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Showing 21 to 40 of 338 Records
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1996 (11) TMI 470
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... ... ..... able. In this context, I further make it clear that in terms of S. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, another duly authorised complaint could be filed in time i.e. within one month from the date of cause of action. In this view of the matter, Ex. P-1, a letter of authorisation filed after one year cannot be taken as a proper ratification of the action initiated by P.W. 1. Because if it is taken that on the date of Ex. P-1, letter (filed after one year), a duly constituted complaint is filed, it would be barred by limitation of one month prescribed by S. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Moreover nothing prevented the complainant to withdraw the complaint himself voluntarily and file another complaint with proper authorisation within the time permitted by S. 142 of the Act. 26. For the above reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order of the Court below and hence I pass the order as under 27. The Criminal Appeal is dismissed. 28. Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 469
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... ... ..... through any other person, or in any other way try to tamper with the evidence or influence any witness in this case or any other case against them or any other crime under investigation by any government agency; ( 3 ) If the appellants desire to go out of Delhi, they shall give prior information to C.B.I. about their programme, including the places and addresses where they can be contacted during that period; (4) The appellants shall cooperate in the early completion of the trial and shall attend the hearings unless exempted; (5) The appellants shall intimate the place of their residence and shall not change the same without prior intimation to the respondent of their intention to shift elsewhere; (6) The appellants will appear before the concerned officer of the C.B.I. or any other government agency whenever required in connection with any crime or matter under investigation. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and this appeal is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
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1996 (11) TMI 468
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... ... ..... ntemplated in Chapter VII of the Act, the company had delivered possession subject to the terms and conditions thereunder. It is seen that one of the conditions was that on cessation of the public purpose, the lands acquired would be surrendered to the Government. In furtherance thereof, the lands came to be surrendered to the Government for resumption. The lands then were allotted to SRVS Ltd., 5th respondent which is also a subsidiary amalgamated company of the original company. Therefore, the public purpose for which acquisition was made was substituted for another public purpose. Moreover, the question stood final settled 32 years ago and hence the writ petition cannot be entertained after three decades on the ground that either original purpose was not public purpose or the land cannot be used for any other purpose. Under these circumstances, we think that the High Court was right in refusing to entertain the writ petition. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 467
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... ... ..... ecessary for an effective exercise of the substantive power have to be inferred. See Khyerbari Tea Company Limited & Another v. State of Assam & others A.I.R. (1964) S.C. 925 at 935 . The rule as quoted n Craies is "one of the first principles of law with regard to the effect of an enabling act is that a legislature enables something to be done, it gives power at the same time by necessary implication to do everything which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purpose in view." For the above reasons, this appeal is allowed, the impugned orders of the Commission are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Commission for a fresh disposal of the matter according to law. No order as to costs. We make it clear that we may not be under stood to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the case of either party. The observations made hereinabove merely constitute reasons for this order and not findings on the claims of the respective parties.
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1996 (11) TMI 466
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... ... ..... of those reasons when the same are put in issue before the higher forum. Under these circumstances, the order of the High Court cannot be sustained. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated 20-4-1992 and remand the writ petition to the High Court for fresh disposal on merits. 5. It is clarified that we shall not be taken to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy in the case. The High Court is requested to dispose of the writ petition expeditiously. 6. While issuing notice in the special leave petition on 20-8-1993, the order of termination of service of the appellants was stayed. That stay order continues to be in operation till date. It is, therefore, appropriate that the stay order should continue to remain in operation for a further period of three months from today during which period the High Court may be approached for disposal of the writ petition and/or continuation of the stay order, as the case may be.
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1996 (11) TMI 465
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... ... ..... and the appellate Court has co- extensive power to permit the appellant to give up his appeal against the respondent either as a whole or part of the relief. As a consequence, though the appeal was admitted under Order XXXXI, Rule 9, necessarily the Court has the power to dismiss the appeal as withdrawn without going into the merits of the matter and deciding it under Rule 11 thereof. Accordingly, we hold that the action taken by the counsel is consistent with the power he had under Order III, Rule 4, CPC, If really the counsel has not acted in the interest of the party or against the instructions of the party, the necessary remedy is elsewhere and the procedure adopted by the Court below is consistent with the provisions of CPC. We do not find any illegality in the order passed by the Additional District Judge as confirmed by the High Court in the revision. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed giving liberty to the petitioner to proceed in according with law.
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1996 (11) TMI 464
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... ... ..... d the appeals we find no ground to take a different view than the one taken by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Consequently, the acquisition proceedings could not be quashed on any grounds. We also find ourselves in respectful agreement with the view taken by this Court in the case of Ram Chand (supra). Consequently. the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. The transfer cases are allowed in terms of the order made in the case of Ram Chand (supra) directing that the tranfer petitioners and the appellants shall be paid an additional amount of compensation to be calculated at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, after the expiry of two years from the date of decision of Aflatoon's case i.e. August 23, 1974 till the date of making of the awards by the Collector, to be calculated with reference to the market value of the land in question on the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 463
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... ... ..... ct 68 of 1984, has no application. The notification under the Adhiniyam similar to Section 4(1) and the declaration similar to Section 6 do not stand lapsed after the expiry of two years from the date the Amendment Act has come into force. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to grant the relief. 6. The Land Acquisition Officer is directed to pass the award in accordance with law within a period of six weeks from the date of the receipt of this order. If the Land Acquisition Officer does not pass the award within that period, he should award interest on the amount awarded 18 from the date of the expiry of six weeks till the date of the deposit with him of the compensation by the requisitioning authority. In any event, if the amount is not deposited with the Land Acquisition Officer within a further period of three months thereafter, there shall be a direction to the State Government to withdraw from the acquisition. 7. The appeal is accordingly ordered. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 462
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... ... ..... this view from the decision of the Bombay High Court in Vimal Lalchand Mutha’s case (supra). In that case, the assessee had entered into an agreement for the purchase of a flat in November 1977 and the formal agreement was executed in December 1978. The assessee had transferred her right, title and interest in the said flat by an agreement executed in April 1983. On these facts, it was held that the rights under the agreement had been held by the assessee for more than 36 months and that the gains arising from the transfer of her rights in the agreement constituted long-term capital gains. We, therefore, hold that the sum of ₹ 1,70,50,000 received by the assessee has to be treated as long-term capital gain. Consequently, we direct the Assessing Officer to examine the assessee’s claim for exemption under section 54E of the Act and grant the exemption claimed if the necessary conditions have been satisfied. 45. In the result, the appeal stands partly allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 461
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... ... ..... on under Section 6 published on May 19, 1995 does not have any effect on the declaration published under Section 6(1) on December 24, 1986 which has the legal effect of getting restored. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, was right in setting aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and dismissing the writ petition. It is already seen that the lands stood vested in the State on January 29, 1987 and after the lands including the land belonging to the appellants in an extent of 81.9 bighas out of total extent of 713.2 bighas, were taken possession, they stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances. The award also became final. Under these circumstances, the learned single Judge was wholly wrong in the judgment under appeal before the Division Bench; the reasoning given and consequences reached by the Division Bench are entirely correct in law warranting no interference. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 460
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... ... ..... ards development charges, has confirmed the same in the impugned judgment. Shri H.K. Puri, learned counsel for the appellants contended that in several judgment, this Court has confirmed deduction upto 40 of the compensation towards development charges and that, therefore, the same ratio would be maintained in all the cases. In some cases this Court has pointed out that depending upon the location between 30 to 40 was proper and was approved. In this case the Division Bench hes accepted thus "I am of the view a deduction of the 40 would be reasonable." We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has correctly applied the principle and we find no ground to interfere with it. The appeal is accordingly dismissed,
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1996 (11) TMI 459
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... ... ..... s of which the High Court had directed to dispose of the dispute relating to the excess land had been reversed by this Court, the Authorised Officer was justified in following the judgment of this Court instead of the judgment of the High Court. It need not be pointed out that the order passed by the High Court attained finality as it was not challenged before the Supreme Court. The order passed by the High Court directing the Authorised Officer to examine the dispute in the light of the judgment of the High Court in the case of Naganatha Ayyar v. Authorised Officer, 84 LW 69 became final although the judgment on which the grievance had to be examined itself was reversed later by this Court. We find no fault with the reasoning of the High Court. It is well settled that even orders which may not be strictly legal become final and are binding between the parties if they are not challenged before the superior courts. In the result the appeal fails and it is dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 458
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... ... ..... es. As a matter of fact, even in the case of direct taxes, levy at a rate higher than 50 is regular feature. Of course, these are instances not involving free speech right and stand upon a different plane. We are also unable to see any substance in the grievance that taxes are only levied upon them and not upon the Doordarshan. We do not think that there can be any comparison between Doordarshan and the appellants. Doordarshan is a government organisation which is supposed to act in furtherance of public interest. It is not a business carried on by the Government. The revenues collected by it by permitting advertisements are only intended to defray part of the huge expenditure the Government incurs on establishing and maintaining the broadcasting system throughout the country. By no stretch of imagination can the appellants claim any similarity with the Doordarshan. For the above reasons the appeals and writ petitions fail and are dismissed. There shall be no order to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 457
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... ... ..... to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 - indeed any of their discretionary powers. It may even be open to the High Court to direct, in case it finds finally that the acquisition was vitiated on account of non-compliance with some legal requirement that the persons interested shall also be entitled to a particular amount of damages to be awarded as a lumpsum or calculated at a certain percentage of compensation payable. There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings. The appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 456
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... ... ..... ce adduced before it that the punishment awarded was justified. However, in Desh Raj Gupta the observations in Gujarat Steel were relied on for taking different view without any reference to either Kalyani or D.C. Roy which appear to have been overlooked. In these circumstances the decision in Desh Raj Gupta cannot be treated as an authority on the point. Both these decisions were by two-judge Bench. As a result of the aforesaid decision it must be held that the only point involved for decision in the appeal is concluded against the appellant by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Kalyani and the observations to the contrary in Gujarat Steel are, therefore, per incurium and not binding. The order of punishment in the present case operated from November 18, 1981 when it was made by the employer and not from December 11, 1985, the date of Labour Court s award. The appellant is, therefore, not entitled to any relief. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 455
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... ... ..... e may ultimately be found liable would be met by have been dismissed. His licences have been cancelled, re-auction conducted and loss due to the State - to the people - has been ascertained. The High Court ought to enforce the undertaking now by proceeding against the respondent-firm licencee and all its partners. The violation of the undertaking, it needs to be mentioned, amounts to contempt of court. It is the duty of the court to try to repair the damage to the extent possible. No one should be allowed to suffer on account of the act(s) of the court. We, therefore, request the High Court to initiate appropriate proceedings for enforcing the "undertaking" aforesaid. Even otherwise, the interim orders passed are always subject to the final orders in the matter. The interim orders can always be corrected or revised at the final stage. Since the respondent is not represented before us, we are desisting from imposing penal costs which we would have imposed otherwise.
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1996 (11) TMI 454
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... ... ..... e for reference under section 10 of the ID Act. The workmen, who no abolition of contract labour system have no right to seek reference under section of 10 of ID Act. Moreover, the workmen immediately are kept out of job to endlessly keep waiting for award and thereafter resulting in further litigation and delay in enforcement. The management would always keep them at by for absorption. it would be difficult for them to work out their right. Moreover, it is a trade and time-consuming process and years would role by. Without wages, they cannot keep fighting the litigation endlessly. The right and remedy would be a teasing illusion and would be rendered otiose and practically compelling the workman at the mercy of the principal employer. Considered from this pragmatic perspective, with due respect to the learned judges, the remedy valuable assistance given by all the learned counsel in the appeals. The appeals are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 453
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... ... ..... n of India etc. v. Metal Box Company of India Limited etc., 1996 (87) E.L.T. 327 (S.C.) JT 1996 (8) SC 638. The appeals are dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 452
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... ... ..... l proceedings. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the touchstone of human conduct. The standard of proof in the departmental proceedings is not the same as of the criminal trial. The evidence also is different from the standard point of Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated by Evidence Act. Under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case, we have seen that the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304A and 338 IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings. The appeals are accordingly allowed. No. costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 450
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... ... ..... ppropriate deliberations at the level of the Government, as repeatedly pointed out by the Supreme Court. In the process what is sacrificed is public interest by each one of the personnel concerned on either side of the litigation who draw their livelihood from the exchequer. It all started with the issuance of certificate in form G2 without specifying what is the final product of the petitioner and what are the raw materials, component parts, etc., which are eligible for the purpose of concessional rate of tax. In the background of the above-mentioned weird facts, the present revision is filed calling upon this court to give a declaration that the order under revision was made by the appellate authority either erroneously or in the alternative it failed to decide the question of law. We decline to exercise the jurisdiction and hope that the facts narrated above sufficiently justify our reluctance to exercise the jurisdiction. The TREVC is dismissed at the stage of admission.
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