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Case Laws
Showing 61 to 80 of 268 Records
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1994 (2) TMI 269
... ...
... ... ..... l in sales. The appellant was, therefore, justified in fighting the excise case and the legal expenses are, therefore, allowable in its hands. I would, therefore, delete the disallowance of Rs. 1,30,000. Relief of Rs. 1,30,000. After hearing both the parties and perusing the material on record, we find no good ground to interfere with the decision taken by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) in allowing necessary deduction in the hands of the assessee-company. As rightly held by him, excise duty was imposed on the manufacturer and all disputes arising from the said levy were required to be contested by the said manufacturer and it was immaterial as to who ultimately benefited from the litigation. We agree with the aforesaid view taken by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and decline to interfere with his orders. The relevant ground in the Revenue s appeal is rejected. In the result, the assessee s appeal is partly allowed, whereas that of the Revenue is dismissed.
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1994 (2) TMI 268
Whether the Financial Corporation set up under Section 3 of the State Financial Corporation Act is entitled to take recourse to the remedy available to it under Section 29 of the Act even after having obtained an order or a decree after invoking the provisions of Section 31 of the Act but without executing that decree/order?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. Action of the defaulting concern could not lead to the consequence that the remedy of the Corporation under Section 29 to recover its outstanding dues together with interest was lost because undoubtedly the Corporation did not proceed further with the proceedings under Section 31 of the Act which it abandoned by withdrawing from those proceedings impliedly. Therefore, when the Corporation, in the facts and circumstances of the case, took recourse to the provisions of Section 29 of the Act to recover its outstanding dues by abandoning the proceedings under Section 31 of the Act, it could not be faulted with and the final order/decree made under Section 31 which had remained unsatisfied, could not debar the Corporation to invoke the provisions of Section 29 of the Act, by giving up further proceedings under Sections 31/32 of the Act.
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1994 (2) TMI 267
Winding up petition - whether the case of the persons opposing the winding up is reasonable?
Whether there are matters which should be inquired into and investigated if a winding-up order is made?
Held that:- Winding up petition dismissed. The financial position of the appellant is sound. It is the largest financial corporation of the State of Uttar Pradesh. It has rendered financial assistance of ₹ 1024.83 crores till March 1992 to more than 100 industrial units and has also promoted joint sector projects. It is profit-making financial corporation and is paying dividend as seen from the balance sheet for the year 1991-92, (filed along with special leave petition). The assets of the appellant-corporation are ₹ 5,26,35,36,568. The reserves are ₹ 17,60,15,222. The profits earned by the appellant before payment of tax is ₹ 7.40 crores and after meeting its financial liabilities, ₹ 2.78 crores.
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1994 (2) TMI 266
Classifiaction ... ... ... ... ..... ne in which product and packages are brought together in-line on a form-fill-seal equipment. It is in such a package which is in the form of a sachet or pouch that the respondents sell the noodles in the market which contain pre-determined quantity. The word Sachet according to dictionary meaning is of French origin and means a small bag. Hence it is not wrapper. In this context it is also noted that there is a finding in the Assistant Collector rsquo s order that the respondents ldquo themselves have been declaring in the excise records that they are manufacturing and clearing noodles in sachets, which is nothing but a container rdquo . Therefore, on a reading of the sub-heading 1902.10 as a whole and giving full effect to all the words used therein, it is held that the noodles manufactured and cleared by the respondents herein are classifiable under sub-heading 1902.10 CETA. The impugned order is hence not sustainable and is set aside. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (2) TMI 265
Appeal to Appellate Tribunal - Additional ground - Manufacturer - Job worker - Paper bags exempted under Notification No. 280/88-C.E.
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1994 (2) TMI 264
Whether the transactions in question were exigible to tax or not under the Act? - Held that:- Appeal allowed. As it is a proper case where the matters are remitted to the appellate authority, viz., the Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, or the corresponding authority as may be obtaining today. We direct that the appellate authority shall entertain the appeal which was filed by the respondent on May 3, 1966, without raising an objection on the ground of limitation and dispose it of in accordance with law.
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1994 (2) TMI 261
Whether the publishers of newspapers are entitled to the benefit of section 8(3)(b) read with section 8(1)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. The expression "goods" occurring in the words "for use by him in the manufacture or processing of goods for sale" in section 8(3)(b) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, does take in, i.e., does not exclude, newspapers. We agree with the view taken by the Madras and Kerala High Courts. In our view, the view taken by the Karnataka High Court is unsustainable.
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1994 (2) TMI 260
Tax revision case filed by the respondent-assessee under section 22 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act allowed
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As the theory evolved by the High Court may not be really called for in the circumstances of the case this appeal has to be dismissed on the ground urged by the assessee himself. As stated above, the order of the Deputy Commissioner is said to have been made on January 6, 1973, but it was served upon the assessee on November 21, 1973, i.e., precisely 10 1/2 months later. There is no explanation from the Deputy Commissioner why it was so delayed. If there had been a proper explanation, it would have been a different matter. But, in the absence of any explanation whatsoever, we must presume that the order was not made on the date it purports to have been made. It could have been made after the expiry of the prescribed four years' period. The civil appeal is accordingly dismissed
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1994 (2) TMI 250
Charges – Registration of ... ... ... ... ..... liquidator, I find that the said order is neither speaking nor the provisions of law have been considered. With regard to expenditure incurred the estimate has to be made in accordance with rule 154 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, and for the purpose of interest provisions exist under rule 156 of the said rules. The responsibility remains of the creditor for proving the debt. In the order of the official liquidator though it is mentioned that entries in respect of expenditure are not existing in the books of the company in liquidation, it has to be seen as to whether the creditor has been able to establish the claim and the same is the position in respect of interest as to under law how much interest could be allowed. The order of the official liquidator in this regard cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed and the official liquidator is directed to pass a fresh order in respect of the claim of the appellant in respect of expenses and interest.
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1994 (2) TMI 244
Winding up - Company when deemed unable to pay its debts ... ... ... ... ..... nies, up to date within a fortnight from this date and shall go on depositing each month such amount as the appellant s husband would have drawn from the respondent-companies for appropriation to himself, by the 15th of next month, until final orders in Company Petitions Nos. 62 to 64 of 1992. (4)The appellant shall be entitled to withdraw the amount deposited by the respondent-companies in the afore-mentioned proceedings to the extent of half of the amount deposited in each case in a lump sum every month, without furnishing any security and the rest, if necessary, by making appropriate application and on furnishing security as determined by the learned company judge. (5)This order, however, is subject to any order that may be passed in any other appropriate proceedings, but shall prevail over any order that may be passed by a court subordinate to this court. The appeals are accordingly ordered and are allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (2) TMI 243
Whether the Ordinance was promulgated under entry 24, List II or entry 42, List III ?
Held that:- Appeal dismissed. As agree with the conclusion reached by the High Court and reject the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellants to the effect that the State Legislature had no legislative competence to legislate on the subject-matter of the Ordinance and, as such, the Governor had no power to promulgate the same. We agree with the High Court that the legislative competence to promulgate the Ordinance could validly be traced to entry 42, List III.
The acquisition of shares under the Ordinance did not, in any manner, have the effect of nullifying any of the orders of the court. We are, therefore, of the view that, in the facts of the present case, the argument that the promulgation of the Ordinance had encroached upon the power of the judicial review of the court is wholly misconceived. No force in any of the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellants and, as such, dismiss the appeal.
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1994 (2) TMI 231
Transfer of shares - Power to refuse registration and appeal against refusal - Heirs of deceased shareholders of respondent-company filed a petition for rectification of register of members by deleting name of deceased shareholder and substituting their names therein -On 21-9-1977 existing articles of association were replaced by a new set wherein new articles were introduced conferring power on company to reject any application for transfer or transmission without assigning any reason in that behalf - On 21-8-1984 appellants received heirship certificate - On 21-11-1984 appellants forwarded a true copy of heirship certificate and requested respondent to do needful - But respondent refused registration to appellants in exercise of powers conferred under articles of association - Appellants submitted that upon failure of Board of Directors to exercise right of refusal within period of two months, they were entitled to registration of shares in their names - Whether right of refusal of a company to register transfer of or transmission by operation of law of right to any share comes to an end after expiry of a period of two months and an absolute right is created in favour of transferee - Held, no - Whether in view of established fact that there was animosity between parties, respondent's decision of refusal to register shares in appellants' names was a proper and commercial decision - Held, yes
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1994 (2) TMI 230
Consumer - First opposite party, SCL, was a share broker and was a member of Madras Stock Exchange - In September 1990, complainant delivered to first opposite party, 100 shares of 'UBPL' and 100 shares of 'TVSEL' through a Chartered Accountant - There was no response from first opposite party and when contacted he told that share certificates were stolen from his office - Complainant came to know that first opposite party had transferred shares in name of other person -Thereafter first opposite party in order to cover up its misdeed agreed to replace shares but share certificates had not yet been issued - Similarly complainant paid Rs. 7,335 to first opposite party for purchase of 500 shares of SVL through a cheque but first opposite party failed to deliver share certificates - Complainant wrote to second opposite party, Madras Stock Exchange to intervene but it expressed its helplessness to convince first opposite party in this matter - Whether complainant could be regarded as a consumer as regards first opposite party, SCL and had availed of its services for sale of 100 shares each of TVSEL, UBPL, and for purchase of 500 shares of SVL for consideration - Held, yes - Whether complainant could claim to be a consumer qua second opposite party, Madras Stock Exchange, which had not rendered any service to complainant for consideration - Held, no - Whether first opposite party could be held guilty of gross deficiency of service and negligence - Held, yes
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1994 (2) TMI 229
Consumer - Complainant paid a sum of Rs. 10,000 for investment in shares and became a member of shares trading facility of opposite party - Opposite party neither invested amount paid by complainant nor advanced any loan and complainant sustained loss of Rs. 10 lakhs due to negligence of opposite party - Complainant Tiled complaint before Commissioner of Police - Opposite party, with a view to get matters settled and to purchase peace, arrived at a final and full settlement and opposite party agreed to pay amount of Rs. 22,500 in respect of investment, profits and compensation - It was evidenced by settlement-cum-receipt on 8-9-1991 - She encashed amounts and wrote a letter to Inspector of Police on same date stating that there was amicable settlement and accounts were settled fully and finally and requested to close case and withdrew her complaint she again filed a police complaint afresh and started demanding payment of some more amount - It was also stated that, as the opposite party refused to pay any further sum, she filed a complaint in District Forum which was dismissed -Whether it could be said that complainant and opposite party together on 8-9-1991 arrived at a full and final settlement of claims relating to profits and compensation - Held, yes - Whether as opposite party had charged commission and undertook to render service to complainant, complainant was a consumer who had hired services of opposite party - Held, yes - Whether complaint was maintainable - Held, yes
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1994 (2) TMI 227
Remuneration of directors – Increase, Penalty where no specific penalty is provided elsewhere in the act
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1994 (2) TMI 203
Stay/Dispensation of pre-deposit ... ... ... ... ..... ified in the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act. When the classification adopted by the Astt. Collector was challenged and the same was set aside as aforesaid, giving liberty to the Astt. Collector to reclassify it under any other heading, prima facie it would not be permissible to the Astt. Collector to again reclassify it under 85.44 for the same period and in the teeth of the order of the learned Collector (Appeals). In this view of the matter we hold, prima facie the impugned order dated 27-10-1993 of the learned Collector (Appeals) is not sustainable. Therefore, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the issue, on prima facie ground we grant stay of the operation of the impugned order, pending appeal. We hope, the Department would take early steps for hearing of this appeal before the Special Bench, CEGAT, New Delhi, as the issue relates to classification and may have recurring effects. The appeal papers are transmitted to Special Bench, CEGAT, New Delhi.
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1994 (2) TMI 201
Refund - Adjudication ... ... ... ... ..... goods received are accounted for and put in reprocess. Any omission in recording certain details can not be fatal for the claim, if they could establish the nature of process and ingredients used in the process subsequently. Hence, we are of the view that the Asstt. Collector cannot fail to ignore the worksheet, without effectively rebutting it by adducing evidence to the contrary. Hence, we agree in toto with the findings of the Collector (Appeals) on the score. Even at this stage, the Department have not come out with any evidence to show that details given in their worksheet are not true and cannot be accepted. 5.5 emsp Going by these accepted factual details, we find no reason to differ from the detailed and reasoned findings of the Collector (Appeals) and confirm each one of them. 5.6 emsp In the result, we dismiss the appeal from the Revenue and direct the Department to extend the consequential relief arising out of the order-in-appeal passed by the Collector (Appeals).
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1994 (2) TMI 200
Penalty - Non-entry of production and clearance of goods ... ... ... ... ..... Appellants have submitted that Gate Passes had been issued by them and the production Reports had also been prepared but these were not posted in the RG 1 Register due to the lapse of their concerned person. Whatever be the reasons, non-entry of production and clearance in Statutory Register is an irregularity and an offence. In the present case, the said offence does not appear to have any Revenue implication, nor has the department made out a case that such non-entry of production and clearance of goods in the statutory records contained the ingredients of any other offence of more serious nature. 4. emsp In the circumstances, we modify the penalty imposed under Rule 173Q to that under Rule 226. The ingredients of the offence had been spelt out to them and also understood/replied by them. The non-mention of Rule 226 in the Show Cause Notice is no impediment to the order proposed by us. 5.The appeal is allowed and the impugned order is partially set aside on the above terms.
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1994 (2) TMI 199
Return of seized goods ... ... ... ... ..... act of omission or commission rendering the goods liable to confiscation under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act can be said to have been established against the appellant. The adjudicating authority has not gone into the allegation of undervaluation and there are no findings to the effect that there is a mis-declaration of value rendering the goods liable to confiscation under Section 111(m) and hence penal liability on the appellant from this angle also could not be considered. We also note that there are no findings of the adjudicating authority establishing nexus of the appellant with the other two consignments, and in those two cases, two other persons were held liable for penalty and not the appellant. In the circumstances, penalty imposed under Section 112 on the appellant merely because of the benami arrangement for this import cannot be sustained under the Customs Act. Hence, we allow the appeal and set aside the penalty, only in so far as the appellant is concerned.
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1994 (2) TMI 198
... ...
... ... ..... s which has to be taken to be one which can be the subject matter of Section 129D(2) read with Section 129D(4). There is no quasi-judicial function performed by the Office Supdt. from import licensing angle. There is nothing that would arise for adjudication when he endorses the Bill of Entry given out of charge rsquo for the imported goods. It is well settled that quasi-judicial decision under Section 47 of the Customs Act, 1962 by quasi-judicial authority can be reviewed under Section 129D(2) read with Section 129D(4). The ratio of the decision cited by the learned Collector (Appeals) in his order is distinguishable as in that case the Collector rsquo s order was not communicated but was only on the file. We, therefore, hold that the lower appellate authority was in error in dismissing the appeal. We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders and remand the matters to the lower appellate authority for decision of the appeals on merits. The appeals are thus allowed by remand.
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