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Showing 41 to 60 of 463 Records
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1998 (4) TMI 540
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... ... ..... necessary so to do dependent on the availability of the abovesaid two facts. The provision does not use the words "reason to believe". Recording of reasons is not an essential requirement of the provision. The Assessing Officer must obtain previous approval of the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner. The intervention of such a high ranking authority is an inbuilt protection to the assessee against any arbitrary or unjust exercise of the power by the Assessing Officer. It is not the case of the petitioner that such previous approval of the Chief Commissioner or the Commissioner has not been obtained. There is no allegation of mala fides. This Court would not in exercise of its writ jurisdiction sit in appeal over the formation of the opinion by the Assessing Officer." 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no case is made out for interfering with the impugned order referring the petitioner to special audit. The petition is dismissed. In favour of revenue
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1998 (4) TMI 539
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... ... ..... ugned judgment being a coordinate Bench could not have taken a view different from that taken by the earlier Division Bench of the High Court in the case of Durgadas Purkayastha (Supra). If the latter Bench wanted to take a view different than that taken by the earlier Bench, the proper course for them would have been to refer the matter to a larger Bench. We have perused the reasons given by the learned Judges for not referring the matter to a larger Bench. We are not satisfied that the said reasons justified their deciding the matter and not referring it to the larger Bench. In the circumstances, we are unable to uphold the impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it relates to the matter of inter se seniority of the Judicial Officers impleaded as respondents in the writ petition. The impugned judgment of the High Court insofar as it relates to the matter of seniority of the respondent Judicial Officers is set aside. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 538
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... ... ..... r, animal or goods". In our view, whether we go by the words this point does not survive. Further, in all these cases, the consignees have taken delivery of the excess load and used the same in their business, commercial or manufacturing processes and hence they cannot blow hot and cold. Point 9 This Point deals with the relief that the Court should prohibit the levy and collection of penal charges under section 73 of the new Act of 1989 read with the Railways (Punitive charges for overloading of Wagon) Rules, 1990, in the future. Inasmuch as we have held under Points 5 and 6 as well as under Point 7 that these penal charges can be collected from the consignees or endorsees of the railway receipt, under the new Act of 1989 and the 1990 Rules made thereunder, the petitioners/appellants are not entitled to any direction against the Railways for the future. In the result, all the Civil appeals and the Transferred Cases are dismissed but in the circumstances, without costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 537
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... ... ..... on bureau had pointed out that no witnesses ad been examined before he gave his report. The Inquiry Officers, who had been appointed on after the other, had just to examine the records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was responsible for condoning or approving the same against the bye-laws. It is nobody's case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the state as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 and directing the state to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996. the Tribunal rightly did not quash these two later memos. Accordingly we do not find any merit in the appeal. It is dismissed with costs
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1998 (4) TMI 536
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... ... ..... others (1984) 2 S.C.C. 614 this Court held that were an Institution was established by a follower of udasi sect to commemorate the memory of his guru and succession of mahantship was guru to chela, the institution was not a sikh institution. The Bench has elaborately dealt with the requirements of Section 16(2) (iii) of the Act and pointed out the distinction between the sikhs and udasis. The Bench quoted with approval a passage in the judgment of the Privy Council in Hem Singh versus Basant Das, AIR 1936 P.C. 93 wherein the distinction between udasis and sikhs was clearly recognized. The Bench pointed out that while the udasis generate the sikh scriptures they also keep the old Hindu practices. 25. On analysing the materials on record in this case, we find that the institution question is not Sikh Gurudwara. The order of the Tribunal has been rightly set aside by the High Court. There is no merit in this appeal and it is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 535
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... ... ..... and Co., Madras v. Collector - 1997 (91) E.L.T. A232. For the reasons given in the said judgment, the appeal is dismissed.
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1998 (4) TMI 534
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... ... ..... ay be adversely affected, or some others may benefit in consequence. But this cannot be a ground for setting aside the merger which is essentially a policy decision. This court in Union of India v. S.L. Dutta (supra) examined this contention. In S.L. Dutta's case (supra) a change in the promotional policy was challenged on the ground that as a result, service conditions of the respondent were adversely affected since his chance of promotion were reduced. Relying upon the decision in the State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant Anant Kulkarni (supra) this court held that a mere chance of promotion was not a condition of service and the fact that there was a reduction in the chance of promotion would not amount to a change in the conditions of service. In the premises, we do not find that there is any adequate ground for setting aside the Central Labour Service Rules, 1987. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Under the circumstance there will, however, be on order as to costs.
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1998 (4) TMI 533
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... ... ..... follows from this that prior to 14-2-1989, the Department considered that the yarn was not classifiable under Heading 56.06 and on this basis as well as on limitation, the appeal was allowed. This decision of the Tribunal was taken in the absence of any citation of precedent decisions. 9. It is thus seen that there are conflicting decisions of the Tribunal on the classification of Taspa yarn. While the decisions by two different benches in the Garden Silk Mills case and that in Dhamanwala Silk Mills case (to which one of us was a party) have held Taspa yarn to be assessable to duty under Heading 56.06 CETA, the decisions in the case of Pratik Crimpers and Hiten Crimpers supra have held contra, and have upheld classification of Taspa yarn under Chapter 54 CETA. Therefore, we are of the view that the issue needs to be i.e. solved by constitutiuon of a Larger Bench by the Hon’ble President. 10. The papers are accordingly submitted to the Hon’ble President.
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1998 (4) TMI 532
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... ... ..... er the management of the company. This clearly establishes that the petitioners were treated as members of the company irrefutably. There has been no reply to this evidence produced by the petitioners. Though this evidence has not been specifically found in the petition, the respondents were given adequate liberty to reply to this contention but the respondents have chosen not to rebut. In the circumstances, it has to be taken that the respondents admit that the petitioners were in fact treated as members of the company even as late as December, 1991, and December, 1992, when the annual general meetings were scheduled. 23. In the above circumstances, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the petitioners are well within their right to maintain the petition under Section 399 and the petition is maintainable. Since the pleadings in this case are already completed, the final hearing will be fixed at Calcutta, for which notices will be sent in due course of time.
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1998 (4) TMI 531
Whether the punishment for established contempt of Court committed by an Advocate can include punishment to debar the concerned advocate from practice by suspending his licence (sanad) for a specified period, in exercise of its powers under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution of India?
Held that:- It must be remembered that wider the amplitude of its power under Article 142, the greater is the need of care for this Court to see that the power is used with restraint without pushing back the limits of the constitution so as to function within the bounds of its own jurisdiction. To the extent, this Court makes the statutory authorities and other organs of the State perform their duties in accordance with law, its role is unexceptionable but it is not permissible or the Court to "take over" the role of the statutory bodies or other organs of the State and "perform" their functions. Upon the basis of what we have said above, we answer the question posed in the earlier part of this order, in the negative. The writ petition succeeds and is ordered accordingly.
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1998 (4) TMI 530
Whether the order of detention passed against the first respondent Amritlal Chandmal Jain ("Amritlal") under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short `COFEPOSA') was illegal?
Held that:- When there is challenge to the legality of detention in writ of habeas corpus the challenge is in effect to the legality and validity of the grounds on which the order of detention is made. It is not that to challenge the legality and validity of the grounds on which order of detention is passed the detenu has to file a separate writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari. Once the detenu is released during pendency of his writ petition has become infructuous and that the grounds on which the order of detention become invalid. But then if the Court refuses corpus when detenu is released the detenu on that account cannot be made to suffer holding that he did not successfully challenge his order of detention. That is exactly what has happened in this case.
. This Court did not go into the question of validity of the order of detention but disposed of the matter on account of the fact that detenu had already been released from his detention. We, therefore, cannot say that challenge to the order of detention by Amritlal was unsuccessful and that he or his relatives or his associates were in any way debarred from challenging the order of detention subsequently when notices under SAFEMA were issued to them. Appeal dismissed.
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1998 (4) TMI 529
Whether the High Court correct in quashing the prosecution against the three respondents?
Held that:- From the complaint in question we, however, find that except a baid statement that the respondents were directors of the manufacturers, there is no other allegation to indicate, even prima facie, that they were in-charge of the company and also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Since we are in respectful agreement with the view si expressed we dismiss this appeal and uphold the order of the High Court quashing the prosecution against the three respondents on a different ground.
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1998 (4) TMI 528
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... ... ..... m under instructions of respondents. Respondents have denied having issued any such instruction and have contended that the amount was deposited by applicant as advance tax voluntarily. Since there is no conclusive evidence in favour of the submission of either parties it is not possible for us to hold that the sum of Rs. 50,000 was paid by applicant as a result of coercion. 14.. In the result, the application is allowed in part. The seizure of the books of accounts and other documents on February 21, 1997 made by the Commercial Tax Officer, Salt Lake Charge, from the place of business of applicant at 104, S.K. Deb Road, Calcutta-700 048 is quashed. The seized books of accounts and documents are to be returned to applicant within a period of 48 hours from date. The sum of Rs. 50,000 deposited by the applicant shall be adjusted by the applicant towards future payments of tax. There shall be no order as to costs. J. GUPTA (Judicial Member).-I agree. Application partly allowed.
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1998 (4) TMI 527
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... ... ..... because the same would cause serious injustice to the petitioner and penalise a dealer for no fault of its own. This will bring about a situation where a dealer has to suffer. 4.. Considering the very object and spirit of the Act, the Revenue cannot take any action which is contrary to the provisions of law. As soon as the purchase is made by a registered dealer, the registered dealer is entitled to get a declaration form. 5.. Accordingly, the order of the Tribunal and the Board is set aside. The respondent No. 1 is directed to admit the declaration forms and allow exemption and/or concession after the declaration forms are found to be correct and complete and valid, and such concession and/or exemption should be done within a period of 10 weeks from the date of communication of this order. 6.. The application is thus disposed of without any order as to costs. 7.. All parties are to act on the xerox copy of this dictated order on the usual undertaking. Writ petition allowed.
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1998 (4) TMI 526
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... ... ..... can be excluded from the entry of the widest amplitude embracing all acids . The clear finding recorded by the Appellate Tribunal is that the industrial stearine fatty acid is nothing but acid and that is chemically known as acid. Also the Appellate Tribunal found that the industrial stearine fatty acid is also commercially known as free fatty acid. This is a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, which cannot be disputed under the revision petition. Learned counsel for the revision-petitioner has not successfully shown to us that the industrial stearine fatty acid does not fall within the ambit of acid at all. So long as the industrial stearine fatty acid is commercially and chemically known as acid, that will surely fall within the ambit of the entry 65 of the First Schedule to the Act and that cannot be taxed as unclassified item. For these reasons, the T.R.C. fails and is dismissed. Order of C.M.P. No. 156 of 1997 in T.R.C. No. 2 of 1997 dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1998 (4) TMI 525
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... ... ..... he committed the breach with or without any guilty intention. Our answer to the first question formulated by us above is, therefore in the negatives. 24.. The principles laid down in the latest pronouncement of the apex Court noticed above, would squarely apply on all fours to the case on hand and consequently, we are unable to accept the plea on behalf of the petitioners that the element of mens rea is either always inter-related or an essential condition precedent to the levy of civil penalty in a taxation statute for violating a civil obligation, or that it cannot be dispensed with or excluded from consideration in the matter of levy of civil penalty in a taxation statute. The grievance in this regard, therefore, has no merit whatsoever. 25.. For all the reasons stated above, the writ appeal as also all the writ petitions fails and shall stand dismissed. No costs. All the pending miscellaneous petitions are, consequently, disposed of. Writ appeals and petitions dismissed.
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1998 (4) TMI 524
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... ... ..... that, by mistake and oversight, it is mentioned that it is purchased by the petitioner. But actually the petitioner was acting as a commission agent. That mistake was rectified in the letter dated October, 27, 1986. The original letter written by the petitioner to the company is dated February 17, 1982. Since that date, he has not taken any action to clarify the mistake. The show cause notice was issued on September 5, 1986 and thereafter, the letter dated October 27, 1986 came into existence taking a stand that the assessee is a commission agent. Thus the present letter dated October 27, 1986 is only an after thought, after the notice is served by the revisional authority. The original letter dated February 17, 1982 does not show that the petitioner has acted as a commission agent. Therefore, we do not see any ground to interfere. In view of what is stated above, we do not find any merit in this petition. Accordingly, this revision petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.
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1998 (4) TMI 523
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... ... ..... and nor of concealment of any liability to tax. 9.. In these circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraphs the question is whether the penalty which still remains can be allowed to stand. This question is to be answered in the negative. Once there is no tax liability the question of penalty being imposed did not arise. The very imposition of penalty in these circumstances was bad. Once the tax liability is gone the penalty falls to the ground. But we would like to say that the provisional assessment orders could very well be challenged before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) wherein the question raised before us could be agitated and relief sought. In the present circumstances we do not think it proper to drive the applicant-firm to file the appeals before the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals). 10.. We allow the applications and set aside the demand notices with regard to the penalty amounts. We make no order as to costs. Applications allowed. Reported in 2000 117 STC 96.
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1998 (4) TMI 522
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... ... ..... relief to the petitioner in anticipation of a prospective notification. The interpretations made by the petitioner as to the scope of I.P.R. for relief in respect of its product, i.e. cement, in the manner as highlighted in the writ petitions are not correct. 26.. The prayer for issuance of a writ commanding the State Government to issue notification under section 6 is found to be misconceived and the same is refused. We make it clear that we have not scrutinised the assessment order. We, however, grant leave, to the petitioner to challenge the same so far as its unit is concerned. But the point of promissory estoppel as claimed is ruled out. 27.. Since cement is to be taxed at one point, if the liability is squared up by Larsen and Toubro Ltd., the other dealer Kehar Agencies cannot be asked to make double payment. With these observations and directions the writ petitions are disposed of. There would be no order as to costs. C.R. PAL, J.-I agree. Writ petitions disposed of.
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1998 (4) TMI 521
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... ... ..... deduction on the value of the material transferred or used in the course of works contract, we have held that the rate of tax is 1 per cent or 3 per cent depending upon the nature of the work. If the work is in the nature of canal digging, lining and repairing, the tax deduction shall be at 1 per cent otherwise it shall be at 3 per cent. 4.. It is stated that part of the work relates to earth work excavation. If no earth is brought from outside source, we direct that no tax shall be collected at source. As regards the rate of tax on the value of the materials had in other items of work, in view of the nature of the work, obviously the tax deduction at the rate of 1 per cent is applicable as per clause (ii) of rule 17-G(1). 5.. We, therefore, direct the authorities concerned to act in accordance with the legal position at clarified above while deducting the tax at source. 6. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of at the admission stage. Petition disposed of accordingly.
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