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Showing 1 to 20 of 355 Records
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1995 (11) TMI 483
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... ... ..... at through mistake he omitted to mention the crime No. in the inquest report. It appears to us that the Investigating Officer had not been diligent enough but for that reason we do not feel that reliable and clinching evidences adduced in this case by the eye witnesses particularly by Dr. Rajveer Singh should be discarded. In this connection, we may refer to a recent decision of this Court in Karnel Singh v. State of M.P. Judgment Today (1995) 6 SC 437. In the said decision, it has been indicated by this Court that in a case of defective investigation, it would not be proper to acquit the accused if the case is otherwise established conclusively because in that event it would tantamount to be falling in the hands of an erring Investigating Officer. As we do not find any reason to disbelieve the testimonies given by eye witnesses of this case, we do not find any reason to take a contrary view and to interfere with the impugned judgment. These appeals, therefore, are dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 482
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... ... ..... ccount of governmental and departmental procedures. According to the learned Counsel, there was sufficient cause for condensation of delay. We are conscious of the decision of this Court in Union of India v. R.P. Builders in F.A.O.(OS) 167/93 dated May 2.7, 1994 where departmental delay was condoned. However, benefit of that judgment cannot be availed of by the appellant as in the present case the delay in filing the appeal has not been satisfactorily explained. Even the administrative delays in filing the appeals have to be properly explained. If there is any negligence or indolence on the part of the appellant or its officers in pursuing the matter, the same cannot be condoned merely because the appellant is a State or Government Undertaking. There cannot be two laws of limitation, one governing the State and the other governing individuals/subjects. In view of the foregoing reasons, the application is dismissed. Consequently, the appeal also fails and the same is rejected.
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1995 (11) TMI 481
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... ... ..... o respondents the revisions must fail because the complaint could not proceed for lack of necessary particulars. The position as against Anil K. Mehra is different. The answer against him is obvious, He is not alleged to be the person responsible for conduct of the business of the firm. But the gap is filled up from the fact that it is he who had issued the cheques in favour of each of the petitioners separately. He may show and try to bring his case within the known exceptions of law but as for the present he can be stated to be in charge of and responsible to the firm for conduct of business. At this initial stage, therefore, the complaint as against him can certainly proceed. 16. For these reasons given above, the revision petitions as against respondents Nos. 2 and 3 fail and are dismissed. However, as against respondent No. 1, the judgment of the learned additional judge is set aside. As against him, the complaint will proceed in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate.
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1995 (11) TMI 480
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... ... ..... "The distinction made between the liabilities of the post-takeover management period and the pre-takeover management period is prima facie sound as the former liabilities are those incurred pursuant to the public management of the undertaking under the statute, while the latter liabilities are those incurred in the course of the private management by the owner of the undertaking." The provisions of the Ordinance No. 6 of 1995 also show that the liabilities for the period prior to the take over of the management are to be discharged from the amount payable to the owner of the textile undertaking for the acquisition of the undertaking and not by the NTC. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention urged on behalf of the appellant that NTC is liable in respect of the gratuity amount payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act to Respondent No.2. The appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed. But in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 479
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... ... ..... rpal, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 478
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... ... ..... dinate delay in the issuance of declaration under Section 6 and the valid notification under Section 4 does not become invalid on that account due to inaction on the part of the subordinates. It is true, for reasons best known to the authorities, that Anand Nursery had the benefit of the exemption. The wrong exemption under wrong action taken by the authorities will not cloth others to get the same benefit nor can Article 14 be pressed into service on the ground of invidious discrimination. The wrong mention of Survey number in notice under Section 9 cannot cast cloud on valid notification issued under Section 4 1 of the Act. It is enough that main survey number is mentioned in the notification under Section 4 and the details thereof would be supplemented at the appropriate stage. Mention of the sub-division of the main survey number does not render the notification under Section 4 1 does not get vitiated. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 477
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... ... ..... d in Article 21 of the Constitution. The ban against the landlord that he shall not receive anything in excess of the fair rent even from the willing tenant who is ready to voluntarily pay in accordance with the prevailing rate of rent in the locality is an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on business envisaged in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. At any rate Section 5 cannot stand alone without subsidiary and incidental provisions for periodical revision of the fair rent. The legislative scheme provided through Section 5, 6 and 8 is a package and are mutually dependent. One provision therefrom cannot be extricated from the other two to keep it alone alive. 31. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned provisions do not stand the test of reasonableness. Accordingly we declare that provisions relating to fair rent, i.e., Sections 5, 6 and 8 of the Act, put together are ultra vires the Constitution of India and are void. Original Petition is allowed.
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1995 (11) TMI 476
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... ... ..... logical screening, the process acquire bias syndrome. Thus bias in the legal paralance can be recognised as an inseparable and incurable malignant in the proceedings. The afflicted proceedings cannot be cured by legal therapy. The inevitability is the only legal surgery bisecting the afflicted part. Thus the entire proceedings are liable to be quashed. 43. In view of the foregoing circumstances, the impugned enquiry proceedings in pursuance of charge sheet dated 16-8-1994 are declared illegal and they are quashed. 44. However, it is not end by itself. It is made clear that this decision shall not preclude the Respondents from initiating fresh proceedings by the appropriate higher authority to 1st respondent from the stage of charge sheet. 45. Tire Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. No costs. Consequent on the decision in the writ petition, there shall be a direction to the respondents to permit the petitioner to occupy the quarter already allotted to him by the Management.
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1995 (11) TMI 475
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... ... ..... judiciary. This is necessary not only for doing justice but also for ensuring that justice is seen to be done. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are afraid that this facet of the rule of law has been eroded. We are satisfied that B.J. Shethna, J., in the facts and circumstances of this case, should have recused himself from hearing this contempt petition, particularly when specific objection to this effect was taken by the appellants in view of the respondent's case in the contempt petition wherein the impugned order came to be made in his favour. In our opinion, the impugned order is vitiated for this reason alone. Consequently, this appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 18.3.1994 is set aside. In view of the fact that B.J. Shethna, J. has since then been transferred from the High Court of Gujarat to the High Court of Rajasthan, it is needless to direct that the matter be now heard in the High Court of Gujarat by a Bench of which he is not a member.
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1995 (11) TMI 474
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... ... ..... s at any stage of the proceeding, permitted amendment of the plaint seeking alternate relief. The ratio therein is clearly distinguishable and does not apply to the facts of this case. On a consideration of this case in its proper perspective, we of the view that granting of amendment of plaint seeking to introduce alternative relief of mandatory injunction for payment of specified amount is bad in law. The alternative relief was available to be asked for when the suit was filed but not made. He cannot be permitted to amend the plaint after the suit was barred by limitation during the pendency of the proceeding in the appellate court or the second appellate court. Considered from this perspective, we are of the opinion that the District Court and the High Court were right in refusing the prayer of amendment of the suit and the courts below had not committed any error of law warranting interference. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 473
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... ... ..... manufactured Aerated Water as alleged and cleared them without payment of duty. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel that the quantity of crown corks which had been damaged during their operation and which are the subject matter of the present proceedings constitute a very small percentage of their total production requirements and that they clear appreciable quantity of aerated water bottles and pay large amount of duty. There is no indication in the findings of the authorities below that the quantity of crown caps which had been reported as waste or damage arising during the manufacturing process and which had been reported by them in their RT-5 quarterly returns were abnormal which could not be treated as normal wastage. There is no investigation in this matter and accordingly no finding also. In these circumstances, I find that the impugned order is not sustainable at all and is to be set aside. Accordingly, I allow the appeal and set aside the order-in-appeal.
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1995 (11) TMI 472
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... ... ..... dence on the record, we have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the Trial Court was not justified in convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence under Section 302/201 IPC. The finding of guilt recorded against the appellant by the Trial Court is not sustainable in law. From the very opening sentence of the judgment of the Trial Court which reads "Birth of a female child is still considered a curse in the Indian society. The present case is the worst type of example where father is alleged to have caused the murder of his two daughters who were aged between 5 to 7 years." it appears to us that the Trial Court got swayed by emotional considerations and allowed suspicion, surmises and conjectures to take the place of legal proof. This appeal is consequently allowed and the conviction and sentence of the appellant is hereby set aside. The appellant is on bail by virtue of an order of this Court dated 25.4.1989. His bail bonds shall stand discharged.
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1995 (11) TMI 471
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... ... ..... This statement is made by the applicants to prove their bona fides and to dispel the suspicion of respondent No. 1 that applicant No. 2 is likely to continue as a company with a small paid-up capital. 29. It is hereby clarified that all the costs, charges and expenses in respect of execution of the transfer deed (deed of assignment) as well as transfer of lease by respondent No. 1 in favour of applicant No. 2 including in respect of stamp duty, registration charges, if any shall be borne by applicant No. 2. Applicant No. 1 gives a solemn assurance to this court as the holding company of applicant No. 2 that all the obligations of applicant No. 2 shall be fulfilled within the time stipulated by the court. 30. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. 31. The official liquidator shall act on the basis of an ordinary copy of this order duly authenticated by the associate of this court. 32. Issue of certified copy is expedited.
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1995 (11) TMI 470
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... ... ..... t, in my opinion, no illegality can be said to have committed. Such a misdeclaration, according to the respondents, attract the provision of confiscation under the Customs Act. 104. In this case the court is not concerned with the fact as to whether in fact any confiscation shall be effected to or not. The petitioner may be able to show that they had not violated any of the provision of the Act and the goods were thus not liable for confiscation. 105. The only question which arises for consideration at this juncture is as to whether there has been reason to believe that such goods, if seized, would be liable for confiscation or not. 106. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is desirable that the respondents take adequate steps for early disposal of the confiscation proceedings. For the foregoing reasons, it must be held that the seizure of the said goods was not illegal. In the result both these applications are dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 469
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... ... ..... n this ground under section 433(f), to make up its mind as to whether the other remedy is available to the petitioners and they are acting unreasonably in seeking to have the company wound up instead of pursing that other remedy." (15) He also placed reliance on Jose J. Kadavil vs. The Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd., reported in 1983 (2) Comp L J 359 (Ker). When the petitioner has an alternative remedy, in this case, the Court has taken the view that winding up must be a last resort. When other alternative remedies are available, the Court ought not to resort to winding up. (16) I have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the respondent at great length. I have also perused all the pleadings and documents filed by the petitioner carefully. For the detailed reasons stated above, it is concluded that the petitioner has not been able to make out any case of winding up of the respondent company. The petition is accordingly dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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1995 (11) TMI 468
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... ... ..... es, we feel that it is just and equitable that their interest should be protected. Therefore, we also order that SSPL will pay to respondents Nos. 17 to 19 either the consideration that they had paid for these shares or the prevailing market price on the date of payment towards these shares whichever is higher. This fully protects the interest of respondents Nos. 17 to 19 who are in the business of dealing in shares. Till such time the amount is paid, even though the name of SSPL will be entered in the register of members in pursuance of this order, it will not exercise any voting rights in respect of these shares nor it will transfer these shares to anyone else and GWL will also not register any transfer during this period. Since we have held that the issue of duplicate certificates was not in order we also direct that with the removal of the names of respondents Nos. 17 to 19 herein, the duplicate certificates will be surrendered by them to GWL which shall cancel the same.
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1995 (11) TMI 467
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... ... ..... by virtue of Section 34 of the Act the provisions contained in the Act shall have an overriding effect on any other law or instrument for the time being in force. 23.2 Banks do not run by foreclosing properties. They do not always gain by securing sale of properties mortgaged. Foreclosure and sale do not expedite recovery of money by which the bank and financial institutions run. The Act No. 51 of 1993 therefore provides for recovery of money even in those cases in which the nature of mortgage secured by the bank would have entitled it to seek foreclosure or sale merely but for the provisions of the Act. (24) For all the foregoing reasons I am of the opinion that a suit for recovery of a debt based on mortgage of any nature whatsoever lies within the jurisdictional competence of the Tribunal. The order dated 1.5.1995 transmitting the record of the suit to the Tribunal cannot be found fault with. The application seeking review/recalling of the order dated 1.5.95 is rejected.
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1995 (11) TMI 466
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... ... ..... in the jurisdiction of this court is a marginal one. Reference in this connection may be to the decisions reported in 70 CWN 122 and 1994(1) CHN 445. 9. In view of the findings aforementioned, 1 do not intend to enter into the merit of the matter not only as regards the allegations made by the petitioners that they have kept out of negotiation and have been treated unfairly by the respondent No. 1, but also the question as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the arbitration clause has any applicability in the case or not. For the reasons aforementioned, I am of the opinion that this court has no territorial jurisdiction, and for the reasons aforementioned, the interim order passed by this court is vacated. As this court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain this writ application, this writ application is also dismissed with liberty to the petitioners to file an appropriate writ application before an appropriate forum for ventilating their grievances.
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1995 (11) TMI 465
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... ... ..... S.B. Majmudar, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (11) TMI 464
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... ... ..... to the business of selling goods will not amount to providing credit facilities in the nature of the business of banking so as to amount to carry on the business of banking or providing credit facilities to its members. Sec. 80P(2)(a)(i) is meant to cover the societies which are carrying on the business of banking and in the course of their business are providing credit facilities to its members." 5. The controversy involved in the present case stands concluded by the judgment of this Court given in the aforesaid case of the assessee itself for the asst. yr. 1977-78. In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this application under s. 256(2) of the Act and no referable question of law is made out because the question sought to be referred stands decided by the Division Bench judgment of this Court, as aforesaid. 6. In this view of the matter, no case of calling a reference is made out. The application under s. 256(2) of the IT Act, is, therefore, dismissed.
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