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1996 (1) TMI 405
... ... ... ... ..... s true that in the eligibility certificate issued to the petitioner by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Limited, it is mentioned that the petitioner Ghouseiya Gram Flour Mills situated in Krishnagiri in Dharmapuri Taluk is manufacturing gram dhall flour. The mention of the works manufacturing gram dhall flour is merely descriptive of the industrial unit of the petitioner and the certificate does not state that the certificate would be valid only if the petitioner would continue to manufacture gram dhall flour only and nothing else. In such circumstances, I have no hesitation to hold that the petitioner who continues his manufacturing activity and, who has not stopped normal production in his industrial unit much less for a continuous period of 6 months is not disentitled to obtain the benefit under the deferral scheme. The impugned orders are set aside. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on this the 31st day of January, 1996. Petition allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 404
... ... ... ... ..... at the unit is eligible for exemption from sales tax under the Government Order-G.O. Ms. No. 74/80/TD dated September 29, 1980-for the following items manufactured and sold by it for the period from November 26, 1979 to November 25, 1984 Sl. No. Name of items Quantity per annum 1. Card board boxes 25 lakhs Nos. 2. Note books 40 tons 3. Other printed items 120 tons 4. Job work 100 tons so deducted to the Commercial Tax Department and the first respondent has to deal with those departments directly on the leans of the certificate without requiring the petitioner to furnish the proof of remittances. In this view of the matter, the writ petitions have to be allowed. Accordingly the writ petitions are allowed with costs and the first respondent-Commercial Tax Officer is directed to give credit to the petitioners in these writ petitions for the amounts indicated in the tax deduction certificates and accordingly adjust against. The sales tax payable by them. Writ petitions allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 403
... ... ... ... ..... hough the court will not normally interfere with the discretionary orders passed by the authorities, it has to be seen whether the said discretion was properly exercised by the authority while passing such orders. As I have stated earlier, the revisional authority having stated that the petitioner has made out a case for stay, should not have mechanically directed the petitioner to deposit 60 per cent of the penalty. This could only show that the order came to be passed in a mechanical manner without any proper exercise of discretion. 4.. In my view the order passed by the revisional authority has to be set aside and accordingly it is set aside. The revisional authority will dispose of the revision petition as expeditiously as possible and in any event within 16 weeks from today and in the meanwhile there will be a stay of the collection of the penalty from the petitioner. This original petition is disposed of with the above directions. Writ petition disposed of accordingly.
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1996 (1) TMI 402
... ... ... ... ..... there is no dispute whatsoever to the effect that the plain envelopes, craft envelopes and calico mounted colour papers could not be said to have been covered by the certificate of exemption. Examining the situation we also record that there is no semblance of a material to see that these items could be considered as other printed items as is sought to be contended on the basis of the said certificate. There is no material whatsoever to see that these items have any connection with the print in regard thereto. 6.. Therefore it will have to be held that the assessee is not entitled to claim exemption with regard to the items such as plain envelopes, craft envelopes and calico mounted colour papers as they are not covered with the certificate granted by the District Industries Centre. We accordingly see no merit in this revision case and order that the revision stands dismissed. Petition dismissed. Reported as Victorty Press (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala 1996 101 STC 450 supra.
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1996 (1) TMI 401
... ... ... ... ..... an amount received by the seller from the purchaser, meaning thereby, the amount of subsidy granted by the Central Government or State Government cannot form part of the turnover as defined in the U.P. Sales Tax Act, now Trade Tax Act. We do not agree with the arguments advanced by the learned Standing Counsel. In view of what has been said above, it is held that the subsidy given by the Government of India to the petitioners cannot be covered within the definition of turnover as defined under section 2(i) of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, now Trade Tax Act. In view of this, all the aforesaid five writ petitions are hereby allowed. Respondent No. 3, the Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), Sales Tax, concerned is restrained from imposing or realising any tax from the petitioners on the amount of subsidy for the aforesaid mentioned various assessment years both under the U.P. as well as Central Sales Tax Acts. The parties are directed to bear their own costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 400
... ... ... ... ..... affidavit not only the facts but also the evidence in proof of such facts have to be pleaded and annexed to it. So, the point that has been raised before us by the appellants is not entertainable. 15.. On the same premises, in the facts and circumstances of this case also, I am of the opinion that the plea of the respondents taken in the written notes cannot be entertained as neither it was pleaded by filing a counter-affidavit in reply to the amendment petition nor any such documents were annexed prior to that. 16.. Consequently this writ application is allowed and the order as contained in annexure 8 to the amendment petition refusing to grant exemption by the District Level Committee is set aside. The concerned respondent is directed to grant exemption for deferment of sales tax in respect of investment made by the petitioners towards bottles and crates. In the facts and circumstances, the parties will bear their own costs. D.P. WADHWA, C.J.I agree. Writ petition allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 399
... ... ... ... ..... sale, as mentioned in clauses (iv) and (ii) respectively in the definition of sale contained in section 2(h) of the Act. The sale under hire-purchase agreement being included in the definition of sale under section 2(h), can directly be assessed under section 3 and the whole amount of the consideration for sale becomes taxable immediately the transaction is entered into, that is, the vehicle is supplied to the customer. There is no question of taxing subsequently the instalments received by the seller which are usually described as hire charges. Section 3-F does not contain anything that may show that it can be attracted to cover a case falling under clause (iii) of the definition of sale . For the above reasons, I find no legal error in the Tribunal s order in holding that the hire charges received by the dealer-respondent were not taxable under the U.P. Trade Tax Act. The revision petitions, therefore, have no force and are hereby dismissed with costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 398
Complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of cheque for insufficiency of the funds in the accounts of the accused
Held that:- Suppose after the cheque is issued to the payee or to the holder in due course and before it is presented for encashment, notice is issued to him not to present the same for encashment and yet the payee or holder in due course presents the cheque to the Bank for payment and when it is returned on instructions, Section 138 does not get attracted. Under these circumstances, since the accused has not made the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice issued by the payee or the holder in due course, the dishonest intention is inferable from those facts. Accordingly, the ingredients as contained in Section 138 have been prima facie made out in the complaint. The High Court, therefore, was wholly incorrect in its conclusion that the ingredients have not been made out in the complaint. The orders of the High Court quashing the com-plaints are illegal. They are accordingly set aside and the trial Court is directed to disposed of the matters as expeditiously as possible. It is made clear that we do not intend to express any opinion on merits.
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1996 (1) TMI 397
... ... ... ... ..... Cabell v. Markhan (1945) 148 F 2d 737 at 739, we get enough light to locate correct path It is one of surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence..........to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning. 7.. Soyabean is said to be covered under clause (iv) of entry No. (vi) of section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act. 8.. Considering the facts and features and the position of law, we hold that the Board of Revenue was justified in holding that the soyabean is covered under term cereal and is liable to tax at the rate of 3 per cent. 9.. Consequently we answer the question in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the department. 10.. This reference application thus stands disposed of but without any order as to costs. 11.. A copy of the order shall be forwarded to the Tribunal in accordance with law. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1996 (1) TMI 396
... ... ... ... ..... ming to know of this provision they had started deducting the amount. Therefore, this was not a case in which the action for penalty should have been initiated at all. Where the Government itself is the defaulter the appropriate course for sales tax authority would be to take up the matter with the administrative machinery and apprise the concerned department of the failure of the concerned drawing and disbursing officer to comply with the provisions of law so that the defaulting official may be administratively held responsible for dereliction of duty. Levying of penalty on the State Government itself serves no purpose whatsoever. For the above reasons these revision petitions are allowed and setting aside Tribunal order dated July 21, 1995, it is ordered that the revisionists' Second Appeals Nos. 210 of 1992, 209 of 1992 and 208 of 1992 stand allowed and the orders levying the aforementioned amounts of penalty under section 8-D(6) are hereby quashed. Petitions allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 395
... ... ... ... ..... orm "C" and paying tax at a concessional rate. The reliance on the case of Hira Sugar Industries v. Commissioner of Sales Tax 1993 UPTC 471 is misplaced because that was a case of refusal by the assessing officer to include the generator and alternator in the registration certificate of the dealer. Here, in the present case, the article in question was already mentioned in the dealer's registration certificate and the dealer having purchased the same, was using it for the very purpose for which it was intended to be used and the purpose that was in contemplation of the dealer as well as the assessing officer. For the above reasons, the revision petition is allowed and setting aside the Tribunal's order in so far as it relates to the levy of penalty on the purchase of the diesel engine and alternator, it is ordered that the dealer's appeal in this regard would stand allowed and the penalty quashed. The parties will bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 394
... ... ... ... ..... s and sells brushes and not shoes. In our opinion article 14 of the Constitution of India cannot be invoked in this case. Merely because one industry has been granted certain concession for remission it does not mean that the same benefit must be granted to all the industries. In fact, para 10 of the petition refers to the notification dated April 12, 1977, wherein it is mentioned that the remission was being granted because of the heavy burden of tax liability on the Agra shoe industries which it was unable to bear. There is nothing to show that the Government found that the brush industry is also unable to bear the tax liability. Moreover, it is settled law that in tax matters greater latitude is given to the Government and it cannot be said that merely because benefit was given to one industry it must be given to others also. Thus, there is no force in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. The interim order dated March 2, 1981, is hereby vacated. Petition dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 393
... ... ... ... ..... t light, and if this object is served only by the combined action of starter, choke and fluorescent tube, then all the components, which contribute to the combined action and to the achievement of the object would constitute an appliance. But standing alone all of them would be merely different spare parts of that appliance. No exception can be taken to the reasoning given in this judgment. Accordingly, we fully concur with the reasoning adopted by their Lordships of the Gujarat High Court in Star Radio Electric Co. s case 1971 27 STC 367 and adopt the same. In view of this, the question referred to us is answered as under Fluorescent tube, starter, choke and phatti when sold separately instead of sale of complete appliance would not be covered under entry 18 of Schedule A to the Haryana General Sales Tax Act, 1973, and the dealer would not be liable to pay sales tax on these items when sold separately at the rate of 10 per cent. No costs. Reference answered in the negative.
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1996 (1) TMI 392
... ... ... ... ..... cluding, we may mention that this Court had directed the Tribunal to refer the aforesaid question of law pertaining to all the nine assessment years in question but the Tribunal has referred the question only in one case and declined the references in the other connected eight cases observing as under There is no wisdom in making eight references to the Punjab and Haryana High Court because the order passed on one of such application which has already been referred to the Punjab and Haryana High Court vide this Tribunal s order dated January 29, 1986 will automatically be applicable to all the eight revision petitions. In view of the aforesaid observations made by the Tribunal, it is directed that the answer given by us to the question referred by the Tribunal would be applicable to the other eight cases as well. The reference is thus answered as above and Civil Misc. No. 5005-CII of 1988 also stands disposed of. There is no order as to costs. Reference answered accordingly.
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1996 (1) TMI 391
... ... ... ... ..... wed by the words aerated water and mineral water in the entry in question. Legislative intent is thus clear that a substance meant for human consumption was covered by entry 39. Apparently distilled water is not meant for human consumption. Distilled water is chemically pure water, made free of all types of infection producing pathogens and all impurities, so that it can be mixed with injectable drugs and medicines. It is undoubtedly an integral component of injected medicine. It has also other uses like use in batteries of motor vehicles. Therefore, the entry 39 does not encompass distilled water . A similar view was taken by this Court in the assessee s case in Bindlish Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa as reported in 1993 89 STC 102 (Orissa). Therefore, the order of assessment as framed, cannot be held to be illegal and is accordingly maintained. The writ application fails and is dismissed. D. MISRA, J.-I agree. Writ petition dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 390
... ... ... ... ..... is that the same person, who owns the new unit and the existing unit, should not be given the benefit of exemption under section 4-A again and again, but if a new unit as such has no interest in the existing unit, then the new unit will not be denied exemption under section 4-A of the Act. No doubt, the veil of a corporate body can be lifted. But no case has been put by the respondents that the director of the petitioner-company, who owned the existing unit, controlled the petitioner-company himself and that the petitionercompany is nothing but one-man show of the said director. For the reasons, the petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order dated December 30, 1992 (annexure 6 to the writ petition) passed by respondent No. 2 is quashed. The respondents are directed to issue the eligibility certificate to the petitioner in accordance with law within one month from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before them by the petitioner. Petition allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 389
... ... ... ... ..... Assessing Authority and also the order dated December 8, 1987 whereby the three applications for making reference to this Court have been declined. We are of the opinion that the order of the Tribunal dated January 19, 1987 is correct and the Assessing Authority has only been called upon to find out how much oil and khal would have been manufactured out of the quantity purchased from within the State and imported from outside the State and further whether the quantity exported could have been produced out of the total quantity of cotton seeds imported from outside the State. Before the dealer can be held liable for violating the declarations furnished under section 24 of the Act, it is necessary for the Assessing Authority to examine what the Tribunal had directed it to do. The Tribunal was thus right in holding that no question of law arises from its order dated January 19, 1987. Consequently, these applications are dismissed with no order as to costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 388
... ... ... ... ..... is to file appeal before the appellate authority as prescribed under the provisions of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the company would adopt such course, but it is possible that the appeals will not be entertained on the ground of limitation. The Government advocate assured that in case such appeals are preferred within a period of two weeks from today, then the appeals will be entertained and disposed of on merits and the objection of limitation will not be raised. In view of the assurance, the apprehension of the respondent no-longer survives. It is open for the respondent to file appeals against the levy of penalty, if so advised. 8.. Accordingly, all the appeals are allowed and impugned judgment dated January 28, 1992, passed by the learned single Judge in Writ Petitions Nos. 16382 to 16385 of 1988 is set aside and the writ petitions stand dismissed. The respondent-company shall pay the costs to the appellants throughout. Appeals allowed.
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1996 (1) TMI 387
... ... ... ... ..... 7, at serial Nos. 2 and 3 respectively. Writ Petition No. 68 of 1995 Turning to the arguments of Sri Sunil Ambwani, appearing in Writ Petition No. 68, of 1995, we reject his contention that the impugned notification is violative of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In the notification dated August 29. 1987, no period of full exemption is stated. Also there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner acted, to its detriment pursuant to any promise held out by respondent No. I and, therefore, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be pressed,into service. Rest of the submissions of Sri Ambwani are similar to those advanced by Sri Bharat Ji Agarwal and, therefore, our view remains the same that we have taken in Writ Petition No. 645 of 1994. In the writ petitions enumerated in the Schedule same question is involved. For the reasons, all the writ petitions fail and are dismissed. Interim orders passed in all the writ petitions are hereby vacated.. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1996 (1) TMI 386
... ... ... ... ..... that manufacturing process is involved in producing cotton from waste cotton and as such the industrial unit is entitled to the exemption claimed by it. 9.. Mr. Ray, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, had also placed reliance upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Kumar Fuels v. State of Uttar Pradesh 1986 63 STC 467 to contend that it is not open to the sales tax authorities to go beyond the certificates issued in favour of the petitioner entitling it to claim exemption. However, in view of out decision upholding the main contention, it is not necessary to go into this aspect of the matter. 10.. Accordingly, the writ applications are allowed and the orders of assessment passed under section 12(8) of the Act as per annexures 1 and 1/A in O.J.C. No. 1166 of 1992 and the notices under section 12(8) impugned in other writ applications are quashed. There will be no order as to costs. D.P. MOHAPATRA, AG. C.J.-I agree. Writ application allowed.
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