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Showing 201 to 220 of 259 Records
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1992 (8) TMI 60 - ORISSA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... re, he prays for restoration of the application under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act as the tax liability is more than Rs. 50,000 and he is aged 72 years. Mr. A. K. Roy, learned standing counsel (income-tax), submitted that there is no scope for restoring a reference application which was decided on merits even though the same was in the absence of the party or his counsel. Mr. Roy is correct in his submission. There is no provision under the Income-tax Act for restoration of an application under section 256(2) of the Act. The Civil Procedure Code is not applicable to attract inherent powers in exercise of the advisory jurisdiction of the court for restoration of such application. Therefore, where the court has considered the application on merits and refused to answer the reference, the scope for restoring such applications because it was heard ex parte, is not available. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in this application which is accordingly dismissed.
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1992 (8) TMI 59 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Entertainment Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... sing of its customers falls within the purview of the words expenditure in the nature of entertainment expenditure within the meaning of section 37(2A) and (2B) of the Act and the assessee is, therefore, not entitled to claim the same as a deduction. Following the said authority, we find no infirmity in the order of the Appellate Tribunal which held that the provisions of section 37(2B) were applicable to the expenses incurred for serving ordinary meals to its customers and constituents by the assessee-company. The question is, therefore, decided affirmatively, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 58 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Revision ... ... ... ... ..... come-tax Officer was not erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue? 3. Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is legally correct in drawing a conclusion that the Commissioner of Income-tax has failed to establish nexus between the stock found at the time of search and the assessment under appeal ? Inasmuch as, in our opinion, all the aforesaid questions are mixed questions of law and fact, we direct the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench B , New Delhi, to draw tip a statement of the case for each assessment year and refer the aforementioned questions to this court for its opinion. The applications are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 57 - DELHI HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ies including the Tribunal in arriving at the conclusion that the said expenditure of Rs. 55,322 was not incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of the business. This is a finding of fact arrived at on the basis of the evidence on record. This finding of fact cannot be interfered with in exercise of our jurisdiction which is a very limited one. It was contended by learned counsel for the assessee that, in the subsequent years, evidence was produced which indicated that services had been rendered by the Corporation. Each year is a self-contained year and, for the assessment year 1964-65, with which we are concerned in this case, there was no evidence other than that which was considered by the Department and the Tribunal. On this evidence a conclusion of fact has been arrived at and the said finding cannot be said to be, not based on any evidence. Question No. 2 is also answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. The respondents will be entitled to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 56 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Expenditure On Augmenting Electric Power Supply ... ... ... ... ..... ure and not capital expenditure. In this connection, B. 1. Divan C. I., speaking for the Division Bench, has made the following pertinent observations (headnote) If a payment has to be made for augmenting the productivity of the profit-making structure that payment would be revenue expenditure and not capital expenditure. Therefore, where payment is made for securing or augmenting electrical power supply, so that the profit-making apparatus or the profit-making structure can be operated with greater productivity and production can be increased, the payment will partake of the character of revenue expenditure. The facts in the present case on the basis of which service line charges were claimed as permissible revenue expenditure are almost parallel. Respectfully following the aforesaid Division Bench, judgment, question No. 4 will have to be answered in the negative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 55 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Sugar Industry ... ... ... ... ..... price is deductible from the computation of the assessee s income of the previous year was referred to this court in CIT v. Janki Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. 1972 84 ITR 348 and then this court held that a clearly ascertained liability arose during the previous year and that the assessee was entitled to the deduction of that liability against the profit earned by the assessee during the previous year. Following the aforesaid authority, we answer the above question referred to us in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 54 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... treating that amount as concealed income, under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. From the order of the Appellate Tribunal, it is amply clear that addition of Rs. 29,673 has been deleted. No information has been furnished to us by standing counsel whether the Revenue has gone in reference in the quantum matter and, therefore, the addition of Rs. 29,673 having been deleted, the penalty imposed under section 271(1)(c) cannot survive. On these facts, we answer the above question in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 53 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Firm, Income, Partners ... ... ... ... ..... t has been noted by the later decision of the Supreme Court in Gangadhar s case 1972 86 ITR 19. As we have discussed earlier, in the absence of the peculiar facts which existed in the case before the Supreme Court in Gangadhar s case 1972 86 ITR 19, the ratio of the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Kettlewell s case 1964 53 ITR 261 would squarely get attracted to the facts of the present case. It cannot be doubted that, because of reduction of the share of the assessee in the reconstituted firm from 36 per cent. to 5 per cent., the trading structure of the assessee was impaired and such cancellation would result in proportionate loss of an income-yielding asset. Consequently, the payment made to him as compensation for such impairment has to be treated as a capital receipt. For all these reasons, therefore, the question referred to us for our opinion is answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 52 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... tion to section 271(1)(c) of the Act, the onus which was on the assessee was to show that failure to disclose complete income did not arise from any fraud or wilful neglect on his part. The Tribunal having found that there is nothing to suggest that these goods had been acquired by the assessee during the year under consideration and that the assessee had discharged the onus placed on him by the Explanation to section 271(1)(e) and such finding not having been specifically challenged by the Revenue in this reference, we are of the considered view that no exception could be taken to the view taken by the Tribunal that the assessee having discharged the onus that lay upon him under the Explanation, no penalty could be levied despite additions having been made with regard to the value of gold biscuits and primary gold. For the above reasons, we answer the aforementioned question in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 51 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Company, Loss ... ... ... ... ..... pure finding of fact. The assessee-company having clearly established the conditions of clause (b) of section 79 to the satisfaction of the Appellate Tribunal, it was rightly held by the Tribunal that the benefit of set off could not be denied to the assessee-company, as section 79 never intended to hit companies which effected change in the share holding, without any intention to avoid or reduce their tax liability. For the above reasons, we answer the first part of the question referred to this court in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No answer need be given on the second part of the question reproducing the reasoning of the Tribunal, which is of no consequence, inasmuch as the Tribunal itself further recorded a finding of fact that the change in the shareholding was per se bona fide and that the case of the assessee-company is fully covered by the exception as stated in clause (b) of section 79 of the Act. No order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 50 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Exemption For Educational Institution ... ... ... ... ..... ucation to Zoroastrian students, it has not been successful in establishing any school or college. Admittedly, since 1956, no educational activity in the sense of normal schooling or actual imparting of knowledge or learning to the students is carried on by the trust. Admittedly, since 1956, the institute was simply giving scholarships to needy Parsi students for technical education without keeping any control over such students or without actually imparting any knowledge to the said students. Therefore, it cannot be said that the trust was carrying on educational activities or that it was an educational institution established for educational purposes. Therefore, the said trust was not entitled to total exemption under section 10(22) of the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the trust was entitled to total exemption. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 49 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... set out in detail the provisions of section 273A of the Act and considered the law on the subject. It is seen from the facts of the case that the disclosure in that case was not in any way related to matters revealed from the search in the spice and time. Hence, the disclosure was held to be voluntary. It is also found by the Bench that there was no detailed consideration of the various aspects of the facts of the case by the Commissioner in his order. Hence, the order of the Commissioner was set aside and the matter was sent back for fresh disposal by the Commissioner. The ruling in that case will not help the petitioners herein as the facts, which were disclosed by the petitioner related to the matters which were discovered at the time of survey by the income-tax officials. I do not find any error whatever in the impugned order of the Commissioner and there is no justification for interfering under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petitions are dismissed.
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1992 (8) TMI 48 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... and comprehensive reading of the declarations in all their material parts, it was clear that what was gifted was not merely the shares of profits from the firms. Even if there was room for doubt with regard to the true meaning of the declarations, the same stood resolved by the debit of the loss from one of the firms in 1968 to the account of the trust. The assessee had made a gift of her shares in the two firms in favour of the beneficiaries of the trust. The asset giving rise to income was transferred to the beneficiaries of the trust within the meaning of section 60. Hence, the share income from the two firms stood diverted to the trust by overriding title even before it reached the assessee. Such income could not be assessed in her hands. On the very same reasoning, on absolutely identical facts, the question referred to us for our opinion has to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. The reference stands disposed of. No costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 47 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Accounting, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... fectly justified in taking the view that liability to pay sales tax on account of withdrawal of sales tax exemption arose for the first time in September, 1972. Consequently, though sales tax liability of Rs. 98,884 related to a period which projected backward to the earlier assessment year covering the sales effected from July 17, 1971, to October 19, 1971, such liability, for the purpose of accounting, arose in September, 1972, and, therefore, the liability to pay the entire amount of Rs. 5,63,287 arose for the first time within the accounting period relevant to the assessment year in question. The said conclusion is well-justified in the facts of the present case and, in the light of the settled legal position emanating from the Supreme Court decision in Kedarnath s case 1971 82 ITR 363. Question No. 2, therefore, also will have to be answered in the affirmative, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 46 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Exemptions, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... basis. The firm s work itself did not involve manufacturing or processing work and consequently the claim of the assessee was rejected by the assessing authority, On those facts, this court held that the firm in which the assessee was a partner, was an industrial undertaking despite the fact that the firm got the cloth printed on job basis. Similar view was taken by this court in CWT v. Dinesh Prakash 1988 173 ITR 520, following the decision in Radhey Mohan Narain s case 1982 135 ITR 372 (All). Following the aforesaid decisions, we hold that the firm in which the assessees are partners will be characterised as an industrial undertaking within the meaning of section 5(1)(xxxii) of the Act despite the fact that it got the leather boots manufactured on job basis from others to whom the raw material was supplied and labour charges were paid on contract basis. We, therefore, answer both the questions in the affirmative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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1992 (8) TMI 45 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Business, Business Income ... ... ... ... ..... erest as well in appeal. Turning to the last question, it will be advantageous to advert to decision rendered by this court in the case of the assessee itself relating to the assessment year 1972-73 reported in CIT v. Saraya Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd. 1992 193 ITR 575 (All), wherein a similar claim of the assessee, that is, deduction of interest paid on the moneys advanced to the directors of the assessee-company or the firms in which they are substantially interested, was disallowed. Following the said decision, we hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that interest to the extent of Rs. 40,000 was not laid out wholly and exclusively for the purposes of the assessee s business. Our answers to the questions are as follows Question No. 1 is answered against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue question No. 2 is answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue and question No. 3 is answered in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 44 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income, Agricultural Income Tax ... ... ... ... ..... the revisions are allowed, the abovesaid order of the Tribunal below as well as the orders of the assessing authority and the first appellate authority are set aside and the cases are remanded to the assessing authority for fresh disposal in accordance with law. No costs. The above writ petition prays for refund of the amount of tax paid in consequence of the above-referred to order of the Tribunal dated January 10, 1992. But since we have set aside the order, the writ petition has to be dismissed. However, since we have set aside the orders of the first appellate authority as well as the assessing authority also, we direct the assessing authority to make fresh assessment within a reasonable time preferably within three months from this date. After the fresh order of assessment is passed, it is open to the writ petitioner to take suitable action to work out its remedies pursuant to the said assessment order. With the above direction, the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 43 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... e Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the land in question which was sold to outsiders did not become its stock-in-trade and furthermore there was no profit motive right through the transaction beginning from acquisition of the land. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. V A. Trivedi 1988 172 ITR 95. The principle enunciated in this judgment in fact supports the case of the respondent before us. It was held in Trivedi s case 1988 172 ITR 45 that there has to be an intention to trade at the time of purchase and the onus of establishing it is on the Revenue. In the present case, the purchase was made in 1947 and we are concerned here with sales in the previous years relevant to the assessment years 1975-76 and 1976-77, that is to say, nearly 27 or 28 years after the purchase of land. In our opinion, no question of law arises and this petition is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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1992 (8) TMI 42 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
Penalty, Precedents, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... he amount of penalty has to be quantified up to March 31, 1969, on the basis of the earlier provisions of the Wealth-tax Act, relating to penalty and, after that date, on the basis of the amended provisions. In this view of the matter, we regret our inability to concur with the contrary view expressed by some of the High Courts referred to earlier. In view of the above discussion, we answer the question referred to us by saying that the penalties under section 18(1)(a)(i) of the Wealth-tax Act for delay in filing the returns for the assessment years in question are to be levied for the period of delay prior to April 1, 1969, in terms of the prescribed rates with reference to the unamended section 18 of the Act as it stood prior to its amendment by the Finance Act, 1969, and for the period of delay subsequent to April 1, 1969, at the prescribed rates in terms of law under the amended section 18(1)(a)(i) as it stood after its amendment effected thereto by the Finance Act, 1969.
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1992 (8) TMI 41 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Company, Disallowance, New Industrial Undertaking, Property, Special Deduction
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