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Showing 41 to 60 of 382 Records
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1996 (1) TMI 445
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... ... ..... ection 50 of the N.D.P.S. Act that the option given thereby to the accused is only to choose whether he would like to be searched by the officer taking the search or in the presence of the nearest available Gazette Officer or the nearest available Magistrate. The choice of the nearest Gazetted Officer or the nearest Magistrate has to be exercised by the officer making the search and not by the accused. Learned counsel also referred to an order dated 8.1.1996 made in Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 2546 of 1995 - Raghbir Singh vs. State of Haryana - wherein, according to him, a similar question has been referred for decision by a 3-Judge Bench on the basis that no decision so far has decided that question involved in the second submission made by him. It is sufficient to say that there being no decision taking a contrary view, and in our opinion, the construction being plain, it is unnecessary for us to refer this case to a 3-Judge Bench. Special leave petition is dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 444
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... ... ..... . Whichever view is taken, we hold that in the instant case the AO has rightly computed the income under the provisions of the IT Act under the EMI method which is in accordance with the contract between the parties before he proceeded to invoke the provisions of s. 115J of the IT Act. In the normal course, (that is in the computation of income under the other provisions of the IT Act without applying the provisions of s. 115J) the mere fact that the assessee had made appropriations to reserves or has declared dividends or had charged all the pre-operative and other expenses, etc. against the book profits would not invest such profits with the characteristics of income of the assessee chargeable to tax so long as such appropriations or write off are not in keeping with the income which accrued to the assessee in terms of contract between the parties. 14. For all these reasons, we set aside the orders of the CIT passed under s. 263 for both the years. The appeals are allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 443
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... ... ..... l Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.9048 of 1988. We have heard the counsel for the appellant and following the judgment passed by this Court, we held that the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by Act 68 of 1984. Instead, they are entitled to solatium at 15 and interest at 6 on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession till date of deposit. The appeal is accordingly allowed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 442
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... ... ..... , not right in coming to the conclusion that the principles of natural justice were not complied in the present case. From the facts as narrated hereinabove, it is also apparent that the case of the respondent regarding the crossing of the efficiency bar had been reviewed every year in accordance with the provisions of the aforesaid Rule 4.8 and, therefore, the High Court was not correct in assuming that this had not been done in the instant case. The earlier Writ Petition which had been filed by the respondent challenging the adverse entry for the year 1986-87 and the stoppage at the efficiency bar in the first two years was dismissed. In the judgment under appeal, the High Court has not even referred to the filing of the earlier Writ Petition 1836/1990 and its dismissal vide order dated 11.7.1990. This is unsatisfactory to say the least. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment under appeal is set aside. This appeal is allowed. There shall be, however, no order as to costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 441
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... ... ..... g assessment year. 4 It is settled that an authority higher in hierarchy, is entitled to reverse vary or confirm the order of an inferior authority. However, where the order of any inferior authority is being reversed, the least that is expected is that the view which found favour with the inferior authority, should be met by the authority interfering with the order appealed against. The past history of an assessee has always been held to be a relevant consideration in estimating the turnover of a given case. In the instant case the Sales Tax Tribunal has failed to address itself to the consideration which found favour with the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial) in reducing the assessed turnover from ₹ 2,00,000/- to ₹ 1,25,000/-. Ia these circumstances, the order passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal restoring the assessed order at ₹ 2,00,000/- cannot be sustained. 5. In the result the revision succeeds and is allowed in part. There shall be no order as to costs,
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1996 (1) TMI 440
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... ... ..... hip of that party. Even in the absence of a formal resignation from membership an inference can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which he belongs." (Emphasis supplied) If he of his own volition joins another political party, as the appellants did in the present case, he must be taken to have acquired the membership of another political party by abandoning the political party to which he belonged or must be deemed to have belonged under the explanation to paragraph 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule. Of course, courts would insist on evidence which is positive, reliable and unequivocal. For the aforesaid reasons, We hold that the judgment of the High Court declining to interfere with the order of the disqualification passed by the Speaker, Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, calls for no interference in these appeals. The appeals are dismissed with costs. Each appellant to pay the costs in separate sets.
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1996 (1) TMI 439
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... ... ..... n the respondent. Leave granted. The controversy raised in this case is covered by the decision of this Court in Karnataka Public Service Commission & Ors. vs. B.M. Vijaya Shanker & Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 206 . Following the said decision, the appeal is allowed and the order of the Tribunal is set aside, but without costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 438
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... ... ..... , the plaintiff could not have claimed the relief which he sought in the subsequent suit, the plaintiff's subsequent suit is not barred by order 2 Rule 2. Applying this ruling to the facts of the present case, it is clear that, in the first suit, the appellants could only claim reliefs in respect of ₹ 14,12,836/- which was the maximum amount stipulated in the performance guarantee. They could not have claimed reliefs of ₹ 1,13,27,298.16 which they did in the second suit on the basis of the contract relating to the work to be performed by the contractor. It is, therefore, clear that when the appellants, by way of Short Cause Suit No.491/72, sought to enforce the performance guarantee no.57/22, they were seeking reliefs on the basis of a cause of action which was distinct from the one upon which they subsequently based their claim in Spl. Civil Suit No. 29/83. In the result, both the issues are decided in favour of the appellants. The appeal succeeds. No costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 437
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... ... ..... idential reports would be frustrated. Having achieved an optimum level the employee on his part may slacken in his work, relaxing secure by his one time achievement. This would be an undesirable situation. All the same the sting of adverseness must, in all events, be not reflected in such variations, as otherwise they shall be communicated as such. It may be emphasized that even a positive confidential entry in a given case can previously be adverse and to say that an adverse entry should always be qualitatively damaging may not be true. In the instant case we have seen the service record of the first respondent. No reason for the change is mentioned. The down grading is reflected by comparison. This cannot sustain. Having explained in this manner the case of the first respondent and the system that should prevail in the Jal Nigam, we do not find any difficulty in accepting the ultimate result arrived at by the High Court. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 436
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... ... ..... to the legal representative of the deceased respondent and he should not be compelled to contest a claim which due to the inaction of the petitioner or the appellant has become final. So far the facts of the present appeal is concerned, Bir Singh died on 9th December, 1971. The dispute related to consolidation of holding of lands. After the death of Bir Singh the right title and interest in the land shall be deemed to have devolved on his legal representative. As such the right to pursue the remedy against them survived even after the death of Bir Singh. But for pursuing the claim against the legal representative of Bir Singh, the appellants ought to have taken steps to substitute him. Admittedly, no step was taken on behalf of the appellants till 14th March, 1975. As such the High Court was justified in dismissing the writ petition and no exception can be taken against the said order. The appeal accordingly fails and it is dismissed. But there shall be no orders as to cost.
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1996 (1) TMI 435
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... ... ..... or in this matter under Article 136 of the Constitution, more particularly when there is no finding or suggestion that it was a device to evade the Excise duty. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 434
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... ... ..... charge under Section 193 IPC with warning to show exemplary conduct hereafter. His bail bonds are discharged. The Director General of Police, Haryana is directed to take the convicts M.S. Ahlawat, Superintendent of Police, Ishwar Singh, Sub-Inspector and Randhir Singh, Assistant Sub-Inspector forthwith into custody and have them consigned to Central jail, Chandigarh to undergo the sentences and submit a report of compliance to the Registry within one week from the date of the receipt of this order. We place on record our appreciation for prompt investigation conducted and the report submitted, within the time given, by the CBI officers. Though this unfortunate episode has landed the police officers in conviction, we have no reason to believe that the real offenders in the original crime would be tried and dealt with according to law and these orders will not have any effect on the trial of those cases and must be dealt with according to law. The writ petitions stand closed.
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1996 (1) TMI 433
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 432
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... ... ..... Admittedly there was no further hearing of the matter. In the circumstances the order passed by a person who did not hear the matter and who did not have any opportunity to come to grips with the issues arising for consideration, is violative of the principles of natural justice and is liable to be quashed on this ground itself." 24. We agree with the view expressed in the aforesaid decisions. 25. Finally, it cannot be said that this is a case where no prejudice is caused to the respondent. Serious prejudice is caused to him due to the failure to grant personal hearing by the officer who passed exhibit P-8 rejecting the appeal against the order removing him from service. The learned single judge has exercised his discretionary power under Article 226 and quashed exhibit P-8 order for the reasons recorded therein. For the reasons discussed hereinabove, we do not propose to upset the said decision in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 431
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... ... ..... lity was required to refund the amount paid by the appellants by way of octroi duty, it would refund the same with interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum. The time within which the refund would have to be made was left to be determined when the court heard and disposed of the appeals. The Kota municipality is now directed to refund to the appellants the amounts of octroi duty paid by the appellants to it subsequent to the year 1974-75 with interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from the dates of payment till refund or realisation. Such refund shall be made on or before 15th July, 1996. The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The Kota Municipal Limits (Continued Existence) Validating Act, 1975, is declared to be invalid. Refund of octroi duty by the Kota municipality to the appellants shall be made as aforestated. The Kota Municipality shall pay to the appellants the costs of its appeal, quantified in the sum of ₹ 15,000/-.
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1996 (1) TMI 430
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... ... ..... proposed land may be in excess of requirement. Once the Government, after holding the enquiry has considered the objections and decided that the land is needed for public purpose, declaration published under Section 6 would become conclusive of the public purpose. Nonetheless, relevant date for Section 23(1) is the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Admittedly, in this case the second declaration was published within one year even from the date of the order passed by the High Court and, therefore, the view of the Division Bench is required to be upheld. Thus, we hold that the declaration published under Section 6(1) on May 13, 1989 is valid and the notification dated January 22, 1987 under Section 4(1) does not become invalid. The Land Acquisition Officer should conduct and complete award enquiry within one year from the date of the receipt of the order of this Court. The appeals are accordingly dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (1) TMI 429
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... ... ..... are submitted, so that the right which had accrued is extinguished and defeated. So far the present case is concerned, we are informed by the counsel for the appellants that a petition for grant of bail on merit had been filed which was rejected on 22.3.1993, But admittedly no petition for grant of bail after the expiry of the, statutory period for the submission of the charge-sheet had been filed. There is no statement that any application for grant of bail had been filed on behalf of the appellants under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) after the expiry of the statutory period which application was kept pending till 30th August 1993. Now the appellants have forfeited their right to be released on bail under proviso (a) to section 167(2) as they are in custody on basis of orders for remand passed under other provisions of the Code. In such a situation, we are left with no option, but to dismiss these appeals. However, we directed that the trial of the appellants be expedited.
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1996 (1) TMI 428
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... ... ..... order that is impugned should be set aside and the criminal revision application restored to the file of the High Court for being decided afresh without reference to the impugned judgment. 5. The appeal is allowed, the judgment and order under appeal is set aside and Criminal Revision Application No. 1362 of 1994 is restored to the file of the High Court to be considered afresh as aforesaid, after giving to the parties an opportunity of being heard. 6. Pending the disposal of the criminal revision application by the High Court, the husband-appellant shall pay to the respondent-wife interim maintenance in the sum of ₹ 500 per month regularly and all arrears thereof, if any, shall be cleared within six weeks from today. Learned counsel for the husband-appellant undertakes to court that interim maintenance and arrears shall be paid as afore stated. 7. The husband-appellant shall pay to the respondent-wife the costs of this appeal, quantified in the sum of ₹ 3000.
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1996 (1) TMI 427
Whether a person to be searched under Section 50 of the Nercotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 has a right to be given an option of beinq searched either by a Gazetted Officer or by a Magistrate?
Held that:- Finding a person to be in possession of articles which are illicit under the provisions of the Act has the consequence of requiring him to prove that he was not in contravention of its provisions and it renders him liable to severe punishment. It is, therefore, that the Act affords the person to be searched a safeguard. He may require the search to be conducted in the presence of a senior officer. The senior officer may be a Gazetted officer or a Magistrate, depending upon who is conveniently available. The option under Section 50 of the Aet, as it plainly reads, is only of being searched in the presence of such senior officer. There is no further option of being searched in the presence of either a Gazetted Officer or of being searched in the presence of a Magistrate. The use of the word 'nearest' in Section 50 is relevant. The search has to be ccnducted at the earliest and, once the person to be searched opts to be searched in the presence of such senior officer, it is for the police officer who is to conduct the search to conduct it in the presence of whoever is the most conveniently available Gazetted officer or Magistrate. In the result, we find no substance in the only argument advanced before us on behalf of the appellant. The appeal is dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 426
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... ... ..... derstood that the copper sulphate is included in the expression insecticide/pesticide , the only question to be considered by the authorities is whether copper sulphate is insecticide/pesticide. That question has been considered by the appellate authority in these cases by reference to a statute, viz., Insecticides Act, 1969 and Insecticides Rules, 1971, and that certainly forms an excellent piece of evidence to indicate whether copper sulphate is insecticide/pesticide. When the Legislature itself recognises such a fact, it is certainly proper for the authorities to rely upon the same. 8.. In that view of the matter, we do not think there is any justification for the Commissioner/Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to interfere with the orders made by the appellate authoritys orders under section 22-A of the Act and the orders made by the Commissioner/Joint Commissioner in revision are set aside and that of the appellate authority is restored. Appeals allowed accordingly.
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