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Showing 261 to 280 of 285 Records
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1993 (2) TMI 25 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT
Appeal To AAC, Composite Appeal ... ... ... ... ..... ax Officer. Both the orders were challenged before the same authority within time though by filing a composite appeal. Therefore, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal were not justified in treating it as an appeal against the order of assessment only and not entertaining the plea regarding the partition on the ground that for that, a separate appeal was necessary. Moreover, in this case, the Income-tax Officer had not accepted the claim of the assessee that the income which was derived from the business was that of the Hindu undivided family. As the claim for status as Hindu undivided family was not accepted, the claim for giving effect to the partition was also rejected. Thus, the claim for partition was dependent upon the claim for status as Hindu undivided family For these reasons, the question referred to us is answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 24 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Any Remuneration, Other Sources, Remuneration Received By Managing Director ... ... ... ... ..... hich deterred the Revenue from initiating the revisional proceedings within the time contemplated by section 35 or section 36 of the Act, counsel for the Revenue submitted that there is nothing on record to show that there were any supervening events or circumstances beyond control for not setting in motion the proceedings under section 34 of the Act within the normal period provided in sections 35, and 36 of the Act. So, a remit, for that purpose, is not required. In the above circumstances and in view of the Bench decision of this court in Nelliampathy Tea and Produce Co. Ltd. s case 1991 190 ITR 227, we are of the view that suo motu revisional proceedings for the four years 1981-82 to 1984-85 against the two brothers are vitiated due to inordinate delay. The revisional proceedings are unreasonable or irrational. On this short ground, the common suo motu revisional proceedings dated March 30, 1991, is set aside. The above tax revision cases are allowed to the above extent.
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1993 (2) TMI 23 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Company, Provision, Reserve, Reserves, Surtax ... ... ... ... ..... s only a mass of undistributed profits on the first day of the computation period and cases where either a general reserve or a dividend reserve has been expressly created on the first day of the subsequent year. He has submitted that when a reserve has been expressly made on the first day of the computation period, it cannot be subsequently diminished with reference to the dividend subsequently paid out of the reserve. This argument cannot be accepted in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Tube Co. P. Ltd. 1992 194 ITR 102. In the premises, the questions which are referred to us are answered as follows Income-tax Reference No. 233 of 1978 The question is answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Income-tax Reference No. 335 of 1978 The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. Income-tax Reference No. 230 of 1978 The question is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 22 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Disallowance, Donation To Charitable Institution, Sugar Industry ... ... ... ... ..... es Sugar Mills Ltd. 1985 154 ITR 308 (Cal)). There this court found that one of the purposes of the trust was to establish, maintain and/or grant aid to places of worship. Thus one of its purposes was clearly a religious purpose and it was open to the trustees to spend the entire income or the fund of the trust for this purpose alone. Thus this purpose clearly attracted the mischief of Explanation 3 to section 80G which mandatorily requires that charitable purpose for section 80G cannot include any purpose the whole or substantially the whole of which is of a religious nature. Following the said decision, we hold the Tribunal to be wrong. Therefore, the three questions are answered seriatim as follows Question No. 1 Answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. Question No. 2 Answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. Question No. 3 Answered in the negative and in favour of the Revenue. There will be no order as to costs. SHYAMAL KUMAR SEN J.-I agree.
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1993 (2) TMI 21 - GAUHATI HIGH COURT
Rules, Shares, Wealth Tax ... ... ... ... ..... rule 1D of the Rules is mandatory. Question No. (ii) is not happily worded. It is not a question of rule 1D of the Rules prevailing over section 7(1) of the Act or vice versa. Rule ID of the Rules is mandatory and section 7(1) is subject to the Rules. Rule 1D of the Rules does not conflict with section 7(1) of the Act. It is to be regarded as part of section 7(1) of the Act and both the provisions must be harmoniously construed. Since there is nothing in section 7(1) which is in conflict with rule 1D of the Rules, it is legitimate to say that the rule prevails. Question No. (ii), viewed in this light, must be answered in favour of the Revenue and in the affirmative. We answer both the questions in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, i.e., in the affirmative. A copy of this judgment under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. In the circumstances, there will be no direction as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 20 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust, Exemptions ... ... ... ... ..... pecified in sub-section (3). In the present case, the trustees of the trust have not lent any part of the income or property of the trust to such a person. They have received as a donation fixed deposit receipts in a certain company. In our view, therefore, the Tribunal was right in coming to the conclusion that the receipt of such a donation did not amount to the assessee lending its income or funds or property to a person of the kind specified in subsection (3). This interpretation is in consonance with the interpretation we have put on the provisions of section 13(2)(h) in a judgment which we have delivered today in the case of Trustees of Mangaldas N. Verma Charitable Trust v. CIT 1994 207 ITR 332, in Income-tax Reference No. 298 of 1978. For the same reasons, the provisions of section 3(2)(h) are also not attracted in the present case. In the premises, the question which is referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 19 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
Appeal To Tribunal, Writ ... ... ... ... ..... judgment which has been relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner itself is distinguishable and at any rate is not an authority for the proposition that the extraordinary powers of this court under article 226/227 of the. Constitution can be invoked in such discretionary matters like stay. Learned counsel placed before us an interim order, a photostat copy of which is dated April 24, 1992, passed in M. P. No. 689 of 1992 admitting the said petition and directing notice of application for stay, in the meanwhile staying operation of the impugned order, annexure P-2, in the said petition. Firstly, such an order cannot be cited as a precedent. Secondly, we do not have the facts as to the nature of the challenge whether it was it petition directing against the order refusing to stay of recovery proceeding pending appeal. There is no such indication in the order placed before us by the petitioner. For the foregoing reasons this petition is dismissed summarily without notice.
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1993 (2) TMI 18 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Charitable Purpose, Charitable Trust ... ... ... ... ..... d in a case where trust moneys are not invested in the purchase of shares in a concern of the kind referred to in section 13(2)(h), or where trust moneys do not continue to remain so invested, the trust being merely a passive recipient of shares in such a company given to it as a donation. The question, therefore, which is before us is answered in the negative and in favour of the assessee. Similarly, in all the other references which are before us, the question is answered in accordance with our reasoning above to the same effect so that the provisions of section 13(2)(h) are not attracted in the case of assessees who have received donations in the form of shares in a company or concern in which one of the persons set out in sub-section (3) has a substantial interest when the trust moneys are not utilised for the acquisition of, such shares. The questions are answered accordingly in favour of the assessee in all the references. No order as to costs. Certified copy expedited.
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1993 (2) TMI 17 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Reference ... ... ... ... ..... oduce before the High Court at the hearing of the present reference application the requisite number of certified copies of the Statement of the Case in Reference Applications Nos. 666 to 668/(Bom) of 1973-74. We are constrained to observe that at the time of hearing of the reference the Revenue had not placed before us the requisite copies of the statement of the case in Reference Applications Nos. 666 to 668/(Bom) of 1973-74. Further, even the first order of the Tribunal, wherein the Tribunal has discussed the point at issue, was also not placed before us. Therefore, the hearing of the reference had proceeded on the material available in the paper book as well as certain statements made by the parties. It is expected of the Tribunal to take proper care in sending the statement of the case for the opinion of this court containing all the relevant material including its speaking order , if in the subsequent order it has simply followed its earlier order. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 16 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Collaboration Agreement, Revenue Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... the above figures that in regard to Trutzschler and Co., the Income-tax Officer held 25 per cent. of the royalty payment as in the nature of revenue expenditure and the balance 75 per cent. as capital expenditure. In the case of the other two foreign concerns, the entire royalty payment was disallowed by him as capital expenditure. On a careful consideration of the facts of the case, we find that the payments made in this case by way of royalty cannot be held to be capital in nature. Applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Alembic Chemical Works Ltd. v. CIT 1989 177 ITR 377 to the facts of the present case, we are of the clear opinion that the royalty payments made by the company to foreign concerns during the relevant years were rightly held by the Tribunal to be revenue expenditure. In that view of the matter, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 15 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Income Tax, Income From Tea, Income Tax Act, Rectification Of Mistakes ... ... ... ... ..... sessing authority when it was brought to his notice, because the basic document, that is to say, the order of the Income-tax Officer, stood substituted by the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Consequently, the computation of the income also required rectification bearing in mind the mandate enacted under rule 6, referred to already. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the assessing authority in the instant case erred in refusing to rectify the assessment order. This is a most appropriate case where the power under section 37 of the Agricultural Income-tax Act should have been exercised by the assessing authority. Consequently, we allow this revision petition, set aside the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals) as well as of the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, and direct the assessing authority to rectify the assessment order in the light of the observations made above and in the light of the application filed by the assessee.
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1993 (2) TMI 14 - PATNA HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act ... ... ... ... ..... savings from past income or receipt by loan or otherwise from some other person. If such person fails to explain the source of investment, which can reasonably be accepted then the only irresistible conclusion can be a presumption that he has earned the said amount during the financial year in question. This is what has been done by the Legislature by creating a fiction under section 69 of the Act and it is definitely a measure to prevent evasion of tax. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the plea of legislative incompetence, as raised by Mr. Chatterji, cannot be said to have any substance. Accordingly, the writ application is dismissed. In view of the discussions made above, questions Nos. 1 and 2 as referred to this court in the reference application are answered in the affirmative and question No. 3 in the negative. Thus, all the three questions are answered against the assessee and in favour of the Department. Costs are assessed at Rs. 500. AFTAB ALAM J.-I agree.
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1993 (2) TMI 13 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Commission Payment, Development Allowance, Interest On Advance, Weighted Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... r has not given any basis as to why he is not granting weighted deduction to the assessee on the entire amount of Rs. 2,22,429. It appears to us that on an estimate basis, he has held that the assessee would not be entitled to weighted deduction on Rs. 22,429. Surely, this is not the way of disposing of an issue while framing the assessment. It is this action of the Income-tax Officer that the appellate authorities did not approve and held that the assessee would be entitled to weighted deduction on the balance amount of Rs. 22,429 also. We do not find any infirmity in the action of the Tribunal in granting weighted deduction on Rs. 22,429. In the result, we hold that the assessee would be entitled to weighted deduction under section 35B of the Act in respect of Rs. (i) Guarantee charges 5,98,228 (ii) Commission 3,75,000 (iii) Miscellaneous expenses 22,429 and that it would not be entitled to such deduction in respect of interest payment of Rs. 6,36,605. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 12 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
Income Tax Act, Revenue Receipt ... ... ... ... ..... he income received by the housing society is business income or not. Undoubtedly, the bye-laws of some of the societies do provide that the object of the society shall be to carry on the business of building and of buying, selling, hiring, letting and developing land in accordance with co-operative principles along with other objectives such as carrying on social, recreative and educational work in connection with its tenants. The question which is referred to us does not require us to consider whether this is a business income of the society or whether it is income from other sources. Hence, this is a question which the Tribunal will have to decide when the matter goes back to the Tribunal. Accordingly, the question, which is referred to us, is answered as follows The amounts received by the assessee-society were not capital receipts but were assessable to tax as income of the society. The questions in all these four references are answered accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 11 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
HUF Property, Individual Property, Share In Firm ... ... ... ... ..... u joint family with liability and hence, a share in the partnership cannot be so transferred. Section 29 of the Partnership Act, however, provides that only certain limited rights are given to a transferee in such a situation. This section is attracted if a partner assigns his share to an outsider without the consent of his partners during the existence of the partnership. In this situation, no immediate rights accrue to the assignee as against the other partners except that the assignee can ask for the share of profits of the firm coming to the transferor which may, from time to time, become payable to him in accordance with the agreement and practice of the partnership. In view of this position in law, in our view, the Tribunal was right in holding that the share in the partnership was an asset which could be thrown into the common stock of the joint family property. The question, therefore, is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the assessee. No order as to costs.
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1993 (2) TMI 10 - SUPREME COURT
Karta, partner in firm - Whether Tribunal was right in holding that the salary received by Shri Brij Mohan was to the extent of Rs. 12,000 assessable in the hands of the assessee family - held that the sum of Rs. 1,400 per month as an allowance to Brij Mohan was for the services rendered by him and that no part of it can reasonably be said to be related to the investment of the family - appeal is allowed and the question referred shall be answered in the negative, i.e., in favour of assessee
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1993 (2) TMI 9 - SUPREME COURT
Tribunal hold that the royalty amounts should be assessed on cash basis for 1967-68, 1968-69 and 1969-70 assessment if the books and balance-sheet of such receipts were found to be maintained on cash basis and in directing fresh assessment on such basis - held that method of accounting is not relevant in this case - held that credit entry amounts to receipt of income - Non-resident is liable to tax
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1993 (2) TMI 8 - SUPREME COURT
Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the assessee i.e., Assam Co-operative Apex Marketing Society Ltd., is entitled to exemption under section 81(i)(c) in respect of their income arising out of procurement of paddy and other agricultural produce - Held, no
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1993 (2) TMI 7 - SUPREME COURT
Held that the provision made by the assessee in its books for meeting the anticipated liability of tax (under section 23A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922) was indeed a provision and not a reserve - High Court was right in holding it to be a provision and not a reserve - hence should not be included in capital computation of assessee under rule I of the Second Schedule to the Super Profits Tax Act, 1963
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1993 (2) TMI 6 - SUPREME COURT
Tribunal recorded the finding that the assessee has failed to establish that the said expenditure was in fact incurred. In view of this finding, the questions of law sought to be raised by the assessee do not arise - it cannot be said that the High Court was not justified in dismissing the application under section 256(2).
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