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Showing 1 to 20 of 286 Records
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1991 (9) TMI 373 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... year from the date of knowledge of the alleged cheating and falsification of accounts. 69. Thus, the special features and the related facts and circumstances as referred to above would manifestly show that the allegations in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable and that the complainant has failed to make out a prima facie case. The dispute is of civil nature and the impugned criminal proceeding appears to be frivolous. vexatious and mala fide initiated with the oblique motive of exerting pressure upon the petitioners to pay a huge amount of money and make other concessions for the alleged loss suffered by the complainant by purchase of shares of GECI in GL. Further, continuation of the proceeding would be an abuse of the process of the court and for the ends of justice the impugned proceeding should be quashed. 70. The application is, therefore, allowed and the impugned criminal proceeding against the petitioners is quashed, I make no order as to costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 372 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... w finds support from the case of Mohinder Singh Gill v. Election Commissioner, AIR 1987 SC 851 858 wherein it has been held that, when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and can not be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. As I am of the view that respondents cannot be allowed to justify the impugned order to be valid on the grounds not taken by the D.I.O.S., I am not inclined to consider said plea on merit in deciding the present writ petition. 12. No other point has been pressed before me. 13. For aforesaid reasons the order dated 6th September, 1990 (Annexure 6 to writ petition) passed by D.I.O.S., Jalaun at Orai is quashed. The petitioners will be entitled for salary as Assistant Teachers of L.T. grade from the date of joining on the basis of appointment letters dated 29-8-1990 (Annexure 4-A to 4-G to writ petition). The writ petition is allowed with costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 371 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e in which the State legislation operates. The reasoning of the High Court to oust the applicability of Section 135 of the Indian Railways Act on the test of sub-Article (2) of Article 285 was totally misplaced, as also in not venturing to create room for it in sub-Article (1) of Article 285. The interplay of the constitutional and legal provisions being well cut and well defined requires no marked elaboration to stress the point. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and issue the writ direction asked for in favour of the Union of India restraining the respondent council from raising demands on the railway in regard to service charges. We make it clear that the rights of the local authority as flowing under Section 135 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 stand preserved in the event of the Central Government moving into the matter, if not already moved. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 370 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court not subordinate to that from which injunction is sought. Section 41(b) denies to the Court the jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a Court which is not subordinate to the Court from which the injunction is sought". The above principle would apply also to a case governed by Clause (d) of Section 41. 9. The lower Court was in serious error in granting interim ex parte order of injunction. The lower Court should have refrained from passing an ex parte order and should have ordered notice to the defendants in which case a palpably erroneous order of this nature would not have been passed. We, therefore, set aside the impugned order. Since the matter has been elaborately argued before us and we have taken a view, no useful purpose will be served in proceeding with the injunction application 10. The appeal is accordingly allowed, but without costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 369 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... eason for it is that when the bail application of one co-accused is rejected on merits, the other co-accused who is not a party to that bail application, had no opportunity to make his submissions before the court. It is only when he moves his bail application that he can make his assertions, which are to be heard and decided on merits by this Court. So it cannot be said that his bail application would be liable to be rejected merely because the bail application of other co-accused had been rejected earlier. 9. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the applicant Shobha Ram should also be granted bail on the ground of parity. 10. The second bail application is allowed. Let applicant Shobha Ram, involved in case crime No. 198 of 1990, Under Sections 302/307/ 452, I.P.C., P.S. Saroorpur, District Meerut, be released on bail on his executing a personal bond and furnishing two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Meerut.
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1991 (9) TMI 368 - KERALA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... wer to review their orders, suo motu (Viswanathan v. Muthuswamy Gounder, AIR 1978 Mad 221; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Sunni Majlis Aukaf, AIR 1968 Delhi 215; Mohammed Abdul Rauf v. Mostt. Khadeja,). However, upon discovery of an error of procedural nature Courts may suo motu correct such error, (Sankaran v. Raman, 1982 KLT 237; Grindlays Bank v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, (AIR 1981 SC 606) (1981) 1 SCWR 236; State of Gujarat v. Sardar Begum, (AIR 1976 SC 1695)) (1976) 2 SCWR 404 . 21. Having regard to the legal position in regard to Court's power to review, suo motu, and in the circumstances of this case, I hold that the learned trial Judge acted without authority in reviewing his order dated 25-11-1988 and in referring the issue No. 3 to the Land Tribunal. In the result, this petition is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The learned trial Judge shall dispose of the suit in accordance with law. The petitioners will get costs from the respondents.
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1991 (9) TMI 367 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ainant had to allege in the complaint against the company that the offence has been committed by its directors, managers, etc., with their consent or connivance or neglect on their part. In all these three complaints, the complainant had not even raised a little finger against Harbhajan Singh, the accused. Thus, even if the entire allegations of the complainant contained in the complaint are to be taken to be true, no case is made out under Section 138 of the Act. 9. For the reasons recorded above, there is no option but to quash the complaint as well as the impugned order of summoning Shri Harbhajan Singh, the petitioner, in order to prevent abuse of the process of the criminal court. I order accordingly by accepting these three petitions. The trial court files be sent back forthwith for continuation of proceedings against the remaining accused. The complainant/respondent No, 2 is directed through his counsel, Mr. Bhandari, to appear in the trial court on September 30, 1991.
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1991 (9) TMI 366 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... its filed by the petitioners in support of their applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the SLAO it is clearly averred that they acquired knowledge of the award of the Court for the first time just a few days before making of the applications under Section 28A. Apparently the correct legal position was not brought to the notice of that officer and he proceeded on the assumption that the application had been made beyond time as the same had obviously been filed long after the expiry of a period of three months from the date on which the award was pronounced by the Court. Whatever may be the reason, the impugned orders were passed under a misconception of law. They are, therefore, not sustainable. 14. These petitions succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders are quashed. The SLAO shall dispose of the applications on merits and in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above. 15. There shall be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1991 (9) TMI 365 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he matter reopened before another Bench, and there would not be any end to such attempts. Besides, it was not consistent with the judicial discipline which must be maintained by Courts both in the interest of administration of justice by assuring the binding nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary. The impugned order dated 16-7-91 is, therefore, set aside and the order dated 6-7-90 granting bail to the appellant is restored. 4. It is, however, made clear that it would be open the State to make a prayer for the cancellation of the bail on the ground of any objectionable conduct on the part of the appellant or any other fresh relevant material which may be a permissible ground for cancellation of bail. But, in such a case it will be highly desirable for the Chief Justice of the High Court to hear the case himself or assign it to some other Judge who had not earlier dealt with the present matter. 5. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
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1991 (9) TMI 364 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the transactions between the parties from which transactions the present suit has arisen, it would be inconvenient to the defendants to defend themselves before this Court or would be inconvenient to the plaintiff if he is asked to go to institute the suit in Cochin as pleaded by the defendants. We, however, refrain for, if we do so, we shall usurp the jurisdiction and discretion of the learned single Judge, who is to decide whether to grant leave or not. Since we are of opinion that a proper adjudication is necessary on all relevant facts of the case before deciding whether to grant leave or not and since it has not been done in passing the impugned judgment we are inclined to interfere with the impugned order. The impugned order, for the said reason, is set aside. The case is remitted to the Original Side of this Court for a re-hearing and decision on the question whether leave should be granted or not, in accordance with law. This appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 363 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... oppel to the prosecution. While rejecting that contention the Apex Court has held as follows In the instant case for the reasons already mentioned, we are unable to hold that the proceeding before the Collector of Customs is a criminal trial. From this it follows that the decision of the Collector does not amount to a verdict of acquittal in favour of accused Nos. 1 and 2. He further relied upon the ruling reported in MANU/PH/0252/1981 Arun Spinning Mills v. Collector. In it, it was held that departmental proceedings initiated before the proper Officer is not covered by "legal proceedings." It was also held that Judgment of the criminal Court does not operate as res judicata in proceedings before departmental officers. In view of the above reasons, I hold that the finding of the Appellate Collector relied upon by the petitioner is not a bar to the launching of this complaint and on that score it cannot be quashed. 8. In view of the above, the petition is dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 362 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e under Clause 14 of Letters Patent shall have to be heard by the learned Chamber Judge, unless assigned to this Court. Liberty to the plaintiffs to move the learned Chamber Judge or the Hon'ble Chief Justice. No one can prejudge the result of the petition for grant of leave under Clause 14 of Letters Patent at this stage. The plaintiffs' conduct in respect of making untrue averments in respect of jurisdictional issue is blameworthy even if the plaintiffs have an arguable case on merits. I express no opinion on merits of the other contentions. (5) I do not propose to keep the motion pending. Motion is accordingly dismissed on limited grounds as stated above. (6) The plaintiffs shall be at liberty to take out fresh notice of motion in accordance with law after disposal of petition for leave under Clause 14 of Letters Patent on such cause of action, if any, as it may be maintainable in law. (7) Witness summons issued to both witnesses discharged. 18. Order accordingly.
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1991 (9) TMI 361 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... s the distinction between licence and lease vis-a-vis the power of the Tribunal under Section 91 of the Co-op. Societies Act. It is also of no avail to the appellant. Thus I hold that the respondent, after expiry of the licence or its termination, was in settled possession, and its dispossession was otherwise than in due course of law. Therefore, the decree for possession under Section 6 of the Act is not illegal. Remedy of judicial review under Article 136 of the Constitution is plenary and is not hedged with the bar of appeal or review prescribed by Section 6 of the Act. The contention of the counsel for the respondent that this court would not review the decision of the High Court is ex facie desperate and is rejected. 49. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without costs. ORDER 50. In view of the conflicting judgments given by us, the matter may now be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for constituting a larger bench for resolving the conflict.
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1991 (9) TMI 360 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... on by learned Advocate Mr. Parikh there is no question of reading Articles which happens to be documents as documents as referred to in Sub-section 5(a) of Section 173 of the Code. I have made it clear that in case if the prosecution uses the said Articles which happens to be documents as documents and tries to prove the same as a documentary evidence in that case the accused will be entitled to the copies thereof as provided in Section 207 of the Code. 13. In view of the above discussion, there is no reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned Special Judge. Hence, the revision application is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed. Rule discharged. Learned Advocate for the petitioners requests this Court that the interim relief' should be continued for a further period of four weeks as he had instructions that the party wants to approach the higher forum against this order. In view of this fact, the interim relief shall continue for four weeks from today.
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1991 (9) TMI 359 - KERLA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ed in the conveyance or in the contract. In the present case, the plaintiff has no case that the consideration mentioned in the document was not paid or that there was any failure of consideration or that the consideration agreed to between the parties was of a different kind than what is mentioned in the document. The definite case of the plaintiff is that the real consideration for the sale was ₹ 16,000/- whereas the conveyance shows the consideration to be ₹ 10,000/-. In view of the provisions contained in Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act, the plaintiff is not entitled to plead such a case nor is he entitled to adduce evidence in support of the same. In that view of the matter, the decree passed by the courts below is wrong and is liable to be set aside. 11. In the result, I set aside the judgments and decrees of the courts below, allow the second appeal and dismiss the suit. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their costs throughout.
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1991 (9) TMI 358 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... s v. Girja Nandini Devi, . Some support was sought to be drawn from Commr. of Wealth Tax-II, Ahmedabad v. Arvind Narottam ,which lays down that a citizen can adopt lawful methods for avoidance of the taxes.There is no dispute about this proposition of law. In the present case, the question is whether while avoiding the incidence of tax the award and the decree in question were intended to be acted upon and in fact, were acted upon or not? I have also gone through the written arguments given separately by defendant No. 3. They, in my opinion, do not make out the case for rejection of the plaint. Defendant No. 4 has also given written arguments which have been also perused by me. In my opinion, nothing mentioned therein meets with the points discussed by me in detail above. 70. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the plaint is not liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule I I of the Code of Civil Procedure. The applications are dismissed. 71. Applications dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 357 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... is not to be burdened with technicalities. ( 7. ) On a consideration of the facts of the present case, ends of justice would be met by setting aside the orders under appeal and remitting the matter to the High Court to take into account, the subsequent events relied upon by the respondent as well as those now sought to be raised by the appellant if the appellant places them before the High Court in an appropriate manner. It will be for the High Court to decide whether, having regard to the nature of the subsequent facts, it will be necessary to collect oral evidence on them or they could be decided on affidavit-evidence. The High Court will then dispose of the revision petition afresh in accordance with law. We request the High Court to dispose of the revision petition expeditiously and not later than three months from the date of receipt of this order. ( 8. ) The orders under appeal are set aside and the appeal is disposed of in the above terms. No costs. Order accordingly.
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1991 (9) TMI 356 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... prejudicial activity and the purpose of the detention, the order of detention is not vitiated because of the delay. (7) Undoubtedly, if the respondent shows that there is a reasonable nexus between the prejudicial activity and the purpose of detention, the delay in passing the detention order has to be over-looked. However, in the present case we find that there was no additional material before the detaining authority which necessitated the passing of the detention order than the one which was available on the date of the occurrence for which criminal proceedings are already intiated. In our view, the respondents have not adequately explained the delay in passing the detention order after arrest of the petitioner even at a late stage after a period of five months. (8) In the circumstances, we make the Rule absolute and quash the detention order dated 23,5.1990 and direct that the petitioner be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Detention order set aside.
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1991 (9) TMI 355 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... as not "State" within the meaning of Article 12. But this decision has been distinguished and watered down in the subsequent decisions particularly in Ajay Hasia and Ramchandra lyer cases (supra). Counsel for the appellant strongly relied upon the decision in P.K Ramchandra lyer case where this Court held that Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) was "State" under Article 12. But it may be noted that ICAR was originally an attached office of the Government of India and its position was not altered when it was registered as a society. That case, therefore is clearly distinguishable. In our opinion, the case on hand, having regard to the indications to which we have called attention earlier, does not satisfy the requirements of "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution. We, therefore, agree with the conclusion of the High Court and dismiss the appeal. In the circum- stances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 354 - ITAT ALLAHABAD
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... ... ..... n paper is correct. No doubt, it is rather difficult to prove any evidence regarding the consideration received over and above the consideration shown in the paper, yet after the above decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, we are helpless as we have to interprete the law as it stands. It may be possible that even the legislature in its wisdom might have thought likewise and thereafter might have deleted this very provision by amendment in 1988. Anyhow, as the facts and the law stands, we hold that there was no evidence on record to prove that there was any under-statement of the consideration received by sale of alleged jewellery and in absence of that evidence, we have to observe that the revenue has failed to discharge the onus of burden which lay on it to invoke the provisions of section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Hence, we decide the issue in favour of the assessee and set aside the order passed by the teamed CIT(A). 11. As a result, the appeal is allowed.
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