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1996 (5) TMI 407
... ... ... ... ..... such a mode of publication may be sufficient, if reasonable. If the subordinate legislation does not prescribe the mode of publication or if the subordinate legislation prescribes a plainly unreasonable mode of publication, it will take effect only when it is published through the customarily recognised official channel, namely, the Official Gazette or some other reasonable mode of publication. 26.. I am of the considered view that the notification dated 15th September, 1988 was not made public on the day of its alleged publication, to the public at large as was required to be done. On the peculiar facts and in the special circumstances of this case I accept the petition and set aside the order of assessment dated 30th June, 1989 and the demand notice for a sum of Rs. 40,467 issued against the petitioner-firm as a result of the order of assessment. I make no order as to costs. R.K. Nair (Technical Member).-I concur with the honourable Judicial Member. Writ petition allowed.
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1996 (5) TMI 406
... ... ... ... ..... sions as well as judicial delication thereon is that the error which empowers the revenue authorities to initiate rectification proceedings must be a mistake apparent from the record and the error must be something which appears to be ex facie and is incapable of arguments or debate. 9.. Without expressing any opinion on the question, whether the activity of the dealer would fall within the meaning of the expression hotel business or restaurant business and whether petitioner is a hotelier or restaurateur, these petitions are allowed only on the ground that the assessing authority could not have invoked the provisions under section 25-A of the Act to amend/withdraw the composition benefit granted earlier. Accordingly, notices dated July 5, 1989 issued under section 25-A of the Act are quashed as one without jurisdiction. 10.. Petitions are allowed. Rule made absolute. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petitions allowed.
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1996 (5) TMI 405
... ... ... ... ..... goods within the meaning of sub-clause (vi) or any other sub-clause of section 14(iv). In such view of the matter, there cannot be any claim for deduction of the sales turnover on any of these items from the gross turnover either under section 5(2)(va) or section 5(2)(vd) of the 41 Act. 13.. In the result, the application fails and is dismissed accordingly. The respondents are at liberty to adjust the security deposit of Rs. 10 lakhs in cash, if furnished, by the applicant and also encash the bank guarantee of Rs. 10 lakhs, if furnished, by the applicant in terms of the interim order dated March 10, 1995 of this Tribunal in RN-34 of 1995 against any tax that may be due from the applicant. 14.. There will be no order for cost. On the prayer of Shri Sumit Chakraborty, the learned Advocate for the applicant, which is opposed by the State Representative, stay of operation of the judgment is allowed for ten weeks. S. N. Mukherjee (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 404
... ... ... ... ..... use the words plastic materials as appearing in the expression all articles made of plastics..... impugned in that case had not acquired any defined judicial meaning based on any common parlance understanding. 8.. Further, keeping in view the definition of toilet articles as set out in the explanation to Sl. No. 65 of the Second Schedule as quoted above, all articles which are intended to be used in the toilet of human body are covered by the said expression. In the present case, admittedly paper napkins are used for wiping the lips and fingers at meals. Therefore, there cannot be any escape from holding that the same are toilet articles , for the purpose of sub-section (3) of section 5 of the Act read with Sl. No. 65 of the Second Schedule thereof, making the same liable for tax at the rate of 12 per cent. 9.. For the said reasons, in our opinion, the impugned order of the Tribunal requires no interference. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 403
... ... ... ... ..... le to be assessed on the basis of the aforesaid false or incorrect accounts or concealed particulars or false or incorrect account, return or information. If the statute permits the assessee to file a revised return replacing the original return, then, can the original return be taken into consideration for imposing penalty? And as to whether the word return occurring in sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Punjab Act is referable to the original or the revised return requires consideration to interpret section 10(7) of the Punjab Act which would be a question of law. We, therefore, direct the Tribunal to refer the following question of law along with the statement of case for the opinion of this Court Whether for the purpose of imposing penalty under section 10(7) of the Punjab Act, for filing a false or incorrect return, the assessing authority should look to the original return or to the revised return wherever such return has been filed within the time prescribed by law?
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1996 (5) TMI 402
... ... ... ... ..... on on which Shri Chhinna has placed reliance and find that the issue regarding charging of tax on electric motors and the interpretation of the entry No. 17 of Schedule A appended to the Act of 1948 has been considered by the Division Bench in detail and has been held that the electric motors do not fall in the excepted category so as to be charged at concessional rate. The Division Bench also held that the electric motors do not fall within the ambit of the excepted goods and are, therefore, liable to be assessed at the rate of 10 per cent. In view of the aforementioned decision of this Court Gupta Agencies v. State of Punjab 1994 92 STC 543 (P and H) (1993) 103 PLR 461 the questions referred by the Tribunal are answered in favour of the department and against the assessee and it is held that the assessee is liable to pay tax at the rate of 10 per cent and not at the concessional rate of 6 per cent. The references are disposed of accordingly. Reference answered accordingly.
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1996 (5) TMI 401
... ... ... ... ..... hin the period of limitation of five years as required by section 11(4) of the Act. We are also of the opinion that even in case where a composite notice is given by the Assessing Authority under section 11 requiring the assessee to furnish the returns, to pay tax and further give an indication that in case of failure of the dealer (assessee) to comply with the requirement of notice, best judgment assessment would be made, proceedings will be deemed to have commenced as per law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Tara Chand case 1967 19 STC 493 AIR 1967 SC 1408. In view of the above discussion, the two questions referred by the Tribunal are answered in favour of the department. It is held that the Assessing Authority had clearly indicated its intention to proceed to make assessment on the basis of best judgment and the proceedings were initiated within a period of five years as prescribed under section 11(4) of the Act. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1996 (5) TMI 400
... ... ... ... ..... Act was not justified in law and on facts. Consequently the imposition of penalty by the assessing authority and the confirmation thereof by the appellate authorities is liable to be quashed. 14.. For the aforesaid reasons this revision is hereby allowed and the impugned order dated September 14, 1987 passed by the assessing authority for the assessment year 1983-84 and the appellate order dated November 26, 1987 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (Judicial), Sales Tax, Aligarh, and the order dated November 25, 1988 passed by the Sales Tax Tribunal are hereby quashed. The amount of penalty deposited with the assessing authority in compliance with the interim direction dated April 5, 1989 given by this Court at the time of admission of this revision shall be refunded to the assessee within two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. 15.. A certified copy of this judgment be issued within three days on payment of usual charges. Petition allowed.
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1996 (5) TMI 399
... ... ... ... ..... enacting sub-sections (o) and (r) of section 15-A(1) of the Act which provides for penalties that if the assessing authority is satisfied that any dealer or other person imports or transports, or attempts to import or transport or abets the import or transport of any goods in contravention of the provisions of section 28-A of the Act, or the Rules it may, after such enquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary, direct that such dealer or person shall pay, by way of penalty, in addition to the tax, if any payable by him. Therefore, the authorities concerned are at liberty to exercise the powers conferred by sub-sections (o), (r) of section 15-A(1) of the Act strictly in accordance with law. 18.. In view of the premises aforesaid, under the facts and circumstances of this case, impugned orders do not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of its discretionary writ jurisdiction. The writ petition accordingly fails and is therefore, dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 398
... ... ... ... ..... yond that date. In other words, old units were entitled to tax-free purchase of raw materials for use in for additional portions only up to 31st August, 1991. There is no dispute that the Resolution No. 13730 dated September 1, 1986 stands replaced by subsequent resolutions giving incentives to the industries in different forms. I have no doubt in my mind, therefore, that the petitioner having already availed the benefit of tax exemption under S.O. 793 dated September 10, 1987 it was not entitled to second exemption either as a new unit under S.O. 791 or as an old unit under S.O. 793. The order of cancellation of the exemption certificate, therefore, cannot be said to be erroneous although for reasons other than those mentioned in the impugned order, as briefly indicated above. The petitioner, therefore, is not entitled to any relief. 11.. In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. I will however, make no order as to cost. P.K. SARIN, J.-I agree. Writ petition dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 397
... ... ... ... ..... f the Central Government and later when the mistake was discovered the entries were reversed and the amount was credited to the account of the State Government. In that case, the amount was lying with the bank but in the case before us, it has been found as a fact that on the date when the cheque was dishonoured the dealer did not have sufficient funds in its account at Mohali. Moreover, the certificate issued by the State Bank of India has been discarded by the authorities and this finding, as we have already held, is one of fact. It was then contended that the dealer was not liable to pay any interest as the same was not chargeable under the provisions of the Central Act. We need not examine this contention because no such plea was raised before the Tribunal. It is well-settled that a plea not raised before the Tribunal, cannot give rise to a referable question of law. In the result, the petition is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 396
... ... ... ... ..... 59 of 1995 are dismissed. The interim orders dated April 4, 1995 in RN-58 of 1995 and RN-59 of 1995 by which respondents were allowed to proceed with further investigation and to make assessments but were prohibited from communicating final orders of assessment to applicants and from demanding any tax on the basis of any such assessments till disposal of the main applications, are vacated. Now that the applications are dismissed, there will be no bar to communication of final orders of assessment, if any, and raising of demands on the basis of any such assessments. There will be no order for costs. Mrs. Swapna Das, Advocate, prays for stay of the judgment and order on behalf of Mrs. Chandrima Bhattacharya, Advocate for the applicants. Mr. G.K. Goswami, State Representative opposes the prayer. Mrs. Dass has no power on behalf of the applicants. The prayer for stay is considered and rejected. S.N. Mukherjee (Judicial Member).I agree. M.K. Kar Gupta (Technical Member).I agree.
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1996 (5) TMI 395
... ... ... ... ..... any cannot now claim that the demand for interest by the respondents is illegal or unauthorised. 14.. In annexure X to the affidavit-in-reply, the company has given a chart about the bank guarantees furnished and also about the payment by cheque of turnover tax for the period from 1982 to 1988-89. There is no dispute that some of the bank guarantees furnished by the company have been encashed sometime in June, 1989. The date of encashment of a bank guarantee should be treated as the date of payment in part of the amount of turnover tax for the assessment year in respect of which the bank guarantee was furnished. It is needless to mention that interest should not run after encashment of bank guarantee. 15.. In the result, the application fails and it is dismissed without any order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. The interim order dated June 20, 1989 is vacated. L.N. RAY (Chairman).-I agree. P.R. BALASUBRAMANIAN (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 394
... ... ... ... ..... entry No. 39 would then read Raw wool including wool waste but excluding knitting wool . The assessee has, therefore, to be taxed within the letter of the law. 11.. The word raw as per Oxford English Reference Dictionary means In the natural state not processed or manufactured not analysed or processed new to an activity. Wool waste is obviously not something wholly new or which has not undergone any process. As per assessee s own showing it is an admixture of the bye-products of the raw wool after the latter has undergone some kind of process be it a refinement or something else. It cannot be, therefore, termed as raw wool. 12.. From the foregoing discussion it, therefore, inevitably follows that our answer to the question has to be in negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the department. We answer the reference accordingly but without any order as to costs. 13.. A copy of this order be transmitted to the Board of Revenue. Reference answered in the negative.
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1996 (5) TMI 393
... ... ... ... ..... arification under section 3A(2) of the Act, so as to bind them in any manner. 17.. For the said reasons, to close, it is held that the communication annexure-A is wholly illegal having been issued without any authority of law and it is accordingly quashed. It is clarified that the said communication on its quashing will not in any way affect the validity or finality of the order of assessment passed against the petitioner and the demands created thereunder can be enforced in accordance with law. Since in substance, the endeavor of the petitioner by seeking the quashing of the impugned communication (annexure-A) was to get the order of assessment and demand notice annexure-C quashed and he having failed in his this misconceived design, the writ petition stands dismissed. On the facts of the case, I refrain to pass any order as to costs. Let copy of this order the handed over to the learned Additional Government Advocate, for communication and needful. Writ petition dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 392
... ... ... ... ..... would have been better as it exists in other States like Punjab and Haryana, Bihar, Kerala, or under section 194-C of the Income-tax Act, the arguments would not have arisen at all. Since we have upheld the provision on its own merit, therefore, this notification has nothing to do with its validity or otherwise. But, it would have been much better if this provision had been inserted in the Act itself rather than issuing a notification under section 17 of the Act. It is for the Legislature to consider that whether it is proper to insert this provision in the Act or Rules so as to mitigate the hardship which may be caused to the assessee. However, this notification will greatly reduce the hardship to the assessees. 19.. In the result, we do not find any merit in this petition and connected petitions. Hence, this petition and connected petitions (W.P. No. 529 of 1996, W.P. No. 3989 of 1995 and W.P. No. 1165 of 1996) are dismissed. No order as to costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 391
... ... ... ... ..... 991 Mahadevi Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. State of M.P. and others H.S. Shrivastava, Dy. A.G. 11. M.P. 1422 of 1991 Anil Ispat Udyog v. State Level Committee and others B.L. Nerma, Dy. A.G. 12. M.P. 1430 of 1991 Balaji Loda Pvt. Ltd. and others v. State and others H.S. Shrivastava, Dy. A.G. 13. M.P. 1435 of 1991 Orient Steel Re-rolling Mills v. State and others do. 14. M.P. 1436 of 1991 Kakku Steel Mills v. State and others Do. 15 M.P. 1504 of 1991 Om Steels v. State and others Do. 16. M.P. 1505 of 1991 Ajanta Ispat Udyog v. State of M.P. and others Do. 17. M.P. 1833 of 1991 Mahavir Iron and Steel Ind. v. State of M.P. and others Do. 18. M.P. 2143 of 1991 Laxmi Ispat Ind. v. State and others. Do. 19. M.P. 2200 of 1991 Vandana Rolling Mills v. State and others. Do. 20. M.P. 2686 of 1991 Jhakotiya Ispat Udyog v. State and others do. 21. M.P. 561 of 1994 Maheshwari Rolling Mills v. State of M.P. and others do. 22. M.P. 4265 of 1995 Agarwal Steel Processors v. State of M.P. and others do.
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1996 (5) TMI 390
... ... ... ... ..... on Associated Companies Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise (1989) 41 ELT 337 (Tribunal) Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Babu Lal Parmanand 1982 49 STC 181 (All.) Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India (1992) 58 ELT 493 (All.) N.K. Woollen and Silk Mills v. Collector (1989) 43 ELT 686 (Tribunal) and Himachal Steel Kandroi v. Collector of Central Excise, Chandigarh (1988) 37 ELT 291 (Tribunal). All these judgments need not be commented upon and discussed. The principle of law laid down in all these cases is that remand order of the superior court or authority is binding on the subordinate court or authority. All these judgments are distinguishable from the case in hand on facts. I hold that the respondent No. 2 did not travel beyond the scope of remand order of March 31, 1975. 33. To sum up, I concur in the conclusion reached in paragraph 10 of the judgment. 34.. R.K. NAIR (Technical Member).-I concur with the analysis and conclusions of the honourable Judicial Member.
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1996 (5) TMI 389
... ... ... ... ..... come into force with effect from 1st day of May, 1995. This shows that any plant or machinery, if it is being leased out to any other person for consideration, then the same should be treated to be sale and exigible to tax. In this view of the matter, we do not find any justification in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the definition of section 2(t) or section 9-A of the Act of 1994 suffers from any invalidity. Likewise, suffice it to say that Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982, having already been held to be valid by their Lordships of the honourable Supreme Court in the case of Builders Association 1989 73 STC 370 AIR 1989 SC 1371 and reaffirmed in Gannon Dunkerley s case 1993 88 STC 204, the arguments challenging the validity of that provision cannot survive. 8.. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in both the writ petitions and accordingly they are dismissed, but without any orders as to costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1996 (5) TMI 388
... ... ... ... ..... n was only Rs. 8,271 and the tax payable under the notification was only Rs. 250. The gross turnover was not subject to tax and only such gross turnover which was in excess of the exempted limits was taxable turnover. 23.. As the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) determined the matter incorrectly and to that extent so did the Tax Board, I felt it necessary to elucidate the matter in somewhat greater detail in order to set any lingering doubts at rest. 24.. However, in so far as the respondent is concerned having not challenged the order of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) and considering the paltry amounts involved, I do not think it necessary to order the refund of the excess tax realised from him. 25.. The revision petition is dismissed as on no account can it be held that a dealer who registers voluntarily is not entitled to the benefit of the notifications in question or that he is liable to tax on gross turnover under the 1954 Act. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed.
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