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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 408 Records
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1996 (4) TMI 518 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... cle; and (4) to find out the changes made in the accounts and the transactions carried out in the name of the erstwhile firm after the dissolution of the firm by notice dated 10.5.1984 to determine the profit and loss of the petitioner or such other reliefs that the Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. 10. It would be seen that item (1) clearly falls within the exception provided in Section 69(3). In respect of items (2), though it is widely worded, the respondent would be entitled to the question of entitlement towards the goodwill only upto the date of dissolution of the firm but not thereafter. With regard to items (3) and (4), they arise from the contract and these items would not come under any exceptions engrafted under Section 69(3) of the Partnership Act. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in making the reference in item No. (4). 11. The appeals are accordingly allowed to the above extent, but, in the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 517 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nces other professionals Are permitted to simultaneously practise law would not be strictly relevant in deciding the short question with which we are concerned, namely, whether the State Bar Council had undertaken an impermissible exercise in enacting the impugned rule restricting entries of other professionals to the legal profession while they are not prepared to give up their other professions and on the contrary insist on simultaneously practising more than one professions. While deciding this question the wider question whether there can be a better rule than one framed by the State Bar Council would be besides the point and cannot be of any assistance. Such a contention, therefore, cannot be of any avail to the learned senior counsel for the appellant. The aforesaid were the only contentions canvassed on behalf of the appellant and as they fail the appeal also fails and will stand dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 516 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... al, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 515 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... t took the view that there was want of material which could be tendered as substantive evidence to prove association of Thapa with Tiger Memon and his associates. And so, it allowed Thapa to continue on bail. On these special facts, we are not satisfied if a case for cancellation of bail has been made out, despite our taking the view that charges were rightly framed against him. The State's appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Conclusion 62. To conclude, appeals of Abu Azim and Amjad Aziz Meherbux are allowed and they stand discharged. Appeals of Raju @ Rajucode Jain and Somnath Thapa are dismissed. The appeal of State is also dismissed. 63. Before parting, we may say that alongwith these appeals we had heard the case of one Mulchand Shah, being covered by SLP (Crl.). No. 894 of 1995. But, by an order passed on 31.1.1.996 that SLP had been delinked from these cases, on the prayer of counsel for Shah and was ordered to be listed separately. So we have not dealt with that SLP.
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1996 (4) TMI 514 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... . G.B. Pattanaik, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 513 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... en, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 512 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... he High Court and the Learned Additional District Judge are set aside and the matter is remitted to the Learned Additional District Judge for disposal of the appeal according to law and in the light or the position of law explained hereinabove. Learned Additional District Judge shall be entitled to call upon both the parties to adduce necessary evidence to decide the questions arising herein, both factual and legal, according to law. Learned Additional District Judge shall dispose of the appeal within four months form the date of receipt of the copy of this Order. Both the parties shall present themselves before the Learned Additional District Judge on April 16, 1996 which is specified as the date of hearing in the appeal before the Learned Additional District Judge. It shall also be open to the parties to file such documentary evidence as they wish to in support of their respective cases. No oral evidence shall, however, be permitted 21. There shall be no order as to costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 511 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... y it. Therefore this finding against bar of the suit under Order 7, Rule 11(d) is also vitiated. 12. On the analysis and discussions in the foregoing paragraphs, it is my considered view that the order passed by the learned trial Judge rejecting the plaint under Order 7, Rule 11(a) and (d) of C.P.C. is unsustainable and has to be set aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the order dated 26.3.1994 of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) Bhubaneswar in Misc. Case No. 75 of 1993 is set aside. There will be no order for costs of this Court." After hearing the learned counsel on both sides and after carefully perusing the relevant pleadings, we do not think that the High Court has committed any error in rejecting the application of the appellant under Order 7 Rule 11. We accept the view taken by the High Court and consequently find no case for interference. In the result all the Civil Appeals are dismissed with costs and Special Leave petition is dismissed without costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 510 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... which disentitles him as time is the essence of the contract. It is sought to be contended by Mr. B.K. Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner has performed the essential terms of the contract. Essential terms of the contract is that he has to return the approved draft sale deed which he has already returned to him. But amendment sought in the sale deed is not of material particulars and is not an essential term and, therefore, the High Court was in error in considering this aspect of the matter. We find no force in the contention. The essential term of the contract is executing the sale deed with in stipulated period. He did not perform his part of the contract within stipulated time. The High Court was right in refusing to enforce the contract. It being discretionary remedy the High Court has exercised sound judicial discretion to the relief of specific performance of the contract. The Special Leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 509 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ession within 24 hours. The executing Court is directed to dispose of the application filed by respondent Nos. 7, 8 and 9, heirs of the landlady filed under Section 28 of the Special Relief Act, 1963 for rescinding the contract along with the application filed under Order 21, Rules 98 and 99, CPC and dispose it of after the former is decided. Contempt Petition No. 61 of 1996. 9. Notice is issued to the 1st respondent to show cause why he should not be convicted for deliberate disobedience of the order dated July 24, 1995, directing that the appellant be put into possession through Court Officer. Counsel for the 1st respondent takes notice for contempt. He seeks for and is granted time for filing counter-affidavit. The 1st respondent through its Chief Executive/Managing Director or by whatever name is called, shall be present in person in the Court on 15.7.96 to which date the matter is directed to be posted. 10. Contempt Petition No. 309 of 1995 to be posted on the same day.
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1996 (4) TMI 508 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... al, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 507 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... he ground that the leased out plant and machinery are installed in the manufacturing business of the lessee. 25. For the above reasons, respectfully following the decision of the Apex Court, Delhi High Court and the jurisdictional High Court, we find ourselves constrained to disallow the claim for the grant of investment allowance notwithstanding the case law cited by the learned counsel for the assessee in favour of the grant of his claim. This ground is dismissed. 26. The last ground is that there is no liability for interest under section 217 and the CIT (Appeals) erred in confirming the interest levied of ₹ 4,05,562. 27. We are of the view that the assessee should not have taken for granted the grant of extra shift allowance and at least to this extent, it appears that interest is leviable under section 217. Accordingly, we dismiss this ground but interest is to be calculated with reference to the finally assessed income. 28. In the result, the appeal is dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 506 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... , Form 25 prescribed by Section 83 requires verification before prescribed authority. The concept of substantial compliance has no application in such a case. It is seen that the copy of the affidavit supplied to the respondent does not contain the affirmation by the Oath Commissioner. Under these circumstances, the defect is not a curable defect. Therefore, the dismissal of the election petition on this ground is sustainable in law. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on an order of this court in C.A. No. 925 of 1995 (Boota Singh v. Sher Singh and others) decided on March 13, 1996. It would be seen that a Bench of two Judges of this Court has not expressed any conclusive opinion on the controversy. On the other hand, this court remitted the matter to the High Court for reconsideration in accordance with law. Under these circumstances, the ratio therein is of no assistance to the appellant. 4. The appeal is dismissed. But, in the circumstances, without costs
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1996 (4) TMI 505 - ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... value of the seized goods for the purpose of enhancing the disclosed taxable turnover. At the most, the value of the seized goods plus equal amount thereof, could be reasonably taken as taxable turnover. Then it comes to ₹ 11,04,425/- and the tax liability could be calculated on this value. The finding of the Tribunal is contrary to the law and practice and cannot be sustained. For the aforesaid reasons, the revision partly succeeds and the matter has to be sent to the Tribunal for fresh determination of tax liability on the taxable turnover of ₹ 11,04,425/-. Therefore, the revision is hereby allowed and the judgment and order dated 19-5-1988 passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal, Ghaziabad Bench if hereby quashed and the learned Tribunal is hereby directed under Section 11 (8) of the U. P. Sales Tax Act to determine the tax liability of the assessee for the assessment year 1981-82 on taxable turnover of ₹ 11,04,425/- in respect of the seized goods on 6-10-1981.
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1996 (4) TMI 504 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... The assessee also pleaded before the authorities that this amount related to the earlier years and, therefore, it cannot be taxed in the assessment year under consideration, even though the character of the said amount is trading receipt. The ratio adumberated in the above cited two decisions would go to show that simply because the earlier years' balance amounts which were kept in the suspense account alone were brought to the P&L a/c in the year under consideration, the entire amount cannot be taxed in the assessment years under consideration. If those amounts relating to the earlier years were not taxed in those years, it is not possible for the Department to tax the entire amount in one year, i.e., the present assessment year under consideration merely on the basis that the entire amounts were transferred to the P&L a/c in the assessment year under consideration. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department.
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1996 (4) TMI 503 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... impediment on its movement by the Act. The Act regulates only packing of the commodities or class of commodities with jute packaging material. Transportation on account thereof stands no impediment for the said trade and commerce. The commerce clause in Art.301, therefore, stands no impediment for free flow of trade and commerce in the commodities for free flow of trade and commerce in the commodities for class of commodities covered by the provisions of the Act. Considered from this perspective, we hold the Act is not violative of Article 301 of the constitution. The Transfer cases and writ petitions are accordingly dismissed and the applications disposed of but, in the circumstances, with costs quantified at ₹ 10,000/- payable to the supreme court legal Aid committee within a period of three months from the date of receipt of this order. On failure thereof, it would open to the supreme court Legal Aid committee to have this order executed as decree according to law.
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1996 (4) TMI 502 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... inference that the order was passed by way of punishment for particular acts of misconduct. These reports were taken into account for assessing the performance of Respondent 1 during the period of probation and for determining whether he was fit for confirmation on the post of Munsif. The said remarks, in our opinion, could legitimately form the basis for deciding whether Respondent 1 was suitable for retention in service or not. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the order for termination of the services of Respondent 1 dated 28-8-1986 was passed by way of punishment for misconduct ( 7. ) For the reasons aforementioned, we are unable to agree with the impugned judgment of the High Court setting aside the order dated 26-8-1986. The appeal is, therefore, allowed, the judgment of the High Court a dated 22-10-1990 is set aside and the writ petition (CWJC No. 2046 of 1987) filed by Respondent 1 is dismissed. But in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 501 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... the power under Sections 3(1) and 4(1) of the Act prescribing the rates of admission. Admittedly, since there is no enumeration in this regard for the video game, clause (v) of the said notification imposes 30 of the admission fee as entertainment tax. The controversy raised in this case is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in Geeta Enterprises & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (1983) 3 SCR 812 . This Court has considered the above provisions and had held that charge of inserting the coin was realised only from those who wanted to operate the video game at the rate of 50 paise. For a slot lasting upto 30 seconds and it amounts to entertainment within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the Act. Therefore, video games is exigible to entertain tax. We, therefore, hold that the appellant is liable to pay the entertainment tax. We do not find any illegality in the view taken by the High Court warranting interference. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (4) TMI 500 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (4) TMI 499 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... fied in declining to alter the date of birth. If such a decision is challenged the court also ought not to grant any relief even if it is shown that the date of birth, as originally recorded, was incorrect because the candidate concerned had represented a different date of birth to be taken into consideration obviously with a view that would be to his advantage. Once having secured entry into the service, possibly in preference to other candidates, then the principle of estoppel would clearly be applicable and relief of change of date of birth can be legitimately denied. To that extent the decision in Manak Chand’s case does not lay down the correct law. For the aforesaid reasons while allowing the appeal the order of the Tribunal is set aside the effect of which would that OA No. 383 of 1994 filed by the respondent would stand dismissed and the date of birth of 17th June, 1939, as recorded in his service book would remain unaltered. There will be no order as to costs.
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