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Case Laws
Showing 201 to 220 of 286 Records
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1991 (9) TMI 86 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Tea - Levy - Validity ... ... ... ... ..... licy of the Government; it is also an accepted position that no taxation measure can be devised which would be free from discriminatory impact; the mere fact that tax falls more heavily on some category, say of package tea which is packed in a container containing less than 27 kgs. by itself would not be a ground to render it invalid; further, the classification between package tea and loose tea seems to be based on difference in value and its notional superiority to the persons who consume it. Therefore, it cannot be said that Tariff Item 3(2) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As stated above, classification between loose tea and package tea is reasonable and with the specific object of affording relief to the tea growers and to the consumers of loose tea. Package tea has its own market and is considered by all concerned to be of different variety. 15. In the result, there is no substance in the petition and it is rejected. Rule discharged with costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 85 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Demurrage charges (Customs) - Seizure and detention ... ... ... ... ..... ies will be at liberty to enforce the Bond and Bank Guarantee 15 days after the order of adjudication is communicated to the petitioner and subject to any order that may be obtained by the petitioner from any higher appellate authority. (vi) If the adjudication proceedings are decided in favour of the petitioner - (a) the petitioner will be at liberty to discharge the bank guarantee and bond fifteen days after the adjudication order and subject to any order that the Department may obtain from any higher appellate authority and (b) the Customs Authority will pay the demurrage in respect of the period of detention to the Port Authorities. If the petitioner by that time has paid the demurrage charges upto 2-2-1990 the Customs Authorities will reimburse the petitioner for the same. 47. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs. 48. All parties to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking.
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1991 (9) TMI 84 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
Battery caps ... ... ... ... ..... rawn. Notice discharged. In spite of the aforesaid order no show cause notice was issued by the respondents upto December 1990. Therefore, it will be difficult to say that the petitioner company by recourse to suppression of facts and mis-statements, misdeclared plastic battery tops as industrial components under Tariff Item 68 and wrongly claimed the benefit of the exemption notification and after 1st March 1986 by describing the said product as industrial component i.e. articles of plastics covered under sub-heading 3926.90/3923.90 instead of paying excise duties under sub-heading 85.06. Apart from the fact that there is no justification for issuing a show cause notice for the period more than six months by resorting to Section 11A of the Act, as we have arrived at the conclusion that the plastic tops cannot be classified under sub-heading 85.06, the aforesaid show cause notice would not survive. Hence this petition is allowed. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 83 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Demand and adjudication proceedings ... ... ... ... ..... n, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, would submit that because the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case by the trial Court and even the appellate Court had not found the petitioner guilty of the violation of the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act and the rules, the petitioner was lulled into the belief that the order of assessment made on 12-9-1979 would not be enforced against him and hence he did not file the appeal. Taking a sympathetic view and in order to give the petitioner opportunity of an appeal, there will be an order in this writ petition while dismissing the same, giving time to the petitioner till 31-10-1991 to file an appeal against the order of assessment dated 12-9-1979. The appeal shall be taken on file and disposed of on merits on condition that the petitioner pays a sum of Rs. 20,000/-(rupees twenty thousand) as a condition precedent. The writ petition is dismissed with this liberty given to the petitioner. No costs.
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1991 (9) TMI 82 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Prosecution - Evidence ... ... ... ... ..... bmits that the evidence of the officer does not in any way implicate this accused, who was admittedly in prison throughout and merely because some other person might have alleged that the contraband was kept there by this accused, would not in any way be sufficient for the purpose of involving him. Mr. Gupte further points out that if the statements of the other accused are scrutinised it will be seen that the goods apparently belonged to the Original Accused No. 3 and in this view of the matter it would be a manifest injustice to reverse the order passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. 3. The order of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is a considered order and it is difficult to find fault with the reasoning. The position in law as enunciated by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate in the order is, in fact, correct and cannot be faulted. 4. In this view of the matter, the appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed. The bail bond of the Respondent to stand cancelled.
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1991 (9) TMI 81 - HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Evidence - Confessional statement - Arrest - Meaning ... ... ... ... ..... mean that the decision of the Collector and the decision of the Tribunal are to be treated as wholly quashed as against only the writ petitioner Manindra Chandra Dey and are not to be enforced in any manner as against him, and that this shall be so especially with regard to the penalty of Rs. 10,000/- imposed upon him. Prakash Yadav, who was fined only 200 rupees, (may be because he turned approver but I need not dwell upon that or even consider that matter) did not challenge the order of the Collector, further, as appears from the record Shreshtha was not even served, thus the proceedings as against them are not being pronounced upon by me and shall remain as they are in law, especially as regards the findings under items (b) and (d) of the Collector s order (at p. 99 of the writ annexures), as well as in regard to item (a) therein, except in so far as that item (a) seeks to pronounce the seizure to be from Manindra Chandra Dey, which pronouncement shall also stand quashed.
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1991 (9) TMI 80 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Zinc ash imported ... ... ... ... ..... ese petitions for the purpose of recovering the quantum of additional customs duty payable on zinc ash imported by the petitioners, provided the petitioners concerned have not filed any claim for exemption on the basis of the said exemption notification regarding zinc ash produced as a result of smelting operations. 17. In cases where the petitioners have deposited the amount of additional duty in Court instead of furnishing bank guarantees and/or bonds, the respondents will be at liberty to withdraw, from the amounts so deposited, the amount of the additional customs duty payable by the petitioners in respect of zinc ash imported by them on the expiry of three months from today or after the disposal of their application for exemption, whichever is later. The balance amount, if any, to be returned to the petitioners concerned. 18. On the application of the petitioners, the operation of this order is stayed for a period or eight weeks from today. 19. Certified copy expedited.
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1991 (9) TMI 79 - HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
Seizure (Customs) - Evidence (Customs) - Prosecution (Customs) ... ... ... ... ..... e he was traveling with the co-accused or because he was his brother. There is nothing to establish that Kapil Mehra was in conscious possession of the smuggled gold. 15. For the reasons discussed above, the appeal is partly allowed. The acquittal of Rohit Kumar is set aside. He is convicted under Section 135 of the Customs Act and Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act. He is awarded the same sentence which was awarded to him by the Trial Court, namely, rigorous imprisonment for one year and three months and fine of Rs. 1,500/- and in default to rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 135 of the Customs Act, and further rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1,500/- and in default to rigorous imprisonment for three months under Section 85 of the Gold (Control) Act. The substantive sentences shall, however, run concurrently. The appeal against Kapil Mehra is dismissed. Rohit Kumar accused shall be got arrested to serve out the above-mentioned sentence.
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1991 (9) TMI 78 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Refund - interest payable thereon ... ... ... ... ..... th the sides on the above question. With regard to award of interest by the learned Single Judge, on the facts and circumstances of the case, we cannot take any exception to that. The rate is also a reasonable one and the learned Single Judge in this behalf has taken note of the provision for interest found in other revenue statutes. However, with regard to the date from which interest should be paid, the decision of the Tribunal was rendered only on 20-9-1990. But for the order of the Tribunal, the respondent would not get the lever, right and basis to insist for refund. In our view, it will be reasonable to take only that date, namely, 20-9-1990 as the date from which interest could be paid. Accordingly, we direct that interest at 18 per annum on the principal amount to be refunded, now refunded on 27-8-1991, should be paid from 20-9-1990 until 27-8-1991. The writ appeal is ordered in the above terms. No costs. Time for payment of the interest amount four weeks from today.
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1991 (9) TMI 77 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYD.
Estoppel - Legislation ... ... ... ... ..... rine is likely to create a public interest. The notifications which have been issued by the Central Government about the rebate of payment of excise duty to the extent indicated therein have acquired their statutory force on their publication in the official gazette. They are therefore, manifestations of the exercise of the delegated legislative powers vested in the authorities and have statutory force which cannotbe challenged by the application of doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Central Government. 8. In view of the above discussion, we do not see any merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances, ihere will be no order as to costs. 9.An oral request for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 of the Constitution was made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Since the matter does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, leave is refused.
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1991 (9) TMI 76 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Evidence - Charge of conspiracy for evasion of excise duty - Prosecution - Offence ... ... ... ... ..... h the object of commiting evasion of excise duty. The learned counsel for the appellant has stated that apart from the statements recorded by the Central Excise officers under Section 14 of the Act, there is no other substantial evidence for the prosecution to prove this charge. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove this charge also. 17. This is an appeal against the acquittal. The trial Judge had considered the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that the prosecution failed to establish the charges and after considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant, I have also agreed with the findings of the learned Special Judge that the charges are not proved. As the prosecution has failed to make out a case to grant leave to file appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, the petition for leave to file the appeal is dismissed and consequently the appeal is also dismissed.
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1991 (9) TMI 75 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Notification withdrawing exemption effective ... ... ... ... ..... ned Single Judge until payment. Mr. Chagla has submitted that the Appellants be ordered to pay the said amount to the 1st Respondents with interest thereon at the rate of 18 per annum. In our view, though the Learned Judge has allowed refund of the amount along with interest, at the rate of 6 per annum to be calculated from 4th November, 1987, the Appellants shall pay the said amount to the 1st Respondents with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per annum from 4th November, 1987, until payment. 17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The Cross-Objections of the 1st Respondents are allowed to the extent that the Appellants shall refund the said sum of Rs. 35,57,094.74 to the 1st Respondents together with interest thereon at the rate of 12 per annum to be calculated from 4th November, 1987 until payment. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall, however, be no order as to costs. 18. Certified copies of this Order to be furnished to all parties expeditiously.
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1991 (9) TMI 74 - HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
Furniture, meaning of - Steel furniture ... ... ... ... ..... cision arrived at in departmental proceedings. It is well-settled that in such cases the question of unjust enrichment does not arise while granting refund to the party who has paid under protest. The question of unjust enrichment arises only when a matter regarding classification comes directly under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. For these reasons, the stand taken by the Department cannot be acceded to. 14. In the result, the Petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 20th June, 1981, Exhibit Y to the Petition, is quashed and set aside. The appellate order dated 7th November, 1979, Exhibit N to the Petition, is confirmed. The petitioners are also entitled to the refund of the amount paid under protest under Item 40 of the Central Excise Tariff as mentioned in prayer clause (b) (iii). Rule is made absolute accordingly. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Certified copy to be issued on priority basis.
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1991 (9) TMI 73 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the operation constitutes "processing"?
Held that:- If any operation in the course of manufacture is so integrally connected with the further operations which result in the emergence of manufactured goods and such operation is carried on with the aid of power, the process in or in relation to the manufacture must be deemed to be one carried on with the aid of power. In this view of the matter, we are unable to accept the contention that since the pumping of the brine into the salt pans or the lifting of coke and lime stone with the aid of power does not bring about any change in the raw material, the case is not taken out of the notification. The exemption under the Notification is not available in these cases. Accordingly, we allow these appeals
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1991 (9) TMI 72 - SUPREME COURT
Strictures passed by Bombay High Court against two Assistant Collectors - Precedent - Principles of judicial discipline - Tapes
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1991 (9) TMI 71 - SUPREME COURT
What is the relevant date for the purpose of calculation of the period of one year provided under Section 35E(3) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944?
Held that:- The power under Section 35E is a power of superintendence conferred on a superior authority to ensure that the subordinate officers exercise their powers under the Act correctly and properly. Where a time is limited for the purposes by the statute, such power, as under Section 33A(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1992, should be exercised within the specified period from the date of the order sought to be reconsidered. To hold to the contrary would be inequitable and will also introduce uncertainties into the administration of the Act for the following reason.
The period of one year fixed under sub-section (3) of Section 35E of the Act should be given its literal meaning and so construed the impugned direction of the Board was beyond the period of limitation prescribed therein and therefore invalid and ineffective. The Tribunal was right in holding that the application before them was out of time. This appeal is accordingly dismissed
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1991 (9) TMI 70 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Capital Gains, Firm, Precedents ... ... ... ... ..... reopened in the mere hope that the Revenue may be able to fish out material casting a doubt on the genuineness of the firm and/or the transaction. Hundreds of cases which stand finally settled by the above decision of the Supreme Court and in which no foundational facts exist for doubting the genuineness of the firm and/or the transaction would , on remand, be reopened to enable the Revenue to make a fishing inquiry. The result would be that hundreds of assessees would be unnecessarily vexed and put to avoidable hardship. We are in respectful agreement with the above principle. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Appellate Tribunal was justified in not acceding to the request of the Revenue to remand the proceedings to the Income-tax Officer. Question of assuming any fact asserted by the Revenue does not arise in the circumstances of the case. The question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. Reference answered accordingly.
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1991 (9) TMI 69 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Income From House Property ... ... ... ... ..... ntribution thus received was spent by the appellant for the maintenance of the family. The impugned order is silent whether any other member of the family was earning or whether the appellant was a complete pauper. Learned counsel for the appellant during arguments stated that one of the sons of the appellant who had been detained under the COFEPOSA Act was working in a mill. After hearing learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Deputy Director for the Competent Authority, it shall be fair to hold that the appellant constructed the third room of the house by spending Rs. 10,000 received by him by way of contribution from his son. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Competent Authority set aside. The Competent Authority shall decide the matter regarding agricultural lands mentioned at S. No. 2 in the notice under section 6(1) of the Act issued to the appellant as also the properties owned by his wife, in the light of the observations made above.
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1991 (9) TMI 68 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Firm, HUF ... ... ... ... ..... firm. Clubbing cannot be done if the said male partner is partner in his capacity as karta of a Hindu undivided family. As defined in section 2(31) of the Act, person includes (i) an individual, and (ii) Hindu undivided family. In a partnership, a Hindu undivided family acts through and is represented by its karta. That does not make the karta partner. He shares the profits and losses of the firm for and on behalf of the Hindu undivided family. As an individual, the karta can be separately assessed. The legislative intention of making a distinction between an individual and a karta of a joint family is very clear. The expression individual does not encompass in its meaning karta of a joint family who acts in representative capacity. In view of our above conclusion, we answer the question in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue holding that the disallowance of the payment of commission was not in order. There shall be no order as to costs. S. K. MOHANTY J. -I agree.
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1991 (9) TMI 67 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Explanations To Provisions, Firm ... ... ... ... ..... tner was only a payment in its physical sense, but the real recipient was someone else ; the real legal nature of the payment has to be the criterion to consider the applicability of section 40(b). (2) There was real and substantial doubt as to the scope of section 40(b) which was remedied by the insertion of the three Explanations by the Amendment Act, 1984. (3) The Explanations convey the real meaning of section 40(b) from the very inception of the said section. By applying these Explanations to consider the scope of section 40(b), the court will be advancing the real purpose of those Explanations. This is not a case of unduly stretching the amendment to make it retroactive, in the sense, retroactively is normally understood. Explanations are to be applied in the manner in which, normally, a "Legislative Explanation" is understood. Consequently, we answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the Revenue. Reference answered accordingly.
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