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Showing 61 to 80 of 465 Records
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1997 (2) TMI 539
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... ... ..... ight and that she was in possession of the suit house when the Hindu Succession Act came into force and in view of Section 14(4) of the said Act, her limited estate enlarges into an absolute one. The reversioners have no right in the property till it comes to them by reversion because the widow is not a ‘trustee’ of the interests of the revesioners after the coming into force of the 1956 Act. In that view, the appellant succeeds in this Appeal. In the result, we hold that the High Court went wrong in holding that the vendor of the appellant namely, Kamlawati had only a limited interest and she had no right to alienate the suit house under the will. we hold that Kamlawati got absolute title to the suit house under the will which is a document effectuating a pre-existing right and not by itself making a grant. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the Judgment and order of the District Court as will as the High Court are set aside. The suit is dismissed. No costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 538
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... ... ..... licence granted by the appellant to him on principles of justice, equity and good conscience'. The fact situation in Jagat Singh's case (supra) was, thus, totally different. The licencee therein had raised a permanent construction acting upon the licence after incurring expenditure for raising the permanent construction and it was for that reason that the court held that the licence could not be revoked at the sweet will of the licensor. In the present case, the respondent has categorically denied to be a licencee of the appellant or that he had raised any construction acting on the licence. He was, thus, not entitled to any relief in the second appeal. The judgment of the High Court under the circumstances cannot be sustained. This appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court are hereby set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, as confirmed by the First Appellate Court, are restored. We, however, make no order as to costs.
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1997 (2) TMI 537
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... ... ..... tunity to produce either T.R.O. or another valid advance licence permitting copper wire bars for importation and duty free clearance under Notification 203/92-Cus. in respect of goods of excess value. In case such a licence or T.R.O. is not produced, the excess value of the goods be allowed under OGL, if so admissible, and duty at the appropriate rate be charged and goods released. If not so admissible, re-adjudication to this limited extent in respect of excess value goods is to be done by the Commissioner of Customs in accordance with law and principles of natural justice. 4.8 In view of our findings above, confiscation of goods and consequent fine of ₹ 3 crores in lieu of confiscation and penalty of ₹ 2 crores on Navneet Kumar, proprietor, are set aside. Goods covered within the balance available in the advance licence produced should be released forthwith, having already been detained for more than two years. 4.9 Appeal disposed of in above terms.
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1997 (2) TMI 536
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... ... ..... etitioner are liable to be included in the total turnover and the only thing that the petitioner is entitled to claim deduction of sales under proviso to section 5(3)(a) of the Act from the total turnover in order to arrive at the turnover on which turnover tax can be imposed. In that view of the matter, it cannot be said that the transactions in the instant case are taken out of the ambit of the Act itself. The exemption as I have indicated earlier, is only in respect of transactions under proviso to section 5(3)(a) of the Act. Consequently, it follows that the petitioner is liable to pay turnover tax under section 6-B of the Act. 21.. For the reasons stated, I do not find any merit in the contentions canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly, petitions are liable to be dismissed. Hence, the following orderPetitions are dismissed. Rule discharged in the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petitions dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 535
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... ... ..... hholding issuance of declarations in Form XXIVA on the ground that the applicant had violated the provisions of section 5(1)(bb) by effecting export sales of the products. 5.. In view of the position of law as argued by the learne advocate for the applicant and as conceded by the learned advocate for the respondents, we hold that the export sales made by the applicant should be treated as sales made in West Bengal in terms of section 5(1)(bb) of the Act of 1941. 6.. Accordingly, the impugned order dated October 10, 1996 passed by respondent No. 1 rejecting the prayer for declaration forms is quashed. Respondent No. 1 is directed to issue declaration forms by February 11, 1997 as prayed for in the application dated September 9, 1996 in terms of rule 27AA of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941, by treating the applicant s export sales made from West Bengal as sales made in West Bengal. 7.. Thus, the main application is disposed of without any order for costs. Application allowed.
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1997 (2) TMI 534
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... ... ..... at situation the appellate authority for the reasons to be recorded in writing can entertain the appeal without deposit of the payment of such amount. (e) Neither on the wording nor in view of the spirit of the Punjab and Haryana Acts it is possible to hold that the appellate authority should see the prima facie nature of the case while hearing the stay matter. (f) The factum of tax assessed being illegal cannot be a relevant consideration for grant of stay by an Appellate Authority. (g) The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution of India in rarest of the rare cases in the given facts and circumstances, can grant stay and waive the condition of pre-deposit of tax and the existing alternative remedy in such circumstances would be no ground to refuse interference. 25.. As a consequence of the aforementioned discussion, the reference is answered against the assessee and dismiss all the writ petitions. No costs. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 533
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... ... ..... tions have been laid down in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, those are meant to meet different requirements with a different object. It is the health of the people which is a primary concern while laying down standards and specifications under those Rules. Therefore, it cannot be said that the assessee-company should also manufacture maize oil of the same standards and specifications and then only its product can be treated to be edible oil for the purposes of taxation. In the broad and general sense and in common parlance, the oil produced by the assesseecompany, if used as a major constituent of vegetable ghee, can be treated to be within the realm and ambit of edible oil. Therefore, maize (corn) oil produced by the assessee-company is to be treated as edible oil. 17.. The question, reproduced in the first paragraph of this order, is answered in the affirmative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1997 (2) TMI 532
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... ... ..... remote possibility. We find no ground to interfere with the impugned orders of the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 dated September 29, 1995 and March 4, 1996 respectively. Interim order stands vacated. Hence, the application is dismissed. We make no order as to costs. After the judgment is delivered, Mr. Sumit Kr. Chakraborty, learned advocate for the applicant, prays for stay of operation of the judgment for eight weeks. Mr. J.K. Goswami, learned State Representative, opposes the prayer for stay. After hearing both sides we are of the opinion that the operation of the judgment is not required to be stayed, but since payment of tax should be made within 30 days in terms of rule 48C(6), we direct that the tax assessed for the period of four quarters ending March 31, 1992 and for the period from March 2, 1991 to March 31, 1991 shall not be realised by respondents for eight weeks from now. L.N. RAY (Chairman).-I agree. M.K. KAR GUPTA (Technical Member).-I agree. Application dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 531
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... ... ..... may eventually escape the taxing net. 13.. As regards the quantum of penalty the value of the 8 reels of coated paper board should be kept out of consideration for the reasons given above. Therefore, contravention of law appears to have been committed in respect of 40 reels of coated poster worth Rs. 2,17,220.80. This value has not been disputed by the learned State Representative. Under section 14A(2) penalty must not exceed 25 per cent of the value of the goods involved. We fully agree with Shri Mukherjee that imposition of the maximum penalty in each and every case irrespective of other consideration is not in keeping with the spirit of law. In our opinion, a penalty of Rs. 40,000 would be reasonable. 14.. In view of the findings above, the application is allowed in part. The impugned orders of the respondents are modified by reducing the penalty to Rs. 40,000. We, however, make no order as to costs. M.K. KAR GUPTA (Technical Member).-I agree. Application allowed in part.
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1997 (2) TMI 530
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... ... ..... of policy by a succeeding Government on the policy pursued by its predecessor. Surely, the successor Government can have different rules from their predecessor including the matters relating to taxation or mode of taxation or basis of taxation or objects of taxation, etc. No explanation was required from the State for the amending Act having retrospective effect. 3.. Since this decision has considered the earlier in D. Cawasji and Co. v. State of Mysore 1985 58 STC 1 (SC) and has explained it, it holds the field and is binding. 4.. As it is, the circumstances of increase in the rate of tax by 1 per cent is in no way in comparison to the facts of the case in D. Cawasji and Co. v. State of Mysore 1985 58 STC 1 (SC) where an abnormal rise was made retrospectively which the Supreme Court observed was prima facie arbitrary and unreasonable. 5.. In these circumstances, we do not find any merit in the petition and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed. Writ petition dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 529
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... ... ..... er . It is also not possible for the pawnbrokers before us to contend that they do not carry on the business of buying and selling. 16.. I am in respectful agreement with the view and this would apply to the facts of the case. The fact that the pawnbrokers are governed by the Tamil Nadu Pawn Brokers Act, 1943, does not alter the situation or makes difference with the question concerning whether the bankers are dealers under the Sales Tax Act. While a pawnbroker is governed by the Pawn Brokers Act, the banker is governed by Baking Regulation Act. Their activity in realising the security is similar and identical. 17.. Taking into account all these I hold that the petitioners bankers are dealers as per section 2(viii) of the Sales Tax Act and are liable to pay tax under section 5 of the Act. The orders passed by the officers are valid. Section 2(viii)(f)(1) of the Sales Tax Act is constitutionally valid. With the result the Original Petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 528
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... ... ..... the extent maintained. In fact, the decision of this Court in Kuruvila Chacko s case 1991 KLJ (TC) 665 was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Sreekrishna Trading Company v. State of Kerala 1998 108 STC 14 1995 2 KLT 255 and held that in cases where in addition to the shortage if there are other irregularities also Kuruvila Chacko s case will not have any application. That apart this is a case in which the Appellate Tribunal has considered the materials available on record and on appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the case has sustained an addition of 2.5 per cent in respect of the sales turnover of foreign liquor and 20 per cent in respect of sales turnover of soft drinks. The aforesaid finding of the Tribunal is a finding of fact. 5.. We will not be justified in interfering with the said finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal in revision under section 41 of the Act. There is no merit in this revision. It is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 527
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... ... ..... le to, or exempt from tax in the hands of the dealer. In the present case, the sales turnover of coconuts is exempt from tax and therefore the value of the gunny bags in which the coconuts are packed is also exempt from tax. The decision cited by the learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) and the decision relied upon by the Joint Commissioner are relating to the subjectmatter prior to abovesaid amendment. Therefore, they would not render any assistance to the learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes), for supporting the order passed by the Joint Commissioner. Accordingly, on a plain reading of the abovesaid provisions contained in sub-sections (7) and (8) of section 3, we set aside the order passed by the Joint Commissioner and restore the order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Accordingly, this tax case appeal is allowed. No costs. 7.. T.C.M.P. No. 91 of 1997. Since the main case, the appeal itself is allowed today, the above T.C.M.P. is dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 526
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... ... ..... n such is the case, section 10(d) is not attracted, though section 10(a) may in such a case be invoked on the footing that the assessee, while furnishing the above referred to C form declaration knew or had reason to believe that the said declaration (that he purchased the said goods with intention to resell the same) is false. But, if section 10(a) is attracted, there could be only prosecution for the offence under section 10(a) and there cannot be imposition of penalty in lieu of prosecution under section 10A of the Act since in section 10-A, section 10(a) is not referred to. 13.. The net result is the authority concerned, may, if he is of the view that the ingredients of section 10(a) are present in the case on hand, seek to prosecute the assessee accordingly. But, the present levy cannot be sustained. Therefore, we have to dismiss this revision, though we do not agree with the reasoning of the Tribunal. Accordingly the revision is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 525
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... ... ..... lief on the part of the assessee that mistake has crept in the filing of the return. So in each case, the question has to be gone into whether the return was incorrect or incomplete and whether the assessee has filed the incomplete return with a view to postpone the tax legitimately due to the State or under bona fide belief that the return was in accordance with law. On the facts of the case, it is seen that the Appellate Tribunal has gone into the question and found that the omission to return the turnover of Rs. 1,53,235.20 was due to bona fide mistake on the part of the assessee. The finding that the error that crept in the original return was due to bona fide mistake is a finding of fact arrived at on the facts of the case. Therefore, we are of the opinion that no interference is called for in the order of the Appellate Tribunal in cancelling the levy of penalty. Accordingly, the tax case revision is liable to be dismissed and is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 524
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... ... ..... pay tax, the sales shall be subjected to tax at the next stage at the hands of the earliest of the successive dealers. 9.. The seller of the medicines, M/s. Quality Pharmaceuticals, Bohar, District Rohtak, was a tiny industrial unit and was, for that reason, exempted from the payment of tax under section 13 of the Act. It is obvious that the said manufacturer was not liable to pay tax and, for that reason, the assessee being the earliest of the successive dealers had to pay tax on those goods. Clause (b) of the notification dated May 5, 1973 issued under section 18 of the Act makes the earliest of the successive dealers liable to pay tax where the sale at the first stage was not subjected to tax on the ground that the seller was not liable to pay tax. 10.. The question, as referred to this Court and reproduced in the first paragraph above, is, therefore, answered in the negative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the department. Reference answered in the negative.
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1997 (2) TMI 523
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... ... ..... 28, 1976. It is also not controverted that the rate of tax has been enhanced to four per cent with effect from March 29, 1976. Therefore, the Assessing Authority cannot impose tax at the rate of four per cent for the purchase made prior to March 29, 1976. The Assessing Authority has, thus, clearly committed an error in imposing tax at the rate of four per cent on the purchases made by the petitioner prior to March 29, 1976. This is a patent error on the admitted facts. The Commissioner should have himself corrected the mistake instead of driving the party to further proceedings and putting it into unnecessary expenditure to approach this Court. 7.. Writ petition is accordingly allowed and the Assessing Authority is directed to correct the order of assessment for the year 1975-76 and impose purchase tax at the rate of three per cent on the purchase of cotton made by the petitioner for the period from July 1, 1975 to March 28, 1976. No order as to costs. Writ petition allowed.
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1997 (2) TMI 522
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... ... ..... g authority and Deputy Commissioner (Appeals), did not believe this affidavit without assigning any good reason. There was also no material on record against it. There was no option before them but to believe this uncontroverted and unrebutted affidavit. There is also nothing on the record to indicate that any attempt was made by the assessing authority to examine the account books of the assessee before rejection of its refund application. 7.. Admittedly, HSD oil so purchased was utilised for the generation of power. It was not utilised for manufacture of the goods for sale in execution of works contract. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we are in complete agreement with the views of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Tribunal, Ajmer. It is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. We do not, therefore, find any good ground to interfere with the order under challenge. 8.. Accordingly, the application for revision is dismissed. No order as to costs. Application dismissed.
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1997 (2) TMI 521
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... ... ..... pecified as the goods which shall be subjected to tax at the first stage of sale. There is no dispute to the fact that packing materials like cases, boxes and cartons, by whatever names they were sold by the assessee, were the products of the cardboard or the duplex board. The words their products used in entry No. 11 of the notification are wide enough to include all the items manufactured from the cardboards. In this light, the question, that packing materials should be treated differently for tax purposes, does not carry any significance inasmuch as entry at serial No. 11 encompasses within its purview all the products manufactured from the cardboards. Therefore, it is immaterial as to how and by what names different products of the cardboards are called in the trade. 16.. In the result, both the questions, referred to this Court for opinion, are answered in the affirmative, i.e., against the assessee and in favour of the department. Reference answered in the affirmative.
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1997 (2) TMI 520
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... ... ..... e for imposing penalty in RN-176 of 1996 were illegal and invalid. We declare the above actions of issuance of notice for penalty proceedings and imposition of penalty of Rs. 77,000 on the applicant in RN-146 of 1996 and issuance of similar notice in RN-176 of 1996 as invalid and illegal and those are quashed in respect of both the applicants. The bank guarantees by which the applicants in these two cases had furnished security to the extent of Rs. 10,000 each in the respective cases shall be released forthwith by the respondents. No order is made for costs. This judgment will govern RN-146 of 1996 and RN-176 of 1996. After the judgment is delivered, Mr. K.K. Saha, learned advocate for respondents, submits that stay of operation of the judgment and order may be granted for eight weeks. The learned advocate for the applicants are opposing the prayer for stay. After hearing both sides we see no ground for granting any stay. The prayer is, therefore, rejected. Petition allowed.
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