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Case Laws
Showing 41 to 60 of 501 Records
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1996 (9) TMI 623
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... ... ..... oners strongly relied upon the decision of the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in the case of Steel Authority of India td. vs. the State of Orissa in Original Jurisdiction case no. 847 of 1991 disposed of by a judgment dated 18.6.92, wherein the Orissa High Court had held that the vehicles kept by the Steel Authority of India for being used within its premises are not liable to pay tax under the Orissa Motor Vehicle Taxation Act. But the very decision has been reversed by this Court in Regional Transport Officer- cum-Taxing Authority, Rourkela & Ors. 1995 (4) SCC 165 wherein it was held that the vehicle in question kept by the Steel Authority of India are taxable under the Motor Vehicle Taxation Act but the matter was remitted on an enquiry on which item of the Schedule the levy in question will remain. In the premises, as aforesaid, the dumpers belonging to the petitioners are taxable as held by the Orissa High Court and we see no infirmity in the said judgment.
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1996 (9) TMI 622
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... ... ..... t be held that the appellant had ratified the action of Sh. L.K. Rohatgi in signing the plaint and thereafter it continued with the suit. CONCLUSIONS The suit of the appellant had been dismissed because issue no.1 had been decided against it. Counsel for the parties have not challenged the decision of the lower appellate court on the other issues, which decision was affirmed by the High Court when it dismissed the second appeal in limine. For the reasons stated hereinabove we hold that issue no.1 was wrongly decided and this being so the appellant was entitled to a decree in view of the decision of the lower appellate court on the other issues. The appeal of the appellant is, accordingly, allowed in the aforesaid terms. The effect of this would be that the suit of the appellant would be decreed in accordance with the decision of the lower appellate court on the other issues which that court had decided in favour of the appellant. The appellant will also be entitled to costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 621
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... ... ..... ion by claimants including writ petitioners themselves. The acquired land got vested in the State Govt, and the Municipal Corporation free from all encumbrances as enjoined by Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. Thus right to get more compensation got vested in diverse claimants by passing of the award, as well as vested right was created in favour of the Bombay Municipal Corporation by virtue of the vesting of the land in the State Government for being handed over to the Corporation. All these events could not be wished away by observing that no third party rights were created by them. The writ petition came to be filed after all these events had taken place. Such a writ petition was clearly still borne due to gross delay and laches. I, therefore, respectfully agree with the conclusion to which my learned brother Ramaswamy, J. has reached that on the ground of delay and laches the writ petition is required to be dismissed and the appeal has to be allowed on that ground.
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1996 (9) TMI 620
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... ... ..... roperty was overvalued so that the petitioners could meet the objection. 6 For this reason alone, I quash the impugned orders, by which reference was made to the Evaluation Officers, Income-tax Department and allow the writ petitions. However, the respondents shall be free to refer the matter to the Evaluation Officers, after giving a show-cause notice to the petitioners as to why the property in question be not reassessed while giving such notice, the respondents shall also take into consideration the final assessment orders passed by the ITO and shall also state the reasons on the basis of which the valuation projected by the petitioners, is not acceptable to the respondents. After giving a chance to the petitioners to show cause against such a notice, the competent authority under the Act shall be within his rights to pass appropriate orders, after taking into consideration the objections, if any, filed by the petitioners. 7. These petitions are, accordingly, disposed of.
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1996 (9) TMI 619
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... ... ..... ted and the order was allowed to become final, the matter may be construed to be an order of illegality. When it is one of jurisdiction, this Court has repeatedly, in plethora of precedents, had held that the courts have no jurisdiction to award additional amount under Section 23(1-A) since the Collector had already passed the award under Section 11 and the benefit of additional amount would be confined to the period between the date of the notification under Section 4(1) and the award under Section 11 when the proceedings were pending before him. In this case, since we have already recorded the finding that the award became final due to collusion by the officers and the claimants, the principle of illegality in the award does not apply since fraud unravels the entire procedure and makes the award a nullity. The appeals are accordingly allowed as indicated above, but in the circumstances, Without costs. As regards structures awarded by the reference Court, they stand upheld.
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1996 (9) TMI 618
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... ... ..... 2153 on 15-5-65 in the office of the Sub-Registrar Baroda for registration. Therefore, the said conditional gift deed dated 15-5-65 is hereby cancelled and meaningless. The property under the conditional gift has not been and is not to be transferred in your name. Thus he expressly made it clear that he did not hand over the possession to the respondent nor did the gift become complete during the life time of the donor. Thus the gift had become ineffective and inoperative. It was duly cancelled. The question then is whether the appellant would get the right to the property? It is not in dispute that after the cancellation deed dated June 9, 1965 came to be executed, duly putting an end to the conditional gift deed dated May 15, 1965, he executed his last will on May 17, 1965, and died two days thereafter. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgements and decrees of the trial Court and the appellate court stand set aside. Consequently, the suit stands dismissed. No costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 617
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... ... ..... on, we are of the opinion that the National Commission committed an error in holding that order passed by the two members of the State Commission without the junction of the President is "illegal and void." Impugned order to that extent is set aside. 21. Coming to the second part of the order as regards the grant of interim order, in our opinion, the National Commission was right in applying the law laid down by this Court in Morgan Stanely Mutual Fund vs. Kartick Das. 1994(II) CPJ 7(SC). The consumer forum has no jurisdiction or power to pass any interim order pending disposal of original complaint filed before it. The impugned order if this behalf is confirmed. 22. In the result. the appeal is partly allowed. The impugned order holding that the order passed by the State Commission, West Bengal is illegal and void is quashed and set aside. But, however, the rest of the impugned order is confirmed. In the circumstances, parties are directed to bear their own costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 616
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... ... ..... . This being so, we are unable to agree with the contention of the assessee that the Tribunal is possessed of the power to review its own order. Moreover, this contention of the assessee runs counter to the decision of the jurisdictional High Court rendered in the case of Ramesh Electric & Trading Co. ( supra). 10. In addition to the reasons already discussed above, we feel that even a review application, in the circumstances of the case, is not maintainable. By way of miscellaneous application, the very same contentions which were advanced at the time of hearing of the appeal and were dealt with by the Tribunal are being canvassed. Hence, even the review petition stricto sensu is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed summarily. We are fortified in this view from the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of All India Judges Association AIR 1993 SC 2493. 11. For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in the application and it is consequently dismissed.
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1996 (9) TMI 615
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... ... ..... ot is, if the District Magistrate has commenced exercising jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Act, in respect of a building which answered the description given in the definition in Section 3 (i), he would well be within his jurisdiction to proceed further notwithstanding the intervening development that the building became roofless. We are inclined to afford such a liberal interpretation to prevent a wrong doer from taking advantage of his own wrong. We therefore, allow this appeal and set side the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. There will be no order as to costs. However, considering the importance of the locality in which building is situate and the palpably low rent which appellant is now paying, we have no doubt, in the interest justice, the appellant should pay higher rent. After hearing the counsel on both sides regarding this aspect, we fix the monthly rent of the building at ₹ 500/-. Appellant shall pay rent at the enhanced rate from 1.8.1996 onwards.
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1996 (9) TMI 614
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... ... ..... The units shared common facilities. 5. The Tribunal found a clause in the agreements which contemplated permission being given to the appellants for manufacture for third parties. Counsel appearing for the appellants stated that he would file before the Tribunal a statement showing such manufacture for a third party by one of the appellants, but it was not done. The counsel stated that there was no documentary evidence in this behalf in regard to the other appellants. 6. In these circumstances, the Tribunal found that the appellants were not independent contractors carrying out job work for Enfield. The fact that they were paying sales-tax or filing income-tax returns did not tilt the scales in their favour. 7. Having regard to the findings of the Tribunal, we do not disagree with its conclusion that the appellants were not individually entitled to the benefit of the exemption in question. 8. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 613
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... ... ..... t any interference in this case is called for. The Civil Appeal is dismissed.
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1996 (9) TMI 612
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... ... ..... ondly, the area of the land to be allotted would be uniform. In similar cases, this Court has favoured uniformity as regards the area. As the plot would be needed for residential purpose we think an area of 250 sq. yds. would be enough and proper. We therefore order for an allotment of plot measuring about 250 sq. yds. to each of the two respondents in some other scheme of the JDA. This would, however, be at the rate which was prevailing when the allotments were first made tp them. Since we laid down the law for the first time, we have hot interfered with the direction of the High Court but have suitably modified it. This direction, therefore, will not be used as a precedent. Appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 20857/93, 20936/93 an CC No. 25107/94 are disposed of accordingly. Appeals arising out of SLP(C) No. 2492/90, which is by Shanti Swaroop against the judgment of the High Court in A.K. Garg and connected cases is, however, dismissed. There would be no order at to costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 611
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... ... ..... twhile Central Excise Tariff w.e.f. 17-3-1985, the definition of Drugs and Cosmetics under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 and the Rules framed thereunder has to be read by giving prominence to the amendment of the Tariff definition. 36. Insofar as issue of directions under Section 37B are concerned, we find that the Govt. is fully competent to issue directions in this type of situations . We, therefore, hold that there is no legal infirmity in the order issued under Section 37B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. 37. From the above discussions, we find that boric acid, salicylic acid and zinc oxide present in the product before us are subsidiary pharmaceutical or antiseptic constituents and their curative and prophylactic value is subsidiary therefore, the product is a preparation for the care of the skin and is classifiable under T.I. 14F(i) up to 28-2-1986 and under heading No. 33.04 from 1-3-1986. 38. The appeals are disposed of in the above terms.
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1996 (9) TMI 610
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... ... ..... g we confirm the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court. In that view of the matter we do not deem it fit to consider the further question whether even if Section 6C operated in favour of the appellant on merits he would have no case as the lease was created in his favor by a life interest holder. Learned senior counsel for the appellant had a serious grievance about the reasoning adopted by the High Court on this aspect. It is not necessary for us to rest our judgment on consideration of this aspect as no further enquiry in the matter survives for consideration in favour of the original appellant once the earlier judgments are found to operate as res judicata debarring his from raising such a contention during execution proceedings taken out by the respondents for fixation of mesne profits. In the result this appeal fails and will stand dismissed in view of our aforesaid findings. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 609
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... ... ..... ng such produce, and paying levy for such activities taken within the specified market. 28. Despite the niceties of arguments made on behalf of the writ petitioners-respondents, it appears to us that as the writ petitioners do not fulfil the basic requirement of being growers of khairwood, an agricultural produce, to be grown in the farm by the agricultural activity contemplated under Section 2(a) of the Marketing Act, they cannot claim exemption from the requirement of obtaining licence under Section 4(3) of the Marketing Act for bringing or storing khairwood within the specified market for subjecting such khairwood to processing for obtaining the end product katha for the purpose of selling such katha. For the same reason, the writ petitioners cannot escape the liability of levy for selling katha after processing khairwood within the specified market. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. There will be no order as to cost.
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1996 (9) TMI 608
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... ... ..... an, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1996 (9) TMI 607
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... ... ..... f the period mentioned in their respective permits or renewed for consideration under Section 71 and grant under Section 72 of the permits afresh consistently with Section 2(31) of the Act. Such permit alone would be a permit defined in Section 2 (31) of the Act. Thereafter, before expiry thereof, they shall apply for and the concerned STA/RTA person authority may grant or refuse renewals of permit for reasons to be recorded under Section 81 of the Act. This interpretation of the law would relieve undue hardship to all the operators and at the same time it would also be consistent with the scheme of the Act to subserve the rights and protection provided under the Act so as to avoid rigour in the operation of the law. Thus considered, for the reasons given above, the view taken by the High Court is in conformity with law but subject to above modification in the judgment. The appeals and the writ petition are accordingly disposed of but, under the circumstances, without costs.
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1996 (9) TMI 606
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... ... ..... laid down as broad proposition of law that if public witnesses are not joined in the raiding party, the recovery effected by the police is always' doubtful or that the accused should not be convicted merely on their statement. It has not been even suggested nor has been pointed out to me or to the trial Court that the police had any enmity with the appellant or there was any motive in their implicating him. The testimony of the witness in my view would not he doubted or discarded merely on the ground that he happens to be an official witness. I have gone through the statement of all the witnesses and I do not find any reason as to whey they should be disbelieved. There is no infirmity in the statement of any of the prosecution witnesses and I have no hesitation in accepting their testimony. (10) For the foregoing reasons I do not find any ground to set aside the judgment of the trial Court. I maintain the conviction and sentence of the appellant and dismiss this appeal.
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1996 (9) TMI 605
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... ... ..... . Heard Counsel for the appellant. Civil appeals are dismissed.
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1996 (9) TMI 604
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... ... ..... fficer to verify whether the appellants have stopped the misuser. If they would have not, the resumption order would get revived and thereafter it would be open to the Estate Officer to deal with the property in accordance with law without further reference to the appellants or taking any further action in this behalf. If the misuser is repeated, he would free to resume the property without further proceedings. Reasonable penalty may be fixed and the appellants shall pay over the same. The appeals are accordingly disposed of. No costs. W.P. 250/96 This writ petition filed by the petitioners challenging the resumption orders passed by the Estate Officer for contravention of the conditions of the sale. Therefore, it would be open to the petitioners, to avail of remedy, if any, available under the law. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. One month's time is given to the petitioner to approach the High Court. In the meanwhile, status quo on today shall be maintained.
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