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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 400 Records
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1996 (10) TMI 489
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... ... ..... Section 120-B IPC read with Section 3(3), TADA Act, for the offences punishable under Sections 3(3) and Section 5 of TADA Act and Section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act and that of A-1 and A-2 under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC is confirmed. The acquittal of A-1 for the offence punishable under Section 353 IPC is set aside and he is convicted for commission of that offence and is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year. He is also convicted under Section 309 IPC and is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for a term of six months. He is also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years. A-5 to A-9 are also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and they are ordered to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. All the sentences imposed upon A-1 are directed to run concurrently.
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1996 (10) TMI 488
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... ... ..... at perception to Shri Rao and the fears expressed by the appellants the venue of trial/trials involving Shri P.V. Narasimha Rao, former Prime Minister may be shifted from Tis Hazari Court complex to another venue; 2) The appellants are directed to submit to the High Court by Monday, the 14th October, 1986, a list of places in New Delhi area which may be suitable for converting into a court, within the shortest possible time; 3) The choice of Patiala House Court complex as the venue of trial, for obvious reasons, be avoided as far as possible, as similar problems may surface there also; 4) On the High Court selecting the new venue the appellants and all concerned should make necessary arrangements for conducting the trial/trials pertaining to Shri Rao; 5) On such happening, the exemption from personal appearance of Shri Rao, granted by vide interim orders of 30-9-1996, may continue until the Court concerned required his presence in the newly venued Court. Ordered accordingly.
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1996 (10) TMI 487
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... ... ..... the civil appeals. The civil appeals are dismissed accordingly.
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1996 (10) TMI 486
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... ... ..... business. In either view of the matter, the authority is of the view that the applicants cannot be said to have had any permanent establishments in India and that they are not taxable on the income received by them under the sub-contracts under consideration. Accordingly, the authority pronounces the following In light of the relevant facts as mentioned in annexure-2 and the applicants interpreta tion of law and facts as mentioned in annex ure-3, whether income derived by H from its contract dated February 22, 1995, with the Indian company, is taxable in India ? No. The taxability in terms of article 5 of the Agreement for Avoidance of Double Taxation concluded between India and Netherlands of revenues earned by B, a tax resident of the Netherlands, from the contract entered into with the company incorporated and existing under the laws of the Republic of Korea. The revenues refer red to in the ques tion are not taxable in India. Hence, the cases are disposed of accordingly.
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1996 (10) TMI 485
Whether the applicant will qualify as a ‘technician’ in accordance with section 10(5B) of the Act ; and accordingly.
Whether, the taxes paid by the employer of the applicant would be exempt from taxation under section 10(5B) of the Act, for a period of fortyeight months commencing from the date of arrival in India ?
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1996 (10) TMI 484
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... ... ..... there was an agreement and, is such a situation, nothing should be done beyond and outside that agreement. The very nature of the agreement and the circumstances around it indicated that no penalty proceedings would be initiated. 13. From the finding given by the Tribunal, it is apparent that the assessee had, in each case, agreed to certain additions in the assessment year 1984-85 though only part of the income related to this year. By agreeing to the additions to be made in one assessment year, the assessee subjected him self to higher tax. It gives rise to a natural presumption that the agreement was conveyed to the Assessing Officer during the course of the assessment proceedings so as to buy peace of mind and to avoid litigation on an understanding and assurance that no further proceedings for the levy of penalty would be initiated. This finding of fact given by the Tribunal does not give rise to any question of law. 14. In the result, all the applications are rejected.
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1996 (10) TMI 483
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... ... ..... ibunal’s finding that there had been no clandestine removed (sic). This is essentially a question of fact and relating to the quantum of a penalty. No interference by this Court is called for. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 482
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... ... ..... ation sent by him to the appellant has been returned stating that the company is closed. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 481
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... ... ..... se any misconduct alleged against the delinquent officer. Therefore, the Tribunal was totally wrong in quashing the charge memo. In similar circumstances, in respect of other persons involved in the same transactions, this Court in appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.19453-63 of 1995 had on February 9, 1996 allowed the appeals, set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and remitted the matter holding that "This is not the stage at which the truth or otherwise of the charges ought to be looked into. This is the uniform view taken by this Court in such matters." We respectfully agree with the above conclusion and set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal. The enquiry officer is directed to conduct and complete the enquiry within a period of eight months from the date of the receipt of the order and the disciplinary authority is directed to take action thereon within three months thereafter. The appeal is accordingly allowed but, in the Circumstance, without costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 480
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... ... ..... tax. Had they been found ineligible, even this facility in respect of these three taxes also would not have been allowed to them. We again see considerable merit in the above submission. The respondents cannot be now permitted to back out of the assurances given when the petitioner No. 1 have acted to their detriment and have invested large amount in the project. More so, when the facilities to which the petitioners are asking to which they are obviously entitled are only deferral payment of the additional tax and turnover tax. In our opinion, the petitioner No, 1 are entitled as a matter of right under the said Scheme to have the said facility. 11. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the petitioners have made out a very strong case for grant of reliefs by this Court. Petition is thus made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the petition. Rule is thus made absolute in terms of prayers (a), (b) and (c) of the petition with no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 479
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... ... ..... en made by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment. The learned counsel has submitted that since the performance has been rated as outstanding and excellent, the Tribunal was justified in holding that there is no proper consideration of the case of the respondent by the special Committee. We are unable to hold that since the performance of the respondent after his promotion as Additional Secretary had been found to be excellent and outstanding, the non-inclusion of his name from the panel by the Special Committee must lead to the inference that there was no proper consideration of the merit and suitability of the respondent for empanelment by the special Committee. For the reasons aforementioned, the directions given by the Tribunal in the impugned judgment cannot be upheld and have to be set aside. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the Tribunal dated May 14, 1996 is set aside and O.A. No. 539 of 1994 filed by the respondent is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 478
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... ... ..... e valid principle which in itself is not irrational, unreasonable or discriminatory Dayaram Shetty's case (supra) . It may be stated here that Mr.Venugopal's contention that the impugned circular has resulted in black listing of the private dealers of pump sets without even giving them an opportunity of being heard cannot be accepted. In our view, it cannot be reasonably contended that if the Government selects a dealer as its approved dealer the same may mean that all the other dealers have been black listed. The question of black listing does not arise because it is nobody's case that all other dealers were previously approved dealers of the Government but by the impugned circular, they have been suddenly stripped of such status without affording them an opportunity of being heard. In the aforesaid facts, we do not find any reason to inferfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed without any order as to cost.
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1996 (10) TMI 477
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... ... ..... under or in respect of the Award after it is filed in the Court, it cannot even be said that to have the award filed in court is not exercise of a substantive right vested in a party not saved by sub-section (2) of Section 85. In the facts of the case, the judgment of this court reported in AIR 1934 Bombay 398 has no applicability. Moreover, if the intention of the legislature would have been not to have such a right, the legislature would have used the terminology of terminated' instead 'commenced' in sub-section (2) of Section 85. Any other interpretation would make the later portion of Clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 85 nugatory. 25. In the result, the petition is allowed and made absolute in terms of prayer (a). The 1st respondent is ordered and directed to file the Award with all depositions in this court within eight weeks of service of certified copy of the order upon him. No order as to costs of the petition, C.C. expedited. 26. Petition allowed.
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1996 (10) TMI 476
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... ... ..... mpleting the work. Therefore using the maximum period of 10 days for furnishing the grounds of detention to the detenu, as provided under Section 8(1) of the National Security Act, 1980, the State Government was informed of this decision." In view of the grounds mentioned therein, we are of the view that the District Magistrate was prevented due to those exceptional circumstances as recorded in the proceeding that the grounds of detention and the documents in support thereof could no be supplied to the detenu within five days but the same came to be supplied within ten days, as envisaged in Section 8(1) of the Act. Therefore, the High Court was not justified in law to hold that non- communication of the ground of exceptional circumstances as reasons recorded by the District Magistrate, vitiate the order of detention. Since the time for detention of one year has expired by efflux of time, we do not propose to interfere with the order. The appeals are accordingly allowed.
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1996 (10) TMI 475
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... ... ..... ed separately for that year/years on a consideration of all eligible officers falling within the zone of consideration determined on the basis of the vacancies of the particular year. (5) If the name of the respondent is included in the notional Select List/Lists prepared for any particular year/years during the period 1980 to 1986 and if he is so placed in the order of merit so as to have been entitled to be appointed against a vacancy of that particular year, he be appointed to the Service against that vacancy of that year with all consequential benefits. (6) The vacancy against which the respondent is so appointed would be adjusted against the subsequent vacancies falling in the promotion quota prescribed for the State Civil Service officers. (7) Such appointment of the respondent would not affect the appointments that have already been made on the basis of the impugned Select List of December 1986/January 1987. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 474
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... ... ..... . It may be indicated here that the second trial has been initiated after obtaining necessary sanction for prosecuting the appellants. The principle of double jeopardy and bar of second trial as enunciated by this Court in V.K. Agarwal's case (supra) and P.V. Mohammad's case (supra) is applicable in the facts of this case. Not only the ingredients of offence in the previous and second trial are different, the factual foundation of first trial and such foundation for the second trial is also not indented. Accordingly, the second trial was not barred under Section 403 Dr. P.C. of 1898 as alleged by the appellant. In the facts of the case, we also do not find any justification for quashing the criminal trial simply on the ground of delay and consequential suffering of the appellant. The offence and normally in such offence, a strict view is to be taken. We, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the impugned decision. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 473
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... ... ..... It was during the pendency of the proceedings taken by him that a notification was issued calling for applications for a fresh grant and license was granted to the appellant. The said exercise was on the supposition that by virtue of the cancellation of the fifth respondent’s license, a vacancy has arisen. Once the said supposition is not true - in the sense that the said cancellation was found to be illegal - the grant of license to the appellant must be deemed to be provisional and a temporary arrangement, as rightly held by the High Court, notwithstanding the fact that it may have been described as a permanent license. Once the fifth respondent’s license is restored, the license granted to the appellant comes to an end by operation of law. It is not really a case of "cancellation" within the meaning of Section 34 of the U.P. Excise Act. No notice was also necessary to be given to the appellant. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 472
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... ... ..... he principal Act on 4.4.1973 was legal and valid and because of the said notification the lands declared as surplus vested in the state under section 18 3 of the principal Act, there is no necessity to decide as to whether Act 25 of 1978 has the protection of Articles 31-A, 31-B and 31-C of the constitution. Once it is held that vesting of the surplus land had taken place on 4.4.1973, then the respondent shall be entitled to the compensation amount which is to be worked out at 2 times of the net annual income because of Act 39 of 1972 which had reduced the multiple of the compensation from 9 times to 2 times of the net annual income w.e.f. 21.12.1972. Accordingly, civil Appeal No. 134 of 1980 are allowed . The Judgement dated 8.10.1976 in writ Petition No. 1464 of 1974 and judgment dated 20.7.1979 in writ petition No. 2341-2343 of 1978 of the High Court area set aside and the writ petitions filed on behalf of the respondent are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (10) TMI 471
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... ... ..... pon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basic of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceeding and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant, Each case requires to be considered in his own backdrops. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned single judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1996 (10) TMI 470
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... ... ..... e relevant basis even though the courts may think that it is not the most appropriate basis, the estimate made by the assessing authority cannot be disturbed. 13. After analysing the facts and holding the petitioner guilty of suppression of taxable turnover, the Tribunal concluded that the tax suppressed by the appellant was to the extent of Rs. 14,88,806. The assessment of the suppressed amount was modified to the extent indicated in the order of the Tribunal. The appellate Tribunal took a lenient view and reduced the penalty of one and half times as imposed by the assessing authority. We are satisfied that the order of the Appellate Tribunal sought to be revised is based upon proper appreciation of findings, relevant provisions of law and critical analysis of the documents which requires no interference. The revision filed before this Court is without any basis and substance. Therefore, the revision petition is dismissed with costs assessed at Rs. 5,000. Petition dismissed.
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