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Case Laws
Showing 321 to 338 of 338 Records
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1996 (11) TMI 18
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... ... ..... RC No. 67 of 1969, dt. 5th Nov., 1971, quoted by the Tribunal, we may note the following observation made by Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, as he then was, speaking for the Bench. The learned Judge observed, her interest in the jewels is limited to being allowed to wear them if the trustees do not withdraw them from her. To our minds, the interest appears to be of a permissive nature and cannot be called property, however widely the expression may be interpreted. We, therefore, agree with the Tribunal that neither the interest of the Sahebzadi in the jewellery fund nor her interest in the shares fund is an asset within the meaning of the WT Act. We are in entire agreement with the observation of the Bench. In view of the said observation, the point is squarely covered by a binding judgment of this Court. Therefore, no referable question of law arises. In view of the above position, we opine that no referable questions of law arise. Accordingly, the wealth-tax case is dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 17
Remuneration Paid To Managing Director ... ... ... ... ..... oyer would amount to perquisite in the hands of the employee-director. In CIT v. Indian Engineering and Commercial Corporation P. Ltd. 1993 201 ITR 723, the Supreme Court held that the employees concerned herein also happen to be directors. The provision in clause (c) of section 40 applies to directors among others. Of course, section 40(c) is applicable only to companies, whereas section 40A(5) is applicable to employees whether of companies or others. In the case of directors, who are also employees, both the provisions will be attracted---the higher of the two ceilings has to be applied . In view of the abovesaid decision of the Supreme Court, we consider that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in the present case directing the Assessing Officer to recompute the liability in accordance with the provisions contained in section 40(c) of the Act. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 16
Penalty, Waiver Of Penalty ... ... ... ... ..... from him. It is not disputed before me that in the instant case when the return was a return of loss no recovery of the tax was required to be started against the petitioner. The observation made by the Commissioner that assessee was not co-operative in recovery proceedings would certainly be contrary to the record and would show non-application of mind. So far as the question of hardship is concerned except employing the language as provided under section 273A(4), the Commissioner has not given any reasons. Considering the totality of the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the order dated March 19, 1985, passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax, Bhopal, deserves to be quashed. It is accordingly quashed. The learned Commissioner is directed to reconsider the matter in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. There shall be no orders as to costs. Security amount, if any, deposited by the petitioner be refunded after due verification.
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1996 (11) TMI 15
Accrual, Mercantile System, Coffee ... ... ... ... ..... f the income of the assessee during the year in which the sale was effected. While coming to the above conclusion, this court considered the plea of the assessee that the procedure followed by the assessee was to account for the actual amount received by it in later years as and when it was received and, therefore, the assessee should not be compelled to deviate from the procedure followed by it. The above plea did not find favour with this court. While coming to the above conclusion, this court had followed the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhavani Tea Produce Company s case 1966 59 ITR 254. We respectfully follow the decision of this court referred to above and disagree with the view taken by the Karnataka High Court in Graig Jones (D. G.) (Mrs.) v. State of Karnataka 1984 148 ITR 297. In the light of the above, we answer the questions raised in these cases in the affirmative, against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue. References are answered as above.
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1996 (11) TMI 14
Accounting, Method Of Accounting, Rejection Of Accounts, Question Of Law ... ... ... ... ..... artment, as also perused the impugned order and the proposed questions for reference. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied with the views expressed by the Appellate Tribunal, while rejecting the prayer of the assessee. Accordingly, we direct the Appellate Tribunal to state the case and refer the following questions before this court (i) Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the books of account were rightly rejected by the Tribunal applying the provisions of section 145(1) of the Act and the addition of Rs. 2,67,952 can, therefore, be sustained? (ii) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the findings of the Tribunal in upholding the rejection of the book profit shown by the assessee is not vitiated by reason of surmises and suspicion, particularly, when there was no allegation of change in the method of accounting to what was accepted by the authorities for the previous years? This petition is thus disposed of.
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1996 (11) TMI 13
Reassessment, Audit ... ... ... ... ..... entioned in the present case, relates to an earlier assessment year and the said audit report is not before us. Therefore, it is not possible for us now to say as to what was pointed out by the audit party. However, the Tribunal in its order, gave a finding that to say that the earlier year s audit party note would not have influenced the Income-tax Officer, would be hyper-technical in nature. The Tribunal also pointed out that the audit party also interpreted the law to be applied and it is not a case where the audit party has merely drawn the attention of the Income-tax Officer to the provisions of law. Considering all these aspects, we are of the opinion that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in coming to the conclusion that the reassessment made under section 147(b) of the Act in the present assessment year under consideration is bad in law. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 12
Loans Or Deposits, Payment Mode, Repayment Mode, Vires, Validity ... ... ... ... ..... uineness of the loan or deposit. We should, however, be not understood as saying that if the deposit or loan is shown to have been received by means of an account payee cheque or an account payee bank draft the Assessing Officer would invariably hold the genuineness of the deposit or loan. The provision of section 269SS of the Act takes into account only one aspect of the matter. We find the provision is quite rational and it achieves the object of curbing circulation of black money. The provision is not discriminatory or arbitrary. The challenge to its constitutional validity must, therefore, be repelled. We are in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Madras High Court in the case of K.R.M.V. Ponnuswamy Nadar Sons (Firm) v. Union of India 1992 196 ITR 431 and the Gujarat High Court in the case of Sukhdev Rathi v. Union of India 1995 211 ITR 157. Accordingly, this writ application fails and is dismissed. We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 11
Gratuity Fund, Actuarial Valuation ... ... ... ... ..... l income of a person. It is also crystal clear that if there is a statutory provision, payment of gratuity has to be paid in accordance with the said statutory provision. The position is that when there is no statutory provision regulating and controlling the payment of gratuity, then and then alone resort to actuarial basis can be perceived. In regard to the situation under consideration, the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, answers the situation. We find that this aspect has not been adverted to at all in spite of there being specific contentions in regard thereto. Therefore, we are left with only one course of remittance of the proceedings to the Deputy Commissioner, Agricultural Income-tax and Sales Tax, Ernakulam, to consider the question in the light of the above observations. The result is that the two orders (annexures C and D) get quashed and set aside resulting in the remittance of the proceedings as observed above. Both tax revision cases get disposed of accordingly.
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1996 (11) TMI 10
Reference, Penalty, Concealment Of Income ... ... ... ... ..... n CIT v. Shri Parshad 1984 146 ITR 397 and argued that similar question has already been decided by the High Court and, therefore, the same need not be referred to this court once again. After having perused the orders passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal, we are of the opinion that the question sought for by the Revenue is a question of law and a direction deserves to be given to the Tribunal to make reference of the same to this court. Whether this court will ultimately accept the plea of the Revenue or not is not to be determined at this stage of the proceedings. The only thing to be seen by the court for the present is whether the question sought for by the petitioner is a question of law or not. For the reasons mentioned above, the petitions are allowed. The Income-tax Appellate Tribunal is directed to state the question of law framed in these petitions and make reference to this court and also remit the records of the cases to this court.
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1996 (11) TMI 9
Bonus, Excess, Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... such payment of bonus was made in the earlier years. Therefore, it is under the customary practice of the assessee to pay bonus every year, in accordance with the profit earned by the assessee. As per the decision of the Supreme Court in Mumbai Kamgar Sabha s case 1976 49 FJR 15 AIR 1976 SC 1455, if the bonus is paid customarily and the payment of bonus is reasonable, it should not be hit by the provisions of section 36(1)(ii) of the Act. Inasmuch as the Tribunal came to the conclusion on appraisal of facts that the bonus paid was reasonable and customary, we are of the opinion that such payment of bonus is allowable as a deduction and the matter need not be remitted back for redetermination of the allowable bonus, as requested by the Department. A similar view was also taken by this court in CIT v. Mohamed Ismail (D.) 1997 227 ITR 211, by judgment dated July 2, 1996. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (11) TMI 8
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... ... ..... r consideration, for application to the present proceedings, the Income-tax Officer considered the expenses to be considered for the disallowance under section 37(3A) in the following manner Rs. (1) Advertisement 8,34,689 (2) Payment to hotels 1,45,852 (3) Motor car expenses 1,10,526 --------------- 10,91,067 ---------------- In regard to which it was claimed on behalf of the assessee that under motor car expenses Rs. 48,201 was spent on repairs to the car and salary to drivers which was disallowed by the officer being unable to treat them as the expenses on running and maintenance of motor cars. In our judgment the approach of the Income-tax Officer will have to be endorsed. For the above reasons we answer the question in the negative---in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for passing consequential orders.
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1996 (11) TMI 7
Rectification Of Mistakes, Interest, Waiver ... ... ... ... ..... on AIR 1996 SC 1509 1996) 3 Scale 103, failure to give an opportunity to the petitioner in my view will not vitiate the order passed under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, on the facts and circumstances of the case. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner seems to be that since the Income-tax Act does not pin-point the time at which the tax should be paid, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit under section 273A of the Act. I am not able to agree the contention of learned counsel as the contention is against the statutory provisions contained in the Act. When Parliament has clearly set out the conditions precedent to make an application under section 273A of the Income-tax Act and when that condition precedent is not fulfilled, I do not think either the order passed under section 273A of the Act is vitiated or the order passed under section 154 of the Act is erroneous in law. There are no merits in these petitions. Writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 6
Every scheme of amalgamation has to necessarily provide a date with effect from which the amalgamation/transfer shall take place. - But where the court does not prescribe any specific date but merely sanctions the scheme presented to it - It must be remembered that before applying to the court under section 391(1), a scheme has to be framed and such scheme has to contain a date of amalgamation/transfer. The proceedings before the court may take some time; indeed, they are bound to take some time because several steps provided by sections 391 to 394A and the relevant rules have to be followed and complied with. the notices issued by the Income-tax Officer (impugned in the writ petition) were not warranted in law. The business carried on by the transferor company (subsidiary company) should be deemed to have been carried on for and on behalf of the transferee company. This is the necessary and the logical consequence of the court sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation as presented to it. The order of the court sanctioning the scheme, the filing of the certified copies of the orders of the court before the Registrar of Companies, the allotment of shares, etc., may have all taken place subsequent to the date of amalgamation/transfer, yet the date of amalgamation in the circumstances of this case would be January 1, 1982.
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1996 (11) TMI 5
Approved superannuation fund is set up only from the contributions made by the employer who is given certain tax benefits in order to encourage the setting up of such superannuation funds. We do not see any reason to strike down any part of the scheme for such a superannuation fund prescribed under the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the Income-tax Rules, 1962 - petition is, therefore, dismissed - Rule 89 is not arbitrary - Rule 91 cannot be considered as giving any unjust gains to the LIC of India.
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1996 (11) TMI 4
Appellant/transferee is a partnership-firm with the name Prima Realty but the cheque described the payee as Prime Reality Ltd. which referred to a different legal entity, a limited company, instead of a firm - non-compliance with the requirement of section 269UG(1) - held that the adjustment of the exact amount due between the persons having a share in the total amount of consideration was an internal arrangement between them and would not vitiate the tender of the amount of consideration
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1996 (11) TMI 3
Whether the respondent-assessee-firm is entitled to registration - ITO held that the respondent-assessee -- sub-partnership -- contravenes the provisions of section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abkari Act and so, the sub-partnership should be considered as void and illegal - held that section 14 of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Abkari Act was not attracted and that the sub-partnership was entitled to registration.
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1996 (11) TMI 2
Income-tax Officer was justified in invoking the provisions of section 13 and correcting the error in the order passed on September 16, 1968. The Income-tax Officer by the second order of rectification was not trying to rectify the original order of assessment passed on March 30, 1965, but was seeking to restore it by rectifying the error in the amended order passed on September 16, 1968 - hence second order of rectification was not barred by limitation
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1996 (11) TMI 1
Machinery installed in Hotel - Tribunal was correct in law in holding that the assessee was entitled to extra depreciation allowance and also extra shift depreciation allowance on the reasoning that there was no prohibition for granting both the allowance either in the Income-tax Rules or in the Act
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