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1989 (4) TMI 320
... ... ... ... ..... r which there must have existed an opportunity for a choice between the relinquishment and the conferment of the right in question. Nothing of the kind could be proved in this case to estopp the first respondent. In Shanti Devi v. A.K. Banerjee, 1981 2 SCC 199, it was held that parties could not by their pleadings alter the intrinsic character of the lease or bring about a change of the rights and obligations flowing therefrom. The Court would only look into the terms of the lease irrespective of the averments in the pleadings. In the instant case as we have already held the lease to have been for twenty years, its character could not have been changed by the pleadings, if any, in the above cases. Nor could the respondents be held to have waived their rights under the lease. We do not find any infirmity in the impugned High Court order on this count also. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Stay order, if any, stands vacated.
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1989 (4) TMI 319
... ... ... ... ..... rucial difference between ss. 87 and 89. This is that, within the period of two years mentioned in s. 89, the Central Government can, while adapting pre-existing laws make any changes therein, including changes by way of repeal or amendment. But s. 87 though capable of enforcement indefinitely, confers a more limited power. It can be invoked only to extend laws already in existence to the Union Territory and cannot make any substantial changes therein. The power under s. 89 is limited in time but extensive in scope while under s. 87 the power is indefinite in point of duration but very much more restricted in its scope. The above discussions dispose of all the contentions urged before us. For the reasons set out, we are of opinion that the conclusion arrived at by the Punjab and Haryana High Court was the correct one. All these petitions and appeals fail and are dismissed and the rules nisi discharged but, in the circumstances, we direct each party to bear his/its own costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 318
... ... ... ... ..... t servant who was on probation. The termination was on the ground that his work had never been satisfactory and he was not found suitable for being retained in the service. This Court held that the termination of service in such cases on the ground of unsuitability for the post not attract Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 7 There cannot be any dispute about this proposition. We are not laying down the rule that there should be a regular enquiry in this case All that we wish to state is that if she is to be discontinued it is proper and necessary that she should be told in advance that her work and performance are not up to the mark. 8. In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 12 January, 1985 terminating the service of the appellant. We, however, make it clear that the appellant will not claim the status of a regular employee unless her services are regularised in accordance with law. In the circumstances of case, we make no order as to costs.
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1989 (4) TMI 317
... ... ... ... ..... lude the turnover is not deliberate and wilful. As such there is no case for levy of penalty. and further having regard to the finding of the Tribunal The turnover in question has been reflected in the books of accounts and also the statement filed before the assessing officer. Considering the pleadings of the appellants as the assessment is under best of judgment under section 12(2) of the Act, penalty under section 12(5)(iii) is not attracted. Omission to include the turnover in return have not been proved to be wilful. we are of the view that there is no scope for invocation of section 12(4) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The tax case is, therefore, dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 316
... ... ... ... ..... s-I should say, more in the interest of the dealers and to protect their interests. The Board would well have been justified in implementing their scheme to jack up the minimum reserve price so as to include the purchase tax element as well, which would have deprived the dealers, like the petitioners, of the opportunity of getting refund, even if the Supreme Court had struck down the liability for purchase tax. The Board acted fairly and equitably in the matter. The claim of the petitioners, if accepted, will leave the Board to make payment of the tax out of the pool fund, thereby depriving the growers, whose interests have to be safeguarded, of amounts legally due to them. There is absolutely no equity or justice in the claim of the petitioners, which will only rob the growers of their dues, to the unjust enrichment of the petitioners. Such an avaricious attitude on the part of the dealers is only to be deprecated. I dismiss the original petitions. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 315
Whether the action of the respondent in evicting the appellant and granting the premises in question to M/s Dhanji Mavji was proper and right?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As we look upon the facts of this case, there was an implied obligation in respect of dealings with the tenants/occupants of the Port Trust authority to act in public interest/purpose - That requirement is fulfilled if it is demonstrated that the Port Trust Authorities have acted in pursuance of a policy which is referable to public purpose.
Once that norm is established whether that policy is the best policy or whether another policy was possible, is not relevant for consideration. It is, therefore, not necessary for our present purposes to dwell on the question whether the obligation of the Port Trust Authorities to act in pursuance of a public purpose was of public law purpose or a private law purpose. Under the Constitutional scheme of this country the Port Trust Authorities were required by relevant law to act in pursuance of public purpose.
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1989 (4) TMI 314
... ... ... ... ..... by the appellants. In every case, the intimation sent to the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Traffic and Licensing), Madras under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act revealed that there was sale of a finished vehicle. As rightly pointed out by the Tribunal there are no materials to support the contention as advanced before us that the sale of the chassis and the construction of the body are two different transactions. Orders of the customers were only for finished vans. If, this be the factual position, the fact that the body had suffered tax earlier is of no consequence. The question is whether the sale was of the finished vehicle or that of two independent goods namely the chassis and body. In this connection the ruling in Rane (Madras) Ltd. v. State of Kerala 1968 21 STC 420 (Ker) FB becomes very relevant, and rightly it was relied on by the Tribunal. We are unable to see any infirmity in the order. The tax revision cases are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 313
... ... ... ... ..... how the explanation would be attracted. It envisages an altogether separate situation. A registered dealer under the Act is required to file the return quarterly and pay the admitted tax which is due to be paid. When no such return is filed, it can be inferred that in order to avoid the dues payable the dealer did not file the return. If the dealer would have explained the circumstances for non-payment, the Sales Tax Officer might have considered the genuineness of his difficulties. In this case, no explanation was offered for consideration of the Sales Tax Officer. Despite opportunity for the same, the petitioner failed to file the returns and pay the admitted tax. His conduct is contumacious. In the circumstances, the Sales Tax Officer was justified in refusing renewal and the revisional authority was justified in affirming the same. 8.. In the result, writ application has no merit which is accordingly, dismissed. No costs. L. RATH, J.-I agree. Writ application dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 312
... ... ... ... ..... by a Division Bench of this Court on 22nd September, 1988. The result is that the aforesaid order of the Commissioner permitting the assessee to pay interest at the rate of 9 per cent only subject to the conditions specified in that order stands upheld. The assessee in the present case is prepared to abide by this order of the Commissioner in respect of the period involved in this revision. This being so, it is not necessary to decide the legal effect of the State Government s orders dated 23rd June, 1976 and 27th September, 1976, which are the bases of the decision of the Tribunal. Consequently the assessee s revision is allowed and it is held that the assessee is liable to pay interest at 9 per cent subject to the conditions mentioned in the aforesaid Commissioner s order, dated 26th April, 1986, for the period in question. The conditions imposed in the Commissioner s order will operate with effect from the date of this order with suitable modifications. Petition allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 311
... ... ... ... ..... f quantum of penalty, since penalty is to be quantified by the appropriate authorities by exercise of their discretion. Such discretion must obviously be exercised properly and judiciously, it being a quasi-judicial function. In the course of exercise of discretion, due regard should be given to the degree of infraction of law and all other relevant attending circumstances in each case. But, we shall not hesitate, as in the present case, to enter into this question and interfere with the quantum of penalty, where the discretion has not been properly and judiciously exercised. 9.. Accordingly, the penalty is reduced to Rs. 10,000 (rupees ten thousand only). The balance of Rs. 83,000 (rupees eighty-three thousand only) shall be refunded by the respondents to the applicant within two months at the latest. The application is, thus, disposed of. There will be no order as to costs. B.C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 310
... ... ... ... ..... of the Act, the appellate authority has no jurisdiction to impose penalty for the first time. In view of this decision, the Board was justified in holding that the penalty under section 17(3) of the Act could not have been imposed on the assessee for the first time at the appellate stage. Learned counsel for the Department contended that in view of the decision of this Court reported in 1987 66 STC 164 (Babulal Agarwal v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P.), the Deputy Commissioner was not right in holding that penalty under section 43(1) of the Act could not have been imposed. The Department, however, did not choose to agitate that question before the Board and hence, that aspect of the matter cannot be considered at this stage. 4.. For all these reasons, our answer to the question referred by the Board is in the affirmative and against the Department. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1989 (4) TMI 309
... ... ... ... ..... ing to tax the dealer (who sold the groundnut to the exporter) as the last purchaser. Evidently this is not correct as a fact. Just because the last purchase is getting exempted by virtue of section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, it would not be permissible in law to shift the point of last purchase to the dealer, who sold the groundnut to the exporter. We may also mention that explanation to section 7(b) added by the Amendment Act 18 of 1985 with effect from July 1, 1985, is not applicable to the assessment year in question in these tax revision cases. The tax revision cases accordingly fail and they are dismissed. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 308
... ... ... ... ..... is, the sales tax was levied at the purchase point and, therefore, the tax was levied under section 7-A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. 11.. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the petitioners are liable to pay sales tax on the excise duty turnover though factually the excise duty was paid by the purchasers at the time of purchase from the petitioners. 12.. In the result, the writ petitions as well as the tax case are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Immediately after the pronouncement of the judgment today, the learned counsel for the petitioners sought oral leave of this Court to prefer an appeal before the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as we have only followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer 1985 59 STC 277, we do not think that any question of law of general importance which, in our opinion, needs to be considered by the Supreme Court. The leave sought for is refused. Petitions dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 307
... ... ... ... ..... assessed and due from a private limited company no demand could have been forwarded by the first respondent to the second respondent for recovery of arrears of tax against the directors except in the manner provided in section 16-B. We would accordingly quash the impugned order of the first respondent dated July 19, 1988 and issue a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from proceeding against the petitioners, who are directors of M/s. Western India Gunnies Pvt. Ltd. The W.P. No. 18277 of 1988 is allowed. No costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. W. P. No. 18168 of 1988 At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner-company wishes to withdraw W.P. No. 18168 of 1988. Accordingly, W. P. No. 18168 of 1988 is dismissed as withdrawn and there will be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. It is however made clear that there is no bar for recovering the tax from the private limited company. W.P. No. 18277 of 1988 allowed. W.P. No. 18168 of 1988 dismissed as withdrawn.
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1989 (4) TMI 306
... ... ... ... ..... each flows from a bona fide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by the statute. Those in charge of the affairs of the company in failing to register the company as a dealer acted in the honest and genuine belief that the company was not a dealer. Granting that they erred, no case for imposing penalty was made out. The instant case, on the facts found by the Sales Tax Officer, in my opinion, squarely falls within the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Steel Ltd. 1970 25 STC 211 1972 83 ITR 26. As there was only a technical default without anything more the assessee was not liable to any penalty. The imposition of penalty on the assessee was bad and unwarranted, and the same is not liable to be sustained. For what has been stated above, this revision succeeds and is allowed. In giving effect to this order under section 11(8) of the Act, the Sales Tax Tribunal shall pass the appropriate order. Petition allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 305
... ... ... ... ..... modity more clearly now. It follows that when one commercial commodity is transformed into another, it becomes a separate commodity for purposes of sales tax. Now entry (xv) in clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act is wire rods and wires-rolled, drawn, galvanised, aluminised, tinned or coated such as by copper . Conversion of G.I. wire into G.I. barbed wire involves a process of twisting and fixing sharp edges upwards and downwards to act as an obstacle to trespassers. A new commercial commodity distinct from G.I. wires comes into existence and in our opinion, therefore, the Tribunal was justified in holding that G.I. barbed wires were not covered by item No. (xv) of clause (iv) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. 5.. Our answer to the question referred to this Court is, therefore, in the affirmative and against the assessee. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear their own costs of this reference. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1989 (4) TMI 304
... ... ... ... ..... ished only in respect of an amount of Rs. 1,533 for which the Deputy Commissioner imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,000. The order of the single Bench of the Board of Revenue does not show that this contention which finds place in the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) was advanced before it since there is no mention of the same in the order. This being so, there was no occasion for it to be considered by the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue, and for the same reason it does not arise for consideration even in this further revision. Moreover, the delay found by the Deputy Commissioner was only in respect of an amount of Rs. 1,533 in his order passed in 1971 while this penalty was set aside by a single Bench of the Board of Revenue in 1974. After all these years it does not appear desirable to reopen that matter which appears to have been given up even before the single Bench of the Board of Revenue. Consequently, the revision is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1989 (4) TMI 303
... ... ... ... ..... r the Revenue, has frankly and, in my opinion, rightly conceded that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Limited 1970 26 STC 354 has not been properly applied by the Tribunal to the facts of the present cases and the attempt made by it to distinguish the same is wholly fallacious. For the reasons stated above I am of the view that the order passed by the Tribunal cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. In the result, the revisions succeed and are allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal is set aside and it is directed to remit the cases back to the assessing authority for deciding the cases afresh in the light of the observations contained in the judgment and also the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Limited 1970 26 STC 354. Parties shall bear their own costs. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under section 11(8) of the Act. Petitions allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 302
... ... ... ... ..... re, to be construed accordingly. The question now is whether on this construction of section 16(1)(b) of the Act any occasion arises for imposing penalty in the present case. It is sufficient to say that none of the authorities including the Board of Revenue has mentioned any facts relating to the alleged default on the basis of which penalty under section 16(1)(b) was sought to be imposed. This being so, there is no material to decide whether imposition of penalty under section 16(1)(b) on the assessee is justified or not. This aspect is, therefore, to be decided afresh on the basis of the facts of this case with advertence to the construction made above of section 16(1)(b) of the Act. Consequently, the revision is partly allowed. The orders relating to imposition of penalty of all the authorities from the original assessing authority to Board of Revenue are set aside. The matter shall be decided afresh by the original assessing authority. No costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1989 (4) TMI 301
... ... ... ... ..... en once it is clear that it has exempted under section 8-A of the Act unless the wording in the notification itself give negative indication it will have to be held that the exemption covers even tax levied under section 6-B. Moreover there is greater flexibility in matters of grant of exemption under section 8-A than under section 8 of the Act and in matters of fiscal policy if exemption under one provision is removed it does not mean it is not covered by another provision. Therefore, all the contentions raised on behalf of the State fail. In the light of this discussion the clarification issued by the Commissioner is plainly wrong. I uphold the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. The impugned notices seeking to reopen the assessments that had been completed on the ground that what is exempt in the notification is only the rate of sales tax and not the turnover tax under section 6-B of the Act are quashed. Petitions allowed, rule made absolute. Petitions allowed.
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