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1995 (9) TMI 372
... ... ... ... ..... n Adilabad from 31.12.1963, this transaction was outside the sweep of Section 3(1) of the Regulation. Consequently no useful purpose would be served by relegating the appellant to the remedy of revision before the State authorties when this question is concluded by our present judgment. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgments of the Division Bench of the High Court and that of learned Single Judge are set aside. Writ Petition filed by the appellant before the High Court is allowed. The orders of the authorities below against the appellant passed under Section 3(1)(a) read with Section 3(2)(a) of the Regulation will stand quashed and set aside. As these appeals are being disposed of on a question of law and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the cases, even though the appeals by the authorities are dismissed and the last appeal moved by T. Rajaiah arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.2407 of 1986 is allowed, there will be no order as to costs in all these appeals.
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1995 (9) TMI 371
... ... ... ... ..... ers was unlawful, the proper course to adopt should have been to strike it down. It was beyond the High Court's power to expand the reach of the remission so as to give the benefit of it to the writ petitioner, who did not belong to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. If the power was improperly exercised, The High Court could not, in effect, grant a general remission where the State had intended it to be restricted. This Court had made it clear that in the event that special leave was granted, the respondents would not be asked to go back to jail. We think that those who have obtained the benefit of the High Court's order must be permitted to retain it and they cannot now be required to serve out the terms in respect of which they got such benefit. The appeals are allowed. The judgments and orders under appeal are set aside but the respondents shall not be required to forgo the benefits they have obtained by reason thereof. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1995 (9) TMI 370
... ... ... ... ..... (8) of Section 4 providing that such persons who have been given deemed promotions shall not be entitled to any arrears for the period prior to the date of their actual promotion, shall not apply in cases where directions to the contrary of competent courts against the respondent-State have become final. In the result, this writ petition succeeds. Section 11 sub-section (2) is struck down as ultra vires the legislative powers of the State. Sub-sections (2), (3) and (8) of Section 4 are read down as aforesaid. The respondent- State shall comply with the directions contained in the binding decision of the High Court of Karnataka dated 21.9.1971 in Writ Petition Nos. 2598, 3302-3304 and 4586 of 1970 and shall make available all consequential financial benefits to the concerned petitioners as directed by the High Court within a period of eight weeks from the receipt of the orders of this Court at its end. Rule issued in the Writ Petition is accordingly made absolute with costs.
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1995 (9) TMI 369
... ... ... ... ..... earned counsel for the assessee also relied on English Electric Co. Ltd. v. Superintendent, Central Excise 1975 II MLJ 479 where under the excise law it has been held that though fuselinks may consist of porcelain-ware also, it cannot to taken as porcelain-ware. Likewise he also relied on the decision Geep Flashlight Industries Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (1985) 22 ELT 3 (SC) where it has been held, under the excise Reported as State of Tamil Nadu v. P. Singaraveloo in 1996 100 STC 540 (Mad.). law, that torchlight though made up of plastic material also cannot be treated as plastic material . With reference to these decisions, we may state that there may not be any necessity for the application of these decisions in the present case since we have already held that nylon article is different from plastic article as per the common parlance theory itself. 6.. Accordingly, the order of the Joint Commissioner is set aside and the appeal is allowed. No costs. Appeal allowed.
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1995 (9) TMI 368
... ... ... ... ..... e Central Sales Tax Act that, if the exemption is only in specified circumstances or under specified conditions then it cannot be construed as exemption from tax generally and if it is otherwise, then it is to be construed as exempted from tax generally. In this case, the notification dated March 31, 1993 makes it clear that exemption is not in specified circumstances nor under specified conditions. As the sale is exempted from tax generally under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, no tax is payable under Central Sales Tax Act in regard to inter-State sales on imitation jewellery. 4.. Hence this petition is allowed and the assessment order (annexure B ) in so far as it relates to the levy of tax on inter-State sales on imitation jewellery, is quashed. Consequently, the demand notice dated June 8, 1995 and notice dated September 6, 1995 (annexure C ) are also quashed. Smt. Vidya, learned Government Pleader, is permitted to file memo of appearance within six weeks. Petition allowed.
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1995 (9) TMI 367
... ... ... ... ..... ion grounds runs as follows Has not the Tribunal decided the issue erroneously without properly considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, even the alleged question of law, as framed by the assessee in the revision petition, is actually not a question of law at all. 2.. That apart, the learned counsel for the petitioner only argued that with reference to the entries in the above slips and pocket note-books, the authorities should have made necessary verifications from the third parties concerned. But, it must be stated that if there is truth on the side of the petitioner, it could have examined the said third parties and it could have also sought for such examination, before the assessing authority. But, no such attempt has been done, admittedly, in the present case. Therefore, there is absolutely, no merit in this revision under section 38 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 and accordingly, this revision is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 366
... ... ... ... ..... ords secured during inspection are not adequate for imposing any penalty. By following the earlier order of the Tribunal in M.T.A. No. 409 of 1980, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner deleted the penalty in its entirety. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner, on perusal of the records came to the conclusion that the records secured are not sufficient for levy of penalty under section 12(3) of the Act. No further evidence was produced to show that there are sufficient records for levy of penalty under section 12(3) of the Act. Under such circumstances, the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner in deleting the penalty is in order. Accordingly we are not inclined to interfere with the same. 4.. In the result, while upholding the contention put forward by the department that an appeal will lie against the Order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner deleting the penalty in its entirety, the revision filed by the department is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 365
... ... ... ... ..... relaxation and persons like petitioner and others similarly placed offered to produce foreign buyer s purchase orders. Under those circumstances, the circular was issued. If the petitioner feels that the condition of producing copy of the foreign buyer s purchase order is unwarranted and results in inconvenience or hardships to the petitioner, let the petitioner comply with the Rule in its entirety, and the additional condition shall not be insisted. He added that if the petitioner complies with the Rule abovementioned, the respondents shall not go by the circular dated February 17, 1995 and they will deal with the case according to the Rule itself. 6.. In this views, I proceed to pass the following Order In view of what is stated above, it is made clear that the petitioner shall go by the Rule and the authorities also will go according to the Rule without looking into the contents of the circular. The writ petition is ordered accordingly. Writ petition ordered accordingly.
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1995 (9) TMI 364
... ... ... ... ..... ay that the purchases, stock and sale would not reflect in the books of accounts. 4.. Learned counsel submitted that reasonable opportunity would have to be understood as an opportunity to the petitioner to be present for explaining the position. Reading the petition in the light of the conclusions recorded by the three authorities, on facts it is not possible to exercise powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is necessary to note that the original amount of penalty of Rs. 47,706 imposed by the Intelligence Officer has been reduced and modified to Rs. 28,800 because the revisional authority thought that maximum penalty is not called for. The maximum penalty is double the amount of evasion in the context. Considering the above circumstances and the material on record it is not possible to contemplate exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India. Petition stands dismissed at the stage of admission. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 363
... ... ... ... ..... ons are questions of law which are required to be referred to this Court for answer 1. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case legally entry tax could be charged even on machinery and stores which were not for consumption or use as raw material or packing material or in the execution of works contracts? 2.. Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case under section 3(1)(b) of the Entry Tax Act the words consumption or use as raw material have wider meaning and includes use of machinery and stores? 8. Accordingly, we, under section 44(3) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, require the Tribunal to state the case and refer it for our answer. 9.. A copy of this order under the signature of the Registrar of this Court shall be forwarded to the Tribunal for compliance. 10.. This application is accordingly allowed and directions in terms indicated above are issued. The parties, are however, left to bear their own costs of this application. Application allowed.
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1995 (9) TMI 362
... ... ... ... ..... r authorities by not acting in accordance with judicial pronouncements has always been deprecated. Thus in view of what has been discussed above we find that the petitioner is not unjustified in entertaining apprehension that he would not get justice at the hands of the departmental authorities even though the law has been clearly declared by this Court in several decisions indicated above as well as by the honourable Supreme Court in similar matter relating to Income-tax Act. In these circumstances we repel the argument raised on behalf of the State about the alternative remedy and facts and circumstances justify entertaining the writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. In the result we allow the writ petition with costs and set aside the impugned order passed by the Additional Commissioner, as contained in annexure 4 dated March 18, 1993 as well as the assessment order dated March 31, 1993, as contained in annexure 5 to the writ petition. Writ petition allowed.
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1995 (9) TMI 361
... ... ... ... ..... 65, it was held by me that the transaction resulted in a sale of goods by the contractee to the contractor. As is evident from the terms of the contract, it specifically states that on the materials being supplied, they will become the property of the contractor and that what is to be charged from the contractor is the price of the goods so supplied. It does not say that the value of the goods so supplied would be adjusted from the dues of the contractor. As observed by he honourable Supreme Court a sale, in the ordinary sense of the term, may not be intended by the parties, but the sale inheres in the transaction. I, therefore, hold that the Tribunal was right in holding that the supply of the building materials by the revisionist to the contractor amounted to a sale liable to be taxed under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. These revisions therefore, have no force and are hereby dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 360
... ... ... ... ..... e the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes dated June 21, 1982 made in exercise of his power under sub-section (2) of section 20 read with sub-section (1) of that section as it stood prior to amending Act 18 of 1985. As pointed out by us already, after the amendment of sub-section (1) of section 20 by Act 18 of 1985 the power of revision under that section can be exercised only if the order or proceeding sought to be revised is prejudicial to the interests of revenue. In view of the declaration of law made by the Supreme Court in Lakshmaiah Setty and Sons 1994 94 STC 190 and in view of the decision in Sushil Kumar Mehta (1990) 1 SCC 193, we have therefore to hold that the order of the Commissioner dated February 20, 1989 impugned in this appeal is without jurisdiction and therefore non est. In that view of the matter, the Special Appeal has to be dismissed as it is preferred against a non est order, and it is accordingly dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 359
... ... ... ... ..... the notice, in the matter of exercise of extraordinary powers, in my judgment the power of release need not be exercised as is seen from the contents of the notice referred to above. Further provisions of the said section would show that there is a power of confiscation also. These powers have to be considered as special provisions when the nature of smuggling floats on the surface of the record. For the above reasons petition stands dismissed at the state of admission. It is necessary to record that the learned Government Pleader has placed a copy of the order in O.P. No. 14323 of 1995 wherein this Court has granted release subject to certain conditions. In my judgment the facts which are revealed from the contents of the notice make out a difference. This especially when in the order placed for my consideration facts are not available and even otherwise facts would govern the ultimate exercise of extraordinary powers in every case. Ordered accordingly. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 358
... ... ... ... ..... ed, i.e., iron and steel are exigible to tax to the first point of sale, and these are declared goods. Cement was also taxable at the first point of sale. But there was no evidence that the goods had suffered tax at the first point of sale inside the State. According to the petitioner, the Tribunal has recorded an erroneous finding on fact that there was no evidence about payment of tax at first point of sale, and ample material was adduced before the Tribunal relating to payment and that has not been considered. Since the matter is pending before the Tribunal, we express no opinion about the acceptability of the stand of petitioner. However, considering the nature of dispute and the amount already paid, we direct that in case the petitioner pays Rs. 3.25 lakhs by October 10, 1995, realisation of balance shall be stayed till disposal of the reference by the Tribunal. 4.. The writ application is accordingly disposed of. P.C. NAIK, J.-I agree. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1995 (9) TMI 357
... ... ... ... ..... rials for a period of 5 years till 14th January, 1978, provided these materials were required for the expanded capacity. Assuming that the contention is satisfied in the instant case, it can only be said that there is exemption regarding payment of octroi. Octroi and entry tax may have similarity in their incidences, but they cannot be said to be the same since the law under which they are imposable are different and the conditions under which they can be imposed are also different. Since what is purported to be imposed is not octroi, but entry tax, the principle of promissory estoppel will not apply. 6.. In the result, we answer question No. 1 in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue, and question No. 2 in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. 7.. A copy of this order under the signature of the Registrar and seal of the High Court shall be transmitted to the Board of Revenue. Reference answered accordingly.
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1995 (9) TMI 356
... ... ... ... ..... Assistant Commissioner in the subsequent year accepted the reasons given by the assessee for reducing the turnover relating to first sales. It is not disputed that the first sales turnover is not consistent with the net purchase of the first sale goods. In view of these facts the Tribunal considered that escaped turnover can be redetermined at Rs. 98,116, i.e., one fourth of the escaped turnover sustained by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The reasons given by the Tribunal in sustaining the one fourth of the addition made by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner appears to be in order. No further evidence was produced before us to deviate from the order passed by the Tribunal in reducing the escaped turnover to one fourth of the escaped turnover determined by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Accordingly we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal on this aspect. 2.. In the result, this revision is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 355
... ... ... ... ..... entire period of the assessment year under consideration. In fact, it related to only two months in the assessment year under consideration. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the assessee as well as the learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) and considering the overall factual position, we are of the opinion that multiplying Rs. 89,507 by three times appears to be on the high side. If we multiply Rs. 89,507 by two times, it would come to Rs. 1,79,014. Taking into consideration the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the assessee that it is not always possible to do the business of this nature in all the months in the assessment year under consideration, we would redetermine the total and taxable turnover at Rs. 1,50,000 instead of rupees two lakhs as determined by the Tribunal. Accordingly, this tax case (revision) filed by the assessee is allowed to the abovesaid extent. No costs. Petition allowed.
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1995 (9) TMI 354
... ... ... ... ..... elhi AIR 1981 SC 991, the Supreme Court noticed similarities and dissimilarities in the terminal tax and octroi. It was also noticed that the two taxes are similar kinds of levies which are closely interlinked with destination of the goods and the user in the local area on arrival of the goods. 6.. At best, it can be said that there are certain common features in the terminal tax and the entry tax but it cannot be said that their incidence is identical. The entry tax is on entry of goods in the local area for use, consumption or sale therein. Terminal tax is a tax on import of goods into or export of goods from a local area. The incidence, coverage and effect of the two taxes are different. There is no principle of law by which the court can hold that when the State imposes entry tax, the Corporation cannot impose terminal tax. 7.. In the result, we find no ground for interference made out by the petitioner and accordingly dismiss the petition with costs. Petition dismissed.
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1995 (9) TMI 353
... ... ... ... ..... t was a question of law requiring determination by this Court after reference. 4.. In our opinion, the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner as a whole and was under an obligation to make a reference to this Court of the questions of law specifically raised in its application numbering (b), (d) and (e). Accordingly, this application is allowed with a direction to the Tribunal to make a reference of the following questions of law (i) Whether statutory declarations S.T. XXII can be produced at appellate stage and if produced, can the deductions be disallowed on the ground that these declarations were not produced at the time of original assessment? (ii) Whether under section 4B, the tax on purchase of such goods, which are liable to be taxed, is taxable at 6 per cent or 4 per cent? (iii) Whether the tax has been correctly levied on the purchase value of rice bran, which is a tax-free item? to this Court for adjudication. Application allowed.
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