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Showing 81 to 100 of 374 Records

• 1994 (11) TMI 371 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... enalty of Rs. 20,000 in each case. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) was correct in confirming these orders and the learned Member of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal, Ajmer, seriously erred in setting them aside. 6.. The fact that crude palm oil contained in the said two tankers was not delivered in Rajasthan has no material bearing in the case. The event attracting the provisions of section 22A(3) took place as soon as the tankers had entered into the territory of Rajasthan without the documents conforming to the goods. Under these facts and circumstances, it is difficult-to sustain the common order of the Tribunal dated March 11, 1988. 7.. Accordingly, both the revision petitions are allowed. The common order of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal, Ajmer, dated March 11, 1988, is set aside and the orders of the Commercial Taxes Officer, Sirohi, dated February 1, 19 32 and of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Jaipur, dated September 29, 1986, are restored. Petitions allowed.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 370 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether the non- publication of the substance of the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 equally be mandatory and its omission renders the declaration invalid?

  Held that:- It is true that the language in Section 6(2) is in pari materia with Section 4(1). The purpose of publication of the declaration is to give effect to the conclusiveness of the extent of the land needed for the public purpose or for a company as made under Section 6(3) of the Act. Since there is an opportunity already given to the owner of the land or persons having interest in the land to raise their objections during the enquiry under Section 5-A, or otherwise in case of dispensing with enquiry under Section 5-A unless they show any grave prejudice caused to them in non-publication of the substance of the declaration under Section 6(1), the omission to publish the substance of the declaration under Section 6(1) in the locality would not render the declaration of Section 6 invalid. We are not intending to say that the officer should not comply with the requirement of law and it is their duty to do it. But their dereliction to do so per se does not render the declaration under Section 6 illegal or invalid. Therefore, the word 'shall' used in sub-section (2) of Section 6 should be construed to be only directory but not mandatory. Moreover, in this case, notice was issued to the respondent under Sections 9 and 10 pursuant to which they appeared before the LAO and put forth their claim and the award has already been made. As stated earlier, since there is an inter se dispute as regards the apportionment, the Land Acquisition Officer had already made the reference under Section 30 and deposited the compensation in the Court of District Judge along with the reference.

  High Court was clearly in error in quashing the notification under Section 4(1) and Section 6 declaration.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 369 - ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT
  
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  ... ... ..... pparatus and appliances, that is to say ......................... (ii) casings, cappings, reapers, bends, junction boxes, meter boards, etc., other than those made of wood........... The question therefore, is whether the articles, bends and junction boxes in the present case are electrical goods as they are other than those made of wood as per entry No. 38 above. If the functional test is to be applied then perhaps it will have to be said that the articles in question are electrical goods. It is evident that the junction boxes cannot be used for any other purposes except for electrical fittings. Thus we have no hesitation in holding that articles in question clearly and squarely fall under entry No. 38. In the passing we may point out that this question may not arise now in view of the deletion of entry No. 88 and also due to recasting of entry No. 38. In the result, the T.R.C. is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 367 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR FORFEITED PROPERTY
  
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  ... ... ..... even in the report of the Income-tax Department, these were stated to be the properties belonging to the respective sons. It would be immaterial that the information also contained the fact that they were supposed to be illegally acquired properties because of the doubt having been removed by the abovequoted judgment of the apex court by saying that (at page 614) We do not think that Parliament ever intended to say that the properties of all the relatives and associates, may be illegally acquired, will be forfeited just because they happen to be the relatives or associates of the convict/detenu. In view of the above, we do not feel called upon to examine other points on question of law or fact and we are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to succeed on the one ground, as discussed above. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed, and the impugned order under section 7 of the Act dated March 7, 1980, and consequential order under section 19(1) of the Act, are set aside.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 366 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR FORFEITED PROPERTY
  
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  ... ... ..... usband was apprehended, which was after the expiry of almost 20 years from the acquisition of this property by the appellant, we do not think that the Competent Authority was justified in taking the view which he did, namely, that the onus was still on the appellant to prove the source of acquisition by documentary evidence. She is also justified in her plea that it was not possible for her to produce evidence after a lapse of so much time when the notice of hearing was given to her for the first time on October 7, 1991, i.e., after the expiry of almost 24 years from the acquisition of this property. We are, therefore, of the view that the property owned by the appellant, which is the subject-matter of forfeiture order, was not liable to be forfeited, for the aforesaid reasons. The appeal is accordingly allowed, and the forfeiture order dated October 26, 1993, under section 7(1) of the Act is set aside and so also the consequential order passed under section 19(1) of the Act.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 365 - APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR FORFEITED PROPERTY
  
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  ... ... ..... es (1) spouse of the person . . . . (3) brother or sister of the spouse of the person and . . . . (5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the person. . . . Niranjan Shah, being spouse of Roma Niranjan Shah, his two sisters are covered by clause 68B(i)(3), and mother under section 68B(i)(5) of the Act, and thus the property of each can be forfeited whether owned jointly or severally, by virtue of being a relative of the affected person, namely, Roma Shah, as defined in this Act. That being so, the property of the partnership firm owned by these four relatives is liable to forfeiture. There being no evidence, that this property was acquired by means, as can be considered lawful or out of income derived from legal sources it has been rightly held to be liable to forfeiture by the competent authority, under section 68-I of the Act by order dated March 10, 1993. There is, thus no merit in appeal, and the same is liable to be dismissed, and is dismissed accordingly.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 364 - SUPREME COURT
  

  If the housing activity carried on by the statutory authority or private builder or contractor came within the purview of the Act only after its amendment by the Ordinance No. 24 in 1993 or the Commission could entertain a complaint for such violations even before?

  Whether the suit has abated or survives?

  Held that:- Appeal allowed. High Court fell into patent error in postponing the date of the operation of the notification. The notification, amending the Rules, was a legislative act.The amendment of the Rules being a delegated legislation; the High Court could not have interfered with the date of operation of the notification.

  Thus set aside the direction given by the High Court regarding the postponement of the enforcement of the notification and we direct that the notification dated March 27, 1992 shall be operative from April 1, 1992.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 363 - CEGAT, NEW DELHI
  

  Smuggling - Penalty - Possession at time of seizure - Statement - Confession - Statement - Co-accused - Remand - Scope - Smuggling - Proof beyond reasonable doubt

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• 1994 (11) TMI 362 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Powers of court to grant relief in certain cases

  
  
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  ... ... ..... at the decision of the learned single judge of the Delhi High Court in the matter of Krishna Prashad v. Registrar of Companies 1978 48 Comp. Cas. 397 supports this view. It is laid down in the aforesaid decision that if the apprehended proceeding has already commenced then the officer concerned has no other course open but to apply to the relevant court under section 633(1). Similar is the case in the matter of Sahani ( S.S.) v. Registrar of Companies 1990 69 Comp. Cas. 556 decided by a single judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. For the aforesaid reasons I am not inclined to entertain this Company Petition No. 470 of 1992 and the same, accordingly, stands dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs. On the application of Shri Bharucha, learned counsel for the petitioners, the ad interim orders are continued for a period of four weeks from today. In view of the order passed in Company Petition No. 470 of 1992, Company Application No. 470 of 1992 stands disposed of.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 358 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
  

  Amalgamation of companies

  
  
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  ... ... ..... dgment and order of this Court granting petition and sanctioning the proposed scheme of amalgamation should be stayed at least for six weeks so as to enable the objector to prefer appeal. Mr. S.B. Vakil, Ld. Counsel for petitioner-company strongly objects for grant of any stay on various grounds more particularly, on the ground that it would create difficulty in convening Annual General Meeting which was required to be held as back as 30-9-1994 and which could be held even within extended period up to 31-12-1994. Both the ld. counsels have submitted number of factors in favour of objector as well as petitioner-company. Having given my anxious thought and consider ation to the aforesaid. I am of the opinion that in a matter like this, the objector must have opportunity to test the correctness of this judgment by preferring appeal before appropriate forum. The request for stay is, therefore, just and proper and stay of judgment of this Court is granted up to 1st December, 1994.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 353 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether the impugned levy is a levy upon the lands within the meaning of entry 49, List II, Schedule VII of the Constitution?

  Whether the levy in question is a levy on lands and buildings within the meaning of entry 49 of List II or whether it is outside the purview of the said entry?

  Held that:- Appeal dismissed. The declaration in section 2 of the Tea Act, it is evident, has again no relevance on the State Legislature's competence inasmuch as the impugned cess is not a cess on the tea industry but a cess on the land comprised in a tea estate. The fact that ultimately the tax may have to be borne by the tea industry is no ground for holding that the said levy is upon the tea industry. For that matter, even the imposition of a land revenue or non-agricultural cess upon the land comprised in a tea estate will ultimately affect the tea industry but that is no ground for invalidating those taxes. This proposition is too well-established.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 350 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether the Board was entitled to make payment of the "purchase tax" out of the pool fund required to be maintained under section 30 of the Coffee Act?

  Held that:- The registered owners who grow coffee and deliver the same for inclusion in the surplus pool are entitled to the payment on some reasonable basis and their interest cannot be defeated or put in jeopardy by any act or omission on the part of the Board. But in view of the stand taken by the Board itself in the paragraph 47 of the counter-affidavit filed in the connected writ petition before this Court, the appellants, need not be apprehensive about their payments. Accordingly, the appeals are disposed of with a direction to the respondent- Board to perform its statutory duty in respect of payment for the coffee delivered to them by the registered owners in accordance with the provisions of the Act and to make payment to the growers at a rate which in the facts and circumstances prevailing in any particular year can be held to be just and reasonable and which should cover cost of production of the concerned coffee and reasonable percentage of profit thereon.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 341 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Levy of entry tax on motor vehicles under the Maharashtra Tax on Entry of Motor Vehicles into Local Areas Act, 1987 challenged - Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Feeble attempt was made to submit that the tax being in addition to octroi realised by the local body it amounted to double taxation. Tax levied under different legislations enacted in exercise of constitutional power are not rendered bad on assumption that it amounts to double taxation. The taxable event for entry tax is not same as for octroi. Nor it is by the same authority for the same purpose and for same period

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• 1994 (11) TMI 337 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether entry tax on goods such as sugar on which no sales tax is leviable, could be subjected to levy under section 3(1)(a) of the Madhya Pradesh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976?

  Held that:- Appeal dismissed. Tax under section 3 is on bringing of goods inside the local area by a dealer for consumption, use or sale therein irrespective of whether sales tax is payable on it or not. Therefore, sugar on which no sales tax is leviable because additional excise duty is payable would not be beyond the taxing net.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 335 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Whether there was an obligation upon the purchaser to return the tins or was it a case where the return or non-return of the tins lay within the discretion and pleasure of the purchaser/ customer/

  Held that:- Appeal allowed. As the transaction in question is neither a bailment nor a pledge. It was a composite transaction. It was to start with an entrustment which could result in a sale of tins in case of non-return of the tins. While entrusting the tins, the respondent took care to stipulate and receive the value of the tins and a little more-to be precise 20 per cent. If the tin was returned, well and good- the transaction remained one of entrustment. But if not returned within 3 months, it became a sale as per the terms of the transaction. The fact that the respondent was receiving back the tins even after the expiry of three months and returning the deposits was more by way of grace-probably a business decision-rather than a matter of right or an obligation.But once we hold that there was no such obligation, then the said trading receipt cannot be anything but sale price.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 330 - SUPREME COURT
  

  Held that:- Appeal allowed. The Indian Railway Commercial Manual, Volume II, Chapter 26, provides for appointment of city booking agencies but neither the said manila] was placed before us nor-more important-has the contract/agreement entered into between the railways and Bhoosa Toli city booking agency (or for that matter any other city booking agency at Kanpur) been placed before us. In the absence of the said material, it is not possible for us to determine the question which the parties have asked us to determine

  The question of fact (i.e., whether the transport is really to the city booking agency from the railway station/godown or the said plea is only a cover for evading the statutory obligation created by section 28-A of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act and the Rules made thereunder) shall be determined by the appropriate authorities under the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 320 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
  

  Amalgamation

  
  
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  ... ... ..... e protection of interest of all concerned including the employees of transferor-company. 17. In the result the petitions deserve to be granted. In view of what is stated above, it is ordered that the transferor-company be amalgamated with the transferee-company with effect from 1st April, 1993 and as per the proposed scheme of amalgamation placed on record at Annexures B and C with consequential reliefs as prayed for in the petitions. Consequently, all the rights, liabilities and duties of the transferor-company shall stand transferred to and vested in the transferee-com- pany, namely, Rangkala Investments Ltd., without any further act or deed, and all the liabilities and duties of the transferor-company shall also become the liabilities and duties of the transferee-company and the transferor-company shall stand dissolved, without winding up, in view of the scheme of amalgamation as per Annexure C being sanctioned. 18. Both these petitions would stand disposed of accordingly.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 312 - STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION
  

  Deficiency in service

  
  
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  ... ... ..... d Cement Co. Ltd. The complainants had claimed Rs. 7,28,500 towards the value of Associated Cement Company shares. The complainants had stated in the complaint that the value of Associated Cement Company shares as on 7-2-1992 was Rs. 470. Thus, it is proved that the complainants were put to loss of Rs. 7,28,500. The aforesaid loss has been caused to the complainants due to the deficien- cies in the service of share-broker, viz., opposite party No. 1 as a result of negligence. The complainants are, therefore, entitled to receive the compensation of the aforesaid amount of Rs. 7,28,500 from opposite party No.1. We, therefore, allow this complaint and pass the following order Complaint is allowed. Opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 are jointly and severally directed to pay to the complainants the amount of Rs. 7,28,500 towards compensation within 30 days from the receipt of this order, failing which the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 18 per cent per annum till realisation.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 311 - HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
  

  Amalgamation of companies

  
  
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  ... ... ..... se Account in bank deposits, treasury bills, units of Unit Trust of India or such trusts securities as it thinks fit, maintain appropriate account of income and expenditure and take all appropriate steps to safeguard the interests of all affected parties till the final disposal of the present writ petition. (xi) The said Share Premium Suspense Account will be dealt with in accordance with the final judgment of the Court in the writ petition. (xii) Subject to the right of respondent No. 1 to scrutinize the application, the petitioners are at liberty to issue notices to convene the Extraordinary general meeting. (xiii) At this stage, Mr. Cooper, the learned counsel for the petitioners, makes a statement on behalf of the petitioners that the petitioners accept the present order which is without prejudice to their rights and contentions in the petition and will be subject to the order to be passed at the final hearing of the petition. (xiv) Hearing of the writ petition expedited.

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• 1994 (11) TMI 310 - HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT
  

  Amalgamation

  
  
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  ... ... ..... e protection of interest of all concerned including the employees of transferor-company. 17. In the result the petitions deserve to be granted. In view of what is stated above, it is ordered that the transferor-company be amalgamated with the transferee-company with effect from 1st April, 1993 and as per the proposed scheme of amalgamation placed on record at Annexures B and C with consequential reliefs as prayed for in the petitions. Consequently, all the rights, liabilities and duties of the transferor-company shall stand transferred to and vested in the transferee-com- pany, namely, Rangkala Investments Ltd., without any further act or deed, and all the liabilities and duties of the transferor-company shall also become the liabilities and duties of the transferee-company and the transferor-company shall stand dissolved, without winding up, in view of the scheme of amalgamation as per Annexure C being sanctioned. 18. Both these petitions would stand disposed of accordingly.

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