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Showing 41 to 60 of 264 Records
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1994 (10) TMI 292
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... ... ..... etitioner of being heard. Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that the first respondent has the jurisdiction under the Act to pass such an order. Merely because he has passed a conditional order of stay, it does not follow that he exercised his jurisdiction illegally or arbitrarily. If he has acted within the limits of his jurisdiction and the impugned order is not shown to be an arbitrary one, it is not proper for this Court to invoke the jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, exhibit P7 is an interlocutory order passed in exercise of the powers conferred on first respondent by the statute. Ordinarily, this Court does not interfere with any interlocutory orders passed by a subordinate Tribunal, if it is neither perverse nor illegal. I do not find any perversity or illegality in the said interlocutory order. 4. For the reasons stated above, I find that there is no merit in this writ petition. It is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (10) TMI 291
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... ... ..... 0 (Cal) 1989 22 STA 113 is not of any help to the applicants. It was not held in this case that in case of a delayed rejection, eligibility certificate has to be issued even though one is not otherwise eligible. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the disposal of the applications by the Assistant Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner could not be held to suffer from inordinate delay. In any case since a vital requirement of the eligibility certificate viz., the condition of clause (vi) of the explanation in the notification is not fulfilled, the applicant cannot legitimately urge the plea of prejudice on account of the delay in the rejection of his application. 23.. In the result, the application fails. The petition is dismissed without any order as to cost. Let the operation of this judgment and order be stayed for a period of eight weeks from this date. S.N. MUKHERJEE (Judicial Member).-I agree. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (10) TMI 290
Whether the constitution of the Special Court can be said to be complete and effective only after the Judge to preside over the court is appointed?
Held that:- We are conscious of the fact that the menace of drug trafficking has to be controlled by providing stringent punishments and those who indulge in such nefarious activities do not deserve any sympathy. But at the same time we cannot be oblivious to the fact that many innocent persons may also be languishing in jails if we recall to mind the percentage of acquittals. Since harsh punishments have been provided for under the Act, the percentage of disposals on plea of guilt is bound to be small; the State Government should, therefore, have realised the need for setting up sufficient number of Special Courts immediately after the amendment of the Act by Amendment Act 2 of 1989. We also recommend to the State Government to set up Review Committees headed by a Judicial Officer, preferably a retired High Court Judge, with one or two other members to review the cases of undertrials who have been in jail for long including those released under this order and to recommend to the State Government which of the cases deserve withdrawal. The State Government can then advise the Public Prosecutor to move the court for withdrawal of such cases. This will not only. help reduce the pendency but will also increase the credibility of the prosecuting agency. After giving effect to this order the Special Court may consider giving priority to cases of those undertrials who continue in jail despite this order on account of their inability to furnish bail.
We, therefore, direct as under:
(i)Where the undertrial is accused of an offence(s) under the Act prescribing a punishment of imprisonment of five years or less and fine, such an undertrial shall be released on bail if he has been in jail for a period which is not less than half the punishment provided for the offence with which he is charged and where he is charged with more than one offence, the offence providing the highest punishment. If the offence with which he is charged prescribes the maximum fine, the bail amount shall be 50% of the said amount with two sureties for like amount. If the maximum fine is not prescribed bail shall be to the satisfaction of the Special Judge concerned with two sureties for like amount.
(ii)Where the undertrial accused is charged with an offence(s) under the Act providing for punishment exceeding five years and fine, such an undertrial shall be released on bail on the term set out in (i) above provided that his bail amount shall in no case be less than ₹ 50,000 with two sureties for like amount.
(iii)Where the undertrial accused is charged with an offence(s) under the Act punishable with minimum imprisonment of ten years and a minimum fine of Rupees one lakh, such an undertrial shall be released on bail if he has been in jail for not less than five years provided he furnishes bail in the sum of Rupees one lakh with two sureties for like amount.
(iv) Where an undertrial accused is charged for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 3 1 and 3 1 A of the Act, such an undertrial shall not be entitled to be released on bail by virtue of this order. All the above directions are intended to operate as one-time directions for cases in which the accused persons are in jail and their trials are delayed. They are not intended to interfere with the Special Court’s power to grant bail under Section 37 of the Act
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1994 (10) TMI 289
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... ... ..... order of April 11, 1979, set up their industries prior to October 21, 1980, within the State of Kerala would thus be entitled to the exemption extended and/or promised under that order. Such exemption would continue for the full period of five years from the date they started production. New industries set up after October 21, 1980, obviously would not be entitled to that benefit as they had notice of the curtailment in the exemption before they came to set up their industries. The principle is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. In the result this petition is allowed. Recovery notice dated December 5, 1986 (annexure J) is quashed and set aside and the respondents are restrained from withdrawing the benefit of the sales tax incentive scheme from the petitioner for the full period of the scheme for which the petitioner was eligible prevalent before notification dated August 17, 1982. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 288
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... ... ..... tion of Delhi that there is a time-limit within which the Standing Committee is expected to deal with the application. If there is failure to act within the time, then same does not automatically give a right to any person concerned to ask for the deemed grant of the application. Failure to disposal of the appeal in the facts of the case will not give any right on the person to ask for the damages and claim for interest. The petitioner has to prove by specific facts which may be available to him to entertain any disputed questions of fact and consider the question of damages suffered by the petitioner for any specific act of negligence of any recalcitrant officer at the relevant time. Considering all the aspects of the matter, we do not find that the petitioner has succeeded in making out any case which calls for interference of this Court. We do not find any merit in this application. The application is rejected. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (10) TMI 287
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... ... ..... n to the State/respondent to explain the delay by filing an additional affidavit before the Tribunal. 3. We, accordingly, allow this revision and set aside the order of the Tribunal in M.T.M.P. No. 56 of 1994 in M.T.A. No. 326 of 1993 dated April, 4, 1994 and remit the petition M.T.M.P. No. 56 of 1994 to the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal (Additional Bench), Madurai. The respondent shall file an additional affidavit before the Tribunal, explaining the delay in filing the petition for enhancement petition. To avoid further delay, the parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on November 29, 1994. The State has to file an additional affidavit on November 29, 1994 or on any other later day as may be extended by the Tribunal, explaining the delay. On filing such an additional affidavit by the State, and hearing both the parties, the Tribunal shall decide the issue afresh, in accordance with law, and in the light of the observations made herein. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 286
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... ... ..... element of wilfulness in filing incorrect return. Unless such a finding is given definitely, penalty is not exigible, according to the judicial pronouncements cited supra. In the present case, the assessing officer has merely stated that as the actual suppression is wilful, penalty under section 12(3) of the Act is also levied. What is the element of wilfulness in filing incorrect returns and suppressing the turnover are not mentioned in the assessment penalty order. The order passed by the assessing officer is in contravention of the decisions of this Court as well as the Supreme Court, cited supra. Therefore, the penalty is not leviable in the present case, without a definite finding that an incorrect return was filed wilfully. In that view of the matter, the penalty levied under section 12(3) of the Act is not exigible and therefore the same is deleted. 9.. In the result, the revision filed by the assessee is allowed in part. No order as to costs. Petition partly allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 285
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... ... ..... ready pointed out, the assessee sold bits of karuvel trees to Seshasayee Paper Mills as firewood. Bills and delivery notes issued by the purchaser would go to show that what was sold by the assessee was only firewood. The fact that Seshasayee Paper Mills was using the bits of karuvel trees as pulp producing product would not by itself change the character of karuvel trees from firewood. This view, we have taken by following the aforesaid decisions cited supra. Accordingly, we hold that the assessing authority was not correct in revising the original assessment and brought to tax the sales turnover of karuvel trees. 12.. Accordingly, we set aside the order passed by the authorities below in levying tax on the sales turnover of karuvel trees. In the result, the order passed by the authorities below including that of the Tribunal stands set aside. Original assessment made by the assessing officer stands restored. Accordingly, the revision is allowed. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 284
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... ... ..... to levy penalty and not the Joint Commissioner. Without affording opportunity of being heard to Parameswari and Co., penalty cannot be levied by the Joint Commissioner against the said company, by treating it as unregistered dealer. 9.. In the present case, under section 34 of the Act the Joint Commissioner cannot treat the tax paid by the said Parameswari and Co. as the penalty paid by it when the assessment on the said company has become final. For all these reasons, considering the facts arising in this case, in the light of the judicial pronouncements cited supra, we hold that the Joint Commissioner II, while exercising his jurisdiction under section 34 of the Act was not correct in setting aside the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who granted exemption. Accordingly, the order passed by the Joint Commissioner II stands set aside, and the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner stands restored. The appeal is allowed with costs. Appeal allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 283
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... ... ..... claim that the sales related to sarees of handloom silk. The Tribunal noted that, having received the show cause notice, the petitioner did not file any objection nor did it choose to seek extension of time for filing the objection, as such, adequate opportunity was afforded to the petitioner. The second aspect relates to production of necessary material either before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner or before the Tribunal to show that the silk sarees were handloom sarees. But on this aspect, the Tribunal noted that the purchase bills covering the disputed turnover did not indicate that the sarees were handloom sarees and no other clinching evidence was placed before the authorities to come to the conclusion that the turnover related to sales of handloom silk sarees. We do not find any illegality in the abovesaid findings of the Tribunal to warrant interference of this Court in these tax revision cases. The tax revision cases are, therefore, dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1994 (10) TMI 282
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... ... ..... matter to remove the ambiguity. The Government have examined the matter in consultation with the Agriculture and Co-operative Department and they hereby clarify that both certified seeds and/or truthfully labelled seeds are exempt from tax as per the order issued in G.O. Ms. No. 604 Revenue(s) Department dated April 9, 1981 and G.O. Ms. No. 129, Revenue (CT-II) Department dated February 14, 1989, as they are two types of seeds sold for agricultural purposes. A perusal of the above clarification makes it clear that the certified seeds and/or truthfully labelled seeds are exempt from tax under G.O. Ms. No. 604. In view of the above clarification, the petitioner is entitled to the exemption under G.O. Ms. No. 604. Therefore, the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal confirming the order of the Deputy Commissioner has to be set aside and we accordingly do so. The tax revision case is accordingly allowed, but in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 281
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... ... ..... ble to tax under entry 101 of Schedule I. The assessee is not entitled to claim exemption on the ground that the same are cotton fabrics falling under entry 5 of Schedule IV. We must also mention in this context that being aware of the change in the law-insertion of entry 101 in Schedule I-the petitioner has not raised any objection before the assessing authority for subjecting the turnover relatable to transmission beltings to tax under entry 101 of Schedule I. There are no merits in the writ petition and accordingly it is dismissed. No costs. After we have completed dictation and pronounced the judgment, the learned counsel for the petitioner seeks oral leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under article 134-A(1) of the Constitution of India. In our considered opinion this case does not involve any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court. The oral application for leave is, therefore, rejected. Writ petition dismissed.
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1994 (10) TMI 280
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... ... ..... ailed to furnish the returns in respect of any period before the prescribed date, then the Assessing Authority has to issue notice within five years after the expiry of such period. Admittedly, no such notice was issued to the respondent within five years after the expiry of the period, i.e., March 31, 1971. Mr. Jhingan, therefore, urged that the learned single Judge was right in holding that the facts of the present case squarely fall under section 11(5) and not 11(2) of the Act. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and on going through the impugned judgments, we are of the considered opinion that the learned single Judge has rightly held that the revisional jurisdiction could not have been exercised by the Assistant Excise and Taxation Commissioner by taking recourse to section 11(2) of the Act. There is no substance in both these appeals. Both these appeals stand dismissed but in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeals dismissed
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1994 (10) TMI 279
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... ... ..... icable to the facts of the present case. Therefore, having regard to the provisions contained in sections 13(2), 24(1), 24(3) of the Act and rule 18(2) of the Rules and the admitted facts and circumstances present in this case, we have no hesitation in holding that, it is not open to the appellant to claim that only on the date of filing of the revised return on February 19, 1992, the differential tax becomes due and that inasmuch as the differential tax was paid on February 19, 1992, it is not liable to pay interest under section 24(3) of the Act. 11.. For all the reasons stated above, the conclusions of the departmental authorities and the learned single Judge that the appellant is liable to pay interest under section 24(3) of the Act are quite correct and we cannot take exception to the same. There is no merit in this writ appeal and it is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Writ appeal dismissed.
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1994 (10) TMI 278
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... ... ..... on 12(5)(iii) of the Act. 4.. We have heard the rival submissions. The fact remains that the assessee submitted a revised return rectifying the mistake which had occurred in the original return before completing the original assessment. The explanation offered by the assessee was that by mistake the original return was filed with defects due to the negligence committed by the staff of the office. The said ground appears to be acceptable. Considering the explanation offered by the assessee that the revised return was filed for rectifying the mistake in the original return before the completion of the original assessment, no penalty is leviable under section 12(5)(iii) of the Act. This view we have taken on the basis of the decisions cited by us hereinabove. 5.. Accordingly, the order passed by the Joint Commissioner is set aside and the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (C.T.) stands restored. In the result, this appeal is allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 277
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... ... ..... under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and the impugned order does not call for any interference. 7.. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in case the Tribunal prima facie holds that the petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of some amount of tax on filing 18A declaration, the Tribunal may be directed to modify the conditional stay order by deducting the exempted amount from the disputed amount. But no such direction can be given in this proceeding because no such averment has been made in this writ petition with a prayer to modify the stay order, as contended now. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to move the Tribunal by filing a fresh petition, if so advised, and canvass this contention there. The Tribunal may consider this contention and pass appropriate orders, if a petition is filed before it within two weeks from today. 8.. With the above observations, the writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (10) TMI 276
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... ... ..... obligation. In the case the honourable Supreme Court further observed that penalty will not be imposed merely because it is lawful to do so. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed the authority competent to impose penalty will be justified in refusing to impose a penalty when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act. From the facts and circumstances of the case, as mentioned in the orders of the authorities below the revisionist s case seems to be merely of a technical breach and indications of a contumacious or dishonest conduct are completely absent. It was thus a case in which though a default punishable under section 15-A(1)(o) was established, there was no justification for the levy of penalty. The officers in the Revenue Department must remember that it is better to lose a little revenue than to lose the goodwill of the tax-payer. For the above reason, the revision petition is allowed and the penalty in question is quashed. Petition allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 275
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... ... ..... Central Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the conditions specified in the order granting exemption under the State Act related to the identity of the goods. It was further observed that the conditions relating to identity of the goods and the dealers would always be there in every exemption and that could not be put as a condition of sale. From the above discussion it follows that the requirements in G.O. Ms. No. 604 dated April 9, 1981, viz., the seeds certified and truthfully labelled are not cumulative requirements and that any one of these categories would qualify for exemption and that the exemption granted under G.O. Ms. No. 604, dated April 9, 1981, is a general exemption and as such it qualifies for exemption under sub-section (2-A) of section 8 of the Central Act. In this view of the matter, the order under revision cannot be sustained, so it is accordingly set aside. The tax revision case is allowed, but in the circumstances, without costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (10) TMI 274
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... ... ..... principles of interpretation laid down in the several decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above. The principles laid down in Anitha Cashew 1993 90 STC 163 (Kar) show that it can apply only to cases where the goods manufactured and sold are not subject to tax at all (as in the case of cashew kernel). 15.. On the basis of the above discussion the two points raised for consideration have to be answered in the negative. The notification dated June 19, 1991, does not exempt tax payable on purchase of raw materials. Hence the impugned endorsement dated October 18, 1994 (annexure B) does not suffer from any error. The petitioner is liable to pay purchase tax on the raw material (groundnuts) purchased by it for manufacturing the goods sold, namely groundnut-oil. There is therefore no merit in this petition and accordingly it is rejected. Mr. S.A. Nazeer, learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance with six weeks. Writ petition dismissed.
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1994 (10) TMI 273
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... ... ..... cified therein. The end-products sold by the rollers are taxable on or after the date of notification and there is no scope for any enquiry as to whether the end-products sold on or after that date of notification were manufactured out of the raw materials on which tax had been paid or as to whether the rolling mills had availed the benefit of exemption of sales tax on the purchase of the raw materials. 12.. Learned counsel for the respondent/State also pointed out that the assessment for the period in question had been made by the authorities on the petitioners several years back and that unless such assessment orders are set aside in a properly instituted proceedings, the petitioners are liable to pay the tax so assessed. The fact that assessments have already been made, is not in dispute. 13.. I do not see any merit in these writ petitions and the same are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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