gross total income of the assessee. 21. The Tribunal will dispose of the case conformably with the answer given above. 22. The case is disposed of finally as above. 23. There will be no order as to costs. 24. I agree.
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1989 (12) TMI 359 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e 26 the Court has observed that in adjudging the amount payable by one party to another, an arbitrator has full power to direct payment by instalments. The directions as to the number, amount, mode and time of payment of these instalments are, therefore, matters within the discretion of the arbitrator and from essential parts of an award which a Court has no more power to modify than it has to enhance or reduce the total sum found payable by the arbitrator. Even if the order fixing the instalments is erroneous, harsh or oppressive, the error is one of substance in the adjudication of the dispute, and not of from which could be amended without affecting the decision. In these circumstances this objection also does not have any substance. It is not for me to decide whether the award is right or wrong and whether the instalments granted are reasonable or not. In the premises the petition is dismissed. There will however, be no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case.
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1989 (12) TMI 358 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... is the document of guarantee that has to be scanned to ascertain whether the guarantee is conditional or otherwise and whether it is an autonomous contract by itself. Ordinarily, the Court shall not grant an injunction restraining enforcement of such bank guarantees save where there is clear case of fraud of which the bank had notice and where the special equity was in favour of the beneficiary under the bank guarantee in the instant case, the appellant." Following the rule of law laid down in Vinay Engineering's case (supra). I hold that the Courts below were not justified in restraining the Corporation from enforcing the Bank guarantee save there is clear case of fraud of which the Bank had notice and where the special equity was in favour of the beneficiary. 6. For the reasons aforesaid, this revision petition is allowed. The orders of the Courts below are set aside. The Corporation is entitled to enforce the Bank guarantee referred to above. 7. Petition allowed.
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1989 (12) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... event relief for cancellation will be surplusage and redundant. A recorded tenure-holder having prima facie title in his favour can hardly be directed to approach the Revenue Court in respect of seeking relief for cancellation of a void document which made him to approach the Court of law and in such case he can also claim ancillary relief even though the same can be granted by the Revenue Court. In any view of the matter, the present action would be covered by the pronouncement of the Full Bench. It is not necessary to go into the correctness of the view of the Full Bench as its correctness was not assailed before us. 8. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the order of the High Court dated 30-11-1984 in Civil Revn. No. 379 of 1983 (reported in 1985 All LJ 325) set aside, the order dated 20-4-1983 of the trial Court on the preliminary issue (Issue No. 4) restored and Civil Suit No. 254 of 1980 remitted to the trial Court for disposal in accordance with law on the merits.
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1989 (12) TMI 356 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... petition, no interim relief was granted and thereafter the sale has taken place. If the petitioner has any ground for challenging that action of sale, the petitioner will be at liberty to challenge the same by way of an independent action. The Corporation is directed to render to the petitioner true and complete account of the sale and if there is any surplus, to disburse the same in accordance with law to the persons entitled to the same. Subject to the aforesaid directions this petition is also dismissed. Rule discharged. 60. In all these petitions, the petitioners will pay the costs of the respondents. 61. Learned counsel for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 6630 of 1985 prayed that certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court be granted. In out opinion, no substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arises in this case and, as such, the prayer for a certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court is rejected.
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1989 (12) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... n exception. In this situation, the view taken by the High court was unexceptional warranting it to be left un interfered with. Some attempt was made by learned counsel for the appellant to contend that the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not be pressed into service to command the State government under S. 3-A (vii) (before its amendment) and S. 3-B of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 (as amended) to issue a notification exempting the respondent from payment of electricity duty. The answer to this argument is available in the conclusion arrived at by the High court extracted above. Without commanding the State government to issue such a notification, it has granted relief to the respondent to which there was no bar. Accordingly, no provision of Madhya Pradesh Electricity Duty Act, 1949 or any other law can be said to have been transgressed. We thus reject this argument too. Thus for the foregoing reasons this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs.
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1989 (12) TMI 354 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e question of applicability of section 44C was not before the appellate authority and as such there was a merger of the original order with the appellate order and consequently, the Commissioner (Appeals) could not invoke the provisions of section 263 for revising the order passed. In this particular case, the Tribunal specifically observed that though the question of applicability of section 44C was an issue, neither of the parties has disputed the quantum in this regard. There is no dispute about the calculation of section 44C but only the applicability of section 44C was disputed. The Tribunal has decided this matter and, therefore, there has been merger of the appellate order with the order of the Commissioner (Appeals). Therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) had no jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of section 263. 6. Accordingly, the question of law is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 7. There will be no order as to costs. Sen, J. - I agree.
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1989 (12) TMI 353 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... h or weight. The use to which it may be put is also immaterial and does not bear on its character as a textile. The fact that the 'dryer felts' are used only as absorbents of moisture in the process of manufacture in a paper manufacturing unit, cannot militate against 'dryer felts' falling within the category of textiles, if otherwise they satisfy the description of textiles. It is not necessary to refer to the other decisions cited before us in this case. The non-inclusion of knotting in the Explanation to Schedule defining 'textiles' is, therefore, immaterial. No other point was pressed before us in this case. We, there- fore, hold that the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, the Government of India and the High Court were right in holding that the establishment of the appellant came within the scope of the Act and the appellant was liable to comply with the requirements of the Act in all respects. The appeal, therefore, fails and it is dismissed.
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1989 (12) TMI 352 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... nuine or bogus are primarily questions to be determined on appreciation of the facts. The findings of the Tribunal on these questions are not liable to be interfered with unless the Tribunal has taken into consideration any relevant material or has failed to take into consideration any relevant material or the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal is perverse in the sense that no reasonable person on the facts placed before it could have come to this conclusion. 12. We are of the view that there were sufficient materials on the basis of which the Tribunal has come to a correct conclusion and the Tribunal has not taken into consideration any irrelevant material and all the facts placed before it have been considered by the Tribunal. 13. The first question, therefore, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The second question is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. 14. There will be no order as to costs. Banerjee, J. - I agree.
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1989 (12) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ment issued by Public Service Commission in accordance with recruitment Rules he acquires right to be considered for selection in accordance with the then existing Rules. This right cannot be affected by amendment of any rule unless the amending rule is retrospective in nature. In the instant case the Commission had acted in accordance with the then existing rules and there is no dispute that the appellants were eligible for appointment, their selection was not in violation of the recruitment Rules. The Tribunal in our opinion was in error in setting aside the select list prepared by the Commission. 12. In view of the above discussions, we allow the appeal and set aside the order of the Tribunal dated September 30, 1987. We further direct the State Government to make appointments to the posts of Motor Vehicles Inspectors on the basis of the select its prepared and finalised by the Commission. The writ petition also disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
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1989 (12) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the first respondent-contemnor to deliver vacant possession immediately and issuing necessary further and consequential directions for enforcing the same. o p /o p In the foregoing circumstances, we find the first respondent guilty of committing contempt by wilful disobedience of the undertaking given by him in this Court and accordingly we convict him and sentence him to pay a fine of ₹ 500 within the period of four weeks, failing which he shall suffer simple imprisonment for one month, and also direct him to deliver vacant possession of the premises forthwith to the petitioner to the extent possible by him. We further direct the District Magistrate, Thane, to evict all those who are in physical possession of the property including the 2nd respondent and his men and if necessary with police help and give vacant possession of the premises to the petitioner forthwith. o p /o p However, we discharge the rule issued against the second respondent. o p /o p R.N.J. o p /o p
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1989 (12) TMI 349 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... acts in this country; (ii) that the liability of such a corporation is not limited to such of its assets (or the assets of its affiliates) as may be found in this country, but that the victims are able to reach out to the assets of such concerns anywhere in the world; (iii) that any decree obtained in Indian Courts in compliance with due process of law is capable of being executed against the foreign corporation, its affiliates and their assets without further procedural hurdles, in those other countries. Our brother, K.N. Singh, J., has in this context dealt at some length with the United Nations Code of Conduct for multi-national Corporations which awaits approval of various countries. We hope that calamities like the one which this country has suffered will serve as catalysts to expedite the acceptance of an international code on such matters in the near future. With these observations, we agree with the order proposed by the learned Chief Justice. Petitions disposed of.
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1989 (12) TMI 348 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... refers to oral accounts of the contents of documents. Correctness of certified copies referred to in clause (1) is presumed under Section 79; but that of other copies must be proved by proper evidence. A certified copy of a registered sale deed may be produced as secondary evidence in the absence of the original. But in the present case Ex. 3 is not a certified copy. It is just an ordinary copy. There is also no evidence regarding contents of the original sale deed. Ex. 3 cannot, therefore, be considered as secondary evidence. The appellate Court has a right and duty to exclude such evidence. In the result, the appeal is allowed, modifying the judgment and decree of the High Court. The judgment and decree of the trial court as affirmed by the District Court are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed. Since the original plaintiff died leaving behind his widow during pendency of the appeal before the High Court, we make no order as to costs. R.N.J. Appeal allowed.
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1989 (12) TMI 347 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... uot; of the 6th respondent. We therefore refrain from saying anything more on the subject. 11. Dr. Ghatate, the learned Counsel appearing for the aggrieved respondent in each of the appeals tried to urge that the Constitution of the Selection Committee itself was defective inasmuch as no experts from other University were invited to participate in it as required by the Statutes. This ground was not urged before the High Court. It involves a question of fact. There was therefore no opportunity either for the appellant or the University to meet it. Probably the facts on the point were against the contesting respondents and that is why the said point was not raised although they had chosen to urge all other vague and unsubstantial points. We cannot therefore permit Dr. Ghatate to urge the said point here for the first time. 12. In the circumstances, we allow all the appeals and set aside the decision of the High Court. Respondent No. 1 in each of the appeals will pay the costs.
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1989 (12) TMI 346 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of the senior-most workmen should be regularised with immediate effect and the remaining 118 petitioners should be regularised in a phased manner, before April 1, 1991 and promoted to the next higher post according to the standing orders. All the petitioners are entitled to equal pay at par with the persons appointed on regular basis to the similar post or discharge similar duties, and are entitled to the scale of pay and all allowances revised from time to time for the said posts. We further direct that 16 of the petitioners who are ousted from the service pending the writ petition should be reinstated immediately. Suitable promotional avenues should be created and the respondent should consider the eligible candidates for being promoted to such posts. The respondent is directed to deposit a sum of ₹ 10,000 in the Registry of this Court within four weeks to meet the remuneration of the Industrial Tribunal. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed, but without costs.
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1989 (12) TMI 345 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... satisfy the authorities that it being a unit registered with of opposite-party is bad even for this reason. A unit which obtains registration before passing of the order cannot be denied eligibility certificate. Nor its period can be curtailed. For reasons stated above this petition succeeds and is allowed. The part of the eligibility certificate by which it has been made effective from February, 1987 is quashed. Consequently assessment proceedings for 1984-85 are quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to its costs. of opposite-party is bad even for this reason. A unit which obtains registration before passing of the order cannot be denied eligibility certificate. Nor its period can be curtailed. For reasons stated above this petition succeeds and is allowed. The part of the eligibility certificate by which it has been made effective from February, 1987 is quashed. Consequently assessment proceedings for 1984-85 are quashed. The petitioner shall be entitled to its costs.
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1989 (12) TMI 344 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the suit was not maintainable?
Held that:- The defendant denied the agreement and went on to state that just before his death her husband had agreed to sell to the plaintiff Item No. 1 of the suit property less one acre of paddy field for a sum of ₹ 11,000 but due to the illness of her husband, the sale in question could not be effected. After the written statement to this effect was filed, no application for amendment to the plaint was made. The Trial Court decreed the suit. In the appeal, the High Court did not accept the agreement pleaded by the plaintiff, but granted a decree on the basis of the agreement set out in the written statement. It was held by a Bench comprising two learned Judges of this Court that the agreement pleaded by the defendant was wholly different from that pleaded by the plaintiff. The plaintiff did not plead either in the plaint or at any subsequent stage that he was ready and willing to perform the agreement pleaded in the written statement and hence, no decree on the basis of that agreement should have been passed in his favour as done by the High Court. The Court held that it was well settled that in a suit for specific performance, the plaintiff should allege that he is ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and in the absence of such an allegation in the plaint, the suit is not maintainable. In our opinion, this case does not lend any support to the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, as in the present case there is no question of any decree being passed on the basis of any agreement other than the one pleaded by the appellant in the plaint. Judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge are set aside. The appeal is allowed.
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