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Case Laws
Showing 141 to 160 of 310 Records
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1992 (2) TMI 191 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
Order - Draft order is not an enforceable order ... ... ... ... ..... ned Collector in the impugned Order. 5. We have held prima facie that the draft Order dated 10-4-1990 was not a valid Order while disposing of the Stay Applications. Upon careful consideration of the whole matter we are of the view that the Order signed by the learned Collector being only a draft, it cannot be taken to be the final order of adjudication which he was to pass it would have become final order when signed by him on the fair copy which he had directed to be put up to him. In coming to this conclusion we are guided by the judgment of Surendra Singh rsquo s case (supra). Without going into the merits of the matter, we set aside the impugned Order and refer the case back to the Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. Considering that the proceedings have taken a long time, we expect that the adjudication proceedings would be concluded expeditiously and, preferably, within a period of 4 months from the date of this Order.
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1992 (2) TMI 190 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Confiscation and penalty ... ... ... ... ..... arned Judge erred in imposing 12 per annum interest to be paid by the Department, which was not warranted particularly in view of the fact that a technical breach of the rules has been established by the Department in the order of adjudication. 8. In the circumstances, we uphold the order of adjudication dated 20th June, 1988 save and except the confiscation of Rs. 17,00,057/- and imposition of fine of Rs. 60,000/- on the petitioners. Rest of the impugned order dated 20th June, 1988 passed by the Assistant Director is hereby confirmed. We also set aside the interest imposed on the Department at 12 per annum by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment. 9. In the circumstances mentioned above, the appeal is partly allowed save and except that the confiscation of Rs. 17,00,057/- and the penalty of Rs. 60,000/- imposed by the order of adjudication are hereby set aside. The rest of the order of adjudication stands. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (2) TMI 189 - SUPREME COURT
Does the rule of natural justice has no exception?
Is denial of opportunity of hearing, in every circumstance, arbitrary?
Held that:- Competitive examinations are required to be conducted by the Commission for public service in strict secrecy to get the best brain. Public interest requires no compromise on it. Any violation of it should be visited strictly. Absence of any expectation of hearing in matters which do not effect any interest and call for immediate action, such as the present one, where it would have delayed declaration of list of other candidates which would have been more unfair and unjust are rare but well recognised exceptions to the rule of natural justice. It cannot be equated with where a student is found copying in the examination or an inference arises against him for copying due to similarity in answers of number of other candidates or he is charged with misconduct or misbehaviour. Direction not to write roll number was clear and explicit. It was printed on the first page of every answer book. Once it was violated the issue of bona fide and honest mistake did not arise. Its consequences, even, if not provided did not make any difference in law. The action could not be characterised as arbitrary. It was not denial of equal opportunity. The reverse may be true. The Tribunal appears to have been swayed by principles applied by this Court where an examinee is found copying or using unfair means in the examination. But in doing so the Tribunal ignored a vital distinction that there may be cases where the right of hearing may be excluded by the very nature of the power or absence of any expectation that the hearing shall be afforded. Rule of hearing has been construed strictly in academic disciplines. It should be construed more strictly in such cases where an examinee is competing for Civil Service post. The very nature of the competition requires that it should be fair, above board and must infuse confidence. If this is ignored then, as stated earlier, it is not only against public interest but it also erodes the social sense of equality. The Tribunal in issuing directions approached the matter technically and has attempted to make out much where it would have been better part of discretion to refuse to interfere. The tribunal completely misdirected itself in this regard. In our opinion its order cannot be maintained. Appeals succeed and are allowed. The order passed by the tribunal is set aside
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1992 (2) TMI 188 - ITAT PUNE
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... ... ..... nsidering all the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the Competent Authority has not established that the fair market value of the property exceeded the apparent consideration shown in the deed of transfer by more than 15 required in terms of second proviso to s. 269C(1). On the contrary, the appellants proved the contrary and rebutted the statutory presumptions under s. 269C(2). Therefore, we hold that the Competent Authority has not validly initiated the acquisition proceedings under s. 269C(1) of the Act. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, we are satisfied that the Competent Authority has not validly acquired the jurisdiction in view of the facts that the notice of acquisition was not published within the statutory time nor was it properly served and as conditions precedent under s. 269C(1) and 269D were not satisfied, the order of the acquisition is ab initio, void and therefore, it is annulled. 29. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 187 - ITAT PUNE
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... ... ..... ll the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the Competent Authority has not established that the fair market value of the property exceeded the apparent consideration shown in the deed of transfer by more than 15 per cent required in terms of second proviso to s. 269C(1). On the contrary, the appellants proved the contrary and rebutted the statutory presumptions under s. 269C(2). Therefore, we hold that the competent authority has not validly initiated the acquisition proceedings under s. 269C(1) of the Act. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, we are satisfied that the competent authority has not validly acquired the jurisdiction in view of the facts that the notice of acquisition was not published within the statutory time nor was it properly served and as conditions precedent under ss. 269C(1) and 269D were not satisfied, the order of the acquisition is ab initio, void and, therefore, it is annulled. 29. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 182 - ITAT PUNE
Acquisition Of Immovable Property, Conditions Precedent For Initiation Of, Notice For ... ... ... ... ..... umstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the Competent Authority has not established that the fair market value of the property exceeded the apparent consideration shown in the deed of transfer by more than 15 per cent as required in terms of second proviso to section 269C(1). On the contrary, the appellants proved the contrary and rebutted the statutory presumptions under section 269C(2). Therefore, we hold that the Competent Authority has not validly initiated the acquisition proceedings under section 269C(1) of the Act. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, we are satisfied that the Competent Authority has not validly acquired the jurisdiction in view of the facts that the notice of acquisition was not published within the statutory time nor was it properly served and as conditions precedent under section 269C(1) and 269D were not satisfied, the order of the acquisition is ab initio void and, therefore, it is annulled. 29. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 179 - ITAT PUNE
Assessment Proceedings, Mistake Apparent From Record ... ... ... ... ..... ct which is also required to be taken into account pertains to the second ground relating to restriction of depreciation on plant and machinery in the rectificatory order. In this connection, it could be at once stated that this ground does not arise from the order of the CIT(A), vide para 2 of his appellate order dated 8-3-1988, wherein it has been clearly stated that no ground was raised regarding other action withdrawing Rs. 6,193 on plant and machinery . Therefore, this ground does not arise from the order of the CIT(A) at all. It is relevant to point out that even at the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the assessee, did not advance any argument in this regard. Consequently, this ground is mis-conceived and untenable. Therefore, the question of going into merits of the cases does not arise. In view of the aforesaid facts and legal principles, we uphold the order of the CIT(A) and reject the grounds taken by the assessee. 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed
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1992 (2) TMI 178 - ITAT PUNE
Earnest Money, Long-term Capital Gains, Sale Proceeds, Short-term Capital Gains ... ... ... ... ..... of sale deed to be effected later on, we hold that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of section 54B in respect of the total amount invested in the new agricultural lands up to 16-2-1988 totalling to Rs. 8,21,471. Accordingly, we hold that the benefit of section 54B should be worked out by the ITO with reference to this investment of Rs. 8,21,471. In the case of ITO v. Chimanlal Thakordas 1991 39 ITD 159, the Ahmedabad Bench held that where the assessee had paid full price of new residential house to vendor and has also obtained possession thereof before the expiry of the period mentioned under section 54, the relief under that section could not be denied merely on the ground that the registered sale deed in respect of the property was executed beyond the time limit prescribed under section 54. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the CIT(Appeals) and direct the ITO to grant consequential relief to the assessee as directed above. 10. In the result, the appeal is allowed
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1992 (2) TMI 177 - ITAT PUNE
Account Books, Assessment Order, Assessment Proceedings, Original Assessment, Reassessment Proceedings, Tax At Source, Unexplained Cash Credits
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1992 (2) TMI 170 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... gratia are allowable deduction. In view of the above, we hold that the assessee is entitled to get weighted deduction in respect of 75 per cent of the salary, bonus and ex gratia as claimed by the assessee. This point is also found in favour of the assessee. 6. 6. The last ground is in respect of the Commission paid to foreign agents amounting to Rs. 61,941. We have heard the parties on this point. We have been consistently allowing the claim of the assessee in respect of the commission paid to foreign agents in full. Further, the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Srivilas Cashew Co. vs. CIT (1991) 99 CTR (Ker) 36 held that the assessee is entitled to claim deduction in respect of the payment of commission to the foreign agents, under s. 35B(1)(b)(iv) of the Act. Following the said decision, we hold that the assessee is entitled to weighted deduction under s. 35B(1)(b)(iv) in respect of commission paid to foreign agents. 7. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 168 - ITAT MADRAS-D
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... ... ..... hat he was entitled to the exemption. Unfortunately while the Indian Tax system has copied the American pattern of voluntary tax compliance at the peril of stiff penalties, it has not followed the American practice of providing advance rulings and assistance to tax-payers to avoid such pitfalls. If only he could have been properly advised, he would have invested the proceeds in a different manner and would yet be entitled to the exemption. The strict construction of the section has, therefore, a very harsh effect on the assessee particularly because of delayed hindsight preventing the opportunity for alternative admissible investment. In this background, I may recall the observations of the High Court in Seth Lunidaram Tikamdas v. CIT 1980 121 ITR 824 (Mad.) that in such hard cases, the Department should consider the case of the assessee sympathetically as and when an application is made to the appropriate authority. The appeal is treated as dismissed for statistical purposes
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1992 (2) TMI 166 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Assessing Officer ... ... ... ... ..... before furnishing the return of its income, whichever is earlier. And the assessee did not only satisfy the threshold condition, but had also appended to the original return filed by it proof of the factum of its having satisfied the aforesaid threshold condition. In the circumstances, therefore, to deny the assessee the benefit of deduction under the said section on the ground that audit report in Form No. 3AA was not enclosed to the original return, is, as we see it, to demand a pound of flesh . We have already shown that the requirement of filing an audit report along with the return is merely directory and not mandatory. Therefore, the assessing officer could not have lawfully rejected the assessee s claim under the pretext of making prima facie adjustments under section 143(1). 26. In view of the foregoing, therefore, we direct the assessing officer to allow the assessee the benefit of deduction under the said section. 27. In the result, the assessee s appeal is allowed
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1992 (2) TMI 164 - ITAT MADRAS-A
Carry Forward, Investment Allowance, Liberal Construction, Total Income ... ... ... ... ..... w invariably spills the essence of law to the ground. We, therefore, hold that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of carry forward of unabsorbed investment allowance even in cases of losses. 20. In the case before us, it is not the case of the Commissioner of Income-tax that the assessee did not acquire the right to investment allowance, to start with. His case is also not that the quantum of the allowance was wrongly calculated. His case is that the assessee incurred losses in the two years of accounting in question, and that, ergo, the assessee is not entitled to the benefit of carry forward of the investment allowance. As we see it, the said conclusion of the Commissioner of Income-tax goes counter to the very scheme of the Act. We, therefore, hold that the CIT was not justified in passing the impugned orders in revision. We, therefore, set aside the two orders in question and restore that of the Assessing Officer. 21. In the result, the assessee s appeals are allowed
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1992 (2) TMI 162 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... It was held there that the principle of merger applies only to that part of the order of the assessing authority, which is the subject-matter of appeal. However, another decision of the jurisdictional High Court in the case of Rasoolji Buxji, seems to attract the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Mayarani Punj even to cases of levy of penalty under s. 271(1)(c). Since the point has been examined explained and by the jurisdictional High Court, so far as we are concerned, it is enough and on that basis, we have to hold that the crucial date for the purposes of penalty was the date of completion of the reassessment and the satisfaction of the authority that proceedings for the levy of penalty be initiated. That being the position, the order of the learned Commissioner holding the penalty order dt. 31st July, 1986 to be erroneous or prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, cannot be upheld. 8. In the result all the appeals filed by the assessee succeed.
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1992 (2) TMI 161 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... rts Ltd. vs. Union of India and Ors. (1991) 93 CTR (Del) 169 (1991) 189 ITR 81 (Del) in which a contrary view has been expressed. 19. After considering the rival submissions as also decisions referred to above, we find that on the well known principle laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Vegetable Products Ltd. vs. CIT 1973 CTR (SC) 177 (1973) 88 ITR 192 (SC) and also followed all along and notably in the case of CIT vs. J.K. Hosiery Factory (1986) 52 CTR (SC) 142 (1986) 159 ITR 85 (SC), in such a situation of two views, there being no view of the jurisdictional High Court of Rajasthan available, a view favourable to the assessee has to be taken. Therefore, on this point we would reverse the order of the learned Commissioner(A), and hold that no disallowance of the amount of Rs. 1,195 could be made. 20. In the result the appeal (ITA No. 566/Jp/90) filed by the Department fails and is dismissed whereas the corss-objection No. 27/Jp/90 filed by the assessee is allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 159 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... he relevant valuation dates as determined in the respective assessment orders as liabilities are to be deducted even though those assessment orders are finalised after the valuation date. It is the quantification of the tax liabilities by the ultimate judicial authority which will determine the amount of the debt owed by the assessee on the valuation date. So long as such ultimate determination indicates the existence of a positive tax liability, there is a debt owed by the assessee on the valuation date, even though such determination may be self-sufficient in point of time to the valuation date. In view of the above, the claim made by the assessee is accepted and the WTO is directed to compute the net wealth-tax of the assessee in accordance with the observations of the Supreme Court in the above mentioned cases as mentioned by us above. 11. In the result the appeals filed by the Department fail and are dismissed where the cross-objections filed by the assessee are allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 157 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... was leviable for the asst. yr. 1982-83 for the delay for the period 1st Feb., 1984 to 21st Sept., 1984, i.e., 6 months which will be computed by the AO. 7. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Travencore Agency means rea is not an essential ingredient for a default under s. 271(1)(a) for delay in filing the return. The fact that the assessee filed return upto the asst. yr. 1979-80 and after the asst. yr. 1985-86 in time would not assist the assessee because on facts we have found that there was no reasonable cause for the delay for the period 1st Feb., 1984 to 21st Sept., 1984. The fact that interest had been charged under s. 139(8) would also not effect the position, because the charging of interest under s. 139(8) is compensatory in nature whereas a default under s. 271(1)(a) is treated as a delinquency. There is no question of double punishment. 8. In the result whereas ITA Nos. 84 and 85/Jp/1989 are allowed fully, ITA No. 86/Jp/1989 is only partly allowed.
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1992 (2) TMI 155 - ITAT JAIPUR
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... ... ..... allowance to Rs. 500 on similar considerations. 48. The last ground relating to interest under s. 217 is of a consequential nature and the ITO is directed to see if any interest would be chargeable having regard to the income finally assessed as a result of the appeals filed by the assessee and the Department. 49. ITA No. 506/JP/89 (Filed by the Department in the case of Dr. Jyoti Meenawat for asst. yr. 1986-87) The only ground raised on behalf of the Department in this appeal relates to the deletion of the amount of Rs. 18,000 out of Rs. 20,000 received as gifts from 4 persons namely Mahaveer Sisodia, Mrs. Shashi Sisodia, Miss. Naintara Masih and Shri Navin Mathur. In view of our finding in the assessee s appeal, since it has been held that no addition whatsoever was warranted, this ground fails. 50. In the result whereas the assessee s appeals ITA Nos. 587 to 589 are partly allowed, the appeals ITA Nos. 503, 505 and 506/JP/89 filed by the Department fails and are dismissed.
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1992 (2) TMI 153 - ITAT JAIPUR
Immovable Property, Leasehold Interest, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... uent assessment year, the Assessing Officer had himself granted 20 depreciation on this item. An attempt was made on behalf of the assessee by Shri H.M. Singhvi to say that even in terms of entry C(1)(a) of Sub-Part III of Part I of Appendix to the Depreciation Schedule, 20 depreciation was allowable to the assessee since that entry refers to printing machine also. However, we are of the view that this entry cannot be taken advantage of by the assessee because it relates to cinematograph films - machinery used in the production and exhibition of cinematograph films and, therefore, would have reference to printing machines of that type. However, as we have already seen above, the assessee was entitled to 20 depreciation under entry C(3) as detailed above. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Commissioner (Appeals) was eminently justified in upholding the assessee s claim. We uphold his order. 5. In the result the appeal filed by the Department fails and is dismissed
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1992 (2) TMI 152 - ITAT JAIPUR
Immovable Property, Leasehold Interest, Movable Property ... ... ... ... ..... n Lal Agarwal, the father of Shri Kedarnath Agarwal and grandfather of Shri Narendra Kumar Agarwal, is really besides the point. It was the liberty of the assessee. The question to be seen was whether the donations made to SID qualified for deduction under section 35CCA. SID had withdrawn Rs. 14.50 lakhs on 19-10-1984 and Rs. 4.65 lakhs on 30-10-1984. As already observed earlier, it was not for the assessee to enquire or ensure as to how SID utilised the fund. Having regard to the totality of all the facts and circumstances and on the basis of the above discussion on the points involved, we are of the clear view that the deduction under section 35CCA as claimed by the assessee in respect of the contributions of Rs. 15 lakhs could not be denied for the assessment year in question as the assessee had satisfied the requisites of section 35CCA and the approval of SID subsisted during the relevant period. 24. to 32. These paras are not reproduced here as they involve minor issues.
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