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Showing 1 to 20 of 431 Records
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1998 (6) TMI 592
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... ... ..... s its own share of contributions as required by the Act and the Scheme framed thereunder. Thus, the exercise of dis- cretion by the respondents cannot be held vitiated on the ground that they failed to take into consideration the financial difficulties faced by the employers and such the factors. A careful analysis of the orders passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioners, the extract of which have been reproduced hereinabove, shows that the appellants/petitioners are habitual defaulters. They have, without any rhyme or reason, failed to discharge their statutory duty of depositing the amount in terms of the Act and the Scheme framed thereunder. We find it reasonable to presume that they utilised this money for furtherance of their business interest. Thus, the impugned orders cannot be invalidated on the ground of arbitrariness or non-application of mind. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeals and the writ petitions are dismissed. 31. Appeals/Petition dismissed.
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1998 (6) TMI 591
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... ... ..... ecision taken by the High Courts of Calcutta and Andhra Pradesh referred to above. When on the footing of the days covered by the British calendar month, the period of limitation in the case on hand is calculated, the cheque ought to have been presented in the bank for collection on or before May 16, 1995. But in this case, as pointed above, the cheque had been presented for collection only on May 17, 1995, which is clearly barred by limitation. Therefore, the time barred prosecution cannot be launched as has been specifically provided in Section 138 of the Act. The order of the learned magistrate passed in C. M. P. No. 8609 of 1996 that the date of the cheque must be excluded in calculating the period of limitation is erroneous and it calls for interference by this court. Accordingly, not only the order of the learned magistrate passed in the above C. M. P. is quashed but also the entire proceedings in C. C. No. 582 of 1995 stand quashed. In the result Crl. M. C. is allowed.
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1998 (6) TMI 590
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... ... ..... the detaining authority and what was the reason for not taking up for consideration the representation of the detenu from 21.10.97 till 10.11.97. Though the delay is not long it has remained unexplained. Though the delay by itself is not fatal the delay which remains unexplained becomes unreasonable. In spite of this well-settled legal position the State Government has failed to explain satisfactorily that it had dealt with the representation of the detenu as promptly as possible. It appears that oblivious of the correct legal position and its obligations in matters of preventive detention it has dealt with the representation of the detenu in a routine manner. This indifference of the Government is the cause for rendering the continued detention of the detenu illegal. We, therefore, allow this appeal, quash and set aside the impugned order of detention and direct that the detenu be released forthwith unless his presence in jail is required in connection with some other case.
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1998 (6) TMI 589
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... ... ..... t the accused will be prejudiced in his defence. So, the complaint should not have been taken cognizance of for that reason also. 11. The petitioner will be subjected to extreme harassment if he is constrained to undergo the ordeal of criminal trial based on the allegations contained in Annexure 1. There is not even a remote possibility in the prosecution ending in his conviction. In the circumstances, there is no necessity of directing him to face trial. It is the duty of this Court to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, the complaint cannot be permitted to be proceeded with. Interest of justice also demands quashing of the complaint. I also take note of the fact that the second accused who faced trial has since been acquitted. In the light of what is stated above, the proceedings in C.C. No. 732 of 1996 on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate's Court, Ernakulam as against the petitioner will stand quashed. The Crl. M.C. is allowed as above.
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1998 (6) TMI 588
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... ... ..... who, later assigned his entire rights to the assessee-firm. From these facts, it is amply clear that there was no transfer of the capital asset within the meaning of section 45(1) and, therefore, no capital gains as such will arise liable to tax. 5. On these facts, the finding of the Tribunal that there was transfer of the capital asset is entirely erroneous in law. 6. The view which we have taken is fully fortified by a decision of this Court in CIT v. Mrs. Annamma Alexander 1991 191 ITR 551 in which a Division Bench held that the fact that mesne profits are estimated with reference to the profits which the person in wrongful possession of such property actually received or would have ordinarily received for the purpose of computation or determination of the compensation will not in any way render them as ‘income’ or a revenue receipt. In the result, we answer the aforementioned question in the negative, that is, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue.
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1998 (6) TMI 587
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... ... ..... ccused in Case Nos. 163/S/97 and 203/S/97 in the matter of Orkay Industries Limited are directed to appear before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 9th Court, Bandra, Bombay on Monday, 3rd August 1998. 68. All the accused in Case Nos. 1244/S/97, 1245/S/97, 628/S/97, 1021/S/97, 1020/ S/97, 2076/S/97 and 1689/S/97 in the matter of Atash Industries (India) Limited are directed to appear before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 40th Court, Girgaum, Bombay on Tuesday, 4th August 1998. 69. All the accused in Case Nos. 58/98, 59/98, 60/98, 67/98 and 66/98 in the matter of Orkay Industries Limited are directed to appear before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panvel on Thursday, 6th August 1998. 70. All the accused in Case No. 3177/S/98 in the matter of Atash Industries (India) Limited are directed to appear before Pune Court on Friday, 7th August 1998. 71. The office to send a copy of this order to the concerned Magistrates. 72. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1998 (6) TMI 586
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... ... ..... ases were filed long before the presentation of this petition in December, 1996. There is no explanation as to why the Government chose to wait till December, 1996. 36. Under these circumstances, this reference is liable to be dismissed and should be dismissed for gross and inordinate delay. 37. In view of this, we are not considering the other preliminary objections raised by the respondent. We also record that counsel for both sides desired that whatever our decision on the maintainability may be, we may record our findings on the allegations against him. Counsel for both sides urged before us to inquire into and record a decision on the merits of the case. We do not consider it appropriate to do so when we have decided to dismiss the reference as not maintainable and also in view of certain criminal cases pending against the respondent on the same charges. 38. In view of the aforesaid, this reference is dismissed. We do not, however, propose to make any order as to costs.
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1998 (6) TMI 585
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... ... ..... onversion of raw materials into food in a hotel does not amount to manufacture or processing of goods within the meaning of section 2(7)(c) of the Finance Act, 1979, and, therefore, a hotel is not entitled to concessional rate of tax as specified under clause 2(i)(a) of paragraph E of Schedule I to the Finance Act, 1979. From these authorities, it is amply clear that this court has discussed the question threadbare whether a hotel is an industrial undertaking, engaged in the manufacture or processing of an article, and on both the occasions this court answered the question in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. The questions referred to us are fully covered by these two decisions. Though the said decisions turned upon different provisions of law, in essence they discussed the ingredients of section 32A(2)(b)(iii). Following the same, we answer both the questions in the negative, that is, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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1998 (6) TMI 584
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... ... ..... ore, the legislature itself felt the necessity to prescribe the time-limit for filing the same. Such time-limit was prescribed from 27th September, 1991, by inserting the above words in s. 206. Therefore, it is easy to conclude that since no such time-limit was prescribed for filing Form No. 26C in r. 37, the assessee, who failed to file Form No. 26C before 27th September, 1991, for any financial year relevant to asst. yr. 1989-90, cannot be visited with any penalty since the penalty provisions should be strictly construed and the benefit of any lacuna found should be given to the assessee. Further, I entirely agree that the decisions followed by the learned CIT(A) are quite on the point and sufficiently cover the facts. It is significant that I am the author of the SMC decision published in 26 BCAJ 873 (Bom) (supra). Therefore, I hold that this is a covered matter and there is no substance in the Revenue's appeal. 4. In the result, the Revenue's appeal is dismissed.
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1998 (6) TMI 583
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... ... ..... ny hardship to the respondents, and as such, we hereby order that, the company shall not register the transfer of any shares comprised in the promoters' quota as impugned in the petition and the additional affidavit, till disposal of this petition. This is as against the prayer of the petitioners seeking restraint order on all the shares comprised in the promoters' quota of about 34 lakhs shares. Shri Mathur indicated to us that, the promoters' quota shares impugned in the petition and the additional affidavit work out to only about 10,88,440. Subject to verification of this figure by the parties, our restraint order will cover only these shares. 9. The respondents are yet to file their replies on the additional affidavit filed by the petitioners. The respondents may file their reply to the same by July 15, 1998, and the petitioners will file their rejoinder by August 15, 1998. The petition will be heard on September 14, 15 and 16, 1998, at 2.30 p.m. on each day.
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1998 (6) TMI 582
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... ... ..... ertained from any of the affidavits filed in the proceedings on behalf of the parties seeking stay of proceedings alleging an arbitration agreement covering the subject-matter of the proceedings. 23. By reason of the aforesaid, this application is dismissed as this application has been made long after initiation of the main proceedings under sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act and after having taken a stand on the merits of the main petition. 24. This order also governs the other two applications being C. A. No. 30 and C. A. No. 31 of 1996 seeking same reliefs on the same grounds. Since we have dismissed the application of the respondents for referring the parties to arbitration, the petition will be heard on the merits on November 19 and 20 of 1998, at 10.30 a.m. each day. The respondents are yet to file their replies to the petition, which they may do by September 1, 1998, and rejoinder if any will be filed by October 1, 1998. 25. There will be no orders as to costs.
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1998 (6) TMI 581
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... ... ..... the hearing, in view of the close relation- ship between the parties, we suggested that the disputes should be resolved amicably. Towards this end, the petitioners were prepared to sell their shares to the respondents on a particular price which was not acceptable to the respondent. As a matter of fact, Shri Raghavan argued that the main motive behind the petition was to armtwist the respondents to purchase the shares of the petitioners at a high price which the respondents were not prepared to accede. The respondents were also not prepared for the valuation of the shares by an independent valuer. Under the circumstances, while we do not pass any orders for the respondents to purchase the shares of the petitioners, yet we suggest to the respondents, to avoid any future litigation, to purchase the shares held by the petitioners at a reasonable price taking into consideration the family relationship. 28. With the above suggestion, we dismiss this petition. No order as to cost.
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1998 (6) TMI 580
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... ... ..... use such an abbreviation. (d) As per the suffix, phonetically, the words 'JEX' and 'JASE' are totally dissimilar and are not going to create any confusion in the mind of the users, especially, in this case, when the visual impression of the said two trade names is completely different. (e) In fact, we have compared the two words as a whole with the eyes of the public. We think prima facie that the total sound effect of these two words lacks any similarity. So also, when these words are written down and compared, they do not have any similarity which can deceive the eye of the layman. 57. In view of the above findings, we hold that a case for grant of injunction sought for by the appellant is not made out and the orders under appeals have to be confirmed, as the balance of convenience is only in favour of the defendant. 58. In the result, the appeals are dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Consequently, C.M.P.Nos. 10483 and 10484 of 1997 stand dismissed.
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1998 (6) TMI 579
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... ... ..... event the order is not stayed, the entire business, and activities of the respondent may come to a standstill. He also added that the suit was filed on 4-3-1996 and for the first time, the interim injunction is granted by this order of ours. 104. Per contra, the learned counsel representing the appellant plaintiff submitted that in any case wherever injunction is granted, some inconvenience is caused to the defendant, and that itself may not be a good ground to stay the order granting injunction. 105. We have considered these submissions. 106. Having regard to the fact that the suit was filed on 4-3-1996, there was no interim injunction before the learned single Judge, and for the first time by our order in this appeal we have granted the injunction in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, we think it is just and appropriate to stay the operation of this order/Judgment, for a period of four weeks from today so as to enable the respondent-defendant to seek appropriate remedies.
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1998 (6) TMI 578
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... ... ..... neral body of the creditors. The respondent herein have given sufficient reasons in their petition that they are not doing the transfer with a view to deprive their creditors and they have also filed an affidavit. They have clearly stated the aim that it is done under the restructuring proposals and in business expediency. After giving such an undertaking, there is no reason for the respondent herein to go back from such undertaking. Even if they violate the undertaking, the Courts are here to prevent such violations. Therefore, it is a clear case wherein the action already initiated by the respondent by convening the extraordinary general meeting of the creditors. For these reasons ad interim injunction already granted has to be vacated and the application filed by the respondent herein has to be allowed. In the result, C.A. Nos. 730 and 731/1998 in C.P. No. 380/1997 are dismissed, and C.A. No. 732/1998 in C.P. No. 380/1997 is allowed and in the circumstances without costs.
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1998 (6) TMI 577
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... ... ..... ue as fixed by the transferor, then the question of referring to the company's auditor as per Article 8 would arise. Therefore, when the petitioners entered into an agreement with the respondent for transfer of shares at a price as agreed among themselves, it becomes the fair value as the same has been fixed by the transferor himself as per Article 5. Moreover, we cannot go into the question whether the agreement dated November 16, 1995, became infructuous in Section 111 proceedings which can be agitated only in a civil suit. 15. The cases cited by counsel for the petitioners mostly relate to the mandatory nature of Section 108 which we have already held that in the present case the provisions of this section have been complied with. 16. Thus, in view of the foregoing, the petitioners have not made out a case for rectification of the register of members in relation to the impugned shares and as such these petitions are dismissed. Accordingly, the petitions are dismissed.
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1998 (6) TMI 576
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... ... ..... cused in Case Nos. 163/S/97 and 203/S/97 in the matter of Orkay Industries Limited are directed to appear before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 9th Court, Bandra, Bombay on Monday, 3rd August 1998. 68. All the accused in Case Nos. 1244/S/97, 1245/S/97, 628/S/97, 1021/S/97, 1020/ S/97, 2076/S/97 and 1689/S/97 in the matter of Atash Industries (India) Limited are directed to appear before the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 40th Court, Girgaum, Bombay on Tuesday, 4th August 1998. 69. All the accused in Case Nos. 58/98, 59/98, 60/98, 67/98 and 66/98 in the matter of Orkay Industries Limited are directed to appear before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panvel on Thursday, 6th August 1998. 70. All the accused in Case No. 3177/S/98 in the matter of Atash Industries (India) Limited are directed to appear before Pune Court on Friday, 7th August 1998. 71. The office to send a copy of this order to the concerned Magistrates. 72. Writ petitions dismissed.
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1998 (6) TMI 575
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... ... ..... reported order, Civil Appeal No. 7055 of 1996, dated April 10, 1996--SC). The above observation, in a way, answers the stand taken by Shri Singh. 16. Therefore, we conclude that the principal agreement still subsists and that the supplemental agreement has to be read as a part and parcel of the principal agreement which contains an arbitration clause and that the matter complained of in the petition before us has arisen out of and in connection with the said agreement and that there is nothing to show that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed and that we are statutorily bound to refer the parties to arbitration in terms of Section 45 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 17. Accordingly, we are disposing of this application by referring the parties to the London Court of International Arbitration in accordance with Clause 26.1 of the principal agreement entered into between the parties on October 14, 1996. No order as to costs.
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1998 (6) TMI 574
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... ... ..... s on account of the exporter and merely because of a statement in the contract that the title of the goods will pass only after the goods crossed the customs frontiers will not make the assessees as exporters. Here the export houses have admittedly got the benefit under section 80HHC and there is no dispute that no certificate was issued by the export houses in favour of the assessees. As per the scheme of the Statute, there will be only one exporter in respect of the export and that exporter had already got the benefits. 12. Considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mineral & Metal Trading Corpn.’s case (supra) applies in this case and the assessees are not entitled to the benefit of section 80HHC as the real exporters are the export houses. Therefore, we answer the questions referred to this Court in the negative, that is, against the assessees and in favour of the revenue.
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1998 (6) TMI 573
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... ... ..... stment allowance on car washers, as that cannot be regarded as reasonably necessary for the business that is carried on by the assessee. 10. The language employed in s. 32A(2)(b)(ii) of the Act is such as to require a consideration of the business requirements of the assessee so long as that business of the assessee relates to construction, manufacture or production. The investment allowance, therefore, is not to be confined only to the plant and machinery actually deployed in construction, manufacture or production. The allowance may be claimed in respect of plant and machinery which are reasonably required for the business, though not directly deployed in the construction, manufacture or production. 11. The question referred to us arising out of the assessment of the respondent's income for the asst. yrs. 1981-82 and 1982-83 are, therefore, answered in favour of the assessee, and against the Revenue. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
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