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1994 (5) TMI 271
... ... ... ... ..... of the respondent-management cannot, therefore, be said to be in accordance with law. As, however, permission for retrenchment was sought for on the grounds mentioned in para 23 of the aforesaid application which the specified authority regarded as just and proper, we are of the view reinstatement would not be the proper order to be passed, and interest of justice would be met if, apart from what is due to each of the aforesaid workmen as retrenchment compensation visualised by Section 25-F(b) of the Act, a sum of ₹ 10,000 is paid to each of them. From the amount which would become so due, payment if' any made towards retrenchment compensation shall be deducted; so also, if any further sum had been received by any of the aforesaid workmen. The sum of money which would become ultimately payable, after the deduction(s), if any to be made, shall be remitted to each of the aforesaid workmen within a period of two months from today. 8. The appeal is allowed accordingly.
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1994 (5) TMI 270
... ... ... ... ..... gust 18, 1992, till the actual date of the payment. This is in line with the consent terms in the suit referred to. The respondents shall make further payment if any after the value of the shares is finally determined, as per consent terms in Suit No. 2278 of 1992 before the Bombay High Court. The difference if any shall be paid within four weeks from the date of final settlement in Suit No. 2278 of 1992 along with interest at the rate of 15 per cent. per annum from August 18, 1992, till the actual date of payment, which shall also be paid by demand drafts in the name of the petitioners and the consenters. The shares shall not be transferred from the name of the petitioners and their consenters till the fair value is ultimately settled and final payment made. In case the respondents fail to send the demand drafts as referred to above at the rate of ₹ 30 per share, the petitioners are entitled to press for further reliefs through an application to the Company Law Board.
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1994 (5) TMI 269
... ... ... ... ..... luding the establishing or conducting of any trading floor in the buildings Nos. 36/1602 to 36/1605 in Elamkulam Village, Kanayannur Taluk, Ernakulam District until the disposal of the suit. It is clarified that the first defendant would be entitled to carry on the spot delivery contract business but would not be entitled to permit its members or others to do trading among themselves in the premises of the first defendant. Subject to the above clarification the order of injunction granted by the trial court is confirmed, Bearing in mind that these are interlocutory appeals, I have refrained from elaborately considering the various aspects. But out of deference to the long arguments addressed before me I have dealt with the questions in some detail. In the result the appeals are substantially dismissed except as regards the modification regarding the entitlement of the first defendant to carry on spot delivery contract business as permitted above. I make no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 268
... ... ... ... ..... er of the petitioner. In this connection, the observation of the Supreme Court in the case of Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union, AIR 1970 SC 1767, may be taken note of. It has been observed in that case that "a contempt proceeding against a person who has failed to comply with the court's order serves a dual purpose (1) vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct ; and (2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires of him". In view of the fact that an apology was tendered, by counsel for the respondents and in view of the fact that he immediately undertook to extend all co-operation to the Commissioner in his assignment and that the Commissioner also carried out the inspection on June 23, 1992, we do not propose to take any further action on this application. With these observations, we dispose of the petition with the limited relief relating to transfer of shares complained of by the petitioners.
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1994 (5) TMI 267
... ... ... ... ..... nce of duty or arbitrary action of the authorities in not accepting the claim when damage was found by the Official Committee to have taken place. The limitation to file the suit on facts of this case arises from the date the Government refused to pay the amount determined by the Committee. Since the rejection was not communicated nor the copy of the report was supplied despite request the suit could not be said to be barred by time. 18. In the result, this appeal succeeds. The decree and order passed by the two courts below are set aside. The suit of the appellant for ₹ 1,58,735, the amount of damage determined by the trial court which was neither appealed from nor objected to by the respondent is decreed with costs throughout. The respondent shall further pay interest at the rate of 6 per annum from the date of decree till December 1982 and at the rate of 9 per annum from 1982 to December 1992 and at the rate of 12 per annum from January 1993 till the amount is paid.
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1994 (5) TMI 266
... ... ... ... ..... in respect of 142 jobs out of 246 jobs, in view of the fact that contract labour has already been abolished in 104 jobs. (ix)This order does not relate to the persons who have already been absorbed. (x) The persons, who had been retrenched, but in terms of the directions of this Court, have been taken back, shall also be entitled to the benefit of this order. If there is any dispute in respect of the identity of such persons, that shall also be decided by the Chief Labour Commissioner (Central). (xi)For the purpose of calculating the payment of retrenchment benefit, in the event of their retrenchment, hereafter, the 10 years' period aforesaid shall be counted, in respect such retrenched persons, although they are absorbed after the passing of this order. (xii)This order shall be complied with by the respondent within four months from today. 10.The writ application is allowed accordingly. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 265
... ... ... ... ..... he Adjudicating Authority are final subject only to the provisions for Appeal and revision. This finality can be touched only by way of an Order of the competent authority and not otherwise. And Section 35 and 35E provide the mechanism for approaching that authority and prescribes time limit for doing so and this time limit under Section 35E runs from the date of adjudication Order and we are only concerned with it. Nothing else matters. 8. I am also unable to agree with the observations at para 29 with reference to the so called option available to the Deptt. In my opinion Section 35 is not intended to provide remedy to the Deptt. and the only course open to it is to take recourse to Section 35E under the Act. However, in the matter before us, we are concerned at this stage mainly with interpretation and application of Section 35E and Section 11 A. Hence/there was no need to labour this point further, but it was necessary to make this observations en passant before parting.
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1994 (5) TMI 264
... ... ... ... ..... d I have mentioned that even otherwise the assessment has to follow the pattern prescribed by s. 6(2) it was incumbent on the authorities to determine the capital value of the building in accordance with the provisions of the Act and having regard to the factors mentioned in s. 6(4) if the annual value fixed by the Aluva municipality was considered too low. Neither the appellate nor revisional authorities applied their mind to this aspect. Nor the assessing authority whose order of assessment, as already mentioned, does not disclose the basis of the assessment, or comply with r. 8(3). The orders Exts.P2, P3 and P6 have therefore to be quashed. I do so. The second respondent assessing authority is directed to make an assessment afresh in accordance with law with opportunity to the petitioner to be heard as expeditiously as possible. The amount, if any, paid by the petitioner will be retained by the second respondent to be adjusted towards the tax as assessed afresh. No costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 263
... ... ... ... ..... the District Judge, Quilon. Similarly, any claim in respect of any amount for an additional construction made or additional machinery installed by the Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd., shall be determined by the District Judge, Quilon, on proper application being filed before it. (v) The Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd., shall be entitled to remove any machinery or materials installed by it within one week of preparation of the inventory; and (vi) Any disciplinary enquiry pending against any of the workmen may be continued by the owner of the factory concerned, if he chooses to do so. Subject to the directions given above, the writ petition is allowed. But in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. WP (C) Nos. 445 and 490 of 1989, 3950-61 of 1982, 429-33 of 1979 The above mentioned writ petitions are disposed of, in terms of the judgment of this Court, in Writ Petition (C) No. 415 of 1988, delivered today.
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1994 (5) TMI 262
... ... ... ... ..... Shri Maru Ram, one of the members of the enquiry committee, had percolated throughout the enquiry proceedings thereby vitiating the principles of natural justice and the findings made by the enquiry committee was a product of a bias and prejudiced mind. The illegality committed in conducting the departmental proceedings has left an indelible stamp of infirmity on decision of the Managing Committee since affirmed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Commissioner." In this view of the matter this Court concluded that the decision of the appellate authorities could not cure the initial defect in the constitution of the Enquiry Committee and the consequences flowing from one of the members of the Enquiry Committee being biased. In this view of the matter this Court had allowed the appeal. 5. This being the only point urged in this appeal and we finding no merit therein must dismiss this appeal. The appeal, therefore, fail and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1994 (5) TMI 261
... ... ... ... ..... e complied. 10.. Accordingly, the main application is dismissed. It is, however, directed that the applicant No. 1, Selvel Advertising Pvt. Ltd. will produce the relevant documents/records and books of account for the year 1984-85 before the respondent No. 1, Commercial Tax Officer, Alipore Charge on June 17, 1994 at 2.00 p.m. for the purpose of complying with the decisions of this Tribunal in RN-146 of 1991 and RN-374 of 1992. Thereafter, respondent No. 1 will further direct the applicant to produce the relevant documents/records and books of account for subsequent years on subsequent dates keeping in view the convenience of the applicant for production thereof. 11.. The main application is, thus, disposed of. No order is made for costs. 12. Mr. Pal, learned advocate for the applicants, makes an oral prayer for stay of operation of the judgment. Mr. T.N. De, learned State Representative, opposes the prayer for stay. After hearing both sides, the prayer for stay is rejected.
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1994 (5) TMI 260
Exemption from the tax under provisions of Section 115(4) on the ground that the premises in question were being exclusively used and occupied for charitable purpose denied
Held that:- Both the municipal authorities and the High Court have committed an obvious error of interpreting the provisions of Section 115(4) narrowly and unrealistically. Every Organisation established for a charitable purpose requires some premises to run its administration. Without an administrative office, it is not possible for an Organisation to run and manage its charitable activities. The extent of the premises required to run the administrative office would depend upon the nature and the size of its activities. Hence the premises required by an Organisation for its administrative office are an essential and an integral part of its charitable activities. Sometimes the administrative office of such organisations may be located where the charitable activity or activities are carried on and sometimes it is located away from such place depending upon the availability of the premises and convenience. So long as the premises in which the administrative office of the charitable Organisation is carried on are exclusively used and occupied by its office, the premises would be ones covered by the exemption provided under the said provisions. To hold otherwise, viz., that it is only the premises where actual charitable activity is carried on alone is qualified for the exemption is to be irrational. The interpretation placed by the municipal authorities and also unfortunately by the High Court on the said provisions has, therefore, to be rejected. Appeal allowed of assessee.
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1994 (5) TMI 259
... ... ... ... ..... rvations in the judgment make me feel so ............There may be a contingency where even the jurisdiction to frame the provisional assessment was decided by appellate authority against that assessing authority and the assessing authority wants to challenge the said order before the Sales Tax Tribunal, then he will have no remedy if the final assessment order is framed by another authority. Whether an appeal against an order under section 7B before the Tribunal becomes infructuous or not after the final assessment order is framed, therefore, in my view cannot be decided in abstract form. I am therefore, of the view that the revision petition has no force and the Tribunal has not erred in dismissing the appeal before it challenging the provisional assessment as infructuous because of final assessment under section 10 of the Act having been made during the pendency of the proceedings. The revision petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (5) TMI 258
... ... ... ... ..... f the definition of sale price . The exclusion clause is not intended to apply to a case where the cost of freight is part of the price, but the dealer chooses to split up the price and claim the amount of freight as a separate item in the invoice. Where the cost of freight is part of the price, it would fall within the first part of the definition and to such a case, the exclusion clause in the second part has no application. Therefore, it depends on the nature of the provisions under the Act. The definitions of sale price and purchase price may differ in their content depending on the intention of the Legislature to include or exclude a particular item from sale price or purchase price. 15.. Hence we are not satisfied that incorporation of clauses (ii) and (iv) of section 2(kk) of the Act was beyond the legislative competence of the State. Petition fails and is hereby dismissed, but without costs. Security deposit, if any, be refunded to the petitioner. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (5) TMI 257
... ... ... ... ..... (SC) on which the learned Government Pleader relied related to section 18A of the Income-tax Act, 1922. The Supreme Court read the expression in which the tax was paid in sub-section (6) as in which the tax ought to have been paid having regard to the anomalous situation that would otherwise arise on a literal interpretation of the sub-section. No such situation arises here as I have pointed out in the preceding paragraph. 10.. In this view of the matter, the demand for penal interest under exhibits P5 and P6 is not justified. The petitioner is liable for the interest under section 23(3) only for the period from April 4, 1985, on the amount outstanding on that date. The original petition is therefore allowed. Exhibits P5 and P6 are quashed. The first respondent is directed to confine the recovery of penal interest to the amount payable under section 23(3) on the tax outstanding on April 4, 1985, for the subsequent period. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (5) TMI 256
... ... ... ... ..... sed by the buyers and the return was of pulp trimmings which could not be further used, except after reprocessing. The fact alleged that the petitioner had later supplied an equivalent quantity of pulp in sheet form, even if true, cannot alter the position so long as the goods returned were not of the same nature and quality as the goods sold. The analogy which counsel for the petitioner sought to draw between the pulp and chemical granules does not merit consideration because the returned chemical granules can be used, for the purpose intended without any further processing and continue to retain their physical as well as chemical characteristics. 8.. In this view of the matter, we are leaving open the other question, whether the return to the head office could not be a return of the goods for purposes of section 8A(1)(b). The decision of the Appellate Tribunal does not therefore call for any interference. The tax revision cases are dismissed. No costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1994 (5) TMI 255
... ... ... ... ..... ation of the principles of natural justice when this system is the statutory one which has been in vogue since 1922. The applicant has not been successful in establishing that he had any genuine difficulties in complying with the orders contained in Memo. No. 2907 A. Tax dated August 31, 1984 from the Commercial Tax Officer, Amusement tax section. An assumed inconvenience to comply with the statutory provisions enacted by the Legislature cannot be a good ground for striking out such provision. The petition of the applicant, if allowed, would result in rendering section 4 of the Bengal Amusement Tax Act, 1922 inoperative. The validity of section 4 of the Bengal Amusement Tax Act, 1922, is not under challenge here. 15.. In the result, the applications fail. The applications in Cases Nos. RN-322(T) of 1992 and RN-323(T) of 1992 are dismissed. There will be no order as to cost. S.N. MUKHERJEE (Judicial Member).-I agree. S.P. DAS GHOSH (Chairman).-I agree. Applications dismissed.
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1994 (5) TMI 254
... ... ... ... ..... ranting departure from the established rule that this Court will not entertain a writ petition under article 226 where a statutory remedy of appeal is available. The decisions on which Shri Brar has placed reliance do not throw any light on the question of jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition under article 226 in cases where effective alternative remedy is available. All these cases deal with the merits of the action taken by the officer-in-charge of the checkpost barrier and it is open to the petitioner to raise all such points before the appellate authority. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petitions are dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy of appeal to the petitioner. Opportunity is, however, given to the petitioner to avail remedy of appeal and we hope that if the petitioner files an appeal within two weeks from today, the same will be considered and decided on merits by the appellate authority. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1994 (5) TMI 253
... ... ... ... ..... legality of the action are writ large justifying quashment rather than discharge. 13.. All authorities are required to act within the limits of their powers. Overstepping is not permissible. Law is not so petrified as to stay unresponsive where any person is found forced to face such proceedings. 14.. In the result, I am satisfied that seizure (annexure P4) and notice (annexure P6) are without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained in law. Consequently, annexures P4 and P6 are quashed and all proceedings relating to penalty in pursuance thereof are incinerated. The goods/vehicle were released against undertaking on the strength of the orders of this Court. The undertaking as furnished, is accordingly cancelled. 15.. This order shall, however, not preclude the respondents from taking action against the petitioners on the basis of difference in price if permitted under any other provision of law. 16.. The petition thus, stands allowed with no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1994 (5) TMI 252
... ... ... ... ..... ibutable to the dealer and decide the same, after hearing the petitioner, as first point, deferring till then the question of reassessment, by a reasoned order. (c) The taxing authority shall have freedom to proceed further to reassess, fix tax and penalty in terms of section 19(1) of the Act, if answer recorded on the question of jurisdiction, is in affirmative. 21.. The aforesaid course, intended to subserve the interests of justice, is also in accord with the position of law laid down under order 14, rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that issue relating to jurisdiction when one of law, is triable and determinable as preliminary one leaving the main lis to be dealt with in accordance with the decision on that issue. On the basis of material as available, the question of jurisdiction was raised before me as an issue of law. 22.. The petition is, thus, disposed of finally in terms indicated above with no order as to costs. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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