|
Advanced Search Options
Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 374 Records
-
1994 (11) TMI 431
... ...
... ... ..... nsel for the petitioner, them how does one explain the "promotion" of "Constables" to the rank of "Head Constable" ? And if both belong to the same "rank" then why use the expression "promotion to the rank of Head Constable" as used in Rules 13 and 14 of the Rules ? If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted the words "to the rank of" in the Rules noticed would become redundant. And redundant they are not. In fact they clearly demolish the argument and point out clearly and un-mistakenly, that constables and Head Constable relate to two different ranks and that when under the Rules persons of the the rank of constables are promoted then they are promoted as per Rules 13 and 14 "to the rank of Head Constables". 12. Surely then, Head Constables are officers superior in rank to constables. This being the position the challenge fails, and with it the petition. 13. Petition dismissed.
-
1994 (11) TMI 430
... ...
... ... ..... of accounts could be used only for corroborating the oral statement. Nothing of this sort has been done in this case. The mere fact that Vishwakarma Oil Traders or the person concerned therewith could not be traced is no ground for dispensing with the legal modes of proof. Apart from this circumstance, which was not legally established, there was nothing in this case to justify the enhancement of the turnover. For these reasons the enhancement upheld by the Tribunal was unjustified and the Turnover of Vanaspati by the dealer of ₹ 1,77,34,842/- should have been accepted. 6. For the above reasons, the Commissioner's Revision Petition No. 283 of 1988 is dismissed and the dealer's Revision Petition No. 257 of 1988 is allowed. The Tribunal's order dated 30th November, 1987 is modified to the effect that the turnover of vanaspati will stand reduced to ₹ 1,77,34,842/- as disclosed by the dealer. The Tribunal will pass a consequential order according to law.
-
1994 (11) TMI 429
... ...
... ... ..... he expression 'or interest payable' in Section 20(5) and proviso thereto as was done in Section 11B. This further buttress our conclusion that there is no requirement of payment of interest as a condition precedent for hearing of an appeal filed under Section 20 of the Act. 12. In view of our aforesaid conclusion, we have no hesitation to hold that the Sales Tax Tribunal has committed a serious illegality in requiring the petitioner to pay the amount of interest apart from the amount of tax as a condition precedent for hearing of its appeal by the Appellate Authority. 13. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed. Annexure P-1 is quashed. The petitioner has already deposited the amount of tax except a sum of ₹ 3,000/-. This amount shall be paid by the petitioner within a period of three weeks from today and on payment of that amount the appeal of the petitioner shall be heard and decided by the Appellate Authority on merits. Costs made easy.
-
1994 (11) TMI 428
... ...
... ... ..... d Acquisition Act having regard to the provisions of Section 20 of the said Act which required that for such purpose land could be acquired only in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition and the Division Bench the appeal filed therefrom, both on the ground that said Act, had been struck down as unconstitutional. Hence this appeal. 29. We have held the provisions of the said Act to be valid legislation except in so far as they provide for payment of the compensation amount in instalments. The said Act being valid legislation,its provisions preclude the State from acquiring land for the purpose of a Harijan Welfare Scheme under the Land Acquisition Act. The appeal is allowed and the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act to acquire the appellant's land for the purpose of a Harijan Welfare Scheme are, therefore, quashed and set aside. 30. In all these civil appeals each party shall bear and pay its own costs.
-
1994 (11) TMI 427
... ...
... ... ..... om it could be said that the Investigating Officer's production was essentially required to give an opportunity to the defence to cross examine him with reference to statements recorded by him un- der section 161 Cr. P.C. or any steps taken by him during investigation.' Ms non-examination, therefore, did not in any way affect the prosecution case nor prejudice the appellant in his defence. 8. The only other contention raised by the appellant was that no public witness was examined though the alleged recovery took place at a bus stand in the evening. It appears from the evidence of both PWs 1 and 2 that in spite of requests made none of the shopkeepers and the people present there was willing to join the search party. As we do not find any reason to disbelieve the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that their sincere attempt to secure public witness failed, no adverse inference for such nonexamination can, therefore, be drawn. 9. On the conclusion as above we dismiss the appeal.
-
1994 (11) TMI 426
... ...
... ... ..... Excise, Bombay, Division III 1989 (44) E.L.T. 598 (S.C.) 1989 (4) SCC 592 and Collector of Central Excise v. Newmen Press 1990 (48) E.L.T. 626 (S.C.) . Counsel concedes that the aforesaid two decisions cover the issue against the appellant and in favour of the Revenue.
-
1994 (11) TMI 425
... ...
... ... ..... would have indeed awarded a longer period of incarceration because of the gravity of contumacious act fabrication of document to defeat just cause of an adversary and thereby seriously affecting the purity of courts' proceeding but we have refrained from doing so as this is the first occasion in free India when this Court (for that matter may be any court of the country) has felt called upon to send a person like the contemner behind iron bars in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. We have restricted the period of imprisonment to two weeks in the hope that the incarceration of this contemner will work- as eye-opener and no court will henceforth feel constrained and to do so in any other case. We have traversed the untreaded path guardedly, because the assumption of contempt jurisdiction by a court requires zealous and careful movement as the affected party faces a summary trial and the prosecutor himself acts as a judge. 18. The proceeding stands disposed of accordingly.
-
1994 (11) TMI 424
... ...
... ... ..... ered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. These principles, it appears, were lost sight of by the High Court when it decided to cancel the bail, already granted. The High Court it appears to us overlooked the distinction of the factors relevant for rejecting bail in a nonbailable case in the first instance and the cancellation of bail already granted. 5. We are, therefore, satisfied that the cancellation of anticipatory bail granted to the appellants, for the reasons given by the High Court, was not justified. Nothing has been brought to our notice either from which any inference may possibly be drawn that the appellants have in any manner, whatsoever, abused the concession of bail during the intervening period. 6. We, accordingly, allow this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court and restore that of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak dated 12-11-1993.
-
1994 (11) TMI 423
... ...
... ... ..... death and not all. Such an extravagant interpretation would militate against the purpose, spirit and letter of the amendment. 15. For the foregoing discussion and in view of the admitted fact that Mrs Menan was a contractual tenant at the time of her death, it must therefore be held that the respondent inherited the tenancy as her heir. Consequently, the question as to whether she was ordinarily residing with her mother at the time of her death becomes redundant. We therefore dismiss the appeal but without any order as to costs. 16. Before parting with this judgment we would like to keep on record that our reference to and reliance upon Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. case1 was for the limited purpose of interpreting Section 2(h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 for, the principle enunciated therein relating to inheritance of "statutory tenancy" stands overruled by a Bench of five learned Judges in Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar (1985) 2 SCC 683 AIR 1985 SC 796.
-
1994 (11) TMI 422
... ...
... ... ..... kes out the rigour, as stated earlier, from the applicability of the provisions of the Evidence Act and that of the Code. Compensation under section 57-B is in the nature of liquidated damages under tort to mitigate and relieve from the hardship of the victim or next of kin. The legislature thought it expedient to provide the minimum, of course, subject to law of damages by the aggrieved person or next of kin at the civil action. Therefore, prescription of the damages does not violate either Article 14 or 19. It is a reasonable classification to subserve the social good. The accused charged for the offence stand as a class and that, therefore, there is no invidious discrimination on the proof of the charge for the punishment envisaged under the relevant provisions of section 57-A or 57-B. Therefore, these provisions are not violative of Articles 14, 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution. The appeals are accordingly dismissed with costs quantified as ₹ 20,000 in each appeal.
-
1994 (11) TMI 421
... ...
... ... ..... rchased by the respondent-Mills for selling them or for using them as their raw material in the manufacture of paper. The liability of the respondent-Mills to pay the market fees is in no way negated on that account. The provision requiring the seller to collect the market fees in such cases is made for the convenience of collection of the fees, as is the similar provision made in the first proviso of the said sub-section where buyers cannot be identified. The collection made by the seller, i.e., the forest depots in the present case is for and on behalf of the Committee and is eventually to be handed over to the Committee. The provision is enabling and does not prevent the Committee itself from collecting the fee, if it so proposes. 33. We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court was in error in holding that the levy of market fees in the present case was not legal. The appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs and the impugned decision of the High Court is set aside.
-
1994 (11) TMI 420
... ...
... ... ..... Ground No. (A)(c) we hold, the impugned levy is not a tax on consignment, hence no question of it falling under List I, entry 92-B read with article 269(1)(h) arises. We hold that the impugned Ordinance, in fact, is imposition of luxury tax on tobacco and imposition of the same is not a colourable exercise of power. On Ground No. (B) we hold that the impugned levy is violative of article 301 and is not saved by article 304(b) of the Constitution, thus, is ultra vires. We further hold on Ground No. (C), the impugned Ordinance is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. On Ground No.(D) we hold, the impugned Ordinance is not void on account of passing of the Tobacco Boards Act, 1975, by the Parliament. 101.. In view of the aforesaid findings, and declarations made by us we hold the impugned Ordinance to be void and ultra vires in view of it being violative of articles 14 and 301 of the Constitution. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed with costs. Petitions allowed.
-
1994 (11) TMI 419
... ...
... ... ..... the particular situation it would be unfair for the body or authority not to have allowed a reasonable opportunity to be heard. Case Law Discussed. M. Narasimhachar v. State of Mysore AIR 1960 SC 247, distinguished. 10.. Testing the facts and circumstances of the instant case, on the linchpin of the aforesaid principle of law, it becomes clear that the order (annexure P/9 ) is liable to be dislodged and demolished. 11.. Accordingly I quash the order (annexure P/9 ) but with liberty to respondent No. 3(iv) to hear the petitioner No. 1 on this issue, if any action is found necessary, and pass appropriate order in conformity with law. In that event, if any order is rendered against the petitioners, they shall have liberty to pursue appropriate remedy thereafter. 12.. This petition thus stands allowed in terms indicated above but without any order as to costs. The security amount, if any, shall be refunded to the petitioners, after due verification. Petition allowed accordingly.
-
1994 (11) TMI 418
... ...
... ... ..... ce will come within the term mutually agreed upon between the parties shall be deducted from the invoice of the company. Even though such amount was not deducted at the first instance but the net price received was the catalogue price less the deductions permitted and the assessee will be liable only to pay the tax on the net amount received as held in (1986) 24 ELT 260 (Mad.) (Union of India v. S.S.M. Bros. Ltd.), (1986) 23 ELT 8 (SC) (Moped India Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise), (1984) 17 ELT 329 (SC) (Union of India v. Bombay Tyres International Pvt. Ltd.) and also 1980 46 STC 220 (Mad.) (State of Tamil Nadu v. Ultramarine and Pigments Ltd.). Such deductions are also covered within the definition of clauses (h)(i) of section 2 of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. 27.. We accordingly answer the fresh question of law framed by us above in favour of the assessee. The reference accordingly stands disposed. G.B. Patnaik, J.-I agree. Reference answered accordingly.
-
1994 (11) TMI 417
... ...
... ... ..... n mind that much before the concerned amendment and the initiation of action under section 4-A(3) of the Act, the dealer had become the owner of the land/building. In my view, therefore, even if the Commissioner of Sales Tax had, in law, the authority to act as he did, judiciousness and fairness in exercise of this discretionary powers required him to refuse to exercise the power to cancel the eligibility certificate. For the above reasons, I hold that the Commissioner was not justified in cancelling the eligibility certificate granted to the revisionist and the Tribunal erred in law in affirming such cancellation. The revision petition is, accordingly, allowed. The impugned order dated August 16, 1994, is set aside and it is ordered that the revisionist s appeal No. 6 of 1993 against the order under section 4-A(3) of the Act stands allowed and the Commissioner s order dated March 9, 1993, cancelling the eligibility certificate is quashed. Costs on parties. Petition allowed.
-
1994 (11) TMI 416
... ...
... ... ..... that have already been decided. All procedural laws have retrospective effect only to the extent that they governed all pending cases. But a procedural law even retrospective in operation cannot be applied to a case that is no longer alive. In the present case as already stated the revisions have been disposed of as far back as October 8, 1984 and the matter stood concluded. The insertion of subsection (2) to section 12-A, therefore, cannot be a ground for reviewing that order. 9.. Then section 12-A is a provision under the U.P. Sales Tax Act, and it is a very debatable issue where the provision of section 12-A(2) can be used for determining the nature of a transaction under the Central Sales Tax Act. For this reason also the order that was passed by this Court cannot be made the subject of review because of the amendment referred to above. 10. For the above reasons, I do not find any merit in the applications for review and the same are hereby rejected. Petitions dismissed.
-
1994 (11) TMI 415
... ...
... ... ..... 1.5 times the average running stock at the value fixed by the assessing authority. The Revenue is before us in revision. 2.. We do not find any merit in the case. The turnover returned is Rs. 27,55,336.90. The inspection was on March 18, 1986 and some discrepancies were noted. A penalty of Rs. 17,120 was imposed. The Tribunal has discussed the entire matter in its order and come to the conclusion that assessment at 1.5 times of the average running stock value would meet the ends of justice. The suppression noted at the inspection on March 18, 1986 was Rs. 1,42,728 and the addition which arises consequent on the decision of the Tribunal is over Rs. 33 lakhs. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we think that the Tribunal was well justified in estimating the turnover at the amount fixed by it. Being essentially a question of fact, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. The petition is therefore dismissed. Petition dismissed.
-
1994 (11) TMI 414
... ...
... ... ..... a) to (d) of the Explanation (1) on a date later than the date of commencement of the period of facility notified under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to be new unit for entitlement to the facility of exemption from tax only for part of the period, notified under sub-section (1), to be computed from the date on which all the conditions specified in clauses (a) to (d) of the said Explanation (1) are fulfilled, till the end of the period of such facility. Thus the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of section 4-A of the Act with effect from August 6, 1991. Accordingly in our considered opinion, the impugned orders dated September 9, 1991 and January 27, 1992 are erroneous, therefore, set aside and the case is remanded to the Divisional Level Committee, respondent No. 2 for considering petitioner s application afresh and for deciding the same in the light of observations made above. The writ petition is finally disposed of accordingly. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
-
1994 (11) TMI 413
... ...
... ... ..... lds liability accrues only when default in payment of tax is attributable to assessee alone. Cheque not presented to bank for encashment by the department to realise proceeds of cheque in time cannot constitute assessee to be liable for any interest on that account. Similarly, it is held in the case of Anand Trading Co., Kanpur v. State of U.P. 1991 UPTC 1022 that there could be no levy of interest on the encashed cheque admittedly received along with form IV and submitted to bank for collection by department, cheque neither dishonoured nor any intimation sent by the department to dealer regarding non-encashment of cheque. In such a situation no interest is chargeable under section 8(1) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act. In view of these two decisions the present question raised being covered the present writ petition is accordingly, allowed. The charging of interest for the assessment year 1975-76 is hereby quashed. The petition is accordingly, allowed with costs. Petition allowed.
-
1994 (11) TMI 412
... ...
... ... ..... ew petition filed by the petitioner, authorities of the Excise and Taxation Department are using coercive methods to compel the petitioner to succumb to their unreasonable demand. After hearing Shri Jain and after perusal of record, we are satisfied that there is no justification for the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Faridabad, to withhold his decision of the review petition filed by the petitioner. Though it is for the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the case on merit, it is not permissible for the said authority to frustrate the review petition filed by the petitioner by mere omission to decide the same. For the facts and circumstances of the case, we disposed of this petition with a direction to the Joint Excise and Taxation Commissioner (Appeals), Faridabad, to hear and decide the review petition filed by the petitioner within fifteen days from the date of submission of a copy of this order. Petition disposed of accordingly.
........
|
