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1991 (11) TMI 255
... ... ... ... ..... is true that selection of the petitioner and the stand taken by the Selection Committee before the High Court that he was not eligible at all are, indeed, antithetical and cannot co-exist. But the fact remains that the case of Dr. Kalyana Raman was considered and he was placed second in the panel of names. It is not shown that the selection was arbitrary or whimsical or the Selection Committee did not act fairly towards Dr. Kalyana Raman. The fact that he was placed second in the parcel, itself indicates that there was proper consideration of his case and he has been treated fairly. It should not be lost sight of that the Selection Committee consisted of experts in the subject for selection. They were men of high status and also of unquestionable impartiality. The Court should be slow to interfere with their opinion. 9. In the conclusion, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. In the circumstances of the case, however, we make no order as to costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 254
... ... ... ... ..... rnor of Karnataka on 25th July, 1991 (now the Act) is beyond the legislative competence of the State and is, therefore, ultra vires the Constitution. Question No. 2. (i) The Order of the Tribunal dated June 25, 1991 constitutes report and decision within the meaning of Section 5(2) of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956; (ii) the said Order is, therefore, required to be published by the Central Government in the official Gazette under Section 6 of the Act in order to make it effective. Question No. 3. (i) A Water Disputes Tribunal constituted under the Act is competent to grant any interim relief to the parties to the dispute when a reference for such relief is made by the Central Government; (ii) whether the tribunal has power to grant interim relief when no reference is made by the Central Government for such relief is a question which does not arise in the facts and circumstances under which the Reference is made. Hence we do not deem it necessary to answer the same.
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1991 (11) TMI 253
... ... ... ... ..... hich he did not otherwise possess nor could it take away the rights of the members of the joint Hindu family by accepting the properties in suit to be the personal properties of respondent No. 1. Suffice it to say so far as this submission is concerned that as has been held above, the properties in suit had been earmarked by respondent No. 1 as his personal properties which he was competent to do as a sovereign and the Government by accepting or approving the list of properties submitted by him as his personal properties in pursuance of the covenant did not purport on its own to create any right in favour of respondent No. 1 in such properties. The Government could have disputed the list submitted by respondent No. 1 but it chose not to do so and the assertion of respondent No. 1 that the properties in suit were his personal properties was accepted; 66. In view of the foregoing discussion, both the Civil Appeals fail and are dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.
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1991 (11) TMI 252
... ... ... ... ..... ion of tax in respect of goods carried in the vehicle in question. For that purpose, he has to serve a notice in form VI-B on the owner of the goods or any person on his behalf, giving him an opportunity to rectify the defect or omission if any, or an option to pay such amount indicated by him. Question of exercising the option to pay the amount indicated by the officer in-charge of the check-post arises only where a notice in form VI-B is issued, on the officer being satisfied about existence of situations enumerated in rule 94(4)(a) of the Rules. Since there is controversy on the question as to whether payment was voluntary or it was illegally collected, the officer in-charge of check-post shall not, without being satisfied about existence of situations enumerated in rule 94(4)(a) and/or issuance of notice in form VI-B collect tax from the petitioner. The writ application is disposed of accordingly. No costs. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 251
... ... ... ... ..... any inquiry. The finding of the Tribunal is perverse as no inquiry was made from the suppliers of the saries, etc., in respect of these purchases of the assessee. Penalty cannot be levied simply on the supposition or presumption and it is the burden of the assessing authority to prove the offence. The assessee may take an incorrect legal plea, but to prove it so is the burden of the assessing authority after making due inquiry and bringing the evidence on record in this regard. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the view that the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the documentary evidence which was produced before the assessing authority without making any inquiry. Consequently, the revision is allowed, the orders of the Sales Tax Tribunal and the lower authorities are set aside and the matter is remanded to the assessing authority for making the inquiry de novo in the light of the observations made above. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 250
... ... ... ... ..... or other amount can be said to be due from the dealer. In such circumstances, by invoking the powers vested in the appellant under section 25 of the Act, the issue of exhibit P2 notice was unauthorised and illegal. That apart, it is conceded that the petitioner in the original petition has filed O.P. No. 4321 of 1989 and C.M.P. No. 12443 of 1989 and this Court has stayed the recovery proceedings against the assessee, the petitioner in the original petition. The order of stay, so granted by this Court, was in force on the day when exhibit P2 was issued by the appellant. The issue of exhibit P2 notice, when admittedly there was an order of stay from this Court regarding proceedings initiated against the assessee, to say the least, is improper. The learned single Judge was justified in quashing exhibit P2, in the manner he did, and in directing the appellant to pay the costs. We see no reason to interfere in this writ appeal. The writ appeal is dismissed. Writ appeal dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 249
... ... ... ... ..... re and simple excavation does not amount to manufacture and the benefit of the notification dated March 23, 1963 cannot be availed of. 2.. If further process have been undertaken there should have been a finding given by any of the authorities which is completely lacking in the present case and as such the order passed by the Tribunal is quashed and Tribunal is directed to give the finding about the nature of the process undertaken by the assessee as to whether the same will bring the assessee in the category of manufacturer so that the benefit of notification dated March 23, 1963 can be availed of by the dealer. The Tribunal will also consider that the tax is payable only at a single point. No injustice is done to the assessee in case the department has actually received tax to avoid the double taxation. The matter is sent back to the Tribunal for decision in accordance with the directions given above. 3.. The revision is allowed. 4.. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 248
... ... ... ... ..... he tax is payable only at the first point and if the first point has already been exhausted and sale has been made at the second or subsequent point, then no liability of tax can be fastened on the assessee in the series of successive sales even if taken by interruption of unregistered dealer after a first sale is made by a registered dealer, then the second or subsequent sale by the registered dealer cannot be subjected to tax. It has neither been contended nor alleged that the bottles were imported from outside the State of Rajasthan. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) has gone even to the extent that the sale of bottle along with the wine has not been proved. The department has not challenged the findings before the Board of Revenue and in view of the fact that the matter is covered by the decision of this Court, I do not find any justification in interfering in revisional jurisdiction. 3.. The revision is accordingly rejected. 4.. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 247
... ... ... ... ..... ealised, shall not be realised till disposal of any appeal/revision from the order of penalty if already filed and till disposal of any appeal/revision which has not yet been filed but may be filed within a fortnight from this date. But, if there is no pending appeal/ revision from the order of penalty after a fortnight from this date respondents will be at liberty to enforce the order of imposition of penalty. Any amount of penalty, if already paid or realised, shall abide the ultimate result of appeal/ revision, if any, from the order of penalty. The sum of Rs. 30,000 which was deposited by way of security in terms of interim order dated February 29, 1989 passed by this Tribunal shall abide the ultimate result of any appeal/revision from the order of penalty. 14.. The application is thus disposed of without costs on the above terms. Interim orders are vacated. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. Application disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 246
Whether a specific claim in the plaint is necessary to grant the compensation?
Held that:- In the present case there is no difficulty in assessing the quantum of the compensation. That is ascertainable with reference to the determination of the market value in the land acquisition proceedings. The compensation awarded may safely be taken to be the measure of damages subject, of course, to the deduction therefrom of money value of the services, time and energy expended by the appellant in pursuing the claims of compensation and the expenditure incurred by him in the litigation culminating in the award.
Confirm the finding of the High Court that Respondent was willing and ready to perform the contract and that it was the Appellant who was in breach. However, in substitution of the decree for specific performance, we make a decree for compensation, equivalent to the amount of the land acquisition compensation awarded for the suit lands together with solatium and accrued interest, less a sum of ₹ 1,50,000 (one lakh fifty thousand only) which, by a rough and ready estimate, we quantify as the amount to be paid to the appellant in respect of his services, time and money expended in pursuing the legal-claims for compensation. Therefore, there is no need for Respondent to pay the sum of ₹ 15,000 additionally
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1991 (11) TMI 245
... ... ... ... ..... finding given in the assessment order that the non-disclosure in the return is because of the deliberate action on the part of the assessee to evade the tax. It has been the consistent view of this Court that if an entry is existing in the books of account and the matter relates only to the interpretation about the nature of the transaction or non- taxability on account of the interpretation of the provision of law, then the authorities under the Act would not be justified in levying the penalty. In the present case the finding which has been given by the Tribunal while upholding the tax is that the entries were existing in the books of account and the action was bona fide and the matter stood covered by the judgment of the honourable Supreme Court reported in the Cement Marketing Co. of India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax 1980 45 STC 197. I do not find any justification to interfere in the revision which is dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 244
... ... ... ... ..... . No. 483 dated September 9, 1986, by having recourse to the principle of promissory estoppel or otherwise does not arise. We, therefore, reject the contention of the petitioner and hold that section 3 of the A.P. Act 20 of 1987 fully applies to the petitioner s case and the Act having come into force with retrospective effect from January 1, 1976, it is not legally possible to grant a direction to extend the benefit conferred by G.O. Ms. No. 224, dated March 9, 1976, read with G.O. Ms. No. 483, dated September 9, 1986, contrary to the above legislative provision, the validity of which has already been upheld by this Court. The demands raised by the Commercial Tax Officer (third respondent) are therefore valid in law. Of course, it is open to the petitioner to question the assessment orders and demands on any other grounds. Writ petitions are, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Government Pleader s fee Rs. 200 in each case. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 243
... ... ... ... ..... ccount books. On a perusal of the impugned notice along with the notice dated March 29, 1988, it is evident that the respondent wanted to verify the account books in order to satisfy himself whether the exemption granted in respect of certain items of turnover by the assessing authority was valid or not. However, he did not mention the specific items of turnover in respect of which the petitioner shall produce the books of account. Therefore, we direct that the respondent shall issue a proper notice to the petitioner in the exercise of power under section 20 and continue further proceedings in accordance with law. We also make it clear that it is open to the respondent to initiate proceedings to revise, modify or set aside the order of assessment in exercise of the power under section 20 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 200. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (11) TMI 242
... ... ... ... ..... d by the assessing authority. Secondly, when section 16(1)(i) refers to the concealment of the transaction it refers to the mental element of the assessee by an overt act. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) in the present case has held that the transaction is duly recorded in the books of accounts, and the mala fide intention of the appellant has not been proved beyond any shadow of doubt. As pointed out earlier, when an assessee is dealing with a particular commodity which is purchased by him as tax-paid as well as taxable, there may be a bona fide mistake on the part of the assessee in showing the goods as tax-paid. The finding which has been given by the Deputy Commissioner of Appeals and upheld by the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal is not controverted by any evidence on record and, therefore, I am of the view that the levy of penalty under section 16(1)(i) has rightly been set aside. The revision is accordingly partly accepted. No order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 241
... ... ... ... ..... tion and its meaning changes, so as to take the color of, or be in accord with, the subject to which it is applied . In that sense, it can apply to household furniture to be used in a drug or other store, as the furniture thereof differ in kind and according to the purpose which they are intended to subserve. It can also apply to those equipments to be employed in several places for ornament, or to promote comfort, or to facilitate the business therein. 3.. We have no hesitation to hold that barber chair will be furniture and is different from a dental chair. The clarification issued regarding dental chair cannot be applied in the case of barber chair. On this short ground, the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal cannot stand. The common order of the Appellate Tribunal dated July 25, 1990 is vacated. The orders passed by the assessing authority and confirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner will stand restored. The tax revision cases are allowed. Petitions allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 240
... ... ... ... ..... ourt s process would be to dismiss this petition in limine. It is hence, accordingly, dismissed. Interim orders stand vacated. 10.. As considerable judicial time of the court was taken by the company with the court and the Government Pleader taken for a ride and left and kept under an erroneous impression on the bona fides of the company, we direct the company to pay to the respondents costs quantified at Rs. 5,000 (rupees five thousand). 11.. Learned counsel seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. There is no substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution nor any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. Indeed, major part of the arguments before us indicated that the writ jurisdiction of this Court was invoked more by way of a mercy petition to grant indulgence by way of instalments but on terms which did not inspire courts confidence. Leave to appeal is rejected. Writ petition dismissed.
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1991 (11) TMI 239
... ... ... ... ..... sworn affidavit and the same has been relied upon by the Sales Tax Tribunal, therefore, in revision this Court should not interfere. I have considered the arguments of both the parties and I am of the view that when a dispute is raised by the assessing authority about the correctness of the figures which even the Sales Tax Tribunal has not mentioned in its order to have verified at its level, it was not proper for the Sales Tax Tribunal to knock down the penalties without giving the reasonable opportunity to the assessing authority. In these circumstances the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal is quashed and the matter is remanded to the assessing authority to take the fresh proceedings de novo where the assessee may produce the books of account and get the figures verified as submitted before the Sales Tax Tribunal and the assessing authority thereafter may proceed in accordance with law. The revisions are partly allowed. No order as to costs. Petitions partly allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 238
... ... ... ... ..... om January 1, 1984, it does not contain any provision validating the demand made contrary to the judgment of this Court. Though an audit objection was raised against the collection of entertainment tax from the petitioner at the rate of Rs. 3,594 per week on the ground that rule 27(10) of the A.P. Entertainments Tax Rules was amended with retrospective effect, in view of the decision of this Court holding that the petitioner was entitled to pay entertainment tax only at the rate of Rs. 3,594 per week from May 24, 1986 to March 31, 1986 and which has become final we have no other alternative than to hold that the impugned notice of demand issued by the first respondent is illegal and invalid. Therefore, the impugned notice of demand dated November 18, 1988, is quashed. In the view we have taken, the other contentions raised in the writ petition need not be gone into. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150. Writ petition allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 237
... ... ... ... ..... ied in demanding the higher rate of tax payable in respect of a theatre situated within the second grade municipality. We are unable to accept this contention. Even according to the learned Government Pleader, G.O. Ms. No. 743 dated August 24, 1987, whereunder the State Government expressed that Kamareddy municipality will be classified as a second grade municipality, was not published in the A.P. Gazette. Admittedly, the notification declaring Kamareddy municipality as second grade municipality was published in the A.P. Gazette only on April 11, 1988. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the impugned demand notices issued by the Entertainments Tax Officer are illegal. Accordingly, the impugned demand notices are quashed. However, this order does not preclude the authorities from making a demand at a higher rate with effect from April 1, 1988. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. Advocate s fee Rs. 150 in each. Writ petitions allowed.
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1991 (11) TMI 236
... ... ... ... ..... s a revival of the right of the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment which has already been barred under the old Act. This case was not considering the amendment which was given retrospective effect. However, a Division Bench of this Court held in Firm Chaturbhuj Rikhabdas v. State of Rajasthan ILR 1958 1 Raj 947 that the amendment though retrospective in operation does not suggest that assessment which had already been made would also be reopened because of this retrospective amendment. In the absence of specific provision to that effect, the amendment, therefore, would not touch assessment which had already been made. Following this binding judgment of this Court, I am of the view that the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and the Board of Revenue were justified in declaring that the proceeding initiated after the lapse of 4 years were barred by limitation and the reassessment order was rightly quashed. The revision is rejected. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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