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1995 (3) TMI 443
... ... ... ... ..... e a detailed investigation into factual questions which this Court is not called upon to undertake in view of its decision already arrived at on the constitutional questions as stated above. 72.. For the reasons aforesaid, these writ petitions succeed to the extent that this Court declares that the provisions of the Bihar Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas for Consumption, Use or Sale Therein Act, 1993, does not satisfy the requirement under article 301 read with article 304(b) of the Constitution and section 3 of the said Act is ultra vires article 301 and 304(b) of the Constitution of India. This Court further declares that proviso to section 3 and the provisions of section 6 of the Act, are ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution of India. The respondent State of Bihar, be restrained from enforcing the provisions of the said Act any further. 73.. Let appropriate writs issue. There shall be no order as to costs. K. VENKATASWAMI, C.J.-I agree. Writ petitions allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 442
... ... ... ... ..... e impugned notification is not controverted, namely, considerable increase in the number of dealers liable to pay tax, absence of increase in the number of authorities commensurate with the increase in the number of dealers, requirement of affording reasonable opportunity to dealers of being heard and efforts made to complete the proceedings by the end of the period. These reasons are relevant and germane to the guidelines implicit in sub-section (9). Sub-section (9) does not contain any restriction about the period of extension which can be granted by the State Government. The guideline implicit in sub-section (9) is that the extension can be only for a reasonable period. The extension effected in the instant cases is for a period of two months which cannot be said to be unreasonable. Under the circumstances, the challenge against the impugned notification must fail. 21.. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. Advocate s fee Rs. 500 in each case. Petitions dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 441
... ... ... ... ..... re grant of the final eligibility certificate the alleged closure of the industry was gone into by the concerned authority. Therefore, it cannot afford a ground to the fourth respondent to deny the refund of the tax. In so far as investment of the amount for the development of the industry is concerned it is too much for the fourth respondent to expect it because the amount which could have been invested in development, had been recovered by the authority by coercive process and withheld for such a long time. In these circumstances, we find the action of the fourth respondent not merely illegal and arbitrary but also high-handed. We, therefore, consider it just and appropriate to direct the fourth respondent to refund the tax of Rs. 3,06,901 recovered on March 15, 1993 and March 29, 1993, with interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date of recovery till the date of refund. The writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocate s fee rupees five hundred. Writ petition allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 440
... ... ... ... ..... Part I of Schedule II would be deemed to be excluded from entry 1(iii) of Part II of the said Schedule. The two entries read together show a clear legislative intent that goods of special importance mentioned in section 14 clause (xiv) are to be taxed under entry 1 of Part I at concessional rate of 4 per cent and such goods are not covered by the expression spare parts as used in entry 1, clause (iii) of Part II of the said Schedule. Any other interpretation as sought to be placed on behalf of the department would make the same goods taxable under both the entries and thus create a confusion. It is a settled law that on fiscal statute an interpretation favourable to the assessee has to be preferred. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the tax authorities were not in error in taking axles under entry 1 of Part I of Schedule II of the State Act. 7.. The question referred to, therefore, is answered accordingly in favour of the assessee. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1995 (3) TMI 439
... ... ... ... ..... rd and the fourth respondents have accordingly been directed to pay the amounts due from the petitioner to the tax department. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. In so many similar cases, we have held that so long as the interim order is not passed on the stay application by the appellate authority, such coercive methods to recover the amount of tax under the assessment order, which is the subject-matter of the appeal, are not proper. In spite of this, such proceedings are being initiated. Under the circumstances, we have no alternative but to quash the garnishee proceedings issued against the third and the fourth respondents and to restrain the second respondent from initiating any recovery proceeding against the petitioner pending disposal of its stay application before the appellate authority, i.e., the first respondent. Accordingly this writ petition is hereby finally disposed of. No order as to costs. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1995 (3) TMI 438
... ... ... ... ..... ags would be insignificant is immaterial. If once when the assessee was unable to establish that the sale value of the bran included the sale value of the gunny bags, then the assessee cannot escape from taxing the sale value of the gunny bags separately, in view of the abovesaid judicial pronouncements of various High Courts and the Supreme Court on this aspect. Accordingly, we consider that the order passed by the Tribunal in deleting the sale turnover of packing materials, namely, the gunny bags from the purview of the levy of tax under the Central Sales Tax Act is unsustainable, in both the assessment years under consideration. Accordingly, we restore the order passed by the assessing officer levying the tax on the sale turnover of the packing materials, namely, gunny bags. 16.. In that view of the matter, we allow the revisions filed by the department by setting aside the order passed by the Tribunal on this aspect. There will be no order as to costs. Petitions allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 437
... ... ... ... ..... ections 5(1)(iv)(b) provide for exemptions. Under rule 8 clause (4) and rule 9 while determining the total turnover, the labour charges, the sale or purchase in the course of export or import of goods, the goods for which tax has been paid, etc., will have to be deducted from the total turnover of the dealer. Rule 22A(3) affords an opportunity to the contractor to avoid any deduction on production of certificate issued in that behalf. Therefore, in our view section 5(1)(iv)(a) and (b) is valid and the view of the learned single Judge in reference to the proviso to sec-tion 5(1)(iv)(b) read with rule 8(4)(b) is confirmed. In so far as sub-clauses (7), (7A), (7B), (11) and (12) of section 7 read with rules 22A and 30A are concerned which imposes a levy on the whole amount , they are not in accordance with article 366(29A)(b) of the Constitution of India. Therefore, they are invalid. The writ appeals are allowed to this extent. No order as to costs. Writ appeals partly allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 436
... ... ... ... ..... om Holly Hock Investments (P) Ltd. and as sold by the applicant-company. That being so, there was no processing involved and same goods cannot be subjected to a second point of tax under the 1954 Act. In view of the above finding, the question of imposition of penalty does not arise at all. Similarly it is not necessary for us to say which was the correct rate of tax prevailing at the relevant period or to say whether the relief under section 4(1a) should or should not be given to the applicant. In the result, the application is allowed. The impugned appellate order dated June 3, 1994 is set aside. Respondent No. 2, Commercial Tax Officer or the appropriate officer in his place, is directed to modify the impugned assessment orders for periods from April 1, 1989 to April 24, 1989 and April 25, 1989 to May 10, 1989, in the light of this judgment, within a period of eight weeks from now. Thus, the main application is disposed of. No order is made for costs. Application allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 435
... ... ... ... ..... is generally given a retrospective operation. Test of length of time covered by the retrospective operation cannot by itself be a decisive test (Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar 1963 50 ITR 171 (SC) AIR 1963 SC 1667). The amending Act of 1993 was only a curative Act to do away with the application of the principle of ejusdem generis, as was done by this Tribunal in the judgment delivered in case No. RN-128 of 1992 on July 30, 1992 (Shri Parameshwarlal Behani v. C.T.O. 1993 90 STC 370). The retrospective operation of the amending Act by insertion of section 26A(2C) in the Act with effect from October 1, 1982 cannot, thus, be challenged. 28.. In the result, I am of opinion that the application is to be dismissed without any order as to costs. Order of the Tribunal In accordance with the views of the majority, the application is dismissed without order as to cost. The operation of this judgment and order is stayed for a period of eight weeks from this date. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 434
... ... ... ... ..... to the consumer. Since the consumer and the licensee both have access to read the meter (incidentally, that is the only practical use to which the meter can be put), and since the licensee cannot disallow the consumer to make such use, it can be said that the right to use is exclusively transferred to the consumer. The monthly rent cannot be said to be the maintenance charge, because it is fixed per month and does not depend upon actual expenditure incurred for keeping the meter correct. 10.. In the result, the application is dismissed. The interim order dated February 12, 1986, passed by the High Court had expired in view of the provisions of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, since no extension of that interim order was prayed for in this Tribunal within the stipulated period. The interim order dated September 5, 1989, passed by this Tribunal stands vacated. There will be no order for costs. P.R. BALASUBRAMANIAN (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 433
... ... ... ... ..... the Act. The conclusion arrived at by us is that an officer of the department who is conferred Statewide jurisdiction by the Government by notification can initiate action under section 45A of the Act as against dealers having business anywhere in the State and that action can never be held to be without jurisdiction on the ground that such officer is not having jurisdiction over any local limits. The contrary view taken by the learned Single Judge in Sivaramakrishnan s case 1995 99 STC 473 (Ker) (supra) 1994 KLJ (TC) 369, is not correct and we overrule the same. In these proceedings we are not to examine the correctness or otherwise of the orders passed by the officers under section 45A of the Act. The petitioners are having effective alternate remedy by way of revision against those orders. Without prejudice to their rights to challenge the impugned orders as per the provisions of the Act, original petitions are dismissed. We make no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 432
... ... ... ... ..... respondent No. 2, is directed to pass fresh orders in accordance with the law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment on the application of the petitioner for issue of certificate of authorisation under the 1986 Act within a period of two months from today and thereafter decide the claims of the petitioner for exemption from tax under the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956, on sales of goods produced by the petitioner and for refund of tax paid under the Assam Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1956, on the raw materials purchased by the petitioner during the relevant period in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment, and until such fresh orders are passed by the respondent No. 2 on the claims of the petitioner, no coercive measures shall be taken by the Superintendent of Taxes (Recovery) and Bakijai Officer, Guwahati, respondent No. 3, pursuant to annexures I, J and K. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 431
... ... ... ... ..... ders passed by the Commercial Tax Officer, Assistant Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner are set aside. The Commercial Tax Officer or the appropriate officer in his place, as the case may be, is directed to reconsider the application dated September 22, 1992, filed by the applicant treating him to be a registered dealer for the purpose of his purchases up to May 5, 1992. The applicant will produce all necessary papers and evidence and also requisitions from his selling dealers asking for declaration forms for the purchases, before the Commercial Tax Officer or the appropriate officer in his place. The Commercial Tax Officer or the appropriate officer, as the case may be, is directed to give the applicant an opportunity of being heard and dispose of the said application dated September 22, 1992, in accordance with law with a reasoned order within a period of six weeks from this day. The application is thus disposed of without any order for costs. Application allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 430
... ... ... ... ..... tate of Kerala 1993 89 STC 494 (Ker), McDowell and Co. Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer (Enquiry), Kasaragod 1993 91 STC 610 (Ker) and V. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala 1994 92 STC 221 (Ker). We are in respectful agreement with the principles laid down in those decisions and we find that the orders passed by the Tribunal are erroneous. 5.. Learned counsel further submitted that evasion of payment of tax has not taken place since lemon-grass oil transported by him is only the first sale in the State and it is taxable at the point of last purchase in the State as per entry 72(a) in the First Schedule. Learned counsel also submitted that there is no attempt of evasion of tax as far as the transport of the goods in concerned. Therefore, in the light of what has been stated above, we find no hesitation in setting aside the order of the Tribunal. Consequently, the orders passed in annexures B, C and D are quashed. The tax revision case is allowed, no order as to costs. Petition allowed.
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1995 (3) TMI 429
... ... ... ... ..... lter the picture in any way. It is a fault or omission for which he has to bear the consequence. The mandatory character of the provision under the 41 Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the Kedarnath case 1965 16 STC 607. The challenge regarding the vires of the provision vis-a-vis the constitutional provisions is, therefore, without any substance. 11.. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed accordingly. The assessment of the applicant as modified by the appellate order of the Assistant Commissioner dated August 13, 1993 stands. In case the entire tax held due in terms thereof has not been deposited by the applicant as tax as provided in the interim order of this Tribunal dated November 17, 1993, the respondents will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law for realisation of such tax as may be due from the applicant. There will be no order for cost. S.P. Das Ghosh (Chairman).-I agree. L.N. Ray (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1995 (3) TMI 428
... ... ... ... ..... section 234B(2) safeguard the interest of all the assessees including the applicants before the Settlement Commission. If at the stage of making an application under section 245C(1), the applicant makes a full and true disclosure of his total income, the interest liability which would attach itself to him will substantially come down as the taxes paid in pursuance of the application would also qualify as the taxes paid otherwise referred to in section 234B(2). No special lenience may need to be shown to an applicant who, by definition, has failed to disclose the full and true income before the Assessing Officer and even before the Commission, merely because he has made an application to the Commission. This will also be in line with the conclusion already reached by the Commission in Ashwani Kumar s case 1992 195 ITR 861 (ITSC) (SB). In view of section 245BD of the Income tax Act, 1961, the order of the Special Bench shall be the order of the majority of Members of the Bench.
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1995 (3) TMI 427
... ... ... ... ..... that there was any information on the file that in the years 1964 or 1971, the appellant was indulging in any smuggling or related unlawful activities which could give rise to the assumption that even these meagre investments of Rs. 1,000 in 1964 or Rs. 2,500 in 1971, or Rs. 7,500 in 1973, were not savings from the business income or other savings of the appellant. Only then the onus under section 8 of the Act could legitimately be placed on the appellant. The object of the Act is not to mechanically proceed against each and every item of property, even a small running business, and everything has to be appreciated in proper perspective and in the setting of the facts of the case. In this case, we are satisfied, that there was no justifiable material for holding against the appellant and proceeding to forfeit even his small running business of watch repairing, which is the source of his livelihood. Accordingly, we find it a fit case to allow the appeal and order accordingly.
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1995 (3) TMI 426
... ... ... ... ..... ority means, by seeking remand of the case, would tantamount to ordering reopening of that case, which was not even before us, and which had long been decided and assumed finality, or requiring a direction for issuance of a fresh notice to the appellants in the appeals (respondents in the present rectification petition) which can nowhere be the intent of the rule-making authority, or even the Legislature, to contemplate starting of the entire proceedings de novo under the garb of remand proceedings. Thus, taking the application from whatever angle it may be, we are constrained to say that resort to rectification provisions, is totally misconceived, and lacks understanding of the provision of not only section 20 of the Act, but also of the principles relating to remand, apart from the fact that sole reliance has been placed on Rules which are no longer applicable. In view of the foregoing discussion, the present application is liable to dismissal, and is dismissed accordingly.
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1995 (3) TMI 425
Import - Exemption ... ... ... ... ..... s not applicable retrospectively. However, we observe that in such cases cited supra, this Tribunal had held that if the applicant had applied for obtaining such certificate then the date of application for obtaining such certificate may be relevant date for extending the benefit. Examined in this view of the matter, we find from the certificate that the application for the certificate was preferred by the appellants in the month of October, 1983 on different dates whereas the goods were cleared in September, 1983. Thus, even on this issue the eligibility certificate issued on 9-11-83 cannot be deemed to cover the goods cleared in September, 1983. 8. emsp We have also gone through the case law cited and relied upon by both sides and we find in view of the scrutiny of the evidence on record and submissions made that the case law does not support the contentions of the appellants. 9. emsp Having regard to the above findings, we uphold the impugned order and reject the appeals.
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1995 (3) TMI 424
Refund - Classification list, approved C.L. - Appeal ... ... ... ... ..... directly by appealing against that decision and not indirectly by filing a refund claim on an assessment based on that decision (l) agreeing with him in the aforesaid view it had necessarily to be held that the application for refund in the instant appeal cannot sustain, the assessments having become final. rdquo 6. emsp It is seen that the impugned order directs the Assistant Collector to sanction the refund of duty which was claimed on the grounds that the disputed goods were assessable under sub-heading 3003.30 and not under sub-heading 2102.10 as per the relevant approved classification list. Since according to the approved classification list which the disputed product was classifiable under sub-heading 2102.10 during the relevant period and such approval was not challenged in appeal, on the ratio of the decision of the Tribunal extracted above, it has to be held that the impugned order is not sustainable. He, therefore, set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.
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