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1994 (6) TMI 201
... ... ... ... ..... such sale getting concluded at a later point of time either in the State, where it had been effected or in the State, from which the goods had been moved and not to tax goods relatable to the transaction of branch transfer, which is admittedly a constitutional exclusion, in accordance with entry 92-A of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Although such exclusion is excluded by the insertion of entry 92-B of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution by section 5 of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, enabling the Union to levy or impose tax on such transaction by enacting a suitable legislation therefor, such a legislation is yet to see the light of the day and as such, branch transfer simpliciter is not liable to tax. 49.. Subject to the aforesaid guidelines, all these writ petitions are disposed of Consequently, all WMPs are also dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs, in the circumstances. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1994 (6) TMI 200
... ... ... ... ..... tion. It may be pointed out that the said judgment in Sakti Engineering Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1989 75 STC 215 (AP), was reviewed in Shakti Engineering Company v. Commercial Tax Officer 1990 78 STC 421 (AP) and that judgment was set aside. In view of this position, the learned Government Pleader cannot rely on the judgment in Sakti Engineering Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1989 75 STC 215 (AP). The result of the discussion is that as the petitioner-assessee did not collect the excise duty from the customer-purchaser, it did not form part of the consideration. Therefore, it cannot be taken as part of turnover. In this view of the matter, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and allow the revisions. However, we make it clear that the sales tax shown in the bills and collected by the assessee from the customer-purchaser should be refunded to the customerpurchaser. Subject to the above direction, the tax revision cases are allowed. No costs. Petitions allowed.
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1994 (6) TMI 199
... ... ... ... ..... an interpretation as far as possible consistent with the Constitution, learned counsel relied on the following decisions. R.L. Arora v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1964 34 Comp Cas 487 (SC) AIR 1964 SC 1230, and Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955. But the learned counsel very fairly conceded that such a ground was not taken in the original petition nor argued before the learned single Judge. 3.. For two reasons, we are not inclined to entertain the above contention. When an argument is raised on the ground of violation of article 14, it is mandatory that the petitioner should specifically plead and prove the same. Admittedly, there is no pleading in the original petitions on this aspect. Secondly, a point which was not pleaded or argued before a single Judge will not ordinarily be entertained in writ appeal. We are therefore not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the learned single Judge. The writ appeals therefore stand dismissed. Writ appeals dismissed.
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1994 (6) TMI 198
... ... ... ... ..... sponse to the invitation extended by the court, as amicus curiae is quite laudable. 68.. In fine, the conclusions and findings are summarised as below (1) Section 3-B (both prior to and after March 12, 1993) is not violative of article 296(3)(a) of the Constitution as well as sections 14 and 15 of the Central Act. (2) Reasonable profit margin of the contractor on declared goods involving in the execution of a works contract should also go in deduction from the total turnover for arriving at taxable turnover . (3) The extent of cost of establishment of the contractor as relatable to the supply of labour and services and reasonable profit margin on labour , besides cost of consumables in the execution of works contract should also go in deduction from the total turnover for arriving at the taxable turnover . 69.. All these writ petitions are accordingly disposed of, with no order as to costs. Consequently, all W.M.Ps. are also dismissed. Writ petitions disposed of accordingly.
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1994 (6) TMI 197
... ... ... ... ..... s tax. The original petition is, therefore, dismissed subject to the above observations. Writ petition dismissed.
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1994 (6) TMI 196
... ... ... ... ..... tory authorities have not applied their minds as to what should be the penalty imposable on the petitioner and it is for them to advert to this aspect, I feel that the matter should be remitted to the Intelligence Officer for fresh consideration on this limited issue. 7.. I accordingly set aside exhibits P1, P2 and P6 and direct the first respondent-Intelligence Officer-to consider the case of the petitioner in the light of the observations contained hereinabove. The only question open for consideration will be the quantum of penalty that should be levied on the petitioner on the basis that the maximum penalty leviable is Rs. 5,000 under the latter part of section 45A(1). No other question is open for his consideration. The first respondent should pass fresh orders in the matter, after affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The O.P. is allowed, as above. Petition allowed.
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1994 (6) TMI 195
... ... ... ... ..... n article would emanate the same type of fragrance or odour would not bring the items in question within the meaning of entry 51 of that Act. The principle laid down in that case also does not advance in any way the case of the petitioner. From the above discussion what follows is that, to consider whether an item falls within the meaning of an entry of a Schedule to an Act, it has to be seen whether its qualities would fall in any one of the entries or in any one of the items included in that entry. We may now consider whether Rita falls within the meaning of item 36 of the First Schedule to the Act or not. We have already pointed out supra that Rita has all the qualities of hair tonics and cosmetics. Therefore, it falls within entry 36 of the First Schedule to the Act. In this view of the matter, we find no legal infirmity or illegality in the order of the Tribunal. The T.R.C. fails and accordingly it is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Petition dismissed.
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1994 (6) TMI 194
... ... ... ... ..... just before the completion, the learned counsel for some of the petitioners submitted that he wanted to verify whether any other point remains to be urged in any of the cases and sought time to file a memo confirming that all cases were covered by the aforesaid common question of law. However, as such a memo was not filed, these matters were listed again on June 14, 1994. The counsel confirmed that all the cases raised the said common question of law. Accordingly this order is being pronounced today. After pronouncement of the aforesaid order, the learned counsel for the petitioners orally pray for stay of recovery for a period of four weeks to enable them to make necessary applications before the concerned authorities for grant of time and/or to prefer appeals against this order. Having regard to the nature of the order, the request has to be granted. Accordingly, there shall be stay of recovery of the amounts under the impugned order for a period of four weeks from today.
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1994 (6) TMI 193
Whether any part of the cause of action for filing the petition had arisen within the jurisdiction of the said High Court to entitle it to entertain, hear and decide the said petition?
Whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition?
Held that:- Appeal allowed. In the instant case, we are convinced, beyond doubt, that NICCO did not act bona fide in moving the Calcutta High Court and, therefore, the submission based on Section 21 must fail.
While the spirit of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure may support such a submission, we are afraid, the discretion cannot be used in favour of a party which deliberately invokes the jurisdiction of a court which has no jurisdiction whatsoever for ulterior motives.
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1994 (6) TMI 192
... ... ... ... ..... rd income has been used in section 245C(1), it can only refer to a positive income and not a negative one. We, therefore, wish to express the view that though the application under section 245C need not disclose any additional income for each and every one of the assessment years comprised in it, for the application as a whole, that is, for all the years taken together, there should be additional positive income disclosed otherwise, it cannot be taken that there is disclosure of additional income in the application. The applications in the cases of Airteck Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, and Hari Chand, Sirsa (Applications Nos. 2/2/92/9/I. T. and 8A/1/119/90-I. T., respectively, will now go back to the principal Bench of the Settlement Commission, New Delhi, and the application in the case of Messrs. Damani Bros., Bombay (Application No. 5/IV/53/92-93/I. T.), to the Additional Bench of the Settlement Commission, Bombay, for appropriate orders to be passed by them under section 245D(1).
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1994 (6) TMI 191
... ... ... ... ..... s of the present case viewed in the light of the other fact that there was a search under section 132 of the Income-tax Act at the business premises and residential premises of the partners and cash sales of unaccounted stocks were found and, therefore, the credits in the books of the firm must be put to stricter proof. There is, therefore, every reason to believe that the money credited in the account of the creditors belonging to the assessee-firm and not to the creditors notwithstanding the admission which can only be a self-serving statement on the facts of this case. I am, therefore, in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Accountant Member and hold that there is no adequate evidence on record to support the findings of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) that the source of cash credits of Rs. 90,000 found in the books of the assesse firm was adequately explained. The matter will now go before the regular Bench for decision according to majority opinion.
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1994 (6) TMI 190
... ... ... ... ..... made by respondent No. 4 on March 26, 1992, before respondent No. 3, Assistant Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, Jalpaiguri Circle. If the applicants deposit 50 per cent. of the assessed tax before respondent No. 3 within two months from this date, the order dated December 17, 1992, passed by respondent No. 3 rejecting the appeal against the aforesaid order of assessment should be recalled by respondent No. 3 and respondent No. 3 will thereafter proceed with the appeal and will dispose of it in accordance with law after giving an opportunity to the applicants of being heard. In case the applicants do not make deposit of 50 per cent. of the assessed tax within two months from this date before respondent No. 3, the order of rejection of the appeal as passed by respondent No. 3 on December 17, 1992, will stand. The application under section 8 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, is rejected in all other respects. Parties will bear their own costs of this case.
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1994 (6) TMI 189
... ... ... ... ..... decision of the Tribunal is based more or less on the ratio of the Tribunals decision in the case of Poulose and Mathew referred to Supra. Examining the case before me in the light of the ratio of the decision cited above, I find that the letter dated 13-6-88 is an alternative request to submit the application for refund of Rs. 46,555.80 paid on boughtout items with the permission to reduce Rs. 3,10,372/- from total clearances value. This application does not only talk of claiming refund but also quantify the amount that should be refunded to them. Therefore this letter dated 13-6-88 which admittedly has been considered by the Adjudicating Officer as having been received in his office can be treated as a refund claim. As this letter was within six months, therefore, the refund claim should be treated as submitted within the time. In this view of the matter, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. Consequential relief, if any, shall be admissible under law.
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1994 (6) TMI 188
Manufacture - Dutiability and marketability ... ... ... ... ..... fibres. 7. emsp The Department has not been able to show anything to the contrary. It has also not produced any evidence in support of its contention that a new commodity, with distinct characteristics had emerged. I, therefore, agree with learned Member (J) that no process of manufacture was involved. Hence the material was not excisable at this stage. 8. emsp The facts that the appellants had sold a small quantity is not by itself sufficient to estabilsh that the item was normally or commonly traded in the market as a distinct commodity. 9. emsp As regards time-bar the Collector (Appeals) has observed inter alia that the refund claims were partly time-barred. It follows therefrom that they were admissible to the extent they were within time. 10. emsp As the details have not been indicated, the Assistant Collector is directed to examine this aspect and pass appropriate orders. 11. emsp The appeals are therefore accepted by way of remand. Sd/- (S.K. Bhatnagar) Vice President
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1994 (6) TMI 187
Dutiability - Marketability - Demand - Limitation ... ... ... ... ..... shy tion in question for the manufacture of fluorescent tubes. All queries made by the Department in regard to the said product were duly replied to. Under these circumstances, on the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court quoted above, we hold that the demand confirmed by invoking the extended period under the proviso to Section 11A is not sustainable and the demand which was issued for the period beyond six months was time barred. 16. emsp On the question of marketability, as observed by us earlier, the Collector rsquo s finding was not reasoned and showed non-application of mind. We would have therefore, been inclined to remand the matter to the adjudicating authority to examine the question of marketability. However, in view of our finding that the demand issued for the recovery of the duty on the disputed coating solution was time barred, we do not consider it necessary to do so. 17. emsp In view of the foregoing, we set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal
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1994 (6) TMI 186
Winding-up - Power of Court to assess damages against delinquent directors, etc. ... ... ... ... ..... e part of the directors to recover the amount does not amount to misfeasance within the provisions of the Act. The learned judge in that case was dealing with the provisions of section 235 of the Companies Act, 1913, which are similar to those of section 543. Moreover, in the instant case, the company premises were locked by the State Bank of Patiala on 17-7-1982, and the books and the records of the company were inside. The respondent had no access to them. It was in November, 1987, that this Court directed the bank to open the lock and handover the books to the official liquidator. It was at that time that the statement of affairs could be filed by the respondent. During all this period the ex-directors had no access to the books and could not, therefore, initiate action for recovery of amounts due to the company. In these circumstances, I do not consider that any action is called for against the respondent. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1994 (6) TMI 185
Winding up - Avoidance of certain attachments, executions etc. ... ... ... ... ..... hich is not the case here. Therefore, residuary article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply which prescribes a period of three years from the date when the right to apply accrued to the official liquidator when the sale took place on 24-7-1989. The present petition which can be treated as a suit under section 446 of the Act had to be filed within three years but it was filed on 12-5-1993, much beyond the period of limitation. As a matter of fact, these petitions deserve to be dismissed on this ground alone. Company Petition No. 220 of 1993 filed by Shri Pardeep Gupta who claims to be an ex-director of the company deserves to be dismissed also on the ground that he has no locus standi to file the same and challenge the sale in favour of the auction purchaser after the company went into liquidation. It is the official liquidator who represents the company and not the ex-directors. 19. In the result, both the petitions are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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1994 (6) TMI 178
Directors - Validity of acts of ... ... ... ... ..... the appellants in the grounds of appeal that the Mehtas have no constraints of funds being a 500 million dollars turnover group worldwide with sufficient interest in India also, to contend that, if the Mehtas are having 500 million dollars turnover, then they would not find any difficulty to bring Rs. 12.5 crores for purchase of shares, which arises because of their commitment as per the MOU. In our view also, if the Mehtas are having such financial capacity as contended by them, then it would be open to them to purchase the shares of the CCGL worth Rs. 12.5 crores from their funds. Hence, in our view, this would not be a fit case for vacating the interim relief. 37. In this interim order, some detailed discussion was required because of elaborate arguments. However, we clarify that the observations and findings on facts are made only for deciding the application for interim relief and are not conclusive. 38. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1994 (6) TMI 177
Winding up - Suits stayed on winding-up order ... ... ... ... ..... he Bombay High Court where the suits are pending since this is a matter which arises in the suits. In the result, leave is granted to the applicants to continue the suits bearing Nos. 3485 of 1986 and 3041 of 1989 in the Bombay High Court and the court receiver appointed in Suit No. 3485 of 1986 is also permitted to continue subject to further directions by the Bombay High Court subject to the following conditions (1)The applicants will undertake to discharge their liability due to the workmen, if any, under section 529A of the Companies Act, to the extent of the amounts realised from the assets of the company and (2)The applicants will intimate the official liquidator from time to time about the progress of the suits and the interlocutory applications. (3)Directions may be obtained by the applicants for sale of hypothecated properties after notice to the official liquidator and other defendants in the suits. The company applications are accordingly allowed but without costs.
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1994 (6) TMI 176
Winding up – Exclusion of certain time in computing periods of limitation ... ... ... ... ..... e winding up proceedings to the passing of the winding up order and one year thereafter. It nowhere provides that the limitation once started would come to an end forever. The limitation started under the Limitation Act would continue subject to the exclusion of the period mentioned under section 458A. In these circumstances, the view taken by the learned single judge in Company Application No. 657 of 1983, relying on the decision of another single judge of this court in the matter of Ch. S. Rao v. Prabhudas S. Budhwani, 1978 80 Bom LR 685, in our view is not the correct view. The decision in Ch. S. Rao s case is overruled. In the result, the appeal has to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order dated February 15, 1990, in Company Application No. 657 of 1983, is set aside. As far as Company Application No. 1248 of 1983 is concerned, for the reasons mentioned hereinabove, the claim appears to be time-barred and the same is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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