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Showing 261 to 280 of 291 Records
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1990 (9) TMI 31 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... alty under a provision of law different from the one that obtained on the date when he had first committed that default. In the present case also, the return filed originally on August 15, 1956, was not correct return. So was the return filed by the assessee on March 18, 1969, in response to the notice under section 148/147(a). In the circumstances, it has to be held that the assessee was liable to penalty with reference to the default of concealment committed by him on August 15, 1956. That being so, we uphold the order of the Tribunal that the assessee is liable to penalty under the provisions in this regard as they obtained prior to amendment with effect from April 1, 1968. It might, however, be made clear that, for this purpose, the returned income will naturally be taken as the income shown by the assessee in the original return and not the revised return. Both the questions are answered accordingly, in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 30 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Carry Forward And Set Off, Depreciation, Developement Rebate, Plant ... ... ... ... ..... Court and the matter is pending in the Supreme Court. It is, therefore, necessary to clarify that in case this court s judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court, the assessee will be entitled to depreciation. In the above view of the matter, while the question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue, the Department is directed to allow the assessee depreciation as allowed by the Tribunal in case our court s judgment is eventually reversed by the Supreme Court. As regards the second question also, counsel are agreed that though in view of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Shri Shubhlaxmi Mills Ltd. v. Addl. CIT 1989 177 ITR 193, the question should have been answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue, the law in this regard has since been retrospectively amended by the Finance Act, 1990. In view thereof, the second question must be answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The question is so answered. No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 29 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Partner In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... was declared by section 64 to be includible in computing the total income of the assessee, such income would form part of the total income exigible to tax under section 4 of the Act. We may also usefully refer in this connection to the following observations of the Supreme Court in CIT v. J. H. Gotla 1985 156 ITR 323, 340 On a consideration of the scheme of the Act and the provisions therein as noted before, the share income of the wife and minor children included in the assessee s total income under section 16(3) of the Act should be regarded as business income derived from business carried on by the assessee and, in that view of the matter, the assessee is entitled to set off his loss carried forward from the previous years. Thus, on a due consideration of the facts and the relevant provisions of the Act, we answer the question referred in the affirmative and against the assessee. The Revenue will be entitled to its costs in this reference. Counsel s fee Rs. 500 (one set).
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1990 (9) TMI 28 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Carry Forward And Set Off, Delay In Filing Return, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... 73 and 1973-74 to which section 139(4) as extracted above applies, relied upon the decision in CIT v. Kulu Valley Transport Co. P. Ltd. 1970 77 ITR 518 of the Supreme Court and held that the return, though not originally filed, was filed pursuant to the notice under section 148 of the Act and is return under section 139 although the provisions of section 139(3) of the Act have not been complied with by the assessee. In view of the well discussed decisions of the Calcutta High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court referred to above, we are satisfied that the contention of the Revenue has no force and the Tribunal was correct in affirming the appellate order. Accordingly, we answer the question in the affirmative and against the Revenue by stating that, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in directing the carry forward of the loss of Rs. 2,44,780 to the subsequent year. There shall be no order as to costs. K. C. JAGADEB Roy J. -I agree.
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1990 (9) TMI 27 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Limitation, Rectification ... ... ... ... ..... ld be passed if the applications were filed within four years has no application in this case inasmuch as the principle behind those decisions is that nobody can take advantage of his own wrong. The Department certainly cannot refuse to pass an order under section 154 on the ground that it had failed to pass such an order within four years and that now it cannot pass the order as it has become barred by limitation. This argument cannot apply to a case where the application for rectification is by one departmental officer before another departmental officer. The assessee is not taking advantage of its own wrong. The answer to the first question is, thus, obvious. In view of the fact that we are not directing the Tribunal to refer the first question as a question of law, the second question need not be referred as a question of law as the answer to that question either way is not going to materially affect the parties. Accordingly, rule stands discharged. No order at to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 26 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
In Good Faith, Penalty, Voluntarily ... ... ... ... ..... he light of the observations made hereinabove. At the time of the admission, interim relief was not granted. The matter was taken in appeal. The appellate court granted interim relief in terms of prayer clause (d) of the petition on the condition of the petitioners making a deposit of Rs. 6,50,000 with the Department and furnishing bank guarantee for the balance amount of Rs. 6,50,000 of a nationalised bank to the satisfaction of the prothonotary and Senior Master till the disposal of this petition. In view of the fact that the petition is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) and the amount of Rs. 22,87,000 seized from the petitioners is still in the possession of the Department, it is only reasonable that the bank guarantee should be discharged and the guarantee returned to the petitioners. The Department is also directed to return the amount of Rs. 6,50,000 deposited with it under the orders of this court in accordance with law with interest, if any. No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 25 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ncome of the assessee, the two allowances would form part of income. This view of ours finds support from the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Karnataka Electricity Board Employees Union v. Union of India 1989 179 ITR 521, of the Patna High Court in Brooke Bond Employees Union v. Union of India 1989 179 ITR 533 and of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Coal Mines Officers Association of India v. Union of India 1990 181 ITR 346. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Writ Petitions Nos. 1947, 2001, 2054, 2061, 2104, 2113, 2123, 2136, 2144, 2147, 2159, 2169, 2170, 2185, 2217, 2235, 2252, 2258, 2260, 2266, 2269 (with C. M. No. 3994 of 1990), 2278, 2309, 2325, 2327, 2357, 2358, 2372, 2382, 2390, 2450, 2466, 2470, 2503, 2520, 2545, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2873, 2878, 3196 of 1988 and 2497, 2549, 2775, 2800, 3127, 3249, 2430, 2697 and 2121 of 1989, 2458 of 1989, 1924, 1628, 1668, 1712, 1713, 1746 and 1805 of 1983 are devoid of merit and are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 24 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Actual Cost, Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... cited on behalf of the assessee and the Revenue, the consensus of opinion which emerges from the various decisions of the High Courts throughout the country is that the subsidy or investment subsidy given by the Government which is for development of industries in selected backward districts/areas cannot be deducted from the actual cost for giving the benefit of depreciation or investment allowance. As a matter of fact, the subsidy is a grant for encouraging entrepreneurs to come forward and develop the backward areas. As such, it cannot be deducted from the cost of the assets to the assessee for denying the benefit of depreciation or investment allowance. Thus, we are in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka and Kerala High Courts. In the result, for the reasons mentioned above, we answer this reference and the references mentioned in the schedule appended with this judgment in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1990 (9) TMI 23 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Commission, Deduction, Salary ... ... ... ... ..... The order of the Appellate Tribunal is laconic and there are no positive or clear findings regarding the nature of the receipt of commission by the assessee, the legal basis under which the commission was received, the total amount received by the assessee and other aspects pertaining to his employment. So, in the circumstances disclosed in this case, we are unable to answer the question referred to this court precisely or satisfactorily. We decline to answer the question referred to this court at the same time, we direct the Appellate Tribunal to restore the appeal to file and dispose of the matter in the light of the observations contained in the decision of this court in I. T. R. Nos. 560 to 563 of 1985 and 1. T. R. Nos. 90 to 93 of 1986-CIT v. Varghese Mathew 1990 190 ITR 356. The reference is disposed of as above. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench.
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1990 (9) TMI 22 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... are of income from the assesse-firm during the period amounted to about Rs. 1,37,073.50 and the amount retained by Janata Films by way of commission under the sub-distribution agreement worked out to Rs. 74,381, Accordingly, it is considered reasonable to apportion Rs. 75,000 towards payment for the relinquishment of the share in the partnership firm and the remaining Rs. 50,000 as consideration for the surrendering of sub distribution rights. Accordingly, the second question is answered thus To the extent the payment of Rs. 50,000 which represents, in our view, the consideration for Janata Film Distributors giving up its sub-distribution rights, the question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The balance payment of Rs. 75,000 represents the consideration for Shri N. N. Sippy relinquishing his right, title and interest as partner in the firm. The question in that regard is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 21 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ngs relate to the assessment year 1978-79. The Tribunal had rejected the reference application observing that the questions pertained to a finding of fact on the basis of cogent material. After hearing Shri Dastur, learned counsel for the assessee, and Shri Jetley, learned counsel for the Department, at some length, we are of the view that a question of law does arise out of the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal is, accordingly, directed to refer the following question as a question of law Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal erred in disallowing the appellant s claim of Rs. 5,77,500 being the short-term capital loss incurred by it on the sale of its shares in Vidyut Research Co. P. Ltd. ? This question, in our view, covers all relevant aspects. The Tribunal is directed to draw up the statement of the case and refer the above question of law to this court within six months from today. Rule is made absolute as above. No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 20 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... mption of the nature envisaged by the Income-tax Officer will be contrary to the maxim omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta (all acts are presumed to have been rightly and regularly done). In this view of the matter, there was no occasion on the part of the Tribunal to agree with the views of the income-tax authority and sustain the additions in the trading account. Apart from this, the Tribunal has not given any acceptable reason for holding that, in the nature of the trade carried on by the assessee, a reasonable rate of gross profit should have been 10 . As such, I hold that the Tribunal was not justified in sustaining the addition of Rs. 30,146 in the trading account. Accordingly, my answer to the question referred is in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Assistant Registrar, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Patna Bench, under the seal of this court. There will be no order as to costs. G. G. SOHANI C. J. -I agree.
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1990 (9) TMI 19 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Legal Fiction, Notice ... ... ... ... ..... f the Kerala Agricultural Income-tax Act. It cannot be said that the sending of the registered notice by post to a person, at his last known place of residence or business, in the circumstances, could be treated as a valid service contemplated by section 64(1)(c) of the Act. The contrary view expressed in exhibit P-3 assessment order and upheld in exhibit P-6 order is unreasonable and unsustainable in law. Exhibits P-3 and P-6 orders disclose errors of law apparent on the face of the record. They deserve to be annulled. With great respect to the learned single judge, we find ourselves unable to concur with his view that the service of notice was proper in the instant case. On this short ground, we hold that exhibits P-3 and P-6 orders are illegal. They are quashed. The second respondent is at liberty to proceed ahead with the assessment for the assessment year 1984-85 by serving a fresh pre-assessment notice on the appellant in accordance with law. The writ appeal is allowed
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1990 (9) TMI 18 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
High Court, Offences And Prosecution, Wilful Attempt To Evade Tax ... ... ... ... ..... d evidence to substantiate its case. Needless to add that the petitioners will also have an opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses and challenge their documents in the conduct of their defence. It is settled law that the inherent powers to quash the pending prosecution cannot be exercised if the averments in the complaint, without adding or subtracting, do indicate prima facie commission of the offences alleged. Detailed proof of the allegations will have to form part of the evidence to be recorded during trial. If the first test of the existence of prima facie allegations in the complaint is satisfied, the prayer to quash the pending prosecution will have to be necessarily negatived. On a careful consideration of the arguments advanced by either counsel, coupled with the averments made in the complaints, I am of the firm view that no ground has been made out to allow the petitions and erase the pending prosecutions. These petitions are accordingly dismissed.
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1990 (9) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Deduction For Foreign Royalty, Royalties From Foreign Enterprises ... ... ... ... ..... 80HHB (1), so as to disentitle such income from the benefit under section 80-O. Because, if the Board refuses to approve the agreement, no Assessing Officer will grant relief under section 80-O. Admittedly, the Board in the present case refused to approve the agreement not for the reason that any condition laid down in section 80-O is not satisfied. It has refused to approve the agreement on the ground that a part or the whole of the income/consideration receivable under the agreement was covered under section 80HHB(1)(a) or (1)(b). For reasons stated earlier, this the Board could not legally do. In my judgment, the Board was thus influenced by extraneous circumstances in refusing to approve the agreement. Accordingly, the impugned order requires to be and is hereby quashed. The Board is directed to consider the question of approval of the agreement afresh in the light of observations made hereinabove. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 16 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
HUF, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... vis their sons and female heirs with respect to whom no such concept could be applied or contemplated. It may be mentioned that heirs in Class I of the Schedule under section 8 of the Act include widow, mother, daughter of a predeceased son, etc. Since the view of the Appellate Tribunal was on the basis of the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Babubhai Mansukhbhai (Dr.) 1977 108 ITR 417, which has been overruled by the Supreme Court, we answer the question by stating that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the one-seventh share in the separate property of the deceased inherited by the assessee from his deceased father under section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act does not belong to the joint family of the assessee and, therefore, is to be included in the net wealth of the assessee as his individual wealth. The question is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. K. C. JAGADEB ROY J. - I agree.
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1990 (9) TMI 15 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... the question extracted earlier. In New Orissa Traders v. CIT 1977 107 ITR 553 (Orissa) CIT v. Pohop Singh Rice Mill 1981 132 ITR 390 1980 ILR 2 Cut 136 and in S. J. C. No. 65 of 1982 decided on 12.9.1990, B. J. Bhambhani v. CIT 1991 190 ITR 480, this court has held that no appeal lies against an order expressing not to accept a declaration furnished under section 184(7) of the Act beyond the period allowed without sufficient cause since the same is not one under section 185(3) of the Act. Refusal to accept duplicate copy of an application in Form No. 11A as an application under section 184(4) read with section 184(7) of the Act in an order describing it as one under section 185(3) of the Act is not such an order and the assessee has no right of appeal against such an order tinder section 246(1)(i) of the Act. In view of the discussion made above, the question is answered in the affirmative against the assessee. There shall be no order as to costs. J. M. MAHAPATRA J.-I agree.
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1990 (9) TMI 14 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Loss, Speculation ... ... ... ... ..... has given finding that there was first a breach of contract. Thereafter, there was a settlement of liabilities arising out of the breach of contract and that the amount of Rs. 30,000 paid was in the nature of damages. It is not possible for this court to go into the correctness of this finding, particularly as no such question has been referred to us. Once this finding is accepted, it is evident from the record that the dispute before the Tribunal was whether to follow the Calcutta High Court decision and the Mysore High Court decision or to follow the Madras High Court decision where a contrary view was taken. The Supreme Court in CIT v. Shantilal P. Ltd. 1983 144 ITR 57, as stated earlier, has approved the Calcutta High Court decision and the Mysore High Court decision and has overruled the Madras High Court decision. In the circumstances the answer to the question has to be in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. The question is so answered. No order as to costs.
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1990 (9) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Offences And Prosecution ... ... ... ... ..... be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not affect the various aspects mentioned in sub-divisions (a) to (e) thereof. Section 6A takes in its fold the repeal of Act making textual amendment in the Act or Regulation . In other words, it concerns itself, with omissions, insertions or substitutions. Unless a different intention appears, the repeal in terms of this section shall not affect the continuance of any such amendment made by the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of such repeal. From the insertion of the new sections, while omitting the earlier sections referred to above in the Income-tax Act, it is not possible to gather a contrary intention that the Legislature desired that prosecutions which were permissible under section 276DD of the Act and already initiated before insertion of the new section, were to be erased or obliterated. In view of my reasoning aforementioned, these petitions, which have no merit, are dismissed.
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1990 (9) TMI 12 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Fines And Penalties ... ... ... ... ..... content, nature and character and shades of the meaning of the word damages have to be understood in the context of the scheme of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. The meaning assigned to the said word by the Supreme Court in Organic s case, AIR 1979 SC 1803, must be taken to be the governing factor in determining the question whether the damages under section 14B are penal or compensatory in nature. The expression damages occurring in section 14B is, in substance, a penalty imposed on the employer for the period of infringement of a statutory obligation. The payment made by the assessee in this case, although termed as interest, in fact, represents damages under section 14B of the Act and hence is not allowable as a deduction. For the reasons aforesaid, we answer the question in this reference in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. There will be no order as to costs. BHAGABATI PRASAD BANERJEE J.-I agree.
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