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Showing 261 to 280 of 280 Records
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1996 (6) TMI 20 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Jurisdiction To Impose Penalty, Law Applicable ... ... ... ... ..... v. Purnedu Prosad Roy Chowdhury, AIR 1967 SC 1419, which too was a case of deletion of section 29 of the Calcutta Thika Tenancy Act, 1949, by the Amendment Act of 1953. It was held by this court that by virtue of the said deletion, the Controller, before whom the proceeding was pending, was not deprived of the jurisdiction to try the matter pending before him on the date of coming into force of the amending Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner did not lose the jurisdiction to continue with the proceedings pending before him on March 31, 1976, by virtue of the deletion of sub-section (2) of section 274 by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, with effect from April 1, 1976. He was entitled to continue with those proceedings and pass appropriate orders according to law. Accordingly, following the said judgment, the question referred to us for decision is answered in the negative and in favour of the Department. No order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 19 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Company Director, Private Company ... ... ... ... ..... ch were available to the petitioners. Originally, a tax at Rs. 21,67,400 was imposed. Since the company directors challenged the assessment order before various authorities, the tax has now been reduced to Rs. 2 lakhs odd. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the non-recovery of tax was due to the negligence of the directors. In Praveen D. Desai v. ITO 1984 149 ITR 187, the Bombay High Court had considered a similar question. It was held that the company was disputing its liability to tax and this was enough proof that the non-recovery of taxes could not be attributed to neglect or breach of duty on the part of the petitioner , which the company was agitating against the assessment order and disputing the liability to pay the amount assessed. In such circumstances, it cannot be held that the non-recovery of tax was due to negligence or breach of duty on the part of the petitioners. In the result, I quash exhibits P-20, P-21 and P-22. The original petition is allowed.
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1996 (6) TMI 18 - KERALA HIGH COURT
High Court, Undisclosed Sources ... ... ... ... ..... ilding. The decision rendered by the Tribunal is only on clear appreciation of evidence produced by the Revenue as well as the assessee. Under section 256 of the Income-tax Act, a question of law should arise from the findings of the Tribunal and what we could see here is only questions of fact decided by the Tribunal. Of course we are aware that this case was referred to us because of the direction given by this court in O. P. No. 925 of 1982. Whatever may be the position, that will not deter us from deciding whether questions of law arise for decision from the order of the Tribunal. As we have stated above, what is raised before us are only questions of fact and we do not propose to decide such questions. In the aforesaid circumstances, we decline to answer the questions referred to us for decision. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
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1996 (6) TMI 17 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Agricultural Produce, Special Deduction ... ... ... ... ..... e intention behind the statutory provision. The decision is the declaration of law. Learned counsel for the assessee attempted to contend that the apex society also has its function. In our judgment, in view of the travel of the proceedings where there is no whisper in regard to the submissions sought to be made before us for the first time, on the contrary observations of the Tribunal quoted ad verbatim hereinbefore would show that the assessee apex society cannot be said to be engaged in regard to any affairs of a cottage industry in consonance with the legislative intent behind it. In our judgment, the position is completely covered by the above decision of the apex court. For the above reasons all questions are answered in the negative, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for passing consequential orders.
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1996 (6) TMI 16 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Attributable To, Extra Shift Depreciation Allowance
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1996 (6) TMI 15 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Advance Tax, Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Attributable To, Extra Shift Depreciation Allowance
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1996 (6) TMI 14 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Extra Shift Depreciation Allowance, Plant And Machinery ... ... ... ... ..... ry requirements for the grant of such allowance cannot be dispensed with. What is provided in the rule is that the assessee must establish that it has worked double shift or triple shift, as the case may be, for claiming extra shift depreciation allowance. The view of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner that the plant must be kept ready for 24 hours as aforesaid is a matter which must be established within the framework of the above rule regarding the grant of extra shift depreciation allowance. Since the assessee has failed to establish the requirements for obtaining extra shift allowance discussed hereinabove, we do not propose to interfere with the order of the Tribunal. In the result, the question referred to us is answered in the affirmative and in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of the court and the signature of the Registrar shall be forwarded to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, as required by law.
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1996 (6) TMI 13 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... ording to the Tribunal, a similar issue as arising in the present case, came up for consideration before it, in the case of Higginbotham Limited, Madras. It would mean that the Tribunal would have verified that the bonus payment was in accordance with the provisions contained in section 36(1)(ii) of the Act. Even though there is no definite finding by the Tribunal that the bonus payment was allowable as deduction under section 36(1)(ii) of the Act in the present cases inasmuch as according to the Tribunal the facts arising in the present case as well as in the case of Higginbotham Limited, Madras, are similar, it came to the abovesaid conclusion. Under such circumstances, we are of the opinion that the Tribunal would have satisfied that the bonus payment in the present case is in accordance with the provisions contained in section 36(1)(ii) of the Act. Accordingly, we answer this question also in the affirmative and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 12 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Wholly And Exclusively ... ... ... ... ..... nder this court held that retrenchment was done for reorganising the branch and thereby reducing the wage bill as well. Therefore, it was considered that these matters pertain to business considerations and expediency, and the expenditure incurred by the assessee in this regard was for the purposes of business and also with a view to maintaining good relationship with the labour and that expenditure had to be considered as having been laid out wholly and exclusively for the purpose of business of the assessee. Therefore, this court ultimately came to the conclusion that the expenditure incurred was deductible. In doing so, this court also followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Sassoon J. David and Co. P. Ltd. v. CIT 1979 118 ITR 261. A similar view was also taken by this court in a matter like this in CIT v. Sri Ramavilas Service Ltd., 1995 211 ITR 763. In view of the foregoing decisions, we answer question No. 1 in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 11 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Assessment Order ... ... ... ... ..... sed income of rupees one lakh, then there is no error in the order passed by the Income-tax Officer in the case of the assessee in the assessment year 1974-75. Therefore, in the present case, after the enquiry, the Commissioner of Income-tax has not given any categorical finding that the order passed by the Income-tax Officer on this aspect was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. On the other hand, the Commissioner set aside the order passed by the Income-tax Officer on the ground that verification of account is needed, with a clarification of the assessee. This cannot be a ground for invoking jurisdiction under section 263 of the Act. Therefore, on the factual finding, we consider that the order passed by the Tribunal in holding that the Commissioner of Income-tax has no jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of section 263 of the Act is in order. Accordingly, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 10 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Estate Duty, HUF Property ... ... ... ... ..... ny other person jointly before it can be applied. When a separate property is converted into a joint family property, the property vests in the family as an entity by itself. It will be inaccurate to say that the father owns the property jointly with the family. The rule of survivorship is also abrogated in situations as in sections 6 and 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. This was the view taken in A. N. K. Rajamani Ammal v. CED 1972 84 ITR 790 (pages 795 and 796). Therefore, in the case of the property in the hands of a joint family, it cannot be said that the property was owned by the members of the family jointly, since the property belongs to the joint family, which is a separate unit. Accordingly, there is no error in the order passed by the Tribunal by holding that section 13 of the Estate Duty Act will not apply to the facts of this case. We answer question No. 2 referred to us also in the affirmative and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 9 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... g authority in order to find out whether the assessee is engaged in intermediary activities independently, not as an integral part of its main business, viz., building construction. Inasmuch as such a direction is in accordance with the decisions cited supra, we consider that there is no infirmity in giving such direction by the Tribunal. Accordingly, we hold that there is no infirmity in the order passed by the Tribunal in remitting back this issue. Inasmuch as the question framed and referred by the Tribunal does not reflect the true issue arising in this case, we would like to reframe the question as under Whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is correct in law in remitting back the issue, to consider the claim of exemption under s. 5(1)(xxxii) of the WT Act, 1957, after ascertaining the facts arising in this case . In view of the foregoing discussion, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 8 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Surtax, Computation Of Capital ... ... ... ... ..... preme Court, we answer the above two questions in the negative and in favour of the Department. 4. In sofar as question No. 3 is concerned, it relates to whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the ITO was not correct in applying r. 4 of the Second Schedule to the Companies (Profits) Surtax Act, 1964, in respect of the deduction allowed under Chapter VI-A of the IT Act, 1961. In ITO vs. Stumpp Schuele and Somappa (P) Ltd. (1990) 94 CTR (SC) 160 (1991) 187 ITR 108 (SC), the Supreme Court held that the relief allowed under s. 80-I (priority industry) and s. 80J (newly established industrial undertaking) of the IT Act were not income, profits and gains not includible in the total income of the company under r. 4 of the Second Schedule to the said Act and would not come to diminish the capital of the company to be computed for the purpose of the Surtax Act. In view of the above said decision, we answer question No. 3 in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 7 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure ... ... ... ... ..... the said order, the AAC never made any complaint with regard to the letter said to have been addressed to him by the assessee on 20th Jan., 1976. The Tribunal, being the highest fact-finding authority, came to the conclusion on the basis of the letter dt. 20th Jan., 1976, that services were really rendered by Mrs. Regina Nagesh to Mr. Nagesh. In such circumstances, we consider that no further interference need be made with the fact findings by the Tribunal on this aspect. When the secretary was appointed in pursuance of the agreement and when there is evidence on record to show that services were rendered by Mrs. Regina Nagesh to Mr. Nagesh, there cannot be any impediment for the allowance of the salary payment made by the firm to the secretary. Inasmuch as the conclusion so arrived at by the Tribunal was on the basis of facts and since we have accepted the order of the Tribunal, we answer the questions referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 6 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Recovery Of Tax ... ... ... ... ..... ision cited by learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, in the said case, the entire order of assessment was set aside in appeal and the demand had fallen to the ground and there were no arrears to be paid. Under these circumstances, the Court has observed that the order of attachment issued under s. 226(3) of the Act cannot survive it has no independent existence. Further, there was no tax due to the Department. Here, in the present case, the assessments for the years 1973-74 to 1979-80 and 1982-83 have been set aside. But, the assessment for the year 1981-82 for a sum of Rs. 13,65,778 was upheld and, hence, the said decision has no application to the facts of the present case. 9. Hence, for the reasons stated above, I modify the notice issued by the second respondent and now the notice will read to a sum of Rs. 13,65,778 instead of a sum of Rs. 48,68,400. Accordingly, with the above modification, this writ petition is disposed of. There will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 5 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Development Rebate ... ... ... ... ..... ocess a sum of Rs. 16,00,000 which was directed to be taken out for the purpose of payment of dividend from the earlier years reserve was adjusted out of the profit of Rs. 32,00,000 which remains with the assessee as on 31st Dec., 1967. If that is so, it cannot be said that there is any shortfall in the earlier years as contended by the Department. 16. In view of this factual position, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessee fulfilled the conditions as prescribed under s. 34(3) of the Act and, therefore, they did not want to go into the merits of the case. These facts on record would go to show that there was no mistake apparent on records warranting exercise of jurisdiction under s. 154 of the Act. Accordingly we are in agreement with the order passed by the Tribunal in confirming the order passed by the AAC on this aspect. In that view of the matter we answer the question referred to us by the Department in the affirmative and against the Department. No costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 4 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Developement Rebate, Initial Depreciation ... ... ... ... ..... ficer while making the original assessment. The pointing out, viz., that the assessee is not a manufacturer or a producer would virtually amount to interpretation of the provisions contained in sections 32 and 33 of the Income-tax Act. Therefore, the reopening was done on a mere change of opinion. Further, in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in Indian and Eastern Newspaper Society v. CIT 1979 119 ITR 996, on the basis of the audit report, it is not possible for the Income-tax Officer to reopen the assessment under section 147(b) of the Act. Accordingly, the order passed by the Tribunal in holding that the reopening under section 147(b) of the Act is bad, is in order. Accordingly, we answer question No. 2 in the affirmative and against the department. It is significant to note that when we are answering question No. 2, it is not necessary for us to answer question No. 1. But for the sake of completeness we provided our answer to question No. 1 also. No costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 3 - KERALA HIGH COURT
Indian Gospel Mission ... ... ... ... ..... only difference is that the assessment years involved are different and they are 1968-69, 1972-73, 1973-74, 1974-75 and 1975-76. In regard to these years also the remittances in the name of Indian Gospel Mission are received and credited in the Indian Overseas Bank, Kottayam. Remittances are received through Indian Christian Crusade, U. S. A. The Tribunal has also decided that these remittances with regard to the assessment years in question could not be included in the total income of the assessee during the years in question. The assessee, Dr. K. George Thomas, is also the same. Therefore, our decision in I. T. R. No. 181 of 1991 would operate as the decision of these references. The questions, therefore, are answered in the affirmative, against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee. A copy of this judgment under the seal of this court and the signature of the Registrar shall be sent to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, for passing consequential orders.
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1996 (6) TMI 2 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
Business Expenditure, Estate Duty ... ... ... ... ..... assessee is a controlled company, should be allowed as a revenue expenditure? The point for consideration is whether the expenditure incurred on credit guarantee to ensure payment of the loan taken to discharge the estate duty liability in respect of the estate of the late S. Anantharamakrishnan for which the assessee is a controlled company, should be allowed as a revenue expenditure. A similar question came up for consideration before this court in CIT v. Amalgamations Ltd. 1998 232 ITR 608 (Tax Cases Nos. 317 and 318 of 1983, dated April 10, 1996) wherein by the judgment of this court, dated April 10, 1996, it was held that the expenditure incurred on credit guarantee to ensure payment of the loan taken to discharge the. estate duty liability, is an admissible deduction, as revenue expenditure. In view of the earlier decision of this court, cited supra, we answer the question referred to us in the affirmative and against the Department. There will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (6) TMI 1 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT
New Industrial Undertaking, Special Deduction, Condition Precedent ... ... ... ... ..... terised as manufacture or production of an article within the meaning of the Act. The Tribunal, therefore, committed an error in allowing the benefit of deduction under sections 80HHA and 80J of the Act. It is settled law that the construction of buildings, roads and dams, etc., does not amount to manufacture or production of articles or things as envisaged under the Act. It is also clear that the process of piling also does not amount to manufacture and does not make the assessee an industrial undertaking. Consequently, we answer the aforesaid question in the negative, i.e., in favour of the Department and against the assessee. This miscellaneous civil case is thus disposed of as above with no orders as to costs against the non-applicant as it did not choose to appear and contest the case. Counsel s fee for the applicant is, however, fixed at Rs. 750, if certified. A copy of this order shall be transmitted to the Tribunal for further action as may be necessary under the law.
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