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Showing 41 to 60 of 338 Records
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1996 (11) TMI 449
... ... ... ... ..... g condonation of delay in each of the three tax revision case. One such application was dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court with the consequence that the judgment of the Tribunal became final. It therefore follows that the authorities cannot take any action on the supposition that the judgment of the Tribunal is under consideration by this Court in any tax revision case. 2.. The impugned notices are also liable to be set aside on another ground. Under section 20(2-A) of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, revisional power cannot be exercised in respect of any issue or question which is the subject-matter of an appeal before, or which was decided on appeal by, the Appellate Tribunal under section 21 . It therefore, follows that what has been decided by the Tribunal could not be in subject-matter for exercising revisional jurisdiction. 3.. In the result, the three writ petitions are allowed and the impugned notices are set aside. No costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 448
... ... ... ... ..... y, the works contract executed by the petitioner is complex in nature. Thus, the new construction of water supply schemes as well as sewage schemes, if any, involving supply and laying of pipes executed by the petitioner in indivisible works contract have to be classified as civil works contract only for the purpose of payment of tax at compounded rate under section 7-C of the Act. 11.. In the above circumstances, as prayed for, the notice of the assessing authority in TNGST/0720064/97-98 dated September 26, 1997 is quashed and the assessing authority is directed to grant permission to the petitioner to pay compounded rate of tax under section 7-C of the Act in terms of this order. The original petition is disposed of in the above terms. And this Tribunal doth further order that this order on being produced be punctually observed and carried into execution by all concerned. Issued under my hand and the seal of this Tribunal on the 9th day of November, 1998. Petition allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 447
At what stage the beer is exigible to duty under the Punjab Excise Act, 1914?
Held that:- It is the place of storage, with reference to which duty is liable to be paid, as envisaged under Section 23 of the Act read with the Rule made by the Government.The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the respondents are entitled to collect the excise duty as per the rates specified by the Government in exercise of the power in Chapter V of the Act from the appellant when the appellant removed beer from the place of storage/warehouse etc.
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1996 (11) TMI 446
Whether the suit filed by the appellant against the respondents in the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad was barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 Sub-rule (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908?
Held that:- Infringement of a registered trade mark would also be a continuing wrong so long as infringement continues. Therefore, whether the earlier infringement has continuer or a new infringement has taken place cause of action for filing a fresh suit would obviously arise in favour of the plaintiff who is aggrieved by such fresh infringements of trade mark or fresh passing off actions alleged against the defendant. Consequently, in our view even on merits the learned Trial Judge as well as the learned Single Judge were obviously in error in taking the view that the second suit of the plaintiff in the present case was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 sub-rule (3), CPC.
As the learned Single Judge of the High Court has held on merits in favour of the plaintiff and has taken the view that the action of the defendants is actionable and amounts to acts of passing off as the waterproof raincoats manufactured by the first defendant bearing the trade mark `BACK BACK' are phonetically and visually similar to those of the plaintiff hearing the trade mark `DUCK BACK', it must be held that the plaintiff had made put a case for actionable breach of infringement of plaintiff's trade mark as well as actionable act of passing off by the defendants of their goods as if they were plaintiff's goods and, therefore, the plaintiff's suit would be required to be decreed.
In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of dismissal of the plaintiff's suit as passed by the Trial Court and as confirmed by the High Court are set aside. Plaintiff's Original Suit No.123 of 1982 in the Court of Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad is ordered to be decreed as prayed for. Appeal is accordingly allowed .
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1996 (11) TMI 445
... ... ... ... ..... orfeited to the Government, the situation will have to be understood for the purpose of consideration of benefit of explanation not in the manner in which the Tribunal has observed but it will have to be taken into consideration that the tax on the coconut oil would be no less relevant for reduction in the context, simply by virtue of the position that during the year in question tax on coconut oil cake is in the exempted category leading to the situation of forfeiture of amount to the Government with regard to the tax collected by the assessee in regard thereto. 10.. Therefore the amount of tax at 5 per cent calculated at Rs. 87,142.50 would have to be considered for the benefit of the above explanation. 11.. For the above reasons all the three orders (annexures I, II and III) get quashed and set aside and in this context the proceedings are remitted to comply the above explanation in the light of our above observations. Revision case succeeds accordingly. Petition allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 444
... ... ... ... ..... (a) or (b) of sub-section (1), direct any Commercial Taxes Officer or Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer to prefer appeal before the Tribunal. It clearly provided that the Commercial Taxes Officer or Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer to whom the Commissioner had directed for filing appeal could file second appeal. It is not in dispute that second appeal is filed in pursuance of the direction of the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Department. The petitioner filed the said second appeals in compliance with the order of the Commissioner. It cannot, therefore, be said that he was not competent to file the said second appeals before the Rajasthan Tax Board. As such the application for revision deserves to be allowed. 7.. Accordingly, the application for revision is allowed and the common order of the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer, dated May 11, 1989 is set aside. The second appeals will be decided by the Rajasthan Tax Board, Ajmer, on merits in accordance with law. Petition allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 443
... ... ... ... ..... on 11B(2) ran as under Where any amount of tax, fee, interest or penalty is demanded from a dealer as a result of an order passed in any proceedings under this Act (including assessment, appeal, revision, rectification or otherwise) and such tax, interest or penalty, is not paid by such dealer within the time required by or under the provisions of this Act, he shall be liable to pay interest at the rate of two per cent per month on the amount of tax or interest or penalty from the date of expiry of such time until the date of payment of such amount. No such provision has been referred to in any of the said reported cases, relied upon by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner. 7.. Accordingly, the application for revision is allowed. The orders of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Jaipur dated January 30, 1992 and of the Tax Board, Ajmer dated May 26, 1995 are set aside. The assessment order dated September 25, 1991 is restored. No order as to costs. Application allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 442
... ... ... ... ..... to furnish documents and correct particulars shall be served on the owner of the goods or person in-charge of the vehicle within 15 days from the date of service of the notice. This is a mandatory requirement and has to be read in the context of the reasonable opportunity to be afforded which section 22A(7) speaks of. It is not in dispute that a fifteen days notice was not given in this case. This vitiates the proceedings initiated by the petitioner. This infirmity does not disappear with the petitioner seeking determination of the matter the same day, particularly when there were uncontroverted allegations of duress. When the identity of the consignee was known it was necessary to have made enquiries from him too before imposing penalty. For these reasons the orders of the petitioner and the D.C. (Appeals) cannot stand and were correctly set aside. 8.. The application for revision stands disposed of accordingly with the above observations. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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1996 (11) TMI 441
... ... ... ... ..... record of the AA. 6.. The RST Act does not speak of bonus. The RST Act in section 2(p) which defines sale price speaks of any sum allowed as cash discount according to the practice normally prevailing in the trade and this sum is to be deducted from the sale price. In other words it is a reduction in price and has to be expressed in cash terms as a function, in the mathematical sense, of price. Once the sale of the goods in question is taxable at the first point they can enter the market and the series of sales, if any, thereafter only as tax paid goods. A perusal of the records of the case indicates that there is nothing to show how the so-called bonus could be translated into a cash discount. The D.C. (Appeals) therefore did the right thing in remanding the matter. 7.. The application for revision is accepted and the impugned order of the Board is set aside and the order of the D.C. (Appeals) dated March 29, 1993 is restored. 8.. No order as to costs. Application allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 440
... ... ... ... ..... exure 5, of the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Department, Rajasthan, Jaipur. In this regard, it may simply be observed that the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) would not be prejudiced in any way on the merits of the case by this order, annexure 5. This order will simply be taken as an order passed under section 41(4), RST Act, 1994 transferring the case from Commercial Taxes Officer, Works Contract and Leasing Tax Circle, Ajmer, to Commercial Taxes Officer, Special Circle, Ajmer. 9.. The abovequoted stay order passed by this Tribunal on September 2, 1996 is confirmed and it will continue till the disposal of the appeals filed against the assessment orders, annexures 3 and 4. The Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), Ajmer, will decide them by March 31, 1997. 10. The application moved under section 8(1), Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal Act, 1995 is accordingly disposed of. Any observation made in this order will not prejudice the case of either party. Application disposed of accordingly.
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1996 (11) TMI 439
... ... ... ... ..... o include milk powder, baby food, ghee, cheese and butter with the exception of curd and buttermilk in regard thereto. It is obvious that this inclusive entry would have to be understood in sharing the characteristic of inclusive instances. Obviously therefore falooda would not be understood as a milk product . The Tribunal has also held that it is not a milk product as such. 10.. It is not possible to agree with the observations of the Tribunal that falooda will have to be treated as a multi-point item taxable at the general rate prevalent at the relevant time. Falooda is a cooked food. 11.. Naturally, therefore, the impugned order dated November 15, 1994 in T.A. No. 88 of 1994 of the Kerala Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Additional Bench, Kozhikode, will get modified to that extent directing the assessing authority to consider the tax liability with regard to falooda on the basis that it is a cooked food. The tax revision case gets disposed of accordingly. Petition allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 438
... ... ... ... ..... ion and installation of cranes and hoists that when the Act was amended with reference to the works contract involving transfer of goods, fabrication and installation of cranes and hoists are understood together. Learned counsel wanted to make use of this addition of Fourth Schedule. It is not possible to accept the submission with regard to the understanding of the legislative intention because the necessity for an attempt to understand the legislative intention would arise only when the concerned legislative language presents any kind of difficulty in regard thereto. We have already stated that entry No. 140A is more than clear in the context of the heading transport equipments and the other entries in regard thereto. The Tribunal has considered the entire situation and there is no need to run after finding out the legislative intention in regard thereto when the provision is abundantly clear. For all the above reasons tax revision case stands dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1996 (11) TMI 437
... ... ... ... ..... ailable to the petitioner and, therefore, this Court should not entertain this petition, on the facts and circumstances of the present case, is again devoid of any force. The availability of the alternative remedy does not create a bar to the exercise of the jurisdiction by this Court under article 226 of the Constitution. In our view the order impugned in the petition is wholly without jurisdiction and the authority of law and it is, therefore, a fit case to quash he same in exercise of our writ jurisdiction rather than directing the petitioner to file an appeal, assuming for the present purposes that such an appeal lies. 6.. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the petition, quash the impugned order dated 4th January, 1996, and make the rule absolute. We direct the respondents to issue ST-1 forms forthwith on petitioner complying with the other formalities, if any. The petitioner shall also be entitled to the costs of this petition quantified at Rs. 5,000. Petition allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 436
... ... ... ... ..... he amount falling short that interest could be levied under section 8(1) of the Act and, of course, in a suitable case, penalty could also be levied for not filing the return. So far as the present case is concerned, the assessing officer did not undertake that exercise and there is no finding that the tax deposited by the dealer was less than the tax payable by him on the turnover shown by him in his books of account. Therefore, no interest was leviable on the revisionist under section 8(1) of the Act in the manner described above. 13.. For the above reasons, the levy of interest in the sums aforesaid for the assessment years 1980-81 and 1981-82 is not sustainable in law. The revision petitions are, therefore, allowed and setting aside the Tribunal s order dated January 28, 1988, it is ordered that the dealer s second appeals aforesaid stand allowed and the levy of interest is quashed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties will bear their own costs. Petition allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 435
... ... ... ... ..... to certify that he requires the materials for use as raw material in the manufacture of notified goods under notification and that the said manufactured goods would be sold in the manner contemplated in sub-section (2) of section 4-B. None of these statements is stated to be false or wrong. The mistake according to revenue s own admission was on the part of the assessing officer in issuing a recognition certificate for the manufacture of G.P. buckets the turnover of which was not liable to tax. Such a mistake does not entitle the assessing officer to take recourse to action under section 3-B of the Act. 7.. For the above reasons the Tribunal s order on this point is not sustainable and setting aside the same it is ordered that the revisionist s second appeal before the Tribunal on the aforesaid point stands allowed and the tax levied under section 3-B of the Act is quashed. The revisionist will get its costs of these revision petitions from the respondent. Petitions allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 434
... ... ... ... ..... l and Company s case 1984 56 STC 89 (Raj) are different from those in the present case and, therefore, the ratio of Jindal s case is not applicable to the present case. The learned single Judge was, therefore, not justified in applying the ratio of the decision in Sunder Das Jindal and Company s case 1984 56 STC 89 (Raj) to the present case. 12.. Under these facts and circumstances coupled with the abovequoted observations, it is held that the contract involved in these cases is a contract of work and labour and not for sale and the assessment order annexure 4 (first writ petition) and notice annexure 5 (second writ petition) deserve to be quashed. 13.. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed. Assessment order annexure 4 of the first writ petition and notice annexure 5 of the second writ petition are quashed. It is held that the contract annexures 1 to 3 (both writ petition) is a contract for work and labour and not for sale. No order as to costs. Writ petitions allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 433
... ... ... ... ..... acement. This factual position also has to be appreciated in the light of the approach determined by the three decisions of the apex Court. 23.. The learned Government counsel submitted that if the trees are taken up for sale on the ground that they have become old and very uneconomical making out a situation for replanting rubber, the trees could not be considered as trees basically. It is not possible to accept this submission, in the light of the language of the agreements as well as in the light of the common parlance approach that even a dead tree will have to be understood as tree and not by any other nomenclature. 24.. For all the above reasons, we hold that the standing rubber trees sold in pursuance of the agreements would not be timber exigible to tax and consequently would be agricultural produce coming within the meaning of explanation I(ii) to section 2(xxvii) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act. All the tax revision cases, therefore, succeed. Petitions allowed.
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1996 (11) TMI 432
... ... ... ... ..... applied retrospectively to create a tax liability of the applicant from a date retrospectively. 25. This does not, in any way, challenge the validity of the Act. As such, the prayer is only to the officer concerned not to apply the definition of dealer contained in the Act retrospectively. Such a relief cannot be given by the officer so long as the Act declares clearly that it shall always be deemed to have been in force. 26.. In the circumstances, the only answer to the question referred to this Court by the Financial Commissioner is in the affirmative that the Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation, dealing with the disposal of articles like chassis, tyres, tubes, spare parts and vehicles which it thinks are not useful for public use, though the same can be used for other purposes after some repair be considered dealer within the definition of dealer as is given in section 2(c) of the Himachal Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1968. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1996 (11) TMI 431
... ... ... ... ..... ruling. The 46th Amendment of the Constitution with effect from February 2, 1983 may well be a watershed. The facts of the present case locate it in a different catchment. The fact that the Rajasthan High Court had upheld the impugned same order of the Board in Laxmi Misthan Bhandar s case 1989 74 STC 260 is, with respect of no avail in the facts and circumstances of this case which is squarely covered by the Supreme Court s ruling in Northern India Caterer s case 1980 45 STC 212. The decision in Laxmi Misthan Bhandar s case 1989 74 STC 260, would hold for the matters disposed of by that judgment and other cases similarly placed if there is a finding of fact that the supply of food was dominantly by way of service. 12.. In this view of the matter the revision is accepted and it is held that the impugned order could not decide the instant case and the order of the assessing authority dated December 27, 1983 is restored. No order as to costs. Petition allowed. Here italicised.
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1996 (11) TMI 430
... ... ... ... ..... and flats would be exempted from this tax. In the instant case, the product that fell for consideration before the tax authorities was re-rolled angles, rounds, flats, etc. It is not the case of the petitioner s firm that the ingots and billets used as raw material suffered any tax under the Act. From the finding recorded by the assessing authority it is clear that it was only the scrap that suffered the tax from which ingots and billets were manufactured and ingots and billets used as raw material for the re-rolled rounds, angles and flats, etc., did not suffer any tax. In these circumstances, the re-rolled rounds, angles, flats, etc., cannot be exempted from the payment of tax in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 88, dated January 28, 1977 as held by the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. In this view of the matter the impugned order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal does not call for any interference. Accordingly this tax revision case is hereby dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.
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