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Case Laws
Showing 221 to 240 of 291 Records
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1990 (9) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
Whether there had been an increase in the rent and rule 6 of Schedule II which dealt with the value of the building for the purposes of property tax was inapplicable as the levy under the old Act on the basis of the rental value and enhancement could be done according to the procedure contained in Schedule VII, rule 10 of the old Act?
Held that:- The power to tax is a sovereign power and is legislative in character and it has to be exercised within constitutional limitations. The statutes relating to municipal taxes may be changed according to the existing legislative rules of State policy unless forbidden by the Constitution from doing so. An irregular assessment may also be regularised with retrospective effect within the same constitutional limitations. Where the court has not already declared invalid a taxing measure which was of doubtful validity, it is permissible for the appropriate Legislature to validate it by retrospective legislation. No legal fiction is involved in such a case. Mr. Subba Rao's submission has, therefore, to be rejected.
The Government Order impugned before the High Court has been covered and validated by the above provisions, the Government Order itself covered the period after the repeal of the old Act and till the date of commencement of the Fourth Amendment, so that no interregnum was really there. The assessment made according to the provisions of the old Act was validated as actions taken by the Council pursuant to the impugned Government Order and not under the provisions of the old Act which was already repealed. While referring to the old Act, the Government Order did not revive the Act but only prescribed the same procedure as was found in the repealed Act as a transitory measure.
The validity of section 4(1) of the Fourth Amendment Act having not been challenged before the High Court, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgments of the High Court. Appeal dismissed.
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1990 (9) TMI 70 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the Director of Industries can refuse the exemption certificate on a consideration not specified in the notification?
Held that:- It does seem likely that the State Government had not intended the exemption to be availed of by certain categories of industries. But it has failed to achieve this purpose on account of the wide language in which it couched the exemption notification. We find ourselves unable, for the reasons discussed above, to discover any valid legal basis on which the exemption clearly granted can be withheld from the assessees here. We, therefore, dismiss the appeals of the State and allow the appeals preferred by the assessees and hold them entitled to the exemption under the 1981 notification.
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1990 (9) TMI 69 - SUPREME COURT
Chargeable Profits, Company, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... ngs Ltd. 1977 110 ITR 131 (Mad) ; Commissioner of Surtax v. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. 1979 116 ITR 528 (Bom) ; CIT v. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. 1980 126 ITR 736 (Delhi) ; CIT v. Premier Cotton Spinning Mills Ltd. 1981 128 ITR 694 (Ker) ; CIT v. Schrader Scovill Duncan Ltd. 1981 132 ITR 822 (Cal) ; CIT v. Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. 1982 133 ITR 578 (Guj) ; Siemens India Ltd. v.K. Subramanian, ITO 1983 143 ITR 120 (Bom) ; K. Subramanian v.Siemens India Ltd. 1988 173 ITR 136 (Bom) ; CIT v. J.K. Synthetics Ltd. 1983 143 ITR 396 (All) ; CIT v. Indian Detonators Ltd. 1983 143 ITR 547 (AP); CIT v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd. 1989 178 ITR 635 (P & H) CIT v. Avery Cycle Industries (P.) Ltd. 1989 178 ITR 173 (P & H) and CIT v. Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. 1978 111 ITR 6 (Bom). There is a preponderance of judicial opinion in favour of the assessee with which we agree. The appeals fail and, are, accordingly, dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed.
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1990 (9) TMI 68 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Depreciation, Developement Rebate, Plant ... ... ... ... ..... This court has held in CIT v. Kanodia Warehousing Corporation 1980 121 ITR 996 that, in order to find out whether a building or structure or a part thereof constitutes plant , the court must apply what is called the functional test . If it is found that the building or structure constitutes an apparatus or a tool of the taxpayer by means of which the business activities are carried on, it would amount to plant but where the structure plays no part in the carrying on of those activities but merely constitutes a place within which they are carried on, the building cannot be regarded as a plant. Following the principle of the said decision, it must be held that the building constructed and used as a cinema and wherein the cinema business is being carried on by the assessee does constitute plant along with its fittings and fixtures. For the above reasons, the question referred herein is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 67 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Company, Deduction, Salary, Standard Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... ring the question of allowing deduction under section 80U of the Act, what is to be looked into by the authorities is as to whether the assessee suffers from a permanent physical disability which has the effect of reducing substantially his capacity to engage in a gainful employment or occupation. It is not a condition precedent for allowing the deduction under this provision that the assessee should be unemployed or should not be earning anything. Merely because the assessee is earning income from some business, the deduction under section 80U of the Act cannot be disallowed for, had he not suffered from a permanent physical disability, he could have earned more. In our opinion, the Appellate Tribunal was not justified in disallowing the deduction under section 80U of the Act. Our answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, In favour of the Department and our answer to the second question is in the negative, in favour of the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 66 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Trusts ... ... ... ... ..... ious trust ? An identical question was considered by this court in Income-tax Reference No. 617 of 1977 disposed of on August 9, 1990 (CIT v. Surjit Devi Kunji Lal Jaipuria Charitable Trust (No. 2) 1990 186 ITR 745). It was held that a stipulation of the kind referred to in the question does not render the trust a non-charitable one. Following the said decision, the question referred herein is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 65 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Industrial Undertaking ... ... ... ... ..... ssee that question Nos. 2 and 3 are merely consequential to question No. 1 and, therefore, it is not necessary to refer questions Nos. 2 and 3 specifically. It would be sufficient if question No. 1 is referred. Accordingly, out of the following three questions asked for, only question No. 1 is directed to be stated under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. 1. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was, in law, justified in holding that the assessee was an industrial undertaking ? 2. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was, in law, justified in allowing investment allowance under section 32A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was, in law, justified in holding that the assessee was entitled to deduction under sections 80HH and 80J of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ? The income-tax application is, accordingly, allowed in part. No costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 64 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Remuneration ... ... ... ... ..... . It appears that the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal covers more than one assessment year and the amount of Rs. 1,50,729 represents the liability for the assessment year concerned herein, namely, assessment year 1972-73 A Bench of this court has taken the view in Madho Mahesh Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 1973 92 ITR 503, that, even though no trust is created by an assessee within the meaning of section 36(1)(v), yet the payment towards, the said liability is permissible deduction. The Tribunal has held in this case that the liability to pay this amount accrued during the relevant year, though actual quantification may have been done later. The assessee in this case is maintaining his accounts according to the mercantile system. In the circumstances, the Tribunal was right in holding that the said amount has to be given deduction under section 37 of the Act. In the circumstances, the question referred is answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. No costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 63 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Accrual, Income, Interest ... ... ... ... ..... averments to determine the said question. In our opinion, the plaint averments do clearly indicate and affirm that there was an agreement to pay interest at the rate of 6 per cent. annum during the two previous years relevant to the assessment years concerned herein and that such an agreement continued even subsequent thereto. The Tribunal has clearly misread the said averments in the plaint, which misreading has resulted in its recording a finding for which there is absolutely no basis. There cannot be any better evidence than the assessee s own statements. The Tribunal s finding lies in the face of clear material. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the two questions referred to us must be answered in the following terms Question No. 1 is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. Similarly, question NO. 2 also is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 62 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
... ...
... ... ..... d, further proceedings including the demand notice dated February 14, 1990 (annexure 6), and order of proclamation of sale in pursuance of the attachment order dated January 21, 1990, in pursuance of annexure 1 to the writ petition shall remain stayed. We further direct the petitioners to present themselves with a certified copy of the order passed today before the Tax Recovery Officer, Agra, on September 14, 1990, and to inspect the record in the matter on the date fixed by the Tax Recovery Officer, Agra. In case of the petitioners default in presenting themselves before the said authority on September 14, 1990, or on any subsequent date fixed by the Tax Recovery Officer, Agra, for the inspection of the record, this order shall stand automatically vacated and it will be open to the respondents to proceed with the recovery With the aforesaid observations, the present writ petition is finally disposed of. Copy of this order be given within 48 hours on payment of usual charges.
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1990 (9) TMI 61 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Capital Gains, Charitable Purpose, Trusts ... ... ... ... ..... ust (No. 2) 1990 186 ITR 745). Following the said decision, the first question is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. So far as the second question is concerned, the order of the Tribunal says that the difference between the fair market value of the assets and the actual consideration was brought to tax under the Gift-tax Act. A copy of the gift-tax assessment order was also placed before the Tribunal. Acting upon the same and applying clause (iii) of section 47, the Tribunal held that no capital gains tax can be levied upon the said difference amount. The Tribunal followed the decisions of the Delhi, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka High Courts in preference to the decision of the Kerala High Court. On a reading of section 47 (iii), we are of the opinion that the Tribunal was right in doing so. Accordingly, the second question is also answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 60 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... effect from date earlier to the date of insertion of Explanation (c). We are in complete agreement with the conclusion in that case. In the present case, the Commissioner (Appeals) passed the order in appeal, on January 3, 1983, and the Commissioner has passed the order under section 263 on September 7, 1983. Both these events occurred not only before the insertion of Explanation 0c) but also before the Explanation itself was inserted in the form of clauses (a) and (b) with effect from October 1, 1984. In the above view of the matter, the answer to question No. 1 is squarely covered by the decisions of our court. No useful purpose will, therefore, be served in directing the Tribunal to refer this question to this court for opinion. In view of the fact that question No. 1 cannot be directed to be referred as a question of law to this court, question No. 2 becomes academic and cannot be directed to be referred as a question of law. Rule stands discharged. No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 59 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... . In all the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that section 43B of the Act, after the amendment by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, the Finance Act, 1988, and the Finance Act, 1989, and Explanation 2 to the section which took effect from April 1, 1984, should be considered to give effect to the proper provisions of law applicable in the instant cases. It should be so done by the Appellate Tribunal, the final fact finding authority, on the basis of the facts available before it. Therefore, we decline to answer the question referred to this court in the above three cases. At the same time, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal to restore the three appeals (I. T. A. Nos. 20, 26 and 31/Coch/1986) to file and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. The references are disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (9) TMI 58 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Information, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... It is clear from a reading of the order of the Tribunal that the assessment was reopened on the basis of and in pursuance of the report, or remarks, as it may be called, by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner who pointed out the errors in the assessment order. It is not a case of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner bringing the correct position of law to the notice of the Income-tax Officer but it is a case where the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner pointed out the errors in the assessment order. Such a proceeding or remarks of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner cannot constitute information within the meaning of section 147(b). This is the view taken by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in CIT v. H. D. Dennis 1982 135 ITR 1, following decision of the Supreme Court in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 996. For the above reasons, the question referred is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 57 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction U/S 80-O ... ... ... ... ..... greement also falls under section 80HHB so as to deprive him of the benefit under section 80-0, the assessee will not be prejudiced inasmuch as he, then, will have a right of appeal and reference, etc. In the above view of the matter, in my judgment, it is only appropriate that the Board continues to consider the agreements in question purely from the point of view of section 80-0 and grant or refuse approval on that basis. The Board may, if so advised, qualify the approval by making it clear that it will be open to the Assessing Officer to examine whether the whole or a part of the income under the agreement falls under section 80HHB(1), so as to disentitle such income from the benefit under section 80-0. Because, if the Board refuses to approve the agreement, no Assessing Officer will grant relief under section 80-O. In the result, the rule is made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The Board will consider the applications afresh as per directions above. No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 56 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Civil Court ... ... ... ... ..... the jurisdiction of civil courts under section 293 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In the face of this bar, no occasion was provided for the grant of a temporary injunction as in this case. The impugned order of the lower appellate court is consequently hereby set aside and this revision petition is thus accepted. There will be no order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 55 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Limitation, Notice, Reassessment ... ... ... ... ..... was further held that once notice was issued within the period of limitation, jurisdiction becomes vested in the officer to proceed to reassess and it was held that the notice sent in that behalf was not barred by limitation. In the light of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in R. K. Upadhyaya s case 1987 166 ITR 163, we have to hold that the Tribunal acted erroneously in law in confirming the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner who cancelled the assessment. The Supreme Court decision referred to above is an authority for the proposition that it is sufficient if the notice is issued on or before March 31, 1979. So, we have to hold that the assessment made in this case is not ab initio void. We answer the question referred to this court in the negative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar will be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (9) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Remuneration ... ... ... ... ..... the position of law explained hereinbefore. There is yet another reason for remitting the matter to the Commissioner referred to hereinbefore. In paragraph 4.2 of his order, the Commissioner has stated that the revised returns filed by the petitioner for the aforesaid assessment years were accepted by the Income-tax Officer, but they were only protective assessments and cannot be taken to be a finding of the Assessing Officer that the disclosure is full and true. It is not clear whether ultimately the revised returns filed by the petitioner were accepted or not. That fact will have to be verified by the Commissioner. In the result, the impugned order of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Lucknow, dated March 17, 1990, is set aside and the matter is remitted to him for fresh disposal of the application filed by the petitioner under section 273A of the Income-tax Act in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made hereinabove. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 53 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Remuneration ... ... ... ... ..... er, this provision has since been deleted but which fact has no relevance to the proceeding herein). In other words, the petition to waive the said interest was filed for the first time and, therefore, cannot be said to have been concluded by the previous order of the Commissioner dated January 22, 1975. We may make it clear at this stage that we do not propose to express any opinion on the question whether the power under section 273A(1)(c) is available for waiving interest amounts levied in the assessment years prior to October 1, 1975. That is a matter which can be gone into by the Commissioner if and when necessary. For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed in part, the impugned order is set aside and the matter is sent back to the Commissioner. The Commissioner shall consider the said application afresh and dispose of it according to law. No costs. Certified copy of this order may be given to the petitioner s counsel on payment of usual charges within one week.
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1990 (9) TMI 52 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Secret Commission ... ... ... ... ..... t of several parties were available. They were correlated to the transactions which the assessee had with those persons and the period during which the transactions were entered into. The only missing item was stated to be the names of the particular parties to whom the payments were made. This, the Tribunal held, could not be supplied without detriment to the business of the assessee in the very nature of things. Shri Patel then pointed out that, in paragraph 29 of the judgment, the Special Bench of the Tribunal noted that the position was the same in the case of Indochem Ltd. and that of the assessee. On the above stated facts, our judgment in the case of CIT v. Goodlass Nerolac Paints Ltd. 1991 188 ITR 1 (Income-tax Reference No. 606 of 1976) dated August 21, 1990, squarely applies. Accordingly, we agree with the Tribunal that its conclusion is based on a finding of fact arrived at on the basis of good and cogent material. Rule stands discharged with no order as to costs.
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