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Case Laws
Showing 21 to 40 of 460 Records
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1997 (1) TMI 548 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... Law right to file suit for tort of negligence. It would not be just and proper to fasten duty of care and liability for omission thereof. It would be difficult for the local authority etc. to foresee such an occurrence. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to conclude that the appellant has been negligent in the maintenance of the tees planted by it on the road-sides. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed accordingly. Judgment and decree of the trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court, stands set aside. In the facts of the case, we direct that the amount of ₹ 45,000/- may not be recovered from the respondents though they are not entitled in law to the same, since they are to poor and the amount must have already been spent out. In view of the trouble taken by Shri Narasimha as amicus curiae, we direct the Corporation to pay him a further sum of ₹ 5,000/- Rupees five thousand only within a period of two months from the receipt of this order.
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1997 (1) TMI 547 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... gone out of picture. It must, therefore, be held that only the appellant is the sole surviving obstructionist whose claim regarding the alleged independent right, title and interest in the decretal property has to be adjudicated upon by the Executing Court under Order XXI, Rule 97 Sub-rule (2), CPC pursuant to the present order. The Executing Court shall not entertain objection or obstruction from any other party or person. It is also necessary to direct the Executing Court, to which these proceedings are being remanded, to adjudicate upon the claim of the appellant to the decretal property as per the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 97 Sub-rule (2), CPC read with Order XXI, Rule 98 within a period of three months from the receipts of the writ of the order at its end as the decree is of 1988 and the execution proceedings now would be pending for about nine years. 8. The appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.
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1997 (1) TMI 546 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ely following that date an affidavit that such copies as aforesaid were so delivered or sent. In Shiv Shankar Chadha Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1993 3 SCR 522 it was held that the compliance of this provision is mandatory. Following this judgment this Court in M/s. Marble Udyog Ltd. M/s. P & O India Agency Pvt. Ltd. 1995(3)AD Delhi 812 has held that for non compliance of this provision there was no option left with the Court except to vacate the ex-parte order of injunction. For this reason also the temporary injunction is liable to be vacated. However, the plaintiff has been found to be not entitled to temporary injunction on merits. (49) In view of the above discussion the is No.7411/96 filed by the plaintiff is dismissed and is No.8466/96 filed by the defendant under Order 39 Rule 4 Civil Procedure Code. is allowed with costs. The temporary injunction granted on 16.8.1996 is set aside and vacated. Costs assessed at ₹ 5,000.00 to be paid by the plaintiff.
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1997 (1) TMI 545 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... hat the obligation are actual. The board would supply electrical energy and the consumer is under corresponding duty to pay the sum due toward the electricity consumed. Thus the Electricity Board, having exercised that power, since admittedly the petitioner had neglect to pay the bill for additional sum, was right in disconnecting the supply without recourse to filling of the suit to recover the same. The National Commission, therefore, was right in following the judgment of the Bombay High Court and allowing the appeal setting aside the order of the State Commission. Moreover, there is no deficiency of service in making supplementary demand for escaped billing. Therefore may be negligence or collusion by subordinate staff in not properly recording the reading or allowing pilferage to the consumers. That would be deficiency of service under the Consumer Protection Act. We do not find any illegality warranting interference. The Special Leave Petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (1) TMI 544 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... dates. The banning order came into effect on July 27, 1973. However, the suit was instituted on July Ii, 1977. As already noticed the contract was discharged with effect from the date of the banning order. The suit having been filed on July Ii, 1977, after three years of the coming in force of the ban, was clearly barred. The learned counsel for the plaintiff, however, submitted that the defendants 'having written several letters to the plaintiff requesting for extension of time for performance of the contract, the period of limitation would start running from that date. The defendants refused to cancel the contract. This plea is not available to the plaintiffs the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff on the date when the contract was discharged viz. July 27, 1993 and since it filed the suit after more than three years from threat date the suit is barred by limitation. RELIEF In view of the findings on Issues Nos. 2 to 7, the suit is dismissed. No order as to costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 543 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... e also do not deserve to be accepted. The order that was passed by this Court on 20.2.96 in Transferred Case (Civil) No.9 of 1990 was in respect of levy sugar price for the year 1982-83 and, therefore, it cannot have any bearing on the fixation of price of levy sugar for the years 1975-76 to 1979-80. Moreover, this Court, wile passing the said order, has clearly stated that "...this matter is not covered by the decision of this Colurt in Shri Malprabha Co-operative Sugar Ltd. vs. Union of India and Anr. 1994(1) SCC 648". Even if the Government has omitted to take into consideration one unfavourable element, namely, mopping up of excess realisation it cannot justify its omission to take into consideration another relevant element which is favourable to the producer of sugar. We, therefore, allow these applications and direction the Government to issue additional orders/notifications in terms of the directions given by this Court in the above referred batch of cases.
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1997 (1) TMI 542 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ase and not good law. It is seen that the very object of introducing these amendments was to cut down the delay in disposal of suits and to curtail spate of remedial steps provided under the Code. As held earlier, the right of appeal is a creature of the statute and the statute having expressly prohibited the filing of second appeal under sub-section (2) of Section 104, the right of appeal provided under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent would not be available. As already noted, the main part of Clause 10 clearly indicates that "an appeal would lie from the judgment not being a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction". Thereby the judgment from an appellate jurisdiction stands excluded under the first part of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent itself. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court was right in holding that the Letters Patent Appeal would not lie against an order of the learned single Judge. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 541 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... reverse the credit” shall by substituted. Mr. Ganesh, the learned Counsel for M/s. Raj Exports says that the petitioner will now make an application to the appropriate customs authorities for issuance of detention certificate. He requests that we may direct the authorities to consider and dispose of the said application expeditiously. We have no doubt that the authorities will dispose of the application, if any, filed as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law. In view of the facts stated in the order dated 21-1-97, it is obvious that the petitioner herein shall be entitled to release the goods imported by it without payment of the customs duty. The Special Leave Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
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1997 (1) TMI 540 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... he meaning of cl. (iii) of s. 36(1). However, so far as the claim for deduction of interest paid on moneys borrowed for payment of income-tax is concerned, it was held by this Court in the above decision that interest paid on moneys borrowed for payment of taxes is not entitled to deduction under s. 36(1)(iii) of the Act. In view of the above, we answer the question referred to us as follows The Tribunal was justified in holding that the interest pertaining to the borrowings taken by the assessee for payment of income-tax was not allowable as deduction under s. 36(1)(iii) of the IT Act, 1961. The Tribunal was, however, not justified in holding that the interest paid on moneys borrowed for payment of dividend was not allowable under s. 36(1)(iii) of the IT Act, 1961. Such interest is allowable as deduction under s. 36(1)(iii) of the IT Act, 1961 as the payment of dividend is part of the business of the company. 3. The question referred to us is answered accordingly. No costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 539 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... out the concept that the assessee had lost domain on the income. In instant case before us the affiliation being compulsory, making the social security organisation an earning partner alongside of the assessee, i.e., the assessee earns not only for himself but also for the social security organisation, the extent of the amount relatable to social security organisation, the assessee has no right over it at all and thereby no domain on it. 7. For the foregoing reasons, we find the submissions of the learned Sr. Advocate having considerable force and accordingly we hold that hence the social security charges are to be deducted from the salary income as a prior charge by overriding title and it is only the net salary after such deduction that should be treated as gross salary within the meaning of section 16 of the I.T. Act. We accordingly direct the Assessing Officer to assess the salary income on the basis of our directions as above. 8. In the result, the appeals are allowed.
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1997 (1) TMI 538 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... ), (2), (3) and (4) above, the same shall be entertained only if the applicant for refund/appellant files affidavit stating that he has not passed on the burden of the duty, which is claimed by way of refund, to another person. In case the applicant for refund is a company or a society, the affidavit shall be sworn by the Managing Director or the Principal Officer of the Company or the Society, as the case may be. Such an affidavit shall be treated as an averment/assertion which an applicant for refund has to make in terms of the judgment in Mafatlal.’ The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. No costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 537 - CESTAT CHENNAI
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... ... ..... known as Master Batch and this again mixed in the internal mixer along with the anti-oxidants curing agents, sulphur etc. for a given period. The mixed materials is then dumped on to mixing mill where further blending takes place. After this the compound is taken out, cooled and packed in polythene sheets for despatch. (The process of manufacture is identical for all the Envelope compound, cement compound, Gum compound, etc.) PROCESS OF MANUFACTURE OF GUM STOCKS (a) Mixing Mixing of the compound is similar to the process involved in mixing precured tread rubber until the final batch is obtained. (b) Calendering The final batch sheet are warmed up in a mill and the warm stock is made into a thin continuous sheet using a calender. The calendered sheet is cooled down in cooling drums, a film of polythene applied to the cushion and rolled up with a core to get the finished product. Note The process of manufacture is identical to Bonding gum, and Filler gum.
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1997 (1) TMI 536 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... at in case the Board does not find itself in agreement with the recommendations made by the Tribunal, it would be required to state its reasons in that behalf, give an opportunity to the Baridars and, if necessary, a personal hearing through their representatives or a counsel and then take a decision to pay compensation as it may deem appropriate. In case it disagrees with the recommendations of the Tribunal, it should record reasons in writing and would communicate the same to all the affected persons. This exercise should be done within two months from the date of the receipt of the recommendations of the Tribunal. o p /o p The Governor would appoint the Tribunal within six weeks from the date of the receipt of the judgment. We hope and trust that the Tribunal would dispose of the claims as expeditiously as possible since more than a decade has passed by now. o p /o p The appeals are accordingly disposed of but, in the circumstances, there is no order as to costs. o p /o p
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1997 (1) TMI 535 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... nce the petitioner had committed default and as a condition for re-connection, agreed to pay the amount in instalments, he is liable to comply with the undertaking given for supply of electrical energy. the petitioner committed default in that behalf. so, it is not entitled to seek any declaration or direction from the Court that since the matter is pending before the BIFR, he would be untitled to the supply of electrical energy without the compliance of the corresponding obligation of payment under regulations or of the contract under the Indian Electricity supply Act. It is, therefore, not correct to say that since the proceedings are pending before the BIFR, the electricity is required to be supplied to the consumer without compliance of the conditions. It is then sought to be contended that the authorities may take coercive steps to recover the arrears. at this state, we need not go into the question. o p /o p The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed. o p /o p
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1997 (1) TMI 534 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... ake has been noticed and having regard to the fact that the order in the form of correction has been made on 23-9-1983, to an order dated 30-10-1982, we do not consider it to be that much of a serious and long lapse of time, particularly when the provisions of the Act specifically enable the correction entitled to be made under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure “at any time”, though we are conscious of the fact that even in the case of such stipulation, it becomes necessary to exercise the power within a reasonable time. In the above circumstances we do not consider that the lapse of time in this case is so unreasonable or long as to shock judicial conscience to warrant our interference. 16. In view of the above, we answer the question referred to us for the determination in the affirmative and hold that addendum order dated 23-9-1983 passed by the Adjudicating Authority is one well within the scope of Section 154 of the Customs Act, 1962. No costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 533 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... seeks to withdraw the appeal. The appeal is dismissed as withdrawn. No costs.
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1997 (1) TMI 532 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... right in holding that the recovery certificates issued by the Labour Commissioner for recovery of the mounts claimed by the workmen in the proceedings under section 33C (1) of the Act were perfectly valid, legally sound and suffered from no infirmity whatsoever. We do not find any merit in these appeals and consequently dismiss the same with costs. One of fee only in two appeals. Before parting with the judgment, we would, however, like to clarify that the application which has been filed by the employees union before the Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the Act for recovery of benefits/amounts, other than those claimed in their application under Section 33C (1) of the Act shall be decided by the Labour Court on its own merits and the findings recorded by us hereinabove shall be considered as confined only to the recovery certificates issued by the Labour Commissioner under Section 33C (1) of the Act, which are the subject matter of the appeals hereby disposed of by us.
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1997 (1) TMI 531 - ITAT MUMBAI
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... ... ..... rovisions of the statute, the circular cannot override judicial decisions rendered on the statute. In fields which are covered by judicial decisions, the circular will not be conclusive even so far as the income-tax authorities are concerned. We are fortified in this view from the decision of the Delhi High Court in Geep Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. CBDT 1987 166 ITR 88 . As already observed earlier, the controversy involved in the present appeal stands squarely covered by the decision of the jurisdictional High Court. This being so, even if there is a contrary circular issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes, the view of the Hon’ble High Court has to prevail over the circular of the Board. 10. For the reasons already discussed above, we hold that the CIT (Appeals) has erred in accepting the assessee’s claim for investment allowance. We, therefore, reverse the order of the CIT (Appeals) and restore that of the Assessing Officer. 11. The appeal stands allowed.
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1997 (1) TMI 530 - SC ORDER
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... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (1) TMI 529 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... of Section 397 is prohibited by sub-section (3) thereof, inherent power of the High Court is still available under Section 482 of the Code and as it is paramount power of continuous superintendence of the High Court under Section 483, the High is justified in interfering with the order leading to miscarriage of justice and in setting aside the order of the courts below. It remitted the case to the Magistrate for decision on merits after consideration of the evidence. We make it clear that we have not gone into the merits of the case. Since the High Court has left the matter to be considered by the Magistrate, it would be in appropriate at this stage to go into that question. We have only considered the issue of power and jurisdiction of the High Court in the in the context of the revisional power under Section 397 (1) read with Section 397(3) and the inherent powers. We do not find any justification warranting interference in the appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
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