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1990 (1) TMI 308
... ... ... ... ..... ocedure. The High Court, not being a Court of such restricted power to grant bail, is not "the Court" conceived by Section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act. Fourthly, the construction of the words "the Court" used in Section 37 of the N.D.P.S. Act deprives the High Court of its established jurisdiction. There are no words in the N.D.P.S. Act which bring out the intention to take away the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 439 of the code of Criminal Procedure. VII. ORDER 27. (i) For all these reasons, the application is allowed. The Applicants shall be released on bail in the sum of ₹ 3,00,000/- each with one surety each. The Applicants are at liberty to deposit cash amount in lieu of surety bonds. They shall deposit their passports with the concerned officer. (ii) The Applicants shall report at the Sessions Court of Bombay every Monday. (iii) The application for stay of this Order and leave to the Supreme Court is rejected. 28. Ordered accordingly.
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1990 (1) TMI 307
... ... ... ... ..... o was reasonably understood to have received it for and on behalf of her husband. If the statement is true, there is no contradiction in it and it is categoric and clear. We see no reason to suspect that it is not true for there is no evidence on the side of the plantiffs to the contrary. As stated earlier, there is no evidence at all on the side of the plaintiffs that rents were in arrears. In the absence of any reason to disbelieve the clear and categoric testimony of the defence witnesses on the point, we see no reason to suspect that the rents remained in arrears. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the courts came to the conclusion, as they did, without any evidence whatsoever to support it and contrary to the available evidence let in by the defence. Their conclusion was, therefore, perverse, irrational and totally unjustified. For this reason, we set aside the impugned decree and judgment of the courts below. The appeal is allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 306
... ... ... ... ..... s and authority of the Tribunal may be exercised by Benches thereof. Sub-section 2 of that section next provides that 'a Bench shall consist of one Judicial Member and Administrative Member'. No provision to the contrary is shown to us. It is, therefore, statutorily recognised that every Bench of the Tribunal must consist of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member. It is, therefore, obvious that the Administrative Member alone could not have heard and decided the matter. 4. In view of the above state of the law we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the matter ought not to have been disposed of by the Administrative Member alone. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order and remand the matter to the Tribunal for disposal in accordance with law by a Bench properly constituted as required by Section 5(2) of the statute. The Civil Appeal is accordingly disposed of. 5. In the facts and circumstance of this case there will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (1) TMI 305
... ... ... ... ..... no justification for making additions to the turnover on an ad hoc basis. The Tribunal has rightly deleted the additions. The tax revision case is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 304
... ... ... ... ..... pect of tyre industry certain anomalies and distortions had crept in. Therefore, the relief granted earlier was required to be withdrawn and thus in public interest the scheme was modified vide the impugned notification. It is to be noticed that apart from a bare assertion, the respondents have not given any particulars or data to support the assertion. In Ceat Tyres s case 1987 31 ELT 332 (Bom) it was held that it is just not enough to state that the exemptions were withdrawn in the public interest or that there was a change in the policy because of review of the scheme. We agree with the view of the Bombay High Court. The bald assertion of the respondents that the scheme was reviewed and modified in public interest is of no effect and rejected. The impugned Notification No. 141 of 1978 issued on July 14, 1978, is hereby quashed. We allow the petition and make the rule absolute. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 303
... ... ... ... ..... nts in regard to the ownership since those departments of the Government have prima facie accepted the petitioner as the owner of the business. Accordingly the revisional order of the Additional Commissioner as well as the order of refusal by the Sales Tax Officer are quashed and the Sales Tax Officer is directed to make fresh inquiry into the matter. After collecting the materials if the Sales Tax Officer is prima facie satisfied that the application of the petitioner cannot be granted, she should be given an opportunity of being heard on the basis of her application for registration which should be dealt with. Since the application is of the year 1980 expeditious steps should be taken for making an inquiry so as to dispose of the application of the petitioner by the end of April, 1990. 6.. With the aforesaid directions, this writ application is allowed. No costs. Requisites for issue of the writ to the opposite parties shall be filed by day after tomorrow. Petition allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 302
... ... ... ... ..... nd the cold rolled strips fall under the same entry, namely, entry 2(iii) 2(vi)? of the Third Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was right in treating them as the same goods. The tax revision cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 301
... ... ... ... ..... t into small pieces of plank. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. 1985 60 STC 213 and also the decision of this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. Kunhalavi and Co. 1987 66 STC 100, it was held that tax under section 5A of the Act is not leviable. We are of the view that the question as to whether pencil slats-small pieces of wooden plankis timber, is largely a question of fact. As the final fact-finding authority, the Appellate Tribunal examined the goods and after adverting to their size, quality, etc., came to the conclusion that pencil slats are nothing else than timber. In the light of the decision of this Court and of the Supreme Court, the conclusion is irresistible that section 5A of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act is not attracted. The Appellate Tribunal was justified in holding so. There is no error of law. 4.. We see no merit in this tax revision case. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 300
... ... ... ... ..... What is excluded is the heating systems may be of air, gas or fluid. Air, gas or fluid are not sought to be excluded. If that had been the intention then the entry would have read air or gas . It would not have been worded as at present it is. The plain language of this entry clearly negatives the interpretation sought by the petitioner. It is not true that the Schedules A to D do not impose any tax on gas or oxygen gas. As noticed earlier vide entry 22 of Schedule C all goods other than those specified in Schedules A, B, C, D and E have been made taxable under Schedule C at the rate of 8 per cent. Entry 22 is a residuary entry and takes into its sweep all the goods other than those specified in Schedules A to D. Since, oxygen gas is not specified in any of these Schedules it will fall under entry 212 of Schedule C and bear tax at the rate of 8 per cent. For the aforementioned reasons we find no merit in this writ petition and dismiss the same in limine. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 299
... ... ... ... ..... under section 2(1)(b). 5.. We examined the facts of the cases before us. We find that originally tax was being collected under section 5 of the Act and 4 per cent was being collected. The same was upheld by the assessing authority and the appellate authority. Subsequently, after Sivachandradasa s case 1987 65 STC 379 (Ker) notices are given and assessments are reopened and tax was levied at a higher rate at 20 per cent. In equity too, it is unfair to impose on the dealers a higher percentage of tax. But, we are not resting our decision on this ground. On a proper and fair interpretation of entry 18/157, we find that the goods dealt with by the revision petitioners do not come within entry 18/157. 6.. In this view of the matter, we declare, that the present cases do not come within entry 18/157 of the First Schedule and we set aside the decision to the contrary rendered by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. All the tax revision cases stand allowed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 298
... ... ... ... ..... ules, 1939. After a very detailed examination of the inter-molecular change in the content of the substance, viz., vanaspati, in re groundnut oil, the court held that even though in the course of hydrogenation, the oil absorbed two atoms of hydrogen and there was an inter-molecular change in the content of the substance, but the hydrogenated oil continued even after the change, to be groundnut oil and that hydrogenated oil (vanaspati) cannot be denied that benefit of the deduction from the turnover on the ground that vanaspati has ceased to be groundnut oil. 19.. We feel that people in the trade and commerce conversant with the subject, viz., Bru, understand it in the usual course as a form of coffee and in that sense we have to hold that Bru is a form of coffee and that the entry that is applicable is entry 21 from September 16, 1980 to March 31, 1983. In the result, we have to set aside the common order of the Appellate Tribunal. The T.R.Cs. are allowed. Petitions allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 297
... ... ... ... ..... nue, and the order passed by the Sales Tax Officer merged in the order of the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, which was challenged before the Tribunal, by the department and in that appeal, the rate of tax having not been raised the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, also stood endorsed by the Tribunal. In view of the said fact, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal in the instant case cannot be sustained. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the facts of the case and also to the law rendered by me in the case of Krishna Rice and Oil Mills 1987 67 STC 195 (All.) 1986 UPTC 323 and I am of the opinion that the order passed by the Tribunal deserves to be quashed. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Tribunal is set aside. There will be no order as to costs. Let a copy of this order may be sent to the Tribunal concerned as contemplated under section 11(8) of the Act. Petition allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 296
Whether the auction purchaser’s interest should be protected as against the judgment debtor who has since succeeded in getting rid off the decree against him?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The judgment debtor who has been examined in the case has stated that the auction purchaser is a sambandhi of the decree holder. ’the decree holder’s daughter has been given in marriage to the son of auction purchaser. That evidence remains unchallenged. The evidence further indicates that after the purchase both of them have entered into an agreement with a third party for sale of the second item of properties for Rs.96,000 and a case seems to be pending on the basis of that agreement. The evidence also discloses that the auction purchaser had no money of his own to purchase the property. These circumstances are sufficient to hold that the auction purchaser was not a bona fide purchaser.
The auction sale in his favour must, therefore, fall for restitution. The Court cannot lend assistance for him to retain the property of the judgment-debtor who has since succeeded in getting rid of the unjust decree.
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1990 (1) TMI 295
... ... ... ... ..... ur opinion, the combined effect of all these facts is that the petitioner s unit would be deemed to have been established after the term loan was obtained. The petitioner was hence clearly entitled to the grant of eligibility certificate. The Divisional Level Committee, in our opinion, has committed a patent error in declining to grant the eligibility certificate to the petitioner. In the result the petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders passed by the Divisional Level Committee dated August 22, 1986 and May 12, 1987 (annexures 8 and 11) are quashed. The Divisional Level Committee is also directed to grant the requisite eligibility certificate to the petitioner within one month of the date on which a certified copy of this order is submitted before the Joint Director of Industries, Meerut, the convenor of the Divisional Level Committee. A copy of this order may be given to the learned counsel on payment of requisite charges within a week. Writ petition allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 294
... ... ... ... ..... tion of India must be treated separate from the open market sales effected by the assessee (such a course is prejudicial to the assessee). On appeal by the assessee, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner and directed that the assessment year should be treated as a unit for the purpose of applying explanation III aforesaid. This view is questioned in this tax revision case. We see no reason to take a different view from that of the Tribunal. Tax is levied upon the turnover during the assessment year. Even where provisional assessments are made every month, or at different intervals, all of them are subject to a final assessment for the assessment year. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was justified in holding that the total liability of the assessee shall be determined taking the year as the unit and the entire transactions that occur in that assessment year in respect of paddy and rice. Tax revision case is, accordingly, dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 293
... ... ... ... ..... be made by the petitioner-assessee, who undertook the works contract. Only specifications were given by the customer and various standards were insisted upon for the work that is to be executed. 9.. Judging from whatever angle, we find that the contract is a works contract. The Tribunal is not justified in coming to the conclusion that the contract dated November 8, 1977, is a contract for sale of switch boards and not a contract for work and labour. The Tribunal was also not justified in coming to the conclusion that the switch board has a separate commercial identity even before it is assembled and erected. The Tribunal is not justified in concluding that the property in the switch board stood transferred to the customer before it is installed. 10.. In the result, we allow the tax revision case and answer the reference as indicated above. The amount of Rs. 1,35,411 is not includible in the taxable turnover of the assessee for the assessment year 1979-80. Petition allowed.
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1990 (1) TMI 292
... ... ... ... ..... lable to them was conditional. The amendment did no more than clarify the position. 44.. We, therefore, hold that the Amendment Act of 1987 in so far as it deleted section 6B(2)(e) of the BFST Act, 1941, is a valid piece of legislation, both in respect of prospective operation and in respect of retrospective operation. The challenge under article 14 does not stand any scrutiny because there is nothing which imposes a fresh tax and nothing which can be called unreasonable within the meaning of article 14. 45.. In view of the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in any of the applications. They are liable to fail and hereby dismissed. The amounts deposited by some of the applicants under protest and such amounts as have been deposited by way of security, should be adjusted against the demand for turnover tax and we direct accordingly. 46.. We make no order as to costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 291
... ... ... ... ..... d is 80 per cent coffee and 20 per cent chicory. The Tribunal found the entry that is applicable in the case of these two items is entry 21A. Entry 21A, as we said earlier, is also a specific entry. It is stated very specifically that this entry is an admixture of coffee and chicory. So long as there is no dispute that Ricory and Sunrise are admixtures of coffee and chicory, these items will squarely come under entry 21A of the First Schedule to the Act. When the items are squarely and plainly includible in a specific item, there is absolutely no justification for the taxing authorities to put those items in a general entry dealing with beverages and drinks. The Tribunal has rightly found that these items, viz., Ricory and Sunrise will come under entry 21A. We hold that the order of the Tribunal is perfectly legal and valid. In these circumstances, we do not see any reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The tax revision cases are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 290
... ... ... ... ..... 9-A of the Act. In view of these provisions we cannot direct the third respondent to refund the alleged excess of tax realised from the petitioner to the petitioner directly. The scheme of the Act as disclosed by section 29-A is that the excess amount of sales tax realised by any dealer has to be deposited in Government treasury and thereafter the person from whom such excess was realised by the dealer is entitled to claim the refund by making appropriate application under sub-section (3) of section 29-A. We cannot hence issue a direction which will have the effect of defeating the provisions of law, viz., section 29-A. The petition is accordingly dismissed. We, however, make it clear that we should not be taken to have expressed any concluded opinion on the question whether the amount of sales tax paid by the petitioner to the third respondent was in excess of the sales tax chargeable on the commodity purchased by the petitioner from the respondent. Writ petition dismissed.
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1990 (1) TMI 289
... ... ... ... ..... 5. It was pointed out that section 35 was amended by the amending Act No. 37 of 1972 with effect from January 1, 1960, to provide for reopening of the assessment on the ground of wrong allowance or set-off. We do not think that Shri Jetley is justified in making the submission inasmuch as the rule requires the Sales Tax Officer to record a finding that he had reason to believe that it was so and to issue a notice before making reassessment. This was certainly not done. In fact, this could not have been done at the material time as the provision itself was not then in existence, having come into existence only in the year 1972 though with retrospective effect from January 1, 1960. In the circumstances the submission of Shri Jetley in this regard is to be rejected. The additional question, i.e., question No. 1 in Sales Tax Reference No. 21 of 1986 is, accordingly, answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs. References answered in the negative.
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