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Showing 21 to 40 of 286 Records
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1991 (9) TMI 353
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... ... ..... it has been satisfactorily shown on the evidence on record that the land has facilities of road and other amenities and is adjacent to a developed colony and in such circumstances it is possible to utilise the entire area in question as house sites. In respect of the land acquired for the road, the same advantages are available and it did not require any further development. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has erred in applying the principle of deduction; and reducing the fair market value of land from ₹ 10 per sq. yard to ₹ 6.50 paise per sq. yard. In our opinion, no such deduction is justified in the facts and circumstances of these cases. The appellants, therefore, succeed. In the result, the appeals are allowed and the respondent is directed to pay the compensation as determined by the learned Subordinate Judge with interest and solatium in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case, we make no order as to costs. Appeals allowed.
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1991 (9) TMI 352
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... ... ..... rea where there are a pack of courts and more professional opportunities as compared to municipal limits of District Headquarters. In the former lawyers cater to many and chances to display their professional skill is more than others in the latter. The age factor reveals experience and goes a long way to catch the eye of the clientele. Both classifications appear to us to be based on professional opportunities while being in a particular set or surrounding or being in a particular age group. The legislature is the best judge to determine who has the capacity to pay taxes and who should be burdened and how much. The gradation inter-se herein is based on intelligible differentia. The schedule attached to the Act has taken care to spread the tax burden gradedly. Thus in our view no room has been created to take a different view than the one taken by the High Court against whose decision is this appeal by special leave. Accordingly it is dismissed without any order as to costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 350
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... ... ..... a newspaper or newspapers as set out in section 36(2)(a) of the said Act. In the present case, such a notice was first published in the daily 'Ajit' on May 30, 1977, and hence, the notification under Section 42 of the said Act should have been published on or before May 30, 1980. In fact, the notification under Section 42 of the said Act, admittedly, was published on June 30, 1980, and hence, was clearly beyond time. In these circumstances, the notice under Section 36 of the said Act lapsed on the expiry of three years from May 3G, 1977, and no action pursuant to the said notice could be taken thereafter. The notification under Section 42 of the said Act was clearly beyond time and bad in law, as it was not published within the period pro- vided. The acquisition proceedings lapsed. The submission of learned Counsel for the appellant must be rejected. No other point was canvassed before us. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 349
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... ... ..... other judgments, orders or decisions, though doubts have been occasionally expressed whether, strictly, the foundation of the estoppel in such cases is not representation by conduct, rather than res judicata ...................... ". See also Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee & Ors., AIR 1953 SC 65. The consent decree made on 18.6.1984 remained unchallenged. None questioned it. The appellant never raised any doubt as to its validity or genuineness. He had no case that the decree was vitiated by fraud or misrepresentation or his counsel lacked authority to enter into a compromise on his behalf. Nevertheless, after six years he questioned its validity by means of chamber summons. This was an unsuccessful challenge by reason of delay, estoppel or res judicata, and was rightly so held by the High Court. Accordingly, we see no merit in this appeal. It is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, we do not make any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 348
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... ... ..... ars of age, while petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are hosuewives; petitioner No. 4 is a resident of Bombay and is suffering from the aforesaid diseases and is unable to walk. Petitioner No. 5 was made director in the year 1982. 42. The respondent has not been able to show that any od the petitioners was a party to any resolutions passed by the company for borrowings or taking deposits. 43. In my view, it is established that the petitioners are not "officers in default", within the meaning of section 5 of the Act. 44. Under the facts and circumstances, the petitioners are relieved from the alleged liabilities for non-filing of returns by M/s Punj Sons Pvt. Ltd., under rule 10 of the Companies (Acceptance of Deposits) Rules, 1975, read with section 58A of the Companies Act, 1956, and also from the consequence of the alleged defaults for which the complaints have been filed under rule 11 of the Rules Company Petition No. 133 of 1989 stands disposed off. No order as to costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 347
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... ... ..... ment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condo nation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condo nation set up as 'sufficient cause' also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient cause' as a ground of condo nation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from 'cause of action' for the claim itself. The question of condo nation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 346
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... ... ..... udicial Officer or a Subordinate Judicial Officer to visit the Police Station in connection with his official duties, he must do so with prior intimation of his visit to the District and Sessions Judge. Pursuant to this Court’s appeal made on September 29, 1989, the members of the Bar as well as the members of the Judiciary throughout the country refrained from going on strike as a result of which inconvenience to general public was avoided and the administration of justice continued. The Court is beholden to the members of the Bar and members of the Judiciary for their response to this Court’s appeal. We record our appreciation of the able assistance rendered to the Court by the learned counsel for the parties. We are beholden to Sri Soli Jl. Sorabjee, the then Attorney-General, who at our request ably assisted the Court in resolving complex questions of law. The Writ Petitions, Contempt Petitions and Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
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1991 (9) TMI 345
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... ... ..... applied for the main examination within the due date. This permission is only for the ensuing examination. As we are now permitting those who have passed the preliminary examination of 1990 and have applied for the main examination on the basis of the unquestioned and unchallenged directions given under paras 5(ii), 6 and 7 of the judgment of the CAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi, the same benefit is extended to the other appellants also who satisfy those conditions as mentioned under paras 5(ii), 6 and 7. The Secretary, Union Public Service Commission will make the necessary arrangements enabling the candidates to sit for the main examination of 1990. We will give the judgment touching on the constitutionality of the second proviso to Rule 4 of CSE Rules later. We would once again like to state that the above directions are given only on the basis of the unchallenged conclusions arrived at by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi. Appeals dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 344
Whether High Court has rewritten the retirement benefit provisions of the First Schedule to tile Act which it was not entitled to and the refixation of the pension on that basis was wholly illegal and unconstitutional?
Held that:- High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction and power in amending and altering the provisions of paragraph 2 by substituting different minimum period for eligibility of pension in paragraph 2 of Part I. Since the respondent has not put in seven completed years of service for pension he will be eligible for pension at the rates provided in paragraph 9 of Part I of the First Schedule to the Act, that is to say for the period from 4.10.1983 to 31.10.1986 at the rate of ₹ 8,400 per annum and for the period on and from November 1, 1986 at the rate of ₹ 15,750 per annum.
Puring the pendency of the appeal in this Court in the proceedings dated December 15, 1988 the Government of India communicated to the Chief Secretary, Government of Lucknow, in compliance with the mandamus issued by the High Court, that the President of India was pleased to sanction the addition of one month and 13 days to the service of the respondent to make it six years of completed service subject to the final decision in this appeal. Since the addition of one month and 13 days does not make any difference in calculation of pension as we have already stated, this Presidential sanction has become relevant only for the purpose of calculating the gratuity under section 17A(3) of the Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the order of the High Court is set aside.
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1991 (9) TMI 343
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... ... ..... o. 3. 7.. In the result, the application is to be allowed in part in so far as it relates to the sending back on remand of the review case to the respondent No. 2. 8.. The application is accordingly allowed in part. The suo motu order of review passed by the respondent No. 2 on March 24, 1976, is set aside. The impugned order of the West Bengal Commercial Taxes Tribunal dated March 22, 1982 is set aside, in so far as that order relates to sending back of the review case on remand to the respondent No. 2 for fresh decision on the question of disallowing of the claim of Rs. 41,992.08 under section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. The decision of the respondent No. 3, the West Bengal Commercial Taxes Tribunal regarding the appellate order dated January 21, 1976, relating to the assessment of the applicants for the year ending March 31, 1969, is affirmed. The main application is, thus, disposed of. We make no order as to costs. Application partly allowed.
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1991 (9) TMI 342
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... ... ..... sa Sales Tax Act, 1947 is sustainable? The question whether transaction of unserviceable materials such as, empty drums, scrap, etc., can attract levy of tax has received attention of this Court on several occasions. In State of Orissa v. Orissa Road Transport Company Ltd. 1983 53 STC 329 it was held that such transactions do not constitute business of the dealer and therefore, are not includible in the turnover of the dealer for the purpose of assessment to sales tax. In the assessee s own case, this Court had also reiterated its earlier view. See 1988 70 STC 2 (Steel Authority of India Limited v. State of Orissa). 3.. In that view of the matter, our answer to the reframed question is that the Tribunal s view that the transactions in unserviceable materials attracted levy of sales tax is not sustainable. The reference is answered accordingly in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No costs. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree. Question reframed and answered in the negative.
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1991 (9) TMI 341
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... ... ..... sonable and cannot be termed as arbitrary. In the present case the classification cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable, because the dealers having the prescribed quantum of turnover are classified within one class and any dealer whose turnover does not reach that quantum has not been included in that class. That being so, we cannot accept the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee on this point also. According to us, the classification of dealers made in the impugned provisions in the 1941 Act and the 1954 Act is reasonable and rational. 7.. Therefore, all the contentions fail. The impugned application is dismissed. Interim order, if any, is vacated. 8.. No order is made for costs. 9.. The learned advocate for the applicants makes an oral prayer for stay of the operation of this judgment for eight weeks. After hearing the learned State Representative the prayer is granted. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 340
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... ... ..... s, we cannot ignore the fact that the intention of the Government was to exempt the goods with relation to handwoven quilt beds and pillows, only with effect from the date of the amendment, namely, March 30, 1963. The amendment being declaratory, the assessees cannot avail of the exemption notification unless they are able to establish that the goods involved in the cases related to quilt beds and pillows, handwoven and not machine-made. On the question whether the goods can come within the purview of the words ready-made goods made of cloth , we agree with the Tribunal that the notification intended only to exempt goods made primarily of cloth. In this case the finding is that the major part of the quilt beds and pillows comprised of cotton. We are, therefore, unable to find fault with the reasoning of the Tribunal denying the concessional rate granted by the exemption notifications. Consequently, the tax revision cases fail and are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 339
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... ... ..... tation Act, 1908 (which was in force at that time), namely, three years from the date when the mistake becomes known to the person who has made the payment by mistake. Even assuming for the sake of argument that the mistake became known to the applicant after receipt of the notices of demand in form VII, the applicant came to know of the mistake before January 11, 1988 when he last wrote the letter to the respondent No. 1. As more than three years elapsed from the date of knowledge of the applicant about the mistake, before filing the application, it is to be held that the application for refund of tax with interest is barred by limitation. As the application is capable of being disposed of on this ground, we are not considering the question of unjust enrichment urged on behalf of respondents. 9.. The application is, accordingly, dismissed. 10.. We make no order as to costs. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. L.N. RAY (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 338
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... ... ..... oner and the same is pending disposal by the Tribunal, it is not open to the respondent to initiate revenue recovery proceedings. In support of his argument learned counsel relied on Estee Hubs and Drives (P.) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner (C.T.) 1988 70 STC 345. A Division Bench of this Court has held that it was not proper for the department to initiate revenue recovery proceedings in respect of the liability which was subject-matter of the revision petition, before the Deputy Commissioner under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act. The present case is identical, except the matter is pending in appeal before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. Learned Government Advocate for the Revenue is unable to meet the argument of the petitioner based on the said Division Bench judgment. I am bound by the ratio of the judgment and consequently applying the same the impugned proceedings are quashed. The writ petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1991 (9) TMI 337
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... ... ..... ith them, would not exclude the resultant commodity from the exemption expressed in the amendment Notification dated 12th April, 1979. That judgment fully supports the view that we have taken. 9.. Again in State of Tamil Nadu v. S.V.S. Natarajan and Sons Tax Case (Revision) Nos. 153 and 154 of 1991 decided on 3rd April 1991 it was observed by the Bench that the mere mixing of ingredients for the facility of consumers by the assessee where the ingredients had earlier suffered sales tax, cannot be said to give rise to the emergence of a new commodity, rendering it exigible to levy of sales tax. 10.. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are, therefore, satisfied that the mixture sold by the assessee of the ingredients which were exempted from sales tax, was not exigible to sales tax and consequently we allow this revision petition and set aside the orders of the Tribunal and the subordinate authorities. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1991 (9) TMI 336
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... ... ..... account books and other documents cannot be obtained otherwise, at the time and in the manner requisite to ensure against evasion of liability under the Act. It is also worthy of note that such power of search and seizure is also available under sections 132 and 132-A of the Income-tax Act and rules 112 and 112-A thereof, which has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection (Investigation), Income-tax 1974 93 ITR 505 AIR 1974 SC 348. It was specifically held there that this power was neither discriminatory under article 14 nor violative of article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution of India. Such thus being the settled position in law and respectfully agreeing with the judicial precedent provided by Agrawal Engineering s case 1971 28 STC 507 (All.) FB , we hereby hold sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 36 of the Act to be intra vires and valid. The matter is now remitted to the learned single Judge for disposal of the writ petition on merits.
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1991 (9) TMI 335
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... ... ..... der the 1954 Act is supplied by a contractor in the course of execution of a works contract, it will be treated, for the purpose of section 6D, as goods taxable under the 1941 Act. Actual taxability of a particular commodity will depend on the facts of each case and subject to the provision of section 6D itself including sub-section (2) thereof, which sets out various deductions for the purpose of calculating the net taxable contractual transfer price . 11.. Accordingly, the writ application is dismissed in part in terms of the decisions in the cases of Builders Association of India 1989 73 STC 370 (SC) and Nepal Chandra Banerjee and others RN 30(T), etc., of 1989, decided by judgment dated April 26, 1990 , of this Tribunal. The remaining points in the application are disposed of with the observations made in the judgment. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. P.C. BANERJI (Technical Member).-I agree. Writ application partly dismissed. Since reported in 1992 86 STC 130 (WBTT).
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1991 (9) TMI 334
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... ... ..... e amount charged was for the supply of calendars and represented only packing, freight and printing charges. As a matter of fact, the Joint Commissioner while observing that the calendars had been supplied for consideration, went on to define consideration as charges for printing, packing, freight, etc. We fail to see how collection of charges for printing, packing, freight, etc., which are nothing but expenses for sale promotion could be considered as exigible to sales tax and how those expenses could fall within the definition of the expression sale , within the meaning of section 2(h) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The Joint Commissioner was, therefore, not justified in upsetting the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and consequently, the order of the Joint Commissioner cannot be sustained. We accordingly accept this appeal and set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner and restore that of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1991 (9) TMI 333
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... ... ..... hnical sense and where there is no conflict between the words used in tariff entry and any other entry in the tariff Schedule. (See Akbar Badrudin Jiwani of Bombay v. Collector of Customs AIR 1990 SC 1579). Though dictionary and/or technical nomenclature or meaning is not always conclusive, in this case at hand common parlance or trade meaning and dictionary or technical nomenclature or meaning are not different. 4.. Since conclusion of the Tribunal has been arrived at with reference to materials placed before it and in view of the uses of fan as elaborated above, we are of the considered opinion that its conclusion is correct. 5.. Accordingly, our answer to the reference is that the Tribunal was justified in holding that air-circulators and exhaust fans were electric fans, and consequently, were to be taxed at the first point of sale in a series of sales by successive dealers during the year 1979-80. No costs. S.K. MOHANTY, J.-I agree. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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