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1997 (2) TMI 559
... ... ... ... ..... JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 558
... ... ... ... ..... siness carried on was identical the net profit rate applied at 0.5 per cent. on the estimated sales of ₹ 2 crores thereby determining the net income at ₹ 1 lakh for the current accounting period of six months and 22 days is considered to be most fair and reasonable. I accordingly concur with the view taken by the learned Accountant Member upholding the order of the first appellate authority wherein the net income is adopted at ₹ 1 lakh applying a net profit rate of 0.5 per cent. on estimated sales of two crores. This matter will now be placed before the Division Bench who heard the appeal for passing the majority view. ORDER B. L. CHHIBBER (Accountant Member).-The learned Accountant Member, Shri Nathuram, sitting as Third Member by his opinion dated February 20, 1997, has concurred with the views of the Accountant Member and in accordance with the majority view, the Revenue’s appeal is dismissed. In the result, the Revenue’s appeal is dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 557
... ... ... ... ..... previous year, the same cannot be disallowed under section 43B and also cannot be considered as assessee's income under section 2(24)(x) read with section 36(1)(va). Further, in an unreported case the ITAT Calcutta Bench, in the case of Sudera Services (P.) Ltd. (supra), on which the ld. counsel relied on (copy is placed at page 65 of the paper-book), it has been held, on the facts of that case, that the provisions of section 43B should be construed in a liberal way keeping in view the Legislative intention so that absurdity and the interpretation which leads to injustice may be avoided. 19. In view of the decisions referred to in the foregoing paragraphs of this order, and the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that none of the payments in question were hit by the provisions of section 43B or section 2(24)(x) read with section 36(1)(va), as the case may be, and the additions made by invoking these provisions are hereby deleted.
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1997 (2) TMI 556
... ... ... ... ..... the direction of the court of Session to summon the petitioner. A perusal of the said reveals that the summonses were issued on 22nd April,1996 directing the petitioners to put in appearance before him on 7th May, 1996. Thus the period of limitation in the instant case is to be computed from the said date i.e. 7th May, 1996 the present revision petition was Filed on 1st July, 1996. Thus I find that the present revision petition was filed within 90 days as prescribed under law. Hence the present revision petition is very much within time. (16) In the above circumstances, the petitioner are entitled to succeed. Petition is allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is hereby set aside. The case is remanded to the learned Additional Sessions Judge on 22nd April, 1977. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after hearing both the parties would pass an order afresh on the revision petition preferred by the respondent. (17) The record be sent back.
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1997 (2) TMI 555
... ... ... ... ..... s defence in the suit. However, we think that is one of defaults in the payment of the instalments. Under those circumstances, merely filing of the suit by the Bank does not put a bar on the Tribunal to go into the merits in the complaint. Each case requires examination on the facts of the case. On the other hand, we find force in reasoning given by the Tribunal on third point, It is the petitioner's case that they were unable to produce the goods and have them marketed to pay back the loan in instalments. It was not the case that it was due to deficiency in service. On the other hand, it is admitted that due to slump in the market they could not sell the goods, realise the price of the finished product and pay back the loan to the Bank. That admission stands in their way to plead at the late stage that they suffered loss on account of the deficiency in service. Under those circumstances, we do not find any ground warranting interference. The leave petition is dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 554
... ... ... ... ..... bsolutely no proof from the defendants. (ix) On issue No. 9, the defendants have not proved their claim as stated in para 33 of the written statement. (18) On a consideration of the documents and oral evidence adduced, I find that the plaintiff is entitled to a sum of ₹ 1,18,492.66. Regarding rate of interest though the transactions are of commercial nature as the transactions pertain to the year 1976 and prior thereto, I feel that the rate of interest could be fixed 12 per annum from the date of plaint till the date of realisation. (19) Accordingly, there shall be a decree ; (A)directing the defendants to pay to the plaintiff a sum of ₹ 1,18,492.66. (b) directing the defendants to pay the plaintiff interest 12 per annum on the sum of ₹ 1,18,492.66 from the date of suit till the date of realisation. (c) directing the defendants to pay the plaintiff the costs of the suit. (d) directing the dismissal of the counter claim filed by the defendants with no costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 553
... ... ... ... ..... s without any basis. It, however, appears to us that if the sanction had not been accorded for which the criminal case could have been initiated against the respondent, there was no occasion either for the trial court or for the appeal court to consider the prosecution case on merits. Therefore, the High Court need not have made the finding on merits about the prosecution case. We make it clear that finding made by the courts on the merits of the case will stand expunged and will not be taken into consideration in future. In our view, the High Court should have passed the appropriate order by dropping the proceeding and not entering into the question of merits after it had come to the finding that the proceeding was not maintainable for want of sanction. It is, however, made clear that it will be open to the appellant-State of Tamil Nadu to proceed afresh against the respondent after obtaining necessary sanction if the State so desires. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
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1997 (2) TMI 552
... ... ... ... ..... mmission v. Secy. of State for Employment 1994 ICR 317 1994 1 All E.R. 910 following its earlier decisions, including Factortame (No. 2) Factortame Ltd. v. Secy. of State for Transport (No. 2), 1991 1 A.C. 603 1991 1 All E.R. 70 1990 (3) WLR 818 14. Now coming to the facts of the case, we are of the opinion that award of compensation of ₹ 1, 00, 000 (Rupees one lakh only) to the families of each of the deceased would be appropriate and just. The same shall be paid by the Government of Manipur. The Collector/District Magistrate, Churachandpur shall hand over the cheques to the respective families of the deceased, namely Lalbeiklien and Saikaplien, within two months from today. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. The People's Union for Civil Liberties, which has filed this writ petition and pursued it all these years shall be entitled to its costs, assessed at ₹ 10, 000 (Rupees ten thousand only) payable by the State of Manipur within the same period.
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1997 (2) TMI 551
... ... ... ... ..... ot even an attempt made by the Central Government to independently consider the representations made by the detenu either against the order of detention or against the order of declaration. Having regard to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Smt, Gracy (supra), we have no choice but to hold that the continued detention is not permissible in accordance with law. The order of detention is, therefore, liable to be struck down 16. In the result, Rule is made absolute. The order of detention at Exhibit "A" dated 11 August 1995 is quashed and set aside and the detenu is ordered to be released from detention. We hasten to clarify that it was fairly stated before us that the detenu is in custody in connection with the pending cases under the NDPS Act where bail has either been refused or has not been granted. It, therefore, follows that, as of this date, though the order of detention is set aside, the detenu will not be entitled to be released from jail.
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1997 (2) TMI 550
... ... ... ... ..... ervice and subsequently that order is withdrawn and he is reinstated into the service. Can a similar circumstanced person claim equality under Section 14 for reinstatement? Answer is obviously No'. In a converse case, in the first instance, one may be wrong but the wrong order cannot be the foundation for claiming equality for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier for enforcement of the same order. As stated earlier, his right must be founded upon enforceable right to entitle lion to the equality treatment for enforcement thereof. A wrong decision by the Government does not give a right decision by the Government does not give a right to enforce the wrong order and claim parity or equality two wrongs can never made a right. Under these circumstances, the High Court was clearly wrong in directing reinstatement of the respondent by a mandamus by a mandamus with all consequential benefits. The appeal is accordingly allowed. But in the circumstances without costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 549
... ... ... ... ..... he respondent to the contrary could not have been countenanced in the face of the said statement in the Judgment. We are, therefore, of the said statement in the Judgment. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the respondent must be deemed to have been dismissed by the Competent Authority viz., Chairman. Mr. Narasimha, learned counsel for the respondent writ petitioner, submitted that there are several other submissions which were raised in the writ appeal but which have not been considered by the Division Bench since they allowed the appeal on the aforesaid one submission. In view of this submission, we think it appropriate that the matter should go back to the High Court/Division Bench for a fresh disposal of the writ appeal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made herein. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The Judgment under appeal is set aside and the matter remitted to the High Court for a fresh disposal of the writ appeal. No order as to costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 548
... ... ... ... ..... oof of every day's delay. The imposition of costa on officers for filing appeals causes public injustice and gives the manipulators an opportunity to compound the camouflage. Secondly, the imposition of costs personally against the officers will be counter productive and officers would desist to pursue genuine cases of public benefit or importance or of far reaching effect on public administration or exchequer deflecting course of justice. The Court before imposing costs personally against the officers should be circumspect and keep at the back of its mind the facts and circumstances in each case. Otherwise, public justice will suffer irremediably. Unfortunately, in this case the delay in compliance is of one year and five months and the officer has not explained. The High Court was constrained to impose personal costs against the officer. Under the circumstances, we do not think that it is a fit case for interference. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 547
... ... ... ... ..... e are unable to appreciate the submission. No order or proceeding of the Princely State of Tripura has been produced before the High Court or this Court levying the duty. We also do not know at what rate and on what basis, if any, the duty was being levied. We are also not sure whether the said plea can fall within the four corners of either sub-section (3) or sub- section (4). Sri Javali requested for grant of sometime to enable the State to produce the proceedings. We are not inclined to accede to this plea either. Having not produced the proceedings/orders either before the High Court or before this Court all these years, the State cannot reasonably ask for more time to produce the same when the matter has come up for final hearing. For the above reasons, the appeal is allowed in part. Rule 3 of the Tripura Transit Rules, except sub-rule (5) thereof, is declared to be perfectly valid and effective. The judgment of the High Court is set aside to the above extent. No costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 546
... ... ... ... ..... , 1995, after the amended Rules came into force, and retired from service on July 31, 1995, Since he has already retired, his appointment has not been challenged, though direction to the contra was given by the Division Bench. To that extent, the judgment of the High Court stands set aside and his promotion is ordered to remain undisturbed. As regards others, the Government is required to constitute the DPC which would consider the claims of eligible candidates as per Rules. It would make fresh selection and appointments in accordance with law. Whatever benefits have been given under the impugned order cannot be taken away although the orders are being hereby quashed. But seniority and other criteria would be subject to the decision that would be taken by the Government. The Government is directed to constitute the DPC within a period of eight weeks from the date of the receipts of the order and take speedy action accordingly. The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 545
... ... ... ... ..... ies to prosecute the appeals and that, therefore, the appeals are not being pressed. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 544
... ... ... ... ..... l exercise. Things which have been adjudged long ago should be allowed to rest in peace. a decision rendered long ago can be over-ruled only if this Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong or unfair and nor merely on the ground that another interpretation is possible and the court may arrive at different conclusion. We should remember that the law laid dow by the High Court in the above decision has not been doubted so far. The Act in question is State enactment. These are weighty considerations to hold that even if different view is possible, if it will have the effect of upsetting or re-opening past and closed transactions or unsettling titles all over the State, this Court should be loathe to take a different view. On this ground as well, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment under appeal. 7. The judgment of the High Court of Kerala rendered in C.R.P. No. 1894 of 1988 is affirmed. The appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to casts.
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1997 (2) TMI 543
... ... ... ... ..... n of the High Court on the question of classification is affirmed. So far as the question of refund is concerned, the matter has to be governed by and shall have to be decided and disposed of in terms of the decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. etc. etc. v. U.O.I. etc. etc. - 1997 (89) E.L.T. 247 (S.C.) 1996 (9) SCALE 457 read with the format order (a copy of which is enclosed herewith). The appeal is accordingly disposed of. No costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 542
... ... ... ... ..... eriodical reports ofthe progress made in that behalf besubmitted to the Registry of this Court. The CentralGovernment is directed to convene the meeting within two months from the date of receipt of the order. After evolving the principles, a copy thereof is directed to be forwarded to the Registry of this Court. Shri Rakesh Dwivedi, learnedAdditional Advocate Generalof U.P.and Shri B.B. Singh, learned counsel for the State of Bihar,have taken notice on behalf of the States of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar respectively.They are directed to obtain the copy of the judgment and send the same to the respective States and to ensureimplementation of directions issued by thisCourt from time to time to implement the welfaremeasures envisaged inthe above orders until the principles andpolicies to beevolvedin the aforedirected conference and implemented throughout the country. Post this matter after three months. The writ petitionis, accordingly, disposed of subject to the above directions.
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1997 (2) TMI 541
... ... ... ... ..... adjudication on merits. But the counter comments made against him by the Secretary were warranted in view of the material on record. He brought to our notice that as on the date when the entries were made, the vigilance enquiry was pending against the respondent and, therefore, the adverse remarks came to be made. The findings recorded by the Tribunal of malice and arbitrariness on the part of Secretary as affirmed by the High Court are not warranted for two reasons. Firstly, since the Secretary was not conominee to the proceedings and had no opportunity to explain the position, it would be violative of the principle of natural justice. Secondly, since the vigilance enquiry was pending. unless the officer was exonerated and cleared from the cloud, necessarily, the Secretary could not clear the conduct and integrity of the officer. Therefore, the adverse remarks cannot be said to be to smack of arbitrariness, The appeal is accordingly allowed only the above extent. No costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 540
... ... ... ... ..... rnan, JJ. ORDER Appeal dismissed.
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